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THE     LIFE 


OF 


JEFFERSON  DAVIS 


Br  FRANK  H.  ALFRIEND, 

Late  Editor  of  The   Southern  Literary  Messenger. 


CINCINNATI  AND  CHICAGO  : 
CAXTON     PUBLISHING     HOUSE. 

PHILADELPHIA,  RICHMOND,  ATLANTA  AND  ST.  LOUIS 

NATIONAL  PUBLISHING  CO. 

BALDWYN,  MISS.  :     P.  M.  SAVERY  &  COMPANY. 
SAN  FRANCISCO,  CAL. :    J.  LAWS  &  CO. 

1868. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1867,  by 
FRANK  H.  ALFRIEND, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States,  for  the 
District  of  Virginia. 


PREFACE. 


IN  offering  this  volume  to  the  public,  the  occasion  is  embraced  to  avow, 
with  unfeigned  candor,  a  painful  sense  of  the  inadequate  manner  in  which 
the  design  has  been  executed.  Emboldened  rather  by  his  own  earnest 
convictions,  than  by  confidence  in  his  capacity,  the  author  has  undertaken 
to  contribute  to  American  History,  an  extended  narration  of  the  more 
prominent  incidents  in  the  life  of  JEFFERSON  DAVIS.  Whatever  may  be 
the  decision  of  the  reader  upon  the  merits  of  the  performance,  the  author 
has  the  satisfaction  arising  from  a  conscientious  endeavor  to  subserve  the 
ends  of  truth.  In  pursuit  of  the  purpose  to  write  facts  only,  to  the  aid  of 
familiar  acquaintance  with  many  of  the  topics  discussed,  and  to  informa 
tion  derived  from  the  most  accurate  sources,  has  been  brought  laborious 
investigation  of  numerous  interesting  papers,  which  his  avocation  made 
accessible.  It  is  therefore  claimed  that  no  statement  is  to  be  found  in 
this  volume,  which  is  not  generally  conceded  to  be  true,  or  which  is  not  a 
conclusion  amply  justified  by  indisputable  evidence. 

Nor  is  it  to  be  fairly  alleged  that  the  work  exhibits  undue  sectional  bias. 
As  a  Southern  man,  who,  in  common  with  his  countrymen  of  the  South, 
was  taught  to  believe  the  principles  underlying  the  movement  for  Southern 
independence,  the  only  possible  basis  of  Republicanism,  the  author  has 
regarded,  as  a  worthy  incentive,  the  desire  to  vindicate,  as  best  he  might, 
the  motives  and  conduct  of  the  South  and  its  late  leader. 

Disclaiming  the  purpose  of  promoting  sectional  bitterness,  or  of  a  whole 
sale  indictment  of  the  Northern  people,  he  deems  it  needless  to  dwell  upon 
the  obvious  propriety  of  discrimination.  Holding  in  utter  abhorrence 
the  authors  of  those  outrages,  wanton  barbarities  and  petty  persecutions, 

(iii) 

o  n  n 


IV  PREFACE. 

of  which  her  people  were  the  victims,  the  South  yet  feels  the  respect  of 
an  honorable  enemy  for  those  distinguished  soldiers,  Buell,  Hancock, 
McClellan  and  others,  who  served  efficiently  the  cause  in  which  they  were 
employed,  and  still  illustrated  the  practices  of  Christian  warfare.  To  fitly 
characterize  the  remorseless  faction  in  antagonism  to  the  sentiments  of 
these  honorable  men,  it  is  only  necessary  to  recall  the  malice  which  assails 
a  "lost  cause"  with  every  form  of  detraction,  and  aspires  to  crown  a  tri 
umph  of  arms  with  the  degradation  and  despair  of  a  conquered  people. 

In  his  especial  solicitude  for  a  favorable  appreciation  of  his  efforts,  by 
his  Southern  countrymen,  the  author  has  striven  to  avoid  affront  to  those 
considerations  of  delicacy  which  yet  affect  many  incidents  of  the  late  war. 
He  has  not  sought  to  revive,  unnecessarily,  questions  upon  which  Southern 
sentiment  was  divided,  and  has  rarely  assailed  the  motives  or  capacity  of 
individuals  in  recognized  antagonism  to  the  policy  of  President  Davis. 
Perhaps  a  different  course  would  have  imparted  interest  to  his  work,  and 
have  more  clearly  established  the  vindication  of  its  subject.  But  besides 
being  wholly  repugnant  to  the  tastes  of  the  author,  it  would  have  been  in 
marked  conflict  with  the  consistent  aim  of  Mr.  Davis'  career,  which  was 
to  heal,  not  to  aggravate,  the  differences  of  the  South. 

A  large  part  of  the  labor,  which  would  otherwise  have  devolved  upon 
this  enterprise,  if  adequately  performed,  had  already  been  supplied  by  the 
writings  of  Professor  Bledsoe.  To  the  profound  erudition  and  philosophi 
cal  genius  of  that  eminent  writer,  as  conspicuously  displayed  in  his  work 
entitled,  "Is  Davis  a  Traitor?"  the  South  may,  with  confidence,  intrust 
its  claims  upon  the  esteem  of  posterity. 

The  author  heartily  acknowledges  the  intelligent  aid,  and  generous  en 
couragement,  which  he  has  received  from  his  publishers. 

fc  JANUARY,  1868. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

(Page  13-19.) 

ATTRACTIONS  OF  THE  LATE  WAR  TO  POSTERITY — MR.  LINCOLN'S  REMARK — DIS 
ADVANTAGES  OP  MR.  DAVIS'  SITUATION — SUCCESS  NOT  SYNONYMOUS  WITH 
MERIT — ORIGIN  OF  THE  INJUSTICE  DONE  MR.  DAVIS — REMARK  OF  MACAU- 
LAY — REMARK  OF  MR.  GLADSTONE — THE  EFFECT  THAT  CONFEDERATE  SUC 
CESS  WOULD  HAVE  HAD  UPON  THE  FAME  OF  MR.  DAVIS — POPULAR  AFFECTION 
FOR  HIM  IN  THE  SOUTH — HIS  VINDICATION  ASSURED. 


CHAPTER  I. 

(Page  20-33.) 
BIRTH — EDUCATION — AT  WEST  POINT — IN  THE  ARMY — RETIREMENT — POLITICAL    ^ ' 

•  TRAINING  IN  AMERICA — MR.  DAVIS  NOT  EDUCATED  FOR  POLITICAL  LIFE  AFTER 
THE  AMERICAN  MODEL — BEGINS  HIS  POLITICAL  CAREER  BY  A  SPEECH  AT  THE«H 
MISSISSIPPI   DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION — A  GLANCE  PROSPECTIVELY  AT  HIS 
FUTURE  PARTY  ASSOCIATIONS — HIS    CONSISTENT  ATTACHMENT  TO   STATES'  > 

\    RIGHTS  PRINCIPLES — A  SKETCH  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  QUESTION  OF  » 

•  STATES'  RIGHTS — MR.  CALHOUN  NOT  THE  AUTHOR  OF  THAT  PRINCIPLE — HIS  ^ 
VINDICATION  FROM  THE  CHARGE  OF  DISUNIONISM — MR.  DAVIS  THE  SUCCESSOR 
OF  MR.  CALHOUN  AS  THE  STATES'  RIGHTS  LEADER. 


CHAPTER   II. 

(Page  34-48.) 

RESULTS  OF  PRESIDENTIAL    ELECTION    IN    1844 — MR.    DAVIS   ELECTED   TO   CON 
GRESS — HIS    FIRST    SESSION — PROMINENT    MEMBERS    OF   THE    HOUSE — DOUG-     3f 
LAS,     HUNTER,     SEDDON,     ETC. — DAVIS*     RAPID     ADVANCEMENT     IN     REPUTA 
TION — RESOLUTIONS   OFFERED   BY    HIM — SPEECHES   ON  THE   OREGON    EXCITE-* 


VI  CONTENTS. 

MEXT,  AND  ON  THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THANKS  TO  GENERAL  TAYLOR  AND  HIS 

ARMY— NATIONAL  SENTIMENTS  EMBODIED  IN  THESE  AND  OTHER  SPEECHES 

A  CONTRAST  IN  THE   MATTER  OF  PATRIOTISM MASSACHUSETTS  AND  MIS 
SISSIPPI  IN   THE  MEXICAN   WAR — DEBATE  WITH  ANDREW  JOHNSON JOHN 

QUINCY  ADAMS'  ESTIMATE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


CHAPTER   III. 

(Page  49-67.) 

THE  NAME  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  INSEPARABLE  FROM  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE 

MEXICAN  WAR HIS  ESSENTIALLY  MILITARY  CHARACTER  AND  TASTES JOINS 

GENERAL  TAYLOR' S  ARMY  ON  THE  RIO  GRANDE,  AS  COLONEL  OF  THE  FAMOUS 
"MISSISSIPPI  RIFLES" — MONTEREY — BUENA  VISTA — GENERAL  TAYLOR'S  AC 
COUNT  OF  DAVIS'  CONDUCT DAVIS*  REPORT  OF  THE  ACTION NOVELTY  AND 

ORIGINALITY    OF    HIS   STRATEGY  AT  BUENA  VISTA INTERESTING   STATEMENT 

OF  HON.  CALEB  GUSHING RETURN  OF  DAVIS  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES TRI 
UMPHANT  RECEPTION  AT  HOME PRESIDENT  POLK  TENDERS  HIM  A  BRIGA 
DIER' S  COMMISSION,  WHICH  HE  DECLINES  ON  PRINCIPLE. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

(Page  68-84.) 
••?• 

MR.  DAVIS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  SENATE,  FIRST  BY  EXECUTIVE  APPOINTMENT, 

*     AND  SUBSEQUENTLY  BY  UNANIMOUS  CHOICE  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE  OF  HIS 

STATE POPULAR  ADMIRATION  NOT  LESS  FOR  HIS  CIVIC  TALENTS  THAN  HIS 

MILITARY   SERVICES FEATURES   OF  HIS  PUBLIC  CAREER — HIS    CHARACTER 

^     AND  CONDUCT  AS  A  SENATOR AS  AN  ORATOR  AND  PARLIAMENTARY  LEADER 

HIS  INTREPIDITY AN  INCIDENT  WITH  HENRY  CLAY DAVIS  THE  LEADER 

OF  THE  STATES'  RIGHTS  PARTY  IN  CONGRESS — THE  AGITATION  OF  1850 — 

^  DAVIS  OPPOSES  THE  COMPROMISE FOLLY  OF  THE  SOUTH  IN  ASSENTING  TO 

THAT  SETTLEMENT DAVIS  NOT  A  DISUNIONIST  IN  1850,  NOR  A  REBEL  IN 

1861 HIS  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 

LOGICAL  ABSURDITY  OF  CLAY'S  POSITION  EXPOSED  BY  DAVIS THE  IDEAL 

UNION  OF  THE  LATTER — WHY  HE  OPPOSED  THE  COMPROMISE — THE  NEW 
MEXICO  BILL — DAVIS'  GROWING  FAME  AT  THIS  PERIOD — HIS  FREQUENT  EN 
COUNTERS  WITH  CLAY,  AND  WARM  FRIENDSHIP  BETWEEN  THEM — SIGNAL 
TRIUMPH  OF  THE  UNION  SENTIMENT,  AND  ACQUIESCENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH. 


CONTENTS.  V-l 

CHAPTER  V. 

(Page  85-97.) 

OPPOSITION  TO  THE  COMPROMISE  IN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  AND  MISSISSIPPI — DAVIS 
A  CANDIDATE  FOR  GOVERNOR — HIS  DEFEAT  REALLY  A  PERSONAL  TRIUMPH — 
IN  RETIREMENT,  SUPPORTS  GENERAL  PIERCE' S  ELECTION DECLINES  AN,  AP 
POINTMENT  IN  PIERCE' s  CABINET,  BUT  SUBSEQUENTLY  ACCEPTS  SECRETARY 
SHIP  OF  WAR REMARKABLE  UNITY  OF  PIERCE' S  ADMINISTRATION,  A^D 

HIGH  CHARACTER  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE — DAVIS  AS  SECRETARY  OF   WAR KAN 
SAS-NEBRASKA  BILL  AND  THE  EXCITEMENT   WHICH    FOLLOWED DAVIS  AGAIN 

ELECTED  TO  THE  SENATE — SPEECHES  AT   PASS  CHRISTIAN  AND  OTHER  POINTS 
WHILE  ON  HIS  WAY    TO  WASHINGTON. 


^CHAPTER  VI.  " 


(Page  98-191.) 

RETURN  OF  MR.  DAVIS  TO  THE  SENATE — OPENING  EVENTS  OF  MR.  BUCHANAN'S 

ADMINISTRATION TRUE  INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  LEGISLATION  OF  1854 

SENATOR  DOUGLAS  THE  INSTRUMENT  OF  DISORGANIZATION  IN  THE  DEMO 
CRATIC  PARTY HIS  ANTECEDENTS  AND  CHARACTER AN  ACCOMPLISHED  DEM 
AGOGUE DAVIS  AND  DOUGLAS  CONTRASTED BOTH  REPRESENTATIVES  OF 

THEIR  RESPECTIVE  SECTIONS — DOUGLAS*  AMBITION — HIS  COUP  D'ETAT,  AND 

ITS  RESULTS THE  KANSAS  QUESTION DOUGLAS  TRIUMPHS  OVER  THE  SOUTH 

AND  THE  UNITY  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  LOST — "  SQUATTER  SOVER* 
EIGNTY" — PROPERLY  CHARACTERIZED  —  DAVIS'  COURSE  IN  THE  KANSAS 

STRUGGLE DEBATE  WITH   SENATOR   FESSENDEN PEN-AND-INK  SKETCH  OF 

MR.  DAVIS  AT  THIS  PERIOD TRUE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  POLITICAL  EVENTS  TO 

THE  SOUTH SHE  RIGHTLY  INTERPRETS  THEM MR.  DAVIS'  COURSE 

QUENT  TO  THE  KANSAS  IMBROGLIO— HIS  DEBATES  WITH  DOUGLAS-*-TWO  DIF 
FERENT  SCHOOLS  OF  PARLIAMENTARY  SPEAKING— *D AVIS  THE  LEADER  OF  THE 

REGULAR  DEMOCRACY  IN  THE  THIRTY-SIXTH  CONGRESS— HIS  RESOLUTIONS 

*HIS  CONSISTENCY-*COURSE  AS  TO  GENERAL  LEGISLATION VISITS  THE  NORTH 

SPEAKS  IN  PORTLAND,  BOSTON,  NEW  YORK,  AND  OTHER  PLACES REPLY  TO 

AN  INVITATION  TO  ATTEND  THE  WEBSTER  BIRTH-DAY  FESTIVAL MR.  SEW- 

ARD'S  ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  THE  "IRREPRESSIBLE  CONFLICT" MR.  DAVIS  BE 
FORE  MISSISSIPPI  DEMOCRATIC  STATE  CONVENTION — PROGRESS  OF  DISUNION 

DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY — SPEECHES  OF  MR.  DAVIS  AT  PORT 
LAND  AND  IN  SENATE. 


NION —  ^ 

-          ^ 


Vlll  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   VII. 

(Page  192-232.) 

ELECTION  OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN — HISTORICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  EVENT — 
THE  OBJECTS  AIMED  AT  BY  HISTORY  AND  BIOGRAPHY  IDENTICAL  IN  THE  DIS 
CUSSION  OF  EVENTS  OF  THE  LATE  WAR — NORTHERN  EVASION  OF  THE  REAL 

QUESTION THE  SOUTH  DID  NOT  ATTEMPT  REVOLUTION SECESSION  A  JUSTI- 

wj  /TRIABLE  RIGHT  EXERCISED  BY  SOVEREIGN  STATES BRIEF  REVIEW  OF  THE 

7  QUESTION WHAT     THE    FEDERALIST     SAYS CHIEF-JUSTICE    MARSHALL MR. 

^"MADISON COERCION  NOT  JUSTIFIED  AT  THE  NORTH  PREVIOUS  TO  THE  LATE 

WAR REMARKS  OF  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN — OF  HORACE 

GREELEY — SUCCESSFUL  PERVERSION  OF  TRUTH  BY  THE  NORTH PROVOCATIONS 

TO  SECESSION  BY  THE  SOUTH AGGRESSIONS  BY  THE  NORTH ITS  PUNIC 

FAITH LOSS  OF  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER PATIENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH 

REMARKS  OF  HON.  C.  C.  CLAY WHAT  THE  ELECTION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN 

MEANT HIS  ADMINISTRATIVE  POLICY REVELATIONS  OF  THE  OBJECTS  OF 

THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY WENDELL  PHILLIPS NO  SECURITY  FOR  THE 

SOUTH  IN  THE  UNION — MEETING  OF  CONGRESS — MR.  DAVIS'  ASSURANCE 

/  TO    PRESIDENT   BUCHANAN CONCILIATORY   COURSE    OF   MR.    DAVIS HIS   CON- 

V  SISTENT  DEVOTION  TO  THE  UNION,  AND  EFFORTS  TO  SAVE  IT FORESEES 

WAR  AS  THE  RESULT  OF  SECESSION,  AND  URGES  THE  EXHAUSTION  OF  EVERY 
/EXPEDIENT  TO  AVERT  IT — THE  CRITTENDEN  AMENDMENT — HOPES  OF  ITS 

^ADOPTION DAVIS  WILLING  TO  ACCEPT  IT  IN  SPITE  OF  ITS  INJUSTICE  TO 

THE  SOUTH REPUBLICAN  SENATORS  DECLINE  ALL  CONCILIATORY  MEASURES 

THE  CLARKE  AMENDMENT WHERE  RESTS  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  DIS 
UNION? STATEMENTS  OF  MESSRS.  DOUGLAS  AND  COX SECESSION  OF  THE 

COTTON  STATES — A  LETTER  FROM  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  TO  R.  B.  RHETT,  JR. 

*v£  MR.  DAVIS'  FAREWELL  TO  THE  SENATE HIS  REASONS  FOR  WITHDRAWING 

.  RETURNS  TO  MISSISSIPPI — MAJOR-GENERAL  OF  STATE  FORCES — ORGANIZATION 

OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT — MR.  DAVIS  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  STATES. 


CHAPTER  VIII.   ' 

(Page  233-265.) 

THE  "CONFEDERACY  ESTABLISHED  AND  IN  OPERATION — CALMNESS  AND  MODERA 
TION  OF  THE  SOUTH THE  MONTGOMERY  CONSTITUTION THE  IMPROVEMENTS 

UPON  THE  FEDERAL   INSTRUMENT — POPULAR  DELIGHT  .AT  THE  SELECTION    OF 
MR.    DAVIS   AS   PRESIDENT — MOTIVES  OF  HIS  ACCEPTANCE — HIS   PREFERENCE 


CONTENTS.  IX 


FOR  THE  ARMY — DAVIS  THE  SYMBOL  OF  SOUTHERN  CHARACTER  AND  HOPES 

ON  HIS  WAY  TO  MONTGOMERY A  CONTRAST INAUGURATION  AND  INAUGURAL 

ADDRESS — THE    CONFEDERATE    CABINET TOOMBS WALKER MEMMINGER 

BENJAMIN MALLORY REAGAN HISTORICAL  POSITION    OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS 

THE    TWO    POWERS EXTREME    DEMOCRACY   OF    THE    NORTH — NOBLE    IDEAL 

OF    REPUBLICANISM    CHERISHED    BY     THE     SOUTH DAVIS'     REPRESENTATIVE 

QUALITIES  AND  DISTINGUISHED  SERVICES THE  HISTORIC  REPRESENTATIVE  OF 

THE  CONFEDERATE  CAUSE EARLY  HISTORY  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONT 
GOMERY CONFIDENCE  IN  PRESIDENT  DAVIS  UNLIMITED PRESIDENT  DAVIS\ 

ADMINISTRATIVE  CAPACITY HIS  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATION THE  CONFED 
ERATE  ARMY — WEST  POINT — NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  SURRENDER  OF  FORTS  SUM-;. 

TER  AND  PICKENS MR.  BUCHANAN'S  PITIABLE   POLICY THE  ISSUE  OF  PEACE 

OR  WAR — PERFIDIOUS  COURSE  OF  THE  LINCOLN  ADMINISTRATION — -MR.  SB- 
WARD*  S  DALLIANCE  WITH  THE  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSIONERS— HIS  DECEP 
TIONS — THE  EXPEDITION  TO  PROVISION  THE  GARRISON  OF  SUMTER — REDUC 
TION  OF  THE  FORT — WAR GUILT  OF  THE  NORTH — ITS  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR 

THE  WAR. 


CHAPTEE    IX. 

(Page  266-293.) 

EVENTS  CONSEQUENT  UPON  THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  FORT  SUMTER — MR.  LINCOLN 
BEGINS  THE  WAR  BY  USURPATION — THE  BORDER  STATES — CONTINUED  DU 
PLICITY  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT VIRGINIA  JOINS  THE  COTTON 

STATES — AFFAIRS  IN   MARYLAND,    MISSOURI,    AND   KENTUCKY — UNPROMISING 

PHASES    OF    THE    SITUATION,    AFFECTING    THE    PROSPECTS    OF    THE    SOUTH 

DIVISIONS  IN  SOUTHERN  SENTIMENT — THE  NORTHERN  DEMOCRACY — PRESI 
DENT  DAVIS'  ANTICIPATIONS  REALIZED HIS  RESPONSE  TO  MR.  LINCOLN'S 

PROCLAMATION  OF  WAR — PUBLIC  ENTHUSIASM  IN  THE  SOUTH — PRESIDENT 
DAVIS'  MESSAGE — VIRGINIA  THE  FLANDERS  OF  THE  WAR — REMOVAL  OF  THE 

CONFEDERATE  CAPITAL    TO  RICHMOND POLICY  OF  THAT  STEP    CONSIDERED 

POPULAR  REGARD  FOR  MR.  DAVIS  IN  VIRGINIA— ACTION  OF  THE  VIRGINIAN 
AUTHORITIES — NORTH  CAROLINA;  HER  NOBLE  CONDUCT,  AND  EFFICIENT  AID 

TO    THE     CONFEDERACY MILITARY    PREPARATIONS     IN    VIRGINIA GENERAL 

LEE — HIS  SERVICES  IN  THE  EARLY  MONTHS  OF  THE  WAR MINOR  ENGAGE 
MENTS — PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  GREAT  STRUGGLE  IN  VIRGINIA — AN  IM 
PORTANT  HISTORICAL  QUESTION CHARGES  AGAINST  MR.  DAVIS  CONSIDERED 

HIS    STATESMAN-LIKE    PREVISION DID    HE    ANTICIPATE    AND    PROVIDE    FOR 

WAR? WHEN  MR.  DAVIS*  RESPONSIBILITY  BEGAN HIS  ENERGETIC  PREPAR 
ATION THE  PREVAILING  SENTIMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY  AS  TO  THE  WAR 

QUOTATIONS  FROM  GENERAL  EARLY  AND  GENEKAL  VON  MOLKTE. 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    X. 

(Page  294-325.) 

CHARACTERISTICS    OF    THE    WAR  IN    1861 — THE    TWO   GOVERNMENTS   MORE   DI 
RECTLY    CONNECTED    WITH     RESULTS    IN    THE    FIELD    THAN    AT    SUBSEQUENT 
•^  PERIODS — MR.     DAVIS'     CONNECTION    WITH     THE    MILITARY    POLICY    OF    THE 

CONFEDERACY THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  ADOPTS,   IN  THE  MAIN,   THE 

DEFENSIVE  POLICY  OF  THE  VIRGINIAN  AUTHORITIES FEDERAL  PREPARATIONS 

GENERAL  SCOTT DEFENSIVE  PLANS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES DISTRIBUTION 

OF   THEIR    FORCES THE    CONFEDERATE    CAMPAIGN    OF    1861    JUSTIFIED DIS 
TRIBUTION  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FORCES PROGRESS  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN — GENERALS 

PATTERSON    AND    JOHNSTON JUNCTION    OF    BEAUREGARD    AND    JOHNSTON 

MANASSAS PRESIDENT    DAVIS    ON    THE    BATTLE-FIELD— HIS    DISPATCH HIS 

RETURN  TO   RICHMOND A  SPEECH  NEVER  PUBLISHED  BEFORE REFLECTIONS 

UPON    THE    RESULTS    OF    MANASSAS — MR.    DAVIS    NOT    RESPONSIBLE    FOR    THE 
ABSENCE    OF    PURSUIT — STONEWALL   JACKSON'S   VIEWS — DAVIS    IN  FAVOR   OF 

PURSUIT    OF    THE    FEDERALS MISREPRESENTATIONS MILITARY   MOVEMENTS 

IN    VARIOUS    QUARTERS — THE     "  TRENT    AFFAIR" — -RESULTS    OF    THE    FIRST 
YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

(Page  326-360.) 

PROSPECTS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1 862 — EXTREME  CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH — 
EXTRAVAGANT   EXPECTATIONS — THE   RICHMOND    EXAMINER  ON  CONFEDERATE 

PROSPECTS WAR  BETWEEN  ENGLAND  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  PREDICTED 

THE   BLOCKADE   TO   BE    RAISED THE    SOUTHERN    CONFEDERACY    DECREED    BY 

HEAVEN RESULT   OF   THE    BOASTFUL    TONE    OF    THE  SOUTHERN    PRESS THE 

CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  NOT  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  DISASTERS  OF  1862 

PRESIDENT  DAVIS  URGES  PREPARATION  FOR  A  LONG  WAR HIS  WISE  OPPOSI 
TION  TO  SHORT  ENLISTMENTS  OF  TROOPS PREMONITIONS  OF  MISFORTUNES 

IN  THE  WEST THE  CONFEDERATE    FORCES  IN  KENTUCKY— GENERAL  ALBERT 

SIDNEY  JOHNSTON HIS  CAREER  BEFORE  THE  WAR CHARACTER APPEAR 
ANCE THE  FRIEND  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS MUTUAL  ESTEEM SIDNEY  JOHN 
STON  IN  KENTUCKY HIS  PLANS HIS  DIFFICULTIES THE  FORCES  OF  GRANT 

AND  BUELL CRUEL  DILEMMA  OF  GENERAL  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON A  REVERSE 

GRANT   CAPTURES    FORTS   HENRY  AND   DONELSON — LOSS   OF    KENTUCKY    AND 

TENNESSEE FEDERAL    DESIGNS    IN    THE    EAST BURNSIDE    CAPTURES    ROAN- 

OKE  ISLAND SERIOUS  NATURE  OF  THESE  REVERSES POPULAR  DISAPPOINT 
MENT — ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  CONFEDERATE  ADMINISTRATION 

CHARACTER  AND  MOTIVES  OF  THIS  OPPOSITION — AN  EFFORT  TO  REVOLUTIONIZE 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  CABINET — ASSAULTS  UPON  SECRETARIES  BENJAMIN  AND 
MALLORY — CORRECT  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  REVERSES — CON 
GRESSIONAL  CENSURE  OF  MR.  BENJAMIN SECRETARY  MALLORY — CHARAC 
TERISTICS  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  MIND THE  PERMANENT  GOVERNMENT SECOND 

INAUGURATION  OF  MR.  DAVIS — SEVERITY  OF  THE  SEASON THE  CEREMONIES 

APPEARANCE  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS — HIS  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS ITS  EFFECT 

POPULAR   RE-ASSURANCE — MESSAGE    TO    CONGRESS — COMMENTS    OF    RICHMOND 


CHAPTER    XII. 

(Page  361-389.) 

POPULAR  DELUSIONS  IN  THE  EARLY  STAGES  OF  THE  WAR — A  FEW  CONFLICTS 

AND  SACRIFICES  NOT  SUFFICIENT MORE  POSITIVE  RECOGNITION  OF  MR.  DAVIS* 

VIEWS HIS  CANDID  AND  PROPHETIC  ANNOUNCEMENTS MILITARY  REFORMS . 

CONSCRIPTION  LAW  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  PRESIDENT'S  VIEWS  AND 

COURSE  AS  TO  THIS  LAW HIS  CONSISTENT  REGARD  FOR  CIVIL  LIBERTY  AND^ 

OPPOSITION   TO  CENTRALIZATION — RECOMMENDS  CONSCRIPTION BENEFICIAL 

RESULTS  OF  THE  LAW GENERAL  LEE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  "  UNDER  THE 

PRESIDENT" — NATURE  OF  THE  APPOINTMENT  —  FALSE  IMPRESSIONS  COK- 
RECTED — MR.  DAVIS'  CONFIDENCE  IN  LEE,  DESPITE  POPULAR  CENSURE  OF  THE 

LATTER CHANGES  IN  THE  CABINET MR.  BENJAMIN'S  MANAGEMENT  OF  THE 

WAR  OFFICE DIFFICULTIES  OF  THAT  POSITION THE  CHARGE  OF  FAVORITISM 

AGAINST  MR.  DAVIS  IN  THE  SELECTION  OF  HIS  CABINET HIS  PERSONAL  RE 
LATIONS  WITH  THE  VARIOUS  MEMBERS  OF  HIS  CABINET — ACTIVITY  IN  MILI 
TARY  OPERATIONS THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI BATTLE  OF  ELK  HORN OPERA 
TIONS  EAST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI GENERALS  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAURE- 

GARD ISLAND  NO.   10 — CONCENTRATION    OF  TROOPS  BY  THE  CONFEDERATE 

AUTHORITIES — FAVORABLE  SITUATION SHILOH A  DISAPPOINTMENT DEATH 

OF  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON TRIBUTE   OF   PRESIDENT   DAVIS POPULAR  VERDICT 

UPON  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH GENERALS  BEAUREGARD,  BRAGG,  AND  POLK 

ON  THE  BATTLE THE  PRESIDENT  AGAIN  CHARGED  WITH  "INJUSTICE"  TO 

BEAUREGARD THE  CHARGE  ANSWERED FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS NAVAL 

BATTLE  IN  HAMPTON  ROADS — NAVAL  SUCCESSES  OF  THE  ENEMY. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

(Page  390-421.) 

THE  "ANACONDA  SYSTEM" — HOW  FAR  IT  WAS  SUCCESSFUL — TERRITORIAL  CON 
FIGURATION   OF  THE  SOUTH   FAVORABLE   TO   THE   ENEMY ONE   THEATRE   OF 

WAR    FAVORABLE  TO  THE  CONFEDERATES THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES — 'THE  POTOMAC  LINES CRITICAL  SITUATION  IN 

VIRGINIA EVACUATION  OF  MANASSAS TRANSFER  OF  OPERATIONS  TO  THE 

PENINSULA — MAGRUDER'S  LINES — EVACUATION  OF  YORKTOWN — STRENGTH 
OF  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  BEFORE  RICHMOND DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  "  VIR 
GINIA " PANIC  IN  RICHMOND — MR.  DAVIS*  CALMNESS  AND  CONFIDENCE 

HE  AVOWS  HIMSELF  "  READY  TO  LEAVE  HIS  BONES  IN  THE  CAPITAL  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY" — REPULSE  OF  THE  GUNBOATS — "MEMENTOES  OF  HEROISM" — 
JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN— A  SERIES  OF  VICTORIES,  WITH  IMPORTANT 

RESULTS BATTLE  OF  "  SEVEN  PINES  " A  FAILURE GENERAL  JOHNSTON 

WOUNDED PRESIDENT  DAVIS  ON  THE  FIELD PRESIDENT  DAVIS  AND  GEN 
ERAL  JOHNSTON AN  ATTEMPT  TO  FORESTALL  THE  DECISION  OF  HISTORY — 

RESULTS  OF  LEE?S  ACCESSION  TO  COMMAND JOHNSTON'S  GENERALSHIP 

MR.  DAVIS'  ESTIMATE  OF  LEE — LEE's  PLANS THE  ADVISORY  RELATION  BE 
TWEEN  DAVIS  AND  LEE THEIR  MUTUAL  CONFIDENCE  NEVER  INTERRUPTED 

CONFEDERATE  STRATEGY  AFTER  M'cLELLAN's  DEFEAT  BEFORE  RICHMOND 

»  MAGICAL  CHANGE  IN  THE  FORTUNES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  INVASION 

OF  MARYLAND ANTIETAM TANGIBLE  PROOFS  OF  CONFEDERATE  SUCCESS 

.  GENERAL  BRAGG — HIS  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN CONFEDERATE  HOPES — BATTLE 

OF  PERRYVILLE BRAGG  RETREATS ESTIMATE  OF  THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN 

OF  1862 — OTHER  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  WESTERN  CAMPAIGN REMOVAL  OF 

M'CLELLAN — A  SOUTHERN  OPINION  OF  M'CLELLAN — BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKS- 
BURG BATTLE  OF  MURFREESBORO' BATTLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE THE  SITUA 
TION  AT  THE  CLOSE  OF  1862 PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  RECOMMENDATIONS  TO 

CONGRESS HIS  VISIT  TO  THE  SOUTH-WEST ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE  MISSISSIPPI 

LEGISLATURE. 


j/-  CHAPTEE   XIV. 

(Page  422-449.) 

RESPECT  OF  MANKIND  FOR  THE  SOUTH — THE  MOST  PROSPEROUS  PERIOD  OF  THE 
WAR-*HOW  MR.  DAVIS  CONTRIBUTED  TO  THE  DISTINCTION  OF  THE  SOUTH — 
FACTION  SILENCED — THE  EUROPEAN  ESTIMATE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS — HOW 
HE  DIGNIFIED  THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  SOUTH — HIS  STATE  PAPERS — HIS  ADMINIS 
TRATION  OF  CIVIL  MATTERS — THE  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  PRESIDENTS 
— MR.  DAVIS'  OBSERVANCE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  RESTRAINTS — ARBITRARY  AD 
MINISTRATION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN — MR.  DAVIS*  MODERATION — HE  SEEKS  TO  CON 
DUCT  THE  WAR  UPON  CIVILIZED  IDEAS — AN  ENGLISH  CHARACTERIZATION  OF 
DAVIS  —  COLONEL  FREEMANTLE*S  INTERVIEW  WITH  HIM — MR.  GLADSTONE'S 
OPINION — THE  PURELY  PERSONAL  AND  SENTIMENTAL  ADMIRATION  OF  EUROPB 
FOR  THE  SOUTH — INCONSISTENT  CONDUCT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  GREAT  POWERS — 
THE  LONDON  "TIMES  "  BEFORE  M'CLELLAN'S  DEFEAT — THE  CONFEDERACY  EN 
TITLED  TO  RECOGNITION  BY  EUROPE — ENGLAND'S  SYMPATHY  WITH  THE  NORTH 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

— DIGNIFIED  ATTITUDE  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS  UPON  THE  SUBJECT  OF  RECOGNI 
TION — HIS  EARLY  PREDICTION  UPON  THE  SUBJECT — FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND 
EXPOSED  TO  INJURIOUS  SUSPICIONS — TERGIVERSATIONS  OF  THE  PALMERSTON 
CABINET — THE  BROAD  FARCE  OF  "BRITISH  NEUTRALITY" — ENGLAND  DE 
CLINES  TO  UNITE  WITH  FRANCE  IN  AN  OFFER  OF  MEDIATION  BETWEEN  THE 
AMERICAN  BELLIGERENTS— ENGLAND'S  "POLICY" — SHE  SOUGHT  THE  RUIN  OF 
BOTH  SECTIONS  OF  AMERICA — CULMINATION  OF  THE  ANTISLAVERY  POLICY  OF 
THE  NORTH — MR.  LINCOLN'S  CONVERSATION  WITH  A  KENTUCKY  MEMBER  OF 
CONGRESS — THE  WAR  A  "  CRIME  "  BY  MR.  LINCOLN'S  OWN  SHOWING — VIOLA 
TION  OF  PLEDGES  AND  ARBITRARY  ACTS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT — THE 

MASK  REMOVED  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM — THE  REAL  PURPOSE  OF 
EMANCIPATION — MR.  DAVIS'  ALLUSION  TO  THE  SUBJECT — INDIGNATION  OF  THE 

SOUTH  AT  THE  MEASURE MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  TEXAS  AND  MISSISSIPPI 

VICKSBURG PORT  HUDSON — LOSS  OF  ARKANSAS  POST — FEDERAL  FLEET  RE 
PULSED  AT  CHARLESTON — PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  CAMPAIGN — UNITY  AND 
CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH — MR.  DAVIS'  ADDRESS  TO  THE  COUNTRY IMPOR 
TANT  EXTRACTS GENERAL  LEE  PREPARES  FOR  BATTLE HIS  CONFIDENCE 

CONDITION  OF  HIS  ARMY — BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE JEFFERSON  DAVIS* 

TRIBUTE  TO  STONEWALL  JACKSON. 


CHAPTEK    XV. 

(Page  450-476.) 

CONFEDERATE  PROSPECTS  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE — THE  MIL 
ITARY    SITUATION PRIMARY   OBJECTS    OF    THE    CONFEDERATES AFFAIRS    IN 

THE  WEST A  BRIEF  CONSIDERATION  OF  SEVERAL  PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  SUG 
GESTED  TO  THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES VISIONARY  STRATEGY AN  OF 
FENSIVE  CAMPAIGN  ADOPTED — THE  INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  JUSTIFIED 

CONDITION    OF    THE    ARMY    OF    NORTHERN    VIRGINIA    AT    THIS    PERIOD THE 

MOVEMENT  FROM  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK LEADING  FEATURES  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERATE  PLAN LEE'S  STRATEGY  AGAIN  ILLUSTRATED GETTYSBURG A  FATAL 

BLOW  TO  THE  SOUTH LEE  RETURNS  TO  VIRGINIA THE  SURRENDER  OF  VICKS 
BURG OTHER  REVERSES EXULTATION  OF  THE  NORTH THE  CONFEDERATE 

ADMINISTRATION  AGAIN  ARRAIGNED  BY  ITS  OPPONENTS THE  CASE  OF  GEN 
ERAL  PEMBERTON POPULAR  INJUSTICE  TO  A  GALLANT  OFFICER A  BRIEF 

REVIEW    OF    THE    SUBJECT PEMBERTON's    APPOINTMENT    RECOMMENDED    BY 

DISTINGUISHED    OFFICERS HIS    ABLE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    MISSISSIPPI HIS 

RESOLUTION    TO    HOLD    VICKSBURG,   AS    THE    GREAT    END  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN 

HIS  GALLANTRY  AND    RESOURCES NOBLE  CONDUCT  OF  THIS    PERSECUTED    OF 

FICER A  FURTHER  STATEMENT THE  MISSION  OF  VICE-PRESIDENT  STEPHENS 

— ITS  OBJECTS — PRESIDENT  DAVIS  SEEKS  TO  ALLEVIATE  THE  SUFFERINGS   OF 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

WAR — MAGNANIMITY  AND  HUMANITY  OF  THE  OFFER — PROTTD  POSITION  IN 
THIS  MATTER  OF  THE  SOUTH  AND  HER  RULER — THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 
DECLINES  INTERCOURSE  WITH  MR.  STEPHENS — EXPLANATION  OF  ITS  MOTIVES 
— CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  MESSRS.  DAVIS  AND  STEPHENS. 


CHAPTER    XVI 

(Page  477^501.) 

OPERATIONS  OF  GENERAL  TAYLOR  IN  LOUISIANA — THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  IR 
RECOVERABLY  LOST  TO  THE  CONFEDERACY — FEDERALS  FOILED  AT  CHARLES 
TON — THE  DIMINISHED  CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH — FINANCIAL  DERANGE 
MENT DEFECTIVE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOUTH MR.  DAVIS*  LIMITED 

CONNECTION  WITH  IT — THE  REASONS  FOR  THE  FINANCIAL  FAILURE  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY — INFLUENCE  OF  SPECULATION — ANOMALOUS  SITUATION  OF  THE 
SOUTH — MR.  DAVIS*  VIEWS  OF  THE  FINANCIAL  POLICY  OF  THE  SOUTH  AT  THE 

BEGINNING   OF  THE   WAR MILITARY    OPERATIONS   IN   TENNESSEE BRAGG 

RETREATS  TO  CHATTANOOGA— MORGAN'S  EXPEDITION — SURRENDER  OF  CUM 
BERLAND  GAP — FEDERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  CHATTANOOGA — BATTLE  OF  CHICKA- 
MAUGA — BRAGG'S  EXPECTATIONS — GRANT'S  OPERATIONS — BRAGG  BADLY  DE 
FEATED — PRESIDENT  DAVIS*  VIEW  OF  THE  DISASTER — GENERAL  BRAGG  RE 
LIEVED  FROM  COMMAND  OF  THE  WESTERN  ARMY — CENSURE  OF  THIS  OFFICER 
— HIS  MERITS  AND  SERVICES — THE  UNJUST  CENSURE  OF  MR.  DAVIS  AND  GEN 
ERAL  BRAGG  FOR  THE  REVERSES  IN  THE  WEST — OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA 
IN  THE  LATTER  PART  OF  1863 — CONDITION  OF  THE  SOUTH  AT  THE  CLOSE  OF 
THE  YEAR — SIGNS  OF  EXHAUSTION — PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  RECOMMENDATIONS — 
PUBLIC  DESPONDENCY — THE  WORK  OF  FACTION — ABUSE  OF  MR.  DAVIS  IN 
CONGRESS — THE  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  HIMSELF  AND  HIS  ASSAILANTS — DEFI 
CIENCY  OF  FOOD — HOW  CAUSED — THE  CONFEDERACY  EVENTUALLY  CONQUERED 
BY  STARVATION. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

(Page  502^532.) 


AN  EFFORT  TO  BLACKEN  THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  SOUTH — THE  PERSECUTION  OF 
MR.  DAVIS  AS  THE  SUBSTITUTE  FOR  THE  ASSUMED  OFFENSES  OF  THE  SOUTH- 
REPUTATION  OF  THE  SOUTH  FOR  HUMANITY TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS  OF 

WAR — EARLY  ACTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  UPON  THE  SUBJECT 
— MR.  DAVIS'  LETTER  TO  MR.  LINCOLN — THE  COBB-WOOL  NEGOTIATIONS — PER 
FIDIOUS  CONDUCT  OF  THE  FEDERAL  AUTHORITIES A  CARTEL  ARRANGED  BY 

GENERALS  DIX  AND  HILL COMMISSIONER  OULD — HIS  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH 

THE   FEDERAL  AGENT   OF  EXCHANGH REPEATED   PERFIDY   OF   THE   FEDERAL 


CONTENTS.  XV 

GOVERNMENT — SUSPENSION  OF  THE  CARTEL  CAUSED  BY  THE  BAD  FAITH  OF 
THE  FEDERAL  ADMINISTRATION,  AND  THE  SUFFERING  WHICH  IT  CAUSED — 
EFFORTS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES  TO  RENEW  THE  OPERATION  OF 
THE  CARTEL — HUMANE  OFFER  OF  COMMISSIONER  OULD — JUSTIFICATION  OF  THE 
CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES — GUILT  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT — MR. 
DAVIS'  STATEMENT  OF  THE  MATTER — COLONEL  OULD's  LETTER  TO  MR.  ELD- 
RIDGE — NORTHERN  STATEMENTS:  GENERAL  BUTLER,  NEW  YORK  TRIBUNE, 
ETC. — THE  CHARGE  OF  CRUELTY  AGAINST  THE  SOUTH — A  CONTRAST  BETWEEN 
ANDERSONVILLE  AND  ELMIRA — IMPOVERISHMENT  OF  THE  SOUTH — DISREPU 
TABLE  MEANS  EMPLOYED  TO  AROUSE  RESENTMENT  OF  THE  NORTH — THE  VIN 
DICATION  OF  THE  SOUTH  AND  OF  MR  DAVIS HIS  STAINLESS  CHARACTER,  HIS 

HUMANITY  AND  FORBEARANCE — AN  INQUIRY  OF  HISTORY. 


CHAPTER   XVIII. 

(Page  533-562.) 

INDICATIONS  OF   POPULAR    FEELING  AT    THE  BEGINNING   OF    1864 — APATHY  AND 

DESPONDENCY  OF   THE  NORTH — IMPROVED  FEELING  IN    THE  CONFEDERACY 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENDURANCE — PREPARATIONS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOV 
ERNMENT — MILITARY  SUCCESS  THE  GREAT"  DESIDERATUM — A  SERIES  OF  SUC 
CESSES — FINNEGAN'S  VICTORY  IN  FLORIDA — SHERMAN'S  EXPEDITION — FOR 
REST'S  VICTORY — THE  RAID  OF  DAHLGREN TAYLOR  DEFEATS  BANKS — 

FORREST'S  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN — HOKE'S  VICTORY — THE  VALUE  OF  THESE 

MINOR  VICTORIES CONCENTRATION  FOR  THE  GREAT  STRUGGLES  IN  VIRGINIA 

AND  GEORGIA — FEDERAL  PREPARATIONS — GENERAL  GRANT — HIS  THEORY  OF 

WAR — HIS  PLANS — THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA — SHERMAN FEEBLE 

RESOURCES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY — THE  "  ON  TO  RICHMOND"  AND  "  ON  TO 
ATLANTA" — GENERAL  GRANT  BAFFLED — HE  NARROWLY  ESCAPES  RUIN — HIS 
OVERLAND  MOVEMENT  A  TOTAL  FAILURE — SHERIDAN  THREATENS  RICHMOND 

— DEATH  OF  STUART BUTLERS  ADVANCE  UPON  RICHMOND THE  CITY  IN 

GREAT  PERIL — BEAUREGARD's  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS —VIEWS  OF  MR.  DAVIS — 
DEFEAT  OF  BUTLER,  AND  HIS  CONFINEMENT  IN  A  "CUL  DE  SAC  " — FAILURE  OF 
GRANT'S  COMBINATIONS — CONSTANTLY  BAFFLED  BY  LEE — TERRIBLE  LOSSES 
OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMY — GRANT  CROSSES  THE  JAMES — HIS  FAILURES  RE 
PEATED — HIS  NEW  COMBINATIONS — EARLY' S  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  VALLEY 
AND  ACROSS  THE  POTOMAC — THE  FEDERAL  COMBINATIONS  AGAIN  BROKEN 

DOWN FAVORABLE  SITUATION  IN  VIRGINIA — THE  MISSION  OF  MESSRS.  CLAY, 

THOMPSON,  AND  HOLCOMBE CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  MR.  LINCOLN — THE  AR 
ROGANT  AND  MOCKING  REPLY  OF  THE  FEDERAL  PRESIDENT. 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    XIX. 

(Page  563-589.) 

DISAPPOINTMENT   AT  RESULTS   OF   THE    GEORGIA   CAMPAIGN — HOW   FAR   IT  WAS 

PARALLEL    WITH    THE    VIRGINIA    CAMPAIGN DIFFERENT    TACTICS    ON    BOTH 

SIDES REMOVAL     OF     GENERAL     JOHNSTON— THE     EXPLANATION     OF     THAT 

STEP A    QUESTION    FOR   MILITARY    JUDGMENT THE   NEGATIVE   VINDICATION 

OF  GENERAL  JOHNSTON DIFFERENT  THEORIES  OF  WAR THE  REAL  PHILOS 
OPHY  .OF  THE  SOUTHERN  FAILURE THE  ODDS  IN  NUMBERS  AND  RESOURCES 

AGAINST  THE  SOUTH WATER  FACILITIES  OF  THE  ENEMY STRATEGIC  DIFFI 
CULTIES  OF  THE  SOUTH THE  BLOCKADE INSIGNIFICANCE  OF  MINOR  QUES 
TIONS JEFFERSON  DAVIS  THE  WASHINGTON  OF  THE  SOUTH GENERAL  JOHN 

B.    HOOD HIS    DISTINGUISHED    CAREER — HOPE    OF    THE    SOUTH    RENEWED 

HOOD'S  OPERATIONS LOSS  OF  ATLANTA IMPORTANT  QUESTIONS PRESIDENT 

DAVIS    IN    GEORGIA PERVERSE    CONDUCT    OF    GOVERNOR   BROWN MR.    DAVIS 

IN  MACON AT  HOOD's    HEAD-QUARTERS HOW  HOOD'S  TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN 

VARIED  FROM  MR.  DAVIS'  INTENTIONS SHERMAN'S  PROMPT  AND  BOLD  CON 
DUCT — HOOD'S  MAGNANIMOUS  ACKNOWLEDGMENT — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  POWER  IN  THE  SOUTH-WEST. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

(Page  590-613.) 

INCIDENTS  ON  THE  LINES  OF  RICHMOND  AND  PETERSBURG  DURING  THE  SUMMER 

AND    AUTUMN CAPTURE    OF    FORT    HARRISON OTHER    DEMONSTRATIONS    BY 

GRANT THE  SITUATION  NEAR  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAPITAL EARLY*  S  VALLEY 

CAMPAIGN POPULAR  CENSURE  OF  EARLY INFLUENCE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAM 
PAIGN    UPON    THE    SITUATION    NEAR    RICHMOND WHAT    THE    AGGREGATE    OF 

CONFEDERATE  DISASTERS  SIGNIFIED DESPONDENCY  OF  THE  SOUTH THE   IN 
JURIOUS  EXAMPLES  OF  PROMINENT  MEN THE  PRESIDENT  AND  GENERAL   LEE 

MR.   DAVIS'   POPULARITY WHY  HE  DID  NOT  FULLY  COMPREHEND    THE    DE 
MORALIZATION  OF  THE  PEOPLE HE  HOPES  FOR  POPULAR  REANIMATION WAS 

THE  CASE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY  HOPELESS  ? VACILLATING  CONDUCT  OF  CON 
GRESS THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS  A  WEAK  BODY MR.  DAVIS*   RELATIONS 

WITH    CONGRESS PROPOSED    CONSCRIPTION  OF    SLAVES — FAVORED    BY    DAVIS 

AND    LEE DEFEATED    BY    CONGRESS LEGISLATION    DIRECTED    AGAINST    THE 

PRESIDENT DAVIS'   OPINION    OF    LEE— RUMORS   OF    PEACE HAMPTON    ROADS 

CONFERENCE THE    FEDERAL    ULTIMATUM THE    ABSURD    CHARGE    AGAINST 

MR.   DAVIS  OF  OBSTRUCTING  NEGOTIATIONS HIS  RECORD  ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF 

PEACE A  RICHMOND  NEWSPAPER    ON    THE    FEDERAL   ULTIMATUM— DELUSIVE 

SIGNS    OF    PUBLIC    SPIRIT NO   ALTERNATIVE    BUT   CONTINUED    RESISTANCE — > 

REPORT  OF  THE  HAMPTON  ROADS  CONFERENCE. 


CONTENTS.  Xvii 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

(Page  614-636.) 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EARLY  PART  OF  1865 — LAST  PHASE  OF  THE  MILI 
TARY  POLICY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  PLAN  TO   CRUSH    SHERMAN CALM 

DEMEANOR   OF    PRESIDENT    DAVIS CHEERFULNESS    OF    GENERAL    LEE THE 

QUESTION  AS   TO  THE   SAFETY  OF   RICHMOND — WEAKNESS   OF  GENERAL  LEE'S 

ARMY PREPARATIONS    TO    EVACUATE     RICHMOND    BEFORE    THE     CAMPAIGN 

OPENED A  NEW  BASIS  OF  HOPE WHAT  WAS  TO  BE  REASONABLY  ANTICI 
PATED THE  CONTRACTED  THEATRE  OF  WAR THE  FATAL  DISASTERS  AT 

PETERSBURG MR.  DAVIS  RECEIVES  THE  INTELLIGENCE  WHILE  IN  CHURCH 

RICHMOND  EVACUATED PRESIDENT  DAVIS  AT  DANVILLE HIS  PROCLAMATION 

— SURRENDER  OF  LEE — DANVILLE  EVACUATED — THE  LAST  OFFICIAL  INTER 
VIEW  OF  MR.  DAVIS  WITH  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD HIS  AR 
RIVAL  AT  CHARLOTTE INCIDENTS  AT  CHARLOTTE REJECTION  OF  THE  SHER 
MAN-JOHNSTON  SETTLEMENT MR.  DAVIS'  INTENTIONS  AFTER  THAT  EVENT 

HIS  MOVEMENTS,  SOUTH  WARD INTERESTING  DETAILS — CAPTURE  OF  MR.  DA 
VIS  AND  HIS  IMPRISONMENT  AT  FORTRESS  MONROE. 


CHAPTEE   XXII. 

(Page  637-645.) 

MOTIVE  OF  MR.  DAVIS'  ARREST — AN  AFTER-THOUGHT  OF  STANTON  AND  THE 
BUREAU  OF  MILITARY  JUSTICE — THE  EMBARRASSMENT  PRODUCED  BY  HIS  CAP 
TURE — THE  INFAMOUS  CHARGES  AGAINST  HIM — WHY  MR.  DAVIS  WAS  TREATED 
WITH  EXCEPTIONAL  CRUELTY — THE  OUTRAGES  AND  INDIGNITIES  OFFERED 
HIM — HIS  PATIENT  AND  HEROIC  ENDURANCE  OF  PERSECUTION — HIS  RELEASE 

FROM   FORTRESS   MONROE — BAILED  BY  THE   FEDERAL  COURT  AT  RICHMOND 

JOY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY — IN  CANADA — RE-APPEARANCE  BEFORE  THE  FEDERAL 
COURT — HIS  TRIAL  AGAIN  POSTPONED — CONCLUSION. 


LIFE    OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS 


INTRODUCTION. 

ATTRACTIONS  OP  THE  LATE  WAR  TO  POSTERITY — MR.  LINCOLN'S  REMARK — DIS 
ADVANTAGES  OP  MR.  DAVIS'  SITUATION — SUCCESS  NOT  SYNONYMOUS  WITH 
MERIT ORIGIN  OP  THE  INJUSTICE  DONE  MR.  DAVIS REMARK  OF  MACAU- 
LAY REMARK  OF  MR.  GLADSTONE THE  EFFECT  THAT  CONFEDERATE  SUC 
CESS  WOULD  HAVE  HAD  UPON  THE  FAME  OF  MR.  DAVIS POPULAR  AFFECTION 

FOR  HIM  IN  THE  SOUTH — HIS  VINDICATION  ASSURED. 

nnO  future  generations  the  period  in  American  history,  of 
-*-  most  absorbing  interest  and  profound  inquiry,  will  be 
that  embracing  the  incipiency,  progress,  and  termination  of 
the  revolution  which  had  its  most  pronounced  phase  in  the 
memorable  war  of  1861.  Historians  rarely  concur  in  their 
estimates  of  the  limits  of  a  revolution,  and  usually  we  find 
quite  as  much  divergence  in  their  views  of  the  scope  of  its 
operations,  as  in  their  speculations  as  to  its  origin  and  causes, 
and  their  statements  of  its  incidents  and  results.  If,  however, 
it  is  difficult  to  assign,  with  minute  accuracy,  the  exact  limits 
and  proper  scope  of  those  grand  trains  of  consecutive  events, 
which  swerve  society  from  the  beaten  track  of  ages,  divert 
nations  from  the  old  path  of  progress  into  what  seems  to  be 

the  direction  of  a  new  destiny,  and  often  transform  the  aspect 

(13) 


INTRODUCTION. 

of  continents,  it  is  comparatively  an  easy  task  to  reach  a  re 
liable  statement  of  their  more  salient  and  conspicuous  inci 
dents.  It  is  in  this  aspect  that  the  Titanic  conflict,  which 
had  its  beginning  with  the  booming  of  the  guns  in  Charleston 
harbor  in  April,  1861,  and  its  crowning  catastrophe  at  Appo- 
mattox  Court-house  in  April,  1865,  will  be  chiefly  attractive 
to  the  future  student.  As  a  point  of  departure  from  the 
hitherto  unbroken  monotony  of  American  history,  the  begin 
ning  of  a  new  order  of  things,  the  extinction  of  important 
elements  of  previous  national  existence,  embracing  much  that 
was  consecrated  in  the  popular  affections;  in  short,  as  a  com 
plete  political  and  social  transformation,  an  abrupt,  but  thor 
ough  perversion  of  the  government  from  its  original  purposes 
and  previous  policy,  this  period  must  take  its  place,  with 
important  suggestions  of  theory  and  illustration,  among  the 
most  impressive  lessons  of  history. 

The  profound  interest  which  shall  center  upon  the  period 
that  we  have  under  consideration,  must  necessarily  subject  to 
a  rigid  investigation  the  lives,  characters,  and  conduct  of  those 
to  whom  were  allotted  conspicuous  parts  in  the  great  drama. 
It  is  both  a  natural  and  reasonable  test  that  the  world  applies 
in  seeking  to  solve,  through  the  qualities  and  capacities  of 
those  who  direct  great  measures  of  governmental  policy,  the 
merits  of  the  movements  themselves.  The  late  President  of 
the  United  States,  Mr.  Lincoln,  avowed  his  inability  to  escape 
the  judgment  of  history,  and  the  bare  statement  sufficiently 
describes  the  inevitable  necessity,  not  only  of  his  own  situa 
tion,  but  of  all  who  bore  a  prominent  part  on  either  side  of 
the  great  controversy. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS  confronts  posterity  burdened  with  the 
disadvantage  of  having  been  the  leader  of  an  unsuccessful 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

political  movement.  "Nothing  succeeds  like  success,"  was 
the  pithy  maxim  of  Talleyrand,  to  whose  astute  observation 
nothing  was  more  obvious  than  the  disposition  of  mankind  to 
make  success  the  touchstone  of  merit.  It  is,  nevertheless,  a 
vulgar  and  often  an  erroneous  criterion.  What  could  be  more 
absurd  than  to  determine  by  such  a  test  the  comparative  valor, 
generalship,  and  military  character  of  the  two  contestants  in 
the  late  war?  Concede  its  applicability,  however,  and  we 
exalt  the  soldiership  of  the  North  above  all  precedent,  and 
consign  the  unequaled  valor  of  the  Southern  soldiery  to  re 
proach,  instead  of  the  deathless  fame  which  shall  survive  them. 
To  such  a  judgment  every  battle-field  of  the  war  gives  em 
phatic  and  indignant  contradiction.  History  abounds  with 
evidence  of  the  influence  of  accident  and  of  extraneous  cir 
cumstances,  in  the  decision  of  results,  which,  if  controlled  by 
the  question  of  merit,  as  understood  by  the  predominant  sense 
of  mankind,  would  have  borne  a  vastly  different  character. 

But,  in  addition  to  the  disparaging  influence. of  the  failure 
of  the  cause  which  he  represented,  Mr.  Davis  has  encountered 
an  unparalleled  degree  of  personal  hate,  partizan  rancor,  of 
malignant  and  gratuitous  misrepresentation,  the  result,  to  a 
great  extent,  of  old  partizan  rivalries  and  jealousies,  engen 
dered  in  former  periods  of  the  history  of  the  Union,  and  also 
of  the  spirit  of  domestic  disaffection  and  agitation  which  inevi 
tably  arises  against  every  administration  of  public  affairs,  espe 
cially  at  times  of  unusual  danger  and  embarrassment.*  The 

*A  pertinent  remark  of  Macaulay  is,  "It  is  the  nature  of  parties  to  re 
tain  their  original  enmities  far  more  firmly  than  their  original  principles. 
During  many  years,  a  generation  of  Whigs,  whoin  Sydney  would  have 
spurned  as  slaves,  continued  to  wage  war  with  a  generation  of  Tories 
whom.  Jeffries  would  have  hanged." 


16  INTEODUCTION. 

almost  fanatical  hatred  of  the  Northern  masses  against  Mr. 
Davis,  as  the  wicked  leader  of  a  causeless  rebellion  against  the 
Government  of  his  country,  as  a  conspirator  against  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  his  fellow-citizens,  and  as  a  relentless  monster, 
who  tortured  and  starved  prisoners  of  war,  springs  from  the 
persistent  calumnies  of  such  leaders  of  Northern  opinion,  as 
have  an  ignoble  purpose  of  vindictive  hatred  to  gratify  by  the 
invention  of  these  atrocious  charges.  Yet  this  feeling  of  the 
North  hardly  exceeds  in  violence,  the  resentment  with  which 
it  was  sought  to  inflame  the  Southern  people  against  him,  at 
critical  stages  of  the  war,  as  an  unworthy  leader,  whose  inca 
pacity,  pragmatism,  nepotism,  and  vanity  were  rushing  them 
into  material  and  political  perdition.  Of  popular  disaffection 
to  the  Confederate  cause,  or  dislike  of  Mr.  Davis,  there  was 
an  insignificantly  small  element,  never  dangerous  in  the  sense 
of  attempted  revolt  against  the  authorities,  but  often  hurtful, 
because  it  constituted  the  basis  of  support  to  such  prominent 
men  as  fancied  their  personal  ambition,  or  amour propre,  offended 
by  the  President.  A  misfortune  of  the  South  was  that  there 
were  not  a  few  such  characters,  and  their  influence  upon  cer 
tain  occasions  was  as  baleful  to  the  public  interests  as  their 
animus  was  malignant  against  Mr.  Davis.  Hoping  to  advance 
themselves  by  misrepresentations  of  him,  during  the  war  they 
persistently  charged  upon  him  every  disaster,  and  do  not  scru 
ple  to  impute  to  his  blame  those  final  failures  so  largely  trace 
able  to  themselves.  A  patriotic  regard  for  the  public  safety 
imposed  silence  upon  Mr.  Davis  while  the  war  continued,  and 
a  magnanimity  which  they  have  neither  deserved  nor  appre 
ciated,  coupled  with  a  proper  sense  of  personal  dignity,  have 
impelled  him  since  to  refrain  from  refutation  of  misstatements 
utterly  scandalous  and  inexcusable. 


INTRODUCTION.  1 7 

The  distinguished  English  statesman,*  who,  during  the  prog 
ress  of  the  late  war,  declared  that  "  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  had 
created  a  nation/7  stated  more  than  the  truth,  though  he  hardly 
exaggerated  the  flattering  estimate  which  the  intelligent  public 
of  Europe  places  upon  the  unsurpassed  ability  and  energy  with 
which  the  limited  resources  of  the  South,  as  compared  with 
those  of  her  enemies,  were,  for  the  most  part,  wielded  by  the 

Confederate  administration.     Nor,  indeed,  would  such  an  esti- 

^ 

mate  have  been  too  extravagant  to  be  entertained  by  his  own 
countrymen,  had  the  South  achieved  her  independence  by  any 
stroke  of  mere  good  fortune,  such  as  repeatedly  favored  her 
adversaries  at  critical  moments  of  the  war,  when,  apparently, 
the  most  trifling  incidents  regulated  the  balance.  More  than 
once  the  South  stood  upon  the  very  threshold  of  the  full  frui 
tion  of  her  aspirations  for  independence  and  nationality.  Had 
Jackson  not  fallen  at  Chancellorsville,  the  Federal  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  the  bulwark  of  the  Union  in  the  Atlantic  States, 
would  have  disappeared  into  history  under  circumstances  far 
different  from  those  which  marked  its  dissolution  two  years 
later.  At  Gettysburg  the  Confederacy  was  truthfully  said  to 
have  been  "within  a  stone's-throw  of  peace.'7  If  at  these 
fateful  moments  the  treacherous  scales  of  fortune  had  not 
strangely  turned,  and  in  the  very  flush  of  triumph,  who  doubts 
that  now  and  hereafter  there  would  have  come  from  South 
ern  hearts,  an  ascription  of  praise  to  Jefferson  Davis,  no  less 
earnest  than  to  his  illustrious  colaborers?  At  all  events,  it 
is  undeniable  that,  as  the  Confederate  arms  prospered,  so  the 
affection  of  the  people  for  Mr.  Davis  was  always  more  en 
thusiastic  and  demonstrative.  Only  in  moments  of  extreme 
public  depression  could  the  malcontents  obtain  even  a  patient 

*Mr.  Gladstone. 
2 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

audience  of  their  assaults  upon  the  chosen  President  of  the 
Confederacy. 

The  people  of  the  late  Confederate  States,  whose  destinies 
Jefferson  Davis  directed  during  four  years,  the  most  moment 
ous  in  their  history,  are  competent  witnesses  as  to  the  fidelity, 
ability,  and  devotion  with  which  he  discharged  the  trust  con 
fided  to  him. 

Their  judgment  is  revealed  in  the  affectionate  confidence 
with  which,  during  their  struggle  for  liberty,  they  upheld  him, 
and  in  the  joyful  acclaim,  which  echoed  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  Rio  Grande  upon  the  announcement  of  his  release  from  his 
vicarious  captivity.  As  he  was  the  chosen  representative  of  - 
the  power,  the  will,  and  the  aspirations  of  a  chivalrous  people, 
so  they  will  prove  themselves  the  jealous  custodians  of  his 
fame.  Be  the  verdict  of  posterity  as  it  may,  they  will  not 
shrink  from  their  share  of  the  odium,  and  will  be  common 
participants  with  him  in  the  award  of  eulogy.  There  is  more 
than  an  unreasoning  presentiment,  something  more  tangible 
than  vague  hope,  in  the  calm  and  cheerful  confidence  with  which 
both  look  forward  to  that  ample  vindication  of  truth  which 
always  follows  candid  and  impartial  inquiry. 

That  time  will  triumphantly  vindicate  Mr.  Davis  is  as  cer 
tain,  as  that  it  will  dispel  the  twilight  mazes  which  yet  obscure 
the  grand  effort  of  patriotism  which  he  directed.  The  rank 
luxuriance  of  prejudice,  asperity,  and  falsehood  must  eventu 
ally  yield  to  the  irresistible  progress  of  reason  and  truth. 
Bribery,  perjury,  every  appliance  which  the  most  subtle  inge 
nuity  of  eager  and  unscrupulous  malice  could  invent,  have 
been  exhausted  in  the  vain  effort  to  make  infamous,  in  the 
sight  of  mankind,  a  noble  cause,  by  imputation  of  personal 
odium  upon  its  most  distinguished  representative.  Day  by 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

day  he  rises  beyond  the  reach  of  calumny,  and  his  character 
expands  into  the  fair  proportions  of  the  grandest  ideals  of 
excellence.  An  adamantine  heroism  of  the  antique  pattern  ; 
purity  exalted  to  an  altitude  beyond  conception  even  of  the 
vulgar  mind;  devotion  which  shrank  from  no  sacrifice  and 
quailed  before  no  peril,  were  qualities  giving  tone  to  the  genius, 
which,  wielding  the  inadequate  means  of  a  feeble  Confederacy, 
for  years,  withstood  the  shock  of  powerful  invasion,  baffled  and 
humiliated  a  nation,  unlimited  in  resources,  and  in  spite  of  dis 
astrous  failure,  lends  unexampled  dignity  to  the  cause  in  which 
it  was  employed. 


20  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 


CHAPTER  I. 

BIRTH — EDUCATION — AT  WEST  POINT — IN  THE  ARMY — RETIREMENT — POLITI 
CAL  TRAINING  IN  AMERICA — MR.  DAVIS  NOT  EDUCATED  FOR  POLITICAL  LIFE 

AFTER  THE  AMERICAN  MODEL BEGINS  HIS  POLITICAL  CAREER  BY  A  SPEECH 

AT  THE  MISSISSIPPI  DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION A  GLANCE  PROSPECTIVELY  AT 

HIS  FUTURE  PARTY  ASSOCIATIONS HIS  CONSISTENT  ATTACHMENT  TO  STATES* 

RIGHTS  PRINCIPLES A  SKETCH  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  QUESTION  OP 

STATES'  RIGHTS — MR.  CALHOUN  NOT  THE  AUTHOR  OF  THAT  PRINCIPLE — HIS 
VINDICATION  FROM  THE  CHARGE  OF  DISUNIONISM — MR.  DAVIS  THE  SUCCESSOR 
OF  MR.  CALHOUN  AS  THE  STATES*  RIGHTS  LEADER. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS  was  born  on  the  third  day  of  June, 
1808,  in  that  portion  of  Christian  County,  Kentucky, 
which,  by  subsequent  act  of  the  Legislature,  was  made  Todd 
County.  His  father,  Samuel  Davis,  a  planter,  during  the  Rev 
olutionary  war  served  as  an  officer  in  the  mounted  force  of 
Georgia,  an  organization  of  local  troops.  Subsequently  to  the 
Revolution  Samuel  Davis  removed  to  Kentucky,  and  continued 
to  reside  in  that  state  until  a  few  years  after  the  birth  of  his 
son  JEFFERSON,  when  he  removed  with  his  family  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Woodville,  Wilkinson  County,  in  the  then 
territory  of  Mississippi.  At  the  period  of  his  father's  removal 
to  Mississippi,  Jefferson  was  a  child  of  tender  years.  After 
having  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  a  partial  academic  training  at 
home,  he  was  sent,  at  an  earlier  age  than  is  usual,  to  Transyl 
vania  University,  Kentucky,  where  he  remained  until  he 


WEST   POINT   AND    THE   ARMY.  21 

reached  the  age  of  sixteen.  In  1824  he  was  appointed,  by 
President  Monroe,  a  cadet  at  the  West  Point  Military  Academy. 

Among  his  contemporaries  at  the  academy  were  Robert  E. 
Lee,  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  Leonidas 
Polk,  John  B.  Magruder,  and  others  who  have  since  earned 
distinction.  Ordinary  merit  could  not  have  commanded  in 
such  an  association  of  talent  and  character  the  position  which 
Davis  held  as  a  cadet.  A  fellow-cadet  thus  speaks  of  him : 
"  Jefferson  Davis  was  distinguished  in  the  corps  for  his  manly 
bearing,  his  high-toned  and  lofty  character.  His  figure  was 
very  soldier-like  and  rather  robust ;  hi3  step  springy,  resem 
bling  the  tread  of  an  Indian  '  brave'  on  the  war-path."  He 
graduated  in  June,  1828,  receiving  the  customary  appointment 
of  Brevet  Second  Lieutenant,  which  is  conferred  upon  the 
graduates  of  the  academy.  Assigned  to  the  infantry,  he  served 
with  such  fidelity  in  that  branch  of  the  service,  and  with  such 
especial  distinction  as  a  staff  officer  on  the  North-western  fron 
tier  in  1831-32,  that  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  First 
Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  of  a  new  regiment  of  dragoons  in 
March,  1833. 

About  this  period  the  Indians,  on  various  portions  of  the 
frontier,  stimulated  by  dissatisfaction  with  the  course  of  the 
Government  concerning  certain  claims  and  guarantees,  which 
had  been  accorded  them  in  previous  treaties,  were  excessively 
annoying,  and  the  Government  was  forced  to  resort  to  energetic 
military  measures  to  suppress  them.  Lieutenant  Davis  had 
ample  opportunity  for  the  exhibition  of  his  high  soldierly 
qualities,  cool  courage,  and  admirable  self-possession,  in  the 
Black  Hawk  war,  during  which  he  was  frequently  employed 
in  duties  of  an  important  and  dangerous  character.  During 
the  captivity  of  Black  Hawk,  that  famous  Indian  chieftain  and 


22  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

warrior  is  said  to  have  conceived  a  very  strong  attachment  for 
Lieutenant  Davis,  whose  gallantry  and  pleasing  amenities  of 
bearing  greatly  impressed  the  captive  enemy.  After  his  trans 
fer  to  the  dragoons,  Lieutenant  Davis  saw  two  years  of  very 
active  service  in  the  various  expeditions  against  the  Pawnees, 
Camanches,  and  other  Indian  tribes,  and  accompanied  the  first 
expedition  which  successfully  penetrated  the  strongholds  of  the 
savages,  and  conquered  a  peace  by  reducing  them  to  subjection. 

Though  attached  to  the  profession  of  arms,  for  which  he  has 
on  repeated  occasions,  during  his  subsequent  life,  evinced  an 
almost  passionate  fondness  and  a  most  unusual  aptitude,  Lieu 
tenant  Davis  resigned  his  commission  in  June,  1835,  and  re 
turning  to  Mississippi  devoted  his  attention  to  the  cultiva 
tion  of  cotton  and  to  the  assiduous  pursuit  of  letters.  Not 
long  after  his  resignation,  he  had  married  the  daughter  of  Col. 
Zachary  Taylor,  under  whose  eye  he  was  destined,  in  a  few 
years,  to  win  such  immortal  renown  upon  the  fields  of  Mexico. 
Living  upon  his  plantation  in  great  seclusion,  he  devoted  him 
self  with  zeal  and  enthusiasm  to  those  studies  which  were  to  qual 
ify  him  for  the  eminent  position  in  politics  and  statesmanship 
which  he  had  resolved  to  assume.  In  that  retirement  were 
sown  the  seed,  whose  abundant  fruits  were  seen  in  those  splen 
did  specimens  of  senatorial  and  popular  eloquence,  at  once 
models  of  taste  and  exhibitions  of  intellectual  power ;  in  the 
pure,  terse,  and  elegant  English  of  his  matchless  state  papers, 
which  will  forever  be  the  delight  of  scholars  and  the  study  of 
statesmen,  and  in  that  elevated  and  enlightened  statesmanship, 
which  scorning  the  low  ambition  of  demagogues  and  striving 
always  for  the  ends  of  patriotism  and  principle,  illumines,  for 
more  than  a  score  of  years,  the  legislative  history  of  the  Union. 

The  period  of  Mr.  Davis'  retirement  is  embraced  within  the 


RETIREMENT.  23 

interval  of  his  withdrawal  from  the  army,  in  1835,  and  the 
beginning  of  his  active  participation  in  the  local  politics  of 
Mississippi,  in  1843,  a  term  of  eight  years.  The  diligent 
application  with  which  he  was  employed  daring  these  years 
of  seclusion  constituted  a  most  fortunate  preparation  for  the 
distinguished  career  upon  which  he  at  once  entered.  There  is 
not,  in  the  whole  range  of  American  biography,  an  instance 
of  more  thorough  preparation,  of  more  ample  intellectual  dis 
cipline,  and  elaborate  education  for  political  life. 

The  trade  of  politics  is  an  avocation  familiar  to  Americans, 
and  in  the  more  ordinary  maneuvers  of  party  tactics,  in  that 
lower  species  of  political  strategy  which,  in  our  party  vocabu 
lary,  is  aptly  termed  "  wire-pulling,"  our  politicians  may  boast 
an  eminence  in  their  class  not  surpassed  in  the  most  corrupt  ages 
of  the  most  profligate  political  establishments  which  have  ever 
existed.  Statesmanship,  in  that  broad  and  elevated  conception 
which  suggests  the  noblest  models  among  those  who  have 
adorned  and  illustrated  the  science  of  government,  combining 
those  higher  attributes  of  administrative  capacity  which  are 
realized  equally  in  a  pure,  sound,  and  just  polity,  and  in  a 
free,  prosperous,  and  contented  community,  is  a  subject  utterly 
unexplored  by  American  politicians  at  the  outset  of  their 
career,  and  is  comparatively  an  after-thought  with  those  in 
trusted  with  the  most  responsible  duties  of  state. 

The  political  training  of  Mr.  Davis  was  pursued  upon  a 
basis  very  different  from  the  American  model.  It  has  been 
more  akin  to  the  English  method,  under  which  the  faculties 
and  the  tastes  are  first  cultivated,  and  the  mind  qualified  by 
all  the  light  which  theory  and  previous  example  afford  for  the 
practical  labors  which  are  before  it.  The  tastes  and  habits 
formed  during  those  eight  years  of  retirement  have  adhered  to 


24  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

Mr.  Davis  in  his  subsequent  life.  When  not  engrossed  by  the 
absorbing  cares  of  state,  he  has,  with  rare  enthusiasm  and 
satisfaction,  resorted  to  those  refining  pleasures  which  are  ac 
cessible  only  to  intellects  which  have  known  the  elevating  in 
fluences  of  culture. 

Emerging  from  his  seclusion  in  1843,  when  the  initiatory 
measures  of  party  organization  were  in  course  of  preparation 
for  the  gubernatorial  canvass  of  that  year  and  the  Presidential 
campaign  of  the  next,  he  immediately  assumed  a  prominent 
position  among  the  leaders  of  the  Democratic  party  in  Missis 
sippi.  At  this  time,  probably,  no  state  in  the  Union,  of  equal 
population,  excelled  Mississippi  in  the  number  and  distinction 
of  her  brilliant  politicians.  Especially  was  this  true  of  Yicks- 
burg,  and  of  the  general  neighborhood  in  which  Mr.  Davis 
resided.*  The  genius  of  Seargent  S.  Prentiss  was  then  in  its 
meridian  splendor,  and  his  reputation  and  popularity  were 
coextensive  with  the  Union.  Besides  Prentiss  were  Foote, 
Thompson,  Claiborne,  Gholson,  Brown,  and  many  others,  all 
comparatively  young  men,  who  have  since  achieved  professional 
or  political  distinction.  The  appearance  of  Mr.  Davis  was  soon 
recognized  as  the  addition  of  a  star  of  no  unworthy  effulgence 
to  this  brilliant  galaxy. 

The  Democratic  State  Convention,  held  for  the  purpose  of 
organization  for  the  gubernatorial  canvass,  and  for  the  appoint 
ment  of  delegates  to  the  National  Convention,  assembled  at 
Jackson  in  the  summer  of  1843.  From  the  meeting  of  this 
convention,  which  Mr.  Davis  attended  as  a  delegate,  may  be 
dated  the  beginning  of  his  political  life.  In  the  course  of  its 

*Mr.  Davis  has,  since  his  withdrawal  from  the  army  until  the  breaking 
out  of  the  war,  resided  on  his  plantation  in  Warren  County,  a  few  miles 
from  Vicksburg. 


FIRST   SPEECH.  25 

deliberations  he  delivered  his  first  public  address,  which  im 
mediately  attracted  toward  him  much  attention,  and  a  most 
partial  consideration  by  his  party  associates.  The  occasion 
is  interesting  from  this  circumstance,  and  as  indicating  that 
consistent  political  bias  which,  beginning  in  early  manhood, 
constituted  the  controlling  inspiration  of  a  long  career  of  em 
inent  public  service.  The  undoubted  preference  of  the  con 
vention,  as  of  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  masses  of  the 
Southern  Democracy,  was  for  Mr.  Van  Buren,  and  its  entire 
action  in  the  selection  of  delegates,  and  formal  expressions  of 
feeling,  was  in  accordance  with  this  well-ascertained  pref 
erence.  To  a  proposition  instructing  the  delegates  to  the 
National  Convention,  to  support  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Van 
Buren  so  long  as  there  was  a  reasonable  hope  of  his  selection 
by  the  party,  Mr.  Davis  proposed  an  amendment  instructing 
the  delegates  to  support  Mr.  Calhoun  as  the  second  choice  of 
the  Democracy  of  Mississippi,  in  the  event  of  such  a  contin 
gency  as  should  render  clearly  hopeless  the  choice  of  Mr.  Van 
Buren.  In  response  to  an  inquiry  from  an  acquaintance  if  his  •.  j 
amendment  was  meant  in  good  faith,  and  did  not  contemplate 
detriment  to  the  interests  of  Mr.  Van  Buren,  Mr.  Davis  rose  and 
addressed  the  convention  in  explanation  of  his  purpose,  and  in 
terms  of  such  earnest  and  appropriate  eulogy  of  Mr.  Calhoun  and 
his  principles  as  to  elicit  the  most  enthusiastic  commendation. 

So  favorable  was  the  impression  which  Mr.  Davis  made 
upon  his  party,  and  so  rapid  his  progress  as  a  popular  speaker, 
that  in  the  Presidential  campaign  of  1844,  the  Democracy  con-  / 
ferred  upon  him  the  distinction  of  a  place  upon  its  electoral 
ticket.  In  this  canvass  he  acquired  great  reputation,  and  estab 
lished  himself  immovably  in  the  confidence  and  admiration  of 
the  people  of  Mississippi. 


26  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

This  seems  an  appropriate  point  from  which  to  glance  pros- 
pectively  at  the  political  principles  and  party  associations  of 
Mr.  Davis  in  his  after  career.  Until  its  virtual  dissolution  at 
Charleston,  in  I860,  he  was  an  earnest  and  consistent  member 
of  the  Democratic  party.  To  those  who  are  familiar  with  the 
party  nomenclature  of  the  country,  no  inconsistency  with  this 
assertion  will  appear  involved  in  the  statement,  that  he  has 
also  been  an  ardent  disciple  of  the  doctrine  of  States7  Rights. 
The  Democratic  party  and  the  States'  Rights  party  were  in 
deed  identical,  when  a  profession  of  political  faith  in  this 
country  was  significant  of  something  ennobling  upon  the  score 
of  principle,  something  higher  than  a  mere  aspiration  for  the 
spoils  of  office.  When,  in  subsequent  years,  to  the  large  major 
ity  of  its  leaders,  the  chief  significance  of  a  party  triumph,  con 
sisted  in  its  being  the  occasion  of  a  new  division  of  the  spoils, 
many  of  the  most  eminent  statesmen  of  the  South  became  in 
a  measure  indifferent  to  its  success.  Its  prurient  aspiration 
for  the  rewards  of  place  provoked  the  sarcasm  of  Mr.  Cal- 
houn,  that  it  "  was  held  together  by  the  cohesive  power  of  the 
public  plunder,"  and  the  still  more  caustic  satire  of  John  Ran 
dolph,  of  Roanoke,  that  it  had  "  seven  principles :  five  loaves 
and  two  fishes." 

Nevertheless,  in  its  spirit  thoroughly  national,  catholic  in  all 
its  impulses,  for  many  years  shaping  its  policy  in  harmony 
with  the  protection  of  Southern  institutions,  and  with  few 
features  of  sectionalism  in  its  organization,  it  worthily  com 
manded  the  preference  of  a  large  majority  of  the  Southern 
people.  To  this  organization  Mr.  Davis  adhered  until  the 
inception  of  the  late  conflict,  supporting  its  Presidential  nom 
inations,  in  the  main  favoring  such  public  measures  as  were 
incorporated  in  the  policy  of  the  party,  and  he  was,  for  sev- 


PARTY  ASSOCIATIONS.  27 

eral  years  prior  to  the  war,  by  no  means  the  least  prominent 
of  those  named  in  connection  with  its  choice  for  the  Presi 
dency  in  1860. 

It  is  no  part  of  the  task  which  has  been  undertaken  in  these 
pages  to  sketch  the  mutations  of  political  parties,  or  to  trace 
the  historical  order  and  significance  of  events,  save  in  their 
immediate  and  indispensable  connection  with  our  appropriate 
subject.  So  closely  identified,  however,  has  been  the  public 
life  of  Mr.  Davis  with  the  question  of  States'  Rights,  so  ardent 
has  been  his  profession  of  that  faith,  and  so  able  and  zealous 
was  he  in  its  advocacy  and  practice,  that  his  life  virtually  V 
becomes  an  epitome  of  the  most  important  incidents  in  the 
development  of  this  great  historical  question.  «/His  earliest 
appearance  upon  the  arena  of  politics  was  at  a  period  when  the 
various  issues  which  were  submitted  to  the  arbitrament  of 
arms  in  the  late  war  began  to  assume  a  practical  shape  of  most 
portentous  aspect.  The  address  which  first  challenged  public 
attention,  and  that  extensive  interest  which  has  rarely  been 
withdrawn  since,  was  an  emphatic  indorsement  of  the  political 
philosophy  of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  a  glowing  panegyric  upon  the 
character  and  principles  of  that  immortal  statesman  and  ex 
pounder,  t  Unreservedly  committing  himself,  then,  he  has  stead 
fastly  held  to  the  States'  Rights  creed,  as  the  basis  of  his  po 
litical  faith  and  the  guide  of  his  public  conduct.  ^ 

If  it  be  true  that  the  decision  of  the  sword  only  establishes 
facts,  and  does  not  determine  questions  of  principle,  then  the 
principle  of  States'  Rights  will  be  commemorated  as  something 
more  valuable,  than  as  the  mere  pretext  upon  which  a  few 
agitators  inaugurated  an  unjustifiable  revolt  for  the  overthrow 
of  the  Government  of  the  Union.  Nothing  is  more  likely  than 
that  many  who  recently  rejoiced  at  its  suppression  by  physical 


28  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

force,  may  mourn  its  departure  as  of  that  one  vital  inspiration, 
which  alone  could  have  averted  the  decay  of  the  public  liber 
ties.  Practically  a  "  dead  letter  "  now  in  the  partizan  slang  of 
the  demagogues  who  rule  the  hour,  since  its  prostration  by  mil 
itary  power  in  the  service  of  the  antipodal  principle  of  consoli 
dation,  it  will  live  forever  as  the  motive  and  occasion  of  a 
struggle,  unparalleled  in  its  heroism  and  sacrifices  in  behalf  of 
constitutional  liberty. 

There  is  little  ground  for  wonder  at  the  total  ignorance  and 
persistent  misconception  in  the  mind  of  Europe,  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war,  of  the  motives  and  purposes  of  the 
Confederates  in  seeking  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  when  we 
consider  the  limited  information  and  perverted  views  of  the 
Northern  people  and  politicians  respecting  the  nature  of  the 
Federal  Government  and  the  intentions  of  its  authors.  Nat 
urally  enough,  perhaps,  the  North,  seeing  in  the  Union  the 
source  of  its  marvelous  material  prosperity,  and  with  an  astute 
appreciation  of  its  ability,  by  its  rapidly-growing  numerical 
majority,  to  pervert  the  Government  to  any  purpose  of  sec 
tional  aggression  agreeable  to  its  ambition  or  interests,  refused 
to  tolerate,  as  either  rational  or  honest,  any  theory  that  con 
templated  disunion  as  possible  in  any  contingency.  c  In  their 
willful  ignorance  and  misapprehension  most  Northern  orators 
and  writers  denounced  the  doctrines  of  States7  Rights  as  new 
inventions — as  innovations  upon  the  faith  of  the  fathers  of  the 
Republic — and  professed  to  regard  the  most  enlightened  and 
patriotic  statesmen  of  the  South,  the  pupils  and  followers  of 
illustrious  Virginians  and  Carolinians  of  the  Revolutionary 
era,  as  agitators,  conspirators,  and  plotters  of  treason  against 
the  Union.  Upon  the  score  of  antiquity,  States'  Rights  prin 
ciples  have  a  claim  to  respectability — not  for  a  moment  to  be 


STATES'  EIGHTS.  29 

compared  with  the  wretched  devices  of  expediency  or  the 
hybrid  products  of  political  atheism,  to  which  the  brazen 
audacity  and  hypocrisy  of  the  times  apply  the  misnomer  of 
"  principles." 

They  are,  in  fact,  older  than  the  Union,  and  antedate,  not 
only  the  present  Constitution,  but  even  the  famous  Articles 
of  Confederation,  under  which  our  forefathers  fought  through 
the  first  Revolution.  The  Congress  which  adopted  the  Dec 
laration  of  Independence  emphatically  negatived  a  proposition 
looking  to  consolidation,  offered  by  New  Hampshire  on  the 
15th  of  June,  1776,  that  the  Thirteen  Colonies  be  declared 
a  "free  and  independent  State,"  and  expressly  affirmed  their 
separate  sovereignty  by  declaring  them  to  be  "free  and 
independent  States."  The  declaration  of  the  Articles  of  Con 
federation  was  still  more  explicit — that  "each  State  retains 
its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence,  and  every  power, 
jurisdiction,  and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  Confederation 
expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assem 
bled."  The  Convention  of  1787  clearly  designed  the  present 
Constitution  to  be  the  instrument  of  a  closer  association  of 
the  States  than  had  been  effected  by  the  Articles  of  Confed 
eration,  but  the  proof  is  exceedingly  meager  of  any  general 
desire  that  it  should  establish  a  consolidated  nationality. 

At  this  early  period  the  antagonism  of  the  two  schools  of 
American  politics  was  plainly  discernible.  The  conflict  of 
faith  is  easily  indicated.  The  advocates  of  States7  Rights 
regarded  the  Union  as  a  compact  between  the  States — something 
more  than  a  mere  league  formed  for  purposes  of  mutual  safety, 
but  still  a  strictly  voluntary  association  of  Sovereignties,  in 
which  certain  general  powers  were  specifically  delegated  to 
the  Union ;  and  all  others  not  so  delegated  were  reserved  by 


30  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

the  States  in  their  separate  characters.  The  advocates  of  Con 
solidation  considered  the  Union  a  National  Government — in 
other  words,  a  centralized  power — to  which  the  several  States 
occupied  the  relation  of  separate  provinces. 

The  famous  resolutions  of  '98,  adopted  respectively  by  the 
Virginia  and  Kentucky  Legislatures,  were  the  formal  declar 
ations  of  principles  upon  which  the  States'  Rights  party  was 
distinctly  organized  under  Mr.  Jefferson,  whom  it  successfully 
supported  for  the  Presidency  against  the  elder  Adams  at  the 
expiration  of  the  term  of  the  latter.  With  the  progress  of 
time  the  practical  significance  of  these  opposing  principles  be 
came  more  and  more  apparent,  and  their  respective  followers 
strove,  with  constantly-increasing  energy,  to  make  their  party 
creed  paramount  in  the  policy  of  the  Government.  A  major 
ity  of  the  Northern  people  embraced  the  idea  of  a  perpetual 
Union,  whose  authority  was  supreme  over  all  the  States,  and 
regulated  by  the  will  of  a  numerical  majority,  which  majority, 
it  should  be  observed,  they  had  already  secured,  and  were 
yearly  increasing  in  an  enormous  ratio.  The  South,  in  the 
course  of  years,  with  even  more  unanimity,  clung  to  the  idea 
of  State  Sovereignty,  and  the  interpretation  of  the  Govern 
ment  as  one  of  limited  powers,  as  its  shield  and  bulwark 
against  the  Northern  majority  in  the  collision  which  it  was 
foreseen  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  latter  would  eventually 
occasion. 

A  common  and  totally  erroneous  impression  of  the  North 
ern  mind  is  that  John  C.  Calhoun  invented  the  idea  of  State 
Sovereignty  for  selfish  and  unpatriotic  designs,  and  as  the 
pretext  of  a  morbid  hatred  to  the  Union.  That  eminent 
statesman  and  sincere  patriot  never  asserted  any  claim  to  the 
paternity  of  the  faith  which  he  professed.  It  is  true  that, 


MR.    CALHOUN.  31 

in  &  certain  sense,  he  was  the  founder  of  the  States'  Rights 
party  as  it  existed  in  his  day,  and  which  survived  him  to 
make  a  last  unsuccessful  struggle  to  save  first  the  Union, 
and,  failing  in  that,  to  rescue  the  imperiled  liberties  of  the 
South.  During  the  eventful  life  of  Mr.  Calhoun  the  question 
of  the  relative  powers  of  the  Federal  and  State  Governments 
assumed  a  more  practical  bearing  than  before,  and  his  far- 
reaching  sagacity  was  illustrated  in  his  efforts  to  avert  the 
impending  evils  of  consolidation.  \j  He  was  the  authoritative 
exponent  and  revered  leader  of  the  votaries  of  those  princi 
ples  which  he  advocated,  but  did  not  originate  or  invent, 
and  sought  to  apply  as  the  legitimate  and  safe  solution  of 
the  circumstances  by  which  he  was  surrounded. 

Equally  absurd  and  unfounded  with  the  pretense,  asserted  at 
the  North,  of  the  novelty  of  the  idea  of  State  Sovereignty  and 
its  incompatibility  with  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  was  the 
charge  so  persistently  iterated  against  Mr.  Calhoun  and  his 
followers,  of  disunionism;  of  a  restless,  morbid  discontent, 
which  sought  continually  revenge  for  imaginary  wrongs  in  a 
dissolution  of  the  Union.  To  the  contrary  we  have  the  irre 
futable  arguments  of  Mr.  Calhoun  himself  in  favor  of  the 
superior  efficacy  of  the  States'  Rights  interpretation,  as  an 
agency  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union  as  it  was  designed 
to  exist  by  its  authors.  So  far  from  having  an  anarchical  or 
disorganizing  tendency,  he,  on  all  occasions,  maintained  that 
his  theory  was  "  the  only  solid  foundation  of  our  system  and 
the  Union  itself." 

To  this  faith  the  public  life  of  Jefferson  Davis  has  been 
dedicated.  For  more  than  twenty  years  he  sought  to  illustrate 
it  in  the  realization  of  a  splendid  but  barren  vision  of  a  time- 
honored  and  time-strengthened  Union,  consecrated  in  the  com- 


32  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

mon  affections  and  joint  aspirations  of  a  people,  now,  alas ! 
united  only  in  name. 

During  the  period  of  their  public  service  together,  Mr.  Davis 
received  a  large  share  of  the  confidence  and  regard  of  Mr.  Cal- 
houn,  and  when  the  death  of  the  latter  deprived  the  South  of 
the  counsels  of  an  illustrious  public  servant,  Mr.  Davis,  though 
comparatively  a  young  man,  stood  foremost  as  heir  to  the 
mantle  of  the  great  apostle  of  States'  Bights.* 

*  Dr.  Craven  relates  the  following  incident,  which  is  an  impressive 
illustration  of  the  depth  and  intensity  of  Mr.  Davis'  veneration  for  the 
character  of  Mr.  Calhoun : 

"General  Miles  observed,  interrogatively,  that  it  was  reported  that 
John  C.  Calhoun  had  made  much  money  by  speculations,  or  favoring  the 
speculations  of  his  friends,  connected  with  this  work  (the  Rip-Raps,  near 
Fortress  Monroe). 

"  In  a  moment  Mr.  Davis  started  to  his  feet,  betraying  much  indigna 
tion  by  his  excited  manner  and  flushed  cheek.  It  was  a  transfiguration 
of  friendly  emotion.  The  feeble  and  wasted  invalid  and  prisoner,  sud 
denly  forgetting  his  bonds — forgetting  his  debility,  and  ablaze  with  elo 
quent  anger  against  this  injustice  to  the  memory  of  one  he  loved  and 
reverenced.  Mr.  Calhoun,  he  said,  lived  a  whole  atmosphere  above  any 
sordid  or  dishonest  thought — was  of  a  nature  to  which  even  a  mean  act 
was  impossible.  It  was  said  in  every  Northern  paper  that  he  (Mr.  Davis) 
had  carried  with  him  five  millions  in  gold  when  quitting  Richmond — 
money  pilfered  from  the  treasury  of  the  Confederate  States;  and  that 
there  was  just  as  much  truth  in  that  as  in  these  imputations  against 

Calhoun Calhoun  was  a  statesman,  a  philosopher,  in  the  true 

sense  of  tfiat  grossly-abused  term — an  enthusiast  of  perfect  liberty  in 
representative  and  governmental  action." — Prison  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis. 
Library  edition,  pages  206,  207. 


PEESIDENTIAL   CANVASS.  33 


CHAPTER    II. 

RESULTS  OP  PEESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  IN  1844 — MR.  DAVIS  ELECTED  TO  CON 
GRESS — HIS  FIRST  SESSION — PROMINENT  MEMBERS  OF  THE  HOUSE — DOUG 
LAS,  HUNTER,  SEDDON,  ETC. DAVIS'  RAPID  ADVANCEMENT  IN  REPUTA 
TION RESOLUTIONS  OFFERED  BY  HIM SPEECHES  ON  THE  OREGON  EXCITE 
MENT,  AND  ON  THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THANKS  TO  GENERAL  TAYLOR  AND  HIS 

ARMY NATIONAL  SENTIMENTS  EMBODIED  IN  THESE  AND  OTHER  SPEECHES 

A  CONTRAST  IN  THE  MATTER  OF  PATRIOTISM — MASSACHUSETTS  AND  MIS 
SISSIPPI  IN  THE  MEXICAN  WAR — DEBATE  WITH  ANDREW  JOHNSON — JOHN 
QUINCY  ADAMS'  ESTIMATE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


Presidential  canvass  of  1844  was  one  of  the  most 
-*-  memorable  and  exciting  in  the  annals  of  American  pol 
itics.  By  its  results  the  popular  verdict  was  rendered  upon 
vital  questions  involved  in  the  administrative  and  legislative 
policy  of  the  Government.  The  Democratic  party  was  fully 
committed  to  the  annexation  of  Texas,  with  the  prospect  of 
war  with  Mexico  as  an  almost  inevitable  condition  of  the 
acquisition  of  that  immense  territory,  desirable  to  the  Union 
at  large,  but  especially  popular  with  the  South,  for  obvious 
and  sufficient  reasons.  But  apart  from  the  signal  victory 
achieved  by  the  Democracy,  in  favor  of  this  and  other  leading 
measures  of  that  party,  the  election  of  1844  had  an  incidental 
significance,  which  the  country  generally  recognized,  in  its  final 
and  irrevocable  disappointment  of  the  Presidential  aspirations 
of  Henry  Clay.  This  canvass,  too,  has  a  peculiar  historical 
interest  in  the  demonstration  which  it  gave  of  the  real  popular 

3 


34  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

strength  of  the  respective  parties  which  had  so  long  divided 
the  country.  Comparatively  few  temporary  issues,  of  a  char 
acter  to  excite  strong  popular  feeling  respecting  either  party 
or  its  candidates,  were  made,  and  there  was  a  square  and 
obstinate  battle  of  Democracy  against  Whiggery,  of  what 
Governor  Wise  called  the  old-fashioned  "  Thomas-Jefferson- 
Simon-Snyder-red-waistcoat-Democracy,"  against  Henry  Clay 
and  his  "American  System." 

The  canvass  was  remarkable  not  only  for  its  duration  and 
the  ardor  with  which  it  was  conducted,  but  for  its  unsurpassed 
exhibitions  of  "  stump  oratory."  The  best  men  of  both  parties 
were  summoned  to  the  fierce  conflict;  and  many  were  the 
youthful  paladins,  hitherto  unknown  to  fame,  Avho  won  their 
golden  spurs  upon  this  their  first  battle-field.  Mr.  Davis  had 
borne  a  leading  part  in  support  of  Polk  and  Dallas  and  Texas 
annexation  in  Mississippi.  His  services  were  not  of  a  charac 
ter  to  be  forgotten  by  his  party,  nor  did  an  intelligent  and 
appreciative  public  fail  to  discover  in  the  young  man  whose 
eloquence  and  manly  bearing  had  so  enlisted  their  admiration, 
such  abilities  and  acquirements  as  qualified  him  to  represent 
the  honor  of  his  State  in  any  capacity  which  they  might 
intrust  to  his  keeping. 

Of  Mississippi  it  might  have  been  said,  as  of  Virginia,  that 
"  the  sun  of  her  Democracy  knew  no  setting."  If  possible, 
however,  the  State  was  more  closely  than  ever  confirmed  in  her 
Democratic  moorings  by  the  decisive  results  of  the  election  in 
1844.  When  Mr.  Davis  received  the  appropriate  acknowledg 
ment  of  popular  appreciation  in  his  election  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  in  November,  1845,  Mississippi  sent  an  un 
broken  Democratic  delegation  to  Washington.  His  associates 
were  Messrs.  Roberts  and  Jacob  Thompson  (afterward  Secre- 


ELECTED   TO   CONGRESS.  35 

tary  of  the  Interior  under  Mr.  Buchanan)  in  the  House,  and 
Messrs.  Foote  and  Speight  in  the  Senate. 

On  Monday,  December  8,  1845,  Mr.  Davis  was  qualified  as 
a  member  of  the  House  of*  Representatives,  and  from  that  day 
dates  his  eventful  and  brilliant  legislative  career.  The  Twenty- 
ninth  Congress  was  charged  with  some  of  the  gravest  duties  of 
legislation.  The  questions  of  the  tariff,  the  Oregon  excitement, 
during  which  war  with  England  was  so  imminent,  and  the  set 
tlement  of  important  details  pertaining  to  the  Texas  question, 
were  the  absorbing  concerns  which  engaged  its  attention  until 
the  provisions  and  appropriations  necessary  to  the  successful 
prosecution  of  the  Mexican  war  imposed  still  more  serious 
labors.  The  records  of  this  Congress  reveal  many  interesting 
facts  concerning  individuals  who  have  since  figured  promi 
nently  in  the  history  of  the  country.  The  fact  to  which  we 
have  alluded  of  the  unusual  interest  which  had  been  exhib 
ited  in  the  recent  Presidential  contest,  doubtless  had  a  consid 
erable  influence  in  the  choice  of  members  of  Congress  in  the 
various  States,  and  largely  contributed  to  its  elevated  standard 
of  ability. 

The  debates  in  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Congress,  are  unsurpassed  in  ability  and  eloquence  by 
those  of  any  preceding  or  subsequent  session  of  that  body,  and 
upon  its  rolls  are  to  be  found  many  names,  now  national  in  rep 
utation,  which  were  then  but  recently  introduced  to  public  at 
tention.  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  the  most  thoroughly  representa 
tive  American  politician  of  his  time,  uniting  to  a  more  than 
average  proportion  of  the  respectability  of  his  class,  his  full 
share  of  its  vicious  characteristics,  politic,  adroit,  and  ambi 
tious,  was  comparatively  a  new  member,  and,  at  this  time,  in 
the  morning  of  his  reputation.  E.  M.  T.  Hunter,  of  Virginia, 


36  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

a  statesman  of  sound  judgment  and  accurate  information,  who 
based  his  arguments  upon  the  facts,  and  reduced  the  compli 
cated  problems  of  governmental  economy  to  the  conditions  of 
a  mathematical  demonstration,  had  not  yet  been  transferred  to 
the  Senate.  James  A.  Seddon,  the  safe  theorist,  whose  study, 
like  Edmund  Burke's,  was  "  rerum  cognoscere  causas"  the 
acute  dialectician,  who,  in  his  mental  characteristics,  no  less 
than  in  his  principles,  was  so  closely  allied  to  Mr.  Calhoun, 
was,  like  Jefferson  Davis,  for  the  first  time  a  member  of  Con 
gress.  Andrew  Johnson  was  then  a  member  of  the  House  and 
at  the  outset  of  his  remarkable  career ;  and  in  addition  to  these 
were  Brinkerhoff,  Washington  Hunt,  Dromgoole,  George  S. 
Houston,  and  a  score  of  others,  whose  names  recall  interesting 
reminiscences  of  the  day  in  which  they  figured. 

To  a  man  of  ordinary  purpose,  or  doubtful  of  himself,  the 
prospect  of  competition  with  such  men,  at  the  very  outset  of 
his  public  career,  would  not  have  been  encouraging.  But  there 
are  men,  designed  by  nature,  to  rejoice  at,  rather  than  to  shrink 
from  those  arduous  and  hazardous  positions  to  which  their  re 
sponsibilities  summon  them.  An  attribute  of  genius  is  the 
consciousness  of  strength,  and  that  sublime  confidence  in  the 
success  of  its  own  efforts,  which  doubly  assures  victory  in  the 
battle  of  life.  It  was  with  an  assurance  of  triumph,  far  differ 
ent  from  the  harlequin-like  effrontery  which  is  often  witnessed 
in  the  political  arena,  that  Jefferson  Davis  advanced  to  contest 
the  awards  of  intellectual  distinction.  "With  the  activity  and 
vigor  of  the  disciplined  gladiator,  with  the  gaudia  certaminis 
beaming  in  every  feature,  with  the  calm  confidence  of  the 
trained  statesman,  and  yet  with  all  the  radiant  elan  of  a  youth 
ful  knight  contending  for  his  spurs  at  Templestowe,  he  pursued 
his  brief  but  impressive  career  in  the  lower  house  of  Congress. 


KESOLTJTIONS   AND   SPEECHES.  37 

As  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives  Mr.  Davis 
rapidly  and  steadily  won  upon  the  good  opinion  of  his  associ 
ates,  and  the  favorable  estimate  of  him,  entertained  by  his  con 
stituents  and  friends,  was  confirmed  by  his  greatly  advanced 
reputation  at  the  period  of  his  withdrawal  from  Congress  in 
the  ensuing  summer.?  He  became  prominent,  less  by  the  fre 
quency  with  which  he  claimed  the  attention  of  the  House,  than 
by  the  accuracy  of  his  information,  the  substantial  value  of 
his  suggestions  and  the  easy  dignity  of  his  demeanor.  His 
speeches,  though  not  comparable  with  his  senatorial  efforts, 
were  characterized  by  great  perspicuity,  argumentative  force, 
and  propriety  of  taste,  and  frequently  rose  to  the  dignity  of 
true  eloquence.  They,  in  every  instance,  gave  promise  of  that 
rhetorical  finish,  power  of  statement,  unity  of  thought  and 
logical  coherence,  which,  in  subsequent  years,  were  so  appropri 
ately  illustrated  on  other  theaters  of  intellectual  effort.  Mr. 
Davis  participated  prominently  in  the  debates  upon  the  Oregon 
excitement,  Native  Americanism,  and  the  various  other  con 
temporary  topics  of  interest,  which  were  then  before  Con-  • 
gress,  but  was  especially  prominent  in  the  discussion  of  mili 
tary  affairs,  the  interests  and  requirements  of  the  army,  and  the 
measures  devised  for  the  prosecution  of  the  Mexican  war.  Upon 
the  latter  subjects  his  experience  was  of  great  practical  value. 

On  the  19th  of  December,  1845,  he  offered  the  following 
resolutions :  "  Resolved,  That  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs 
be  instructed  to  inquire  into  the  expediency  of  converting  a  por 
tion  of  the  forts  of  the  United  States  into  schools  for  military 
instruction,  on  the  basis  of  substituting  their  present  garrisons 
of  enlisted  men,  by  detachments  furnished  from  each  State  of 
our  Union,  in  the  ratio  of  their  several  representation  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States." 


r 


38  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Committee  on  the  Post-office  and  Post- 
roads  be  required  to  inquire  into  the  expediency  of  establish 
ing  a  direct  daily  mail  route  from  Montgomery,  Alabama,  to 
Jackson,  Mississippi." 

The  occasion  of  these  motions  was  the  first  upon  which  he 
occupied  the  floor  of  the  House. 

On  the  29th  of  December,  Mr.  Davis  spoke  in  a  very  earnest 
and  impressive  manner  upon  Native  Americanism,  which  he 
strongly  opposed,  and  on  subsequent  occasions  addressed  the 
House  in  favor  of  the  bill  to  receive  arms,  barracks,  fortifica 
tions,  and  other  public  property,  the  cession  of  which  to  the 
Federal  Government,  by  Texas,  had  been  provided  to  take 
place  upon  its  admission  to  the  Union ;  in  favor  of  the  prop 
osition  to  raise  additional  regiments  of  riflemen ;  in  opposition 
to  appropriations  for  improvement  of  rivers  and  harbors ;  upon 
the  Oregon  question,  and  in  favor  of  a  resolution  of  thanks  to 
General  Taylor  and  his  army. 

The  extracts  from  his  speech  on  the  Oregon  question,  and 
the  speech  in  favor  of  thanks  to  General  Taylor  and  his  army, 
which  is  here  given  in  full,  are  taken  from  the  reports  of  the 
Congressional  Globe.  The  intelligent  reader  will  appreciate 
their  real  value,  as  to  accuracy,  without  any  suggestion  from  us. 

On  February  6,  1846,  the  House,  having  resolved  itself 
into  Committee  of  the  Whole,  and  having  under  consideration 
the  joint  resolution  of  notice  to  the  British  Government  con 
cerning  the  abrogation  of  the  Convention  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  respecting  the  territory  of  Oregon, 
Mr.  Davis  spoke  at  some  length,  and  in  an  attractive  and 
instructive  style,  upon  the  subject  before  the  House.  A  great 
portion  of  the  speech  consists  of  interesting  historical  details, 
evincing  a  most  accurate  acquaintance  with  the  subject,  and 


SPEECH    UPON    THE    OREGON    QUESTION.  39 

giving  a  clear  and  valuable  analysis  of  facts.  We  have  space 
for  only  brief  extracts,  which  are  sufficient  to  reveal  Mr.  Davis' 
position  upon  this  important  question : 

"  Sir,  why  has  the  South  been  assailed  in  this 

discussion?  Has  it  been  with  the  hope  of  sowing  dissensions 
between  us  and  our  Western  friends?  Thus  far,  I  think,  it 
has  failed.  Why  the  frequent  reference  to  the  conduct  of  the 
South  on  the  Texas  question  ?  Sir,  those  who  have  made  re 
flections  on  the  South  as  having  sustained  Texas  annexation 
from  sectional  views  have  been  of  those  who  opposed  that 
great  measure  and  are  most  eager  for  this.  The  suspicion  is 
but  natural  in  them.  But,  sir,  let  me  tell  them  that  this 
doctrine  of  the  political  balance  between  different  portions  of 
the  Union  is  no  Southern  doctrine.  We,  sir,  advocated  the 
annexation  of  Texas  from  high  national  considerations.  It 
was  not  a  mere  Southern  question ;  it  lay  coterminous  to  the 
Western  States^  and  extended  as  far  north  as  the  forty-sec 
ond  degree  of  latitude.  Nor,  sir,  do  we  wish  to  divide  the 
territory  of  Oregon ;  we  would  preserve  it  all  for  the  exten 
sion  of  our  Union.  We  would  not  arrest  the  onward  prog 
ress  of  our  pioneers;  we  would  not,  as  has  been  done  in  this 
debate,  ask  why  our  citizens  have  left  the  repose  of  civil  gov 
ernment  and  gone  to  Oregon  ?  We  find  in  it  but  that  energy 
which  has  heretofore  been  characteristic  of  our  people,  and 
which  has  developed  much  that  has  illustrated  our  history. 
It  is  the  onward  progress  of  our  people  toward  the  Pacific 
which  alone  can  arrest  their  westward  march,  and  on  the 
banks  of  which,  to  use  the  language  of  our  lamented  Linn, 
the  pioneer  will  sit  down  to  weep  that  there  are  no  more  for 
ests  to  subdue It  is,  as  the  representative  of  a  high- 
spirited  and  patriotic  people,  that  I  am  called  on  to  resist  this 


40  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

war  clamor.  My  constituents  need  no  such  excitements  to 
prepare  their  hearts  for  all  that  patriotism  demands.  When 
ever  the  honor  of  the  country  demands  redress ;  whenever  its 
territory  is  invaded — if,  then,  it  shall  be  sought  to  intimidate 
by  the  fiery  cross  of  St.  George — if,  then,  we  are  threatened 
with  the  unfolding  of  English  banners  if  we  resent  or  resist — 
from  the  gulf  shore  to  the  banks  of  that  great  river,  through 
out  the  length  and  breadth — Mississippi  will  come.  And 
whether  the  question  be  one  of  Northern  or  Southern,  of 
Eastern  or  Western  aggression,  we  will  not  stop  to  count  the 
cost,  but  act  as  becomes  the  descendants  of  those  who,  in  the 
war  of  the  Revolution,  engaged  in  unequal  strife  to  aid  our 

brethren  of  the  North  in  redressing  their  injuries 

We  turn  from  present  hostility  to  former  friendship — from 
recent  defection  to  the  time  when  Massachusetts  and  Virginia, 
the  stronger  brothers  of  our  family,  stood  foremost  and  united 
to  defend  our  common  rights.  From  sire  to  son  has  descended 
the  love  of  our  Union  in  our  hearts,  as  in  our  history  are 
mingled  the  names  of  Concord  and  Camden,  of  Yorktown 
and  Saratoga,  of  Moultrie  and  Plattsburgh,  of  Chippewa  and 
Erie,  of  Bowyer  and  Guildford,  and  New  Orleans  and  Bun 
ker  Hill.  Grouped  together,  they  form  a  monument  to  the 
common  glory  of  our  common  country;  and  where  is  the 
Southern  man  who  would  wish  that  monument  were  less  by 
one  of  the  Northern  names  that  constitute  the  mass?  Who, 
standing  on  the  ground  made  sacred  by  the  blood  of  Warren, 
could  allow  sectional  feeling  to  curb  his  enthusiasm,  as  he 
looked  upon  that  obelisk  which  rises  a  monument  to  free 
dom's  and  his  country's  triumph,  and  stands  a  type  of  the 
time,  the  men  and  event  that  it  commemorates;  built  of  ma 
terial  that  mocks  the  waves  of  time,  without  niche  or  mold- 


SPEECH    IN    FAVOR   OF   THANKS   TO   THE   ARMY.          41 

ing  for  parasite  or  creeping  thing  to  rest  on,  and  pointing 
like  a  finger  to  the  sky,  to  raise  man's  thoughts  to  philan 
thropic  and  noble  deeds." 

It  is  well  known  that,  upon  this  subject,  there  was  consid 
erable  division  among  the  Democracy.  The  effort  to  commit 
the  party,  as  a  unit,  to  a  position  which  would  have  inevita 
bly  produced  war  with  England  signally  failed.  The  country 
had  not  then  reached  its  present  pitch  of  arrogant  inflation, 
which  emboldens  it  to  seek  opportunity  for  exhibition  in  the 
vainglorious  role  of  braggadocio.  Mr.  Davis,  upon  this  and 
other  occasions,  significantly  rebuked  the  demagogical  clamor 
which  would  have  precipitated  the  country  into  a  calamitous 
war.  His  reply,  on  the  17th  of  April,  1846,  to  Stephen  A. 
Douglas,  who  was  among  the  leading  instigators  of  the  war- 
feeling  in  the  House,  is  exceedingly  forcible  and  spirited. 

The  following  speech  in  favor  of  the  resolution  of  thanks 
to  General  Taylor,  the  officers  and  men  of  his  army,  for  their 
recent  successes  on  the  Rio  Grande,  was  delivered  May  28, 
1846: 

"As  a  friend  to  the  army,  he  rejoiced  at  the  evidence,  now 
afforded,  of  a  disposition  in  this  House  to  deal  justly,  to  feel 
generously  toward  those  to  whom  the  honor  of  our  flag  has 
been  intrusted.  Too  often  and  too  long  had  we  listened  to 
harsh  and  invidious  reflections  upon  our  gallant  little  army 
and  the  accomplished  officers  who  command  it.  A  partial 
opportunity  had  been  offered  to  exhibit  their  soldierly  quali 
ties  in  their  true  light,  and  he  trusted  these  aspersions  were 
hushed — hushed  now  forever.  As  an  American,  whose  heart 
promptly  responds  to  all  which  illustrates  our  national  char 
acter,  and  adds  new  glory  to  our  national  name,  he  rejoiced 
with  exceeding  joy  at  the  recent  triumph  of  our  arms.  Yet 


42  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

it  is  no  more  than  he  expected  from  the  gallant  soldiers  who 
hold  our  post  upon  the  Rio  Grande — no  more  than,  when  oc 
casion  offers,  they  will  achieve  again.  It  was  the  triumph  of 
American  courage,  professional  skill,  and  that  patriotic  pride 
which  blooms  in  the  breast  of  our  educated  soldier,  and  which 
droops  not  under  the  withering  scoff  of  political  revilers. 

"  These  men  will  feel,  deeply  feel,  the  expression  of  your 
gratitude.  It  will  nerve  their  hearts  in  the  hour  of  future 
conflicts,  to  know  that  their  country  honors  and  acknowledges 
their  devotion.  It  will  shed  a  solace  on  the  dying  moments 
of  those  who  fall,  to  be  assured  their  country  mourns  their  loss. 
This  is  the  meed  for  which  the  soldier  bleeds  and  dies.  This 
he  will  remember  long  after  the  paltry  pittance  of  one  month's 
extra  pay  has  been  forgotten. 

"  Beyond  this  expression  of  the  nation's  thanks,  he  liked 
the  principle  of  the  proposition  offered  by  the  gentleman  from 
South  Carolina.  We  have  a  pension  system  providing  for  the 
disabled  soldier,  but  he  seeks  well  and  wisely  to  extend  it  to 
all  who  may  be  wounded,  however  slightly.  It  is  a  reward 
offered  to  those  who  seek  for  danger,  who  first  and  foremost 
plunge  into  the  fight.  It  has  been  this  incentive,  extended  so 
as  to  cover  all  feats  of  gallantry,  that  has  so  often  crowned  the 
British  arms  with  victory,  and  caused  their  prowess  to  be  rec 
ognized  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe.  It  was  the  sure  and 
high  reward  of  gallantry,  the  confident  reliance  upon  their 
nation's  gratitude,  which  led  Napoleon's  armies  over  Europe, 
conquering  and  to  conquer ;  and  it  was  these  influences  which, 
in  an  earlier  time,  rendered  the  Roman  arms  invincible,  and 
brought  their  eagle  back  victorious  from  every  land  on  which 
it  gazed.  Sir,  let  not  that  parsimony  (for  he  did  not  deem  it 
economy)  prevent  us  from  adopting  a  system  which  in  war 


SPEECH   IN    FAVOR   OF   THANKS   TO   THE   ARMY.          43 

will  add  so  much  to  the  efficiency  of  troops.  Instead  of  seek 
ing  to  fill  the  ranks  of  your  army  by  increased  pay,  let  the 
soldier  feel  that  a  liberal  pension  will  relieve  him  from  the 
fear  of  want  in  the  event  of  disability,  provide  for  his  family 
in  the  event  of  death,  and  that  he  wins  his  way  to  gratitude 
and  the  reward  of  his  countrymen  by  periling  all  for  honor  in 
the  field. 

"The  achievement  which  we  now  propose  to  honor  richly 
deserves  it.  Seldom,  sir,  in  the  annals  of  military  history  has 
there  been  one  in  which  desperate  daring  and  military  skill 
were  more  happily  combined.  The  enemy  selected  his  own 
ground,  and  united  to  the  advantage  of  a  strong  position  a 
numerical  majority  of  three  to  one.  Driven  from  his  first  po 
sition  by  an  attack  in  which  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  profes 
sional  skill  or  manly  courage  is  to  be  more  admired,  he  retired 
and  posted  his  artillery  on  a  narrow  defile,  to  sweep  the 
ground  over  which  our  troops  were  compelled  to  pass.  There, 
posted  in  strength  three  times  greater  than  our  own,  they 
waited  the  approach  of  our  gallant  little  army. 

"General  Taylor  knew  the  danger  and  destitution  of  the 
band  he  left  to  hold  his  camp  opposite  Matamoras,  and  he 
paused  for  no  regular  approaches,  but  opened  his  field  artil 
lery,  and  dashed  with  sword  and  bayonet  on  the  foe.  A  single 
charge  left  him  master  of  their  battery,  and  the  number  of 
slain  attests  the  skill  and  discipline  of  his  army.  Mr.  D. 
referred  to  a  gentleman  who,  a  short  time  since,  expressed 
extreme  distrust  in  our  army,  and  poured  out  the  vials  of  his 
denunciation  upon  the  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 
He  hoped  now  the  gentleman  will  withdraw  these  denuncia 
tions;  that  now  he  will  learn  the  value  of  military  science; 
that  he  will  see,  in  the  location,  the  construction,  the  defenses 


44  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

V 

of  the  bastioned  field-works  opposite  Matamoras,  the  utility, 
the  necessity  of  a  military  education.  Let  him  compare  the 
few  men  who  held  that  with  the  army  who  assailed  it ;  let  him 
mark  the  comparative  safety  with  which  they  stood  within  that 
temporary  work ;  let  him  consider  why  the  guns  along  its  ram 
parts  were  preserved,  whilst  they  silenced  the  batteries  of  the 
enemy ;  why  that  intrenchment  stands  unharmed  by  Mexican 
shot,  whilst  its  guns  have  crumbled  the  stone  walls  in  Mata- 
moras  to  the  ground,  and  then  say  whether  he  believes  a 
blacksmith  or  a  tailor  could  have  secured  the  same  results. 
He  trusted  the  gentleman  would  be  convinced  that  arms,  like 
every  occupation,  requires  to  be  studied  before  it  can  be  un 
derstood;  and  from  these  things  to  which  he  had  called  his 
attention,  he  will  learn  the  power  and  advantage  of  military 

science.     He  would  make  but  one  other  allusion  to  the  re- 

« 

marks  of  the  gentleman  he  had  noticed,  who  said  nine-tenths 
of  the  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy  abandoned  the  serv 
ice  of  the  United  States.  If  he  would  take  the  trouble  to  ex 
amine  the  records  upon  this  point,  he  doubted  not  he  would 
be  surprised  at  the  extent  of  his  mistake.  There  he  would 
learn  that  a  majority  of  all  the  graduates  are  still  in  service; 
and  if  he  would  push  his  inquiry  a  little  further,  he  would 
find  that  a  large  mnjority  of  the  commissioned  officers  who 
bled  in  the  action  of  the  the  8th  and  9th  were  graduates  of 
that  academy. 

"  He  would  not  enter  into  a  discussion  on  the  military  at 
this  time.  His  pride,  his  gratification  arose  from  the  success 
of  our  arms.  Much  was  due  to  the  courage  which  Americans 
have  displayed  on  many  battle-fields  in  former  times;  but  this 
courage,  characteristic  of  our  people,  and  pervading  all  sections 
and  all  classes,  could  never  have  availed  so  much  had  it  not 


SPEECH   IN    FAVOR   OF   THANKS   TO  THE   ARMY.          45 

been  combined  with  military  science.  And  the  occasion  seemed 
suited  to  enforce  this  lesson  on  the  minds  of  those  who  have 
been  accustomed,  in  season  and  out  of  season,  to  rail  at  the 
scientific  attainments  of  our  officers. 

"  The  influence  of  military  skill — the  advantage  of  discipline 
in  the  troops — the  power  derived  from  the  science  of  war,  in 
creases  with  the  increased  size  of  the  contending  armies.  With 
two  thousand  we  had  beaten  six  thousand ;  with  twenty  thou 
sand  we  would  far  more  easily  beat  sixty  thousand,  because  the 
general  must  be  an  educated  soldier  who  wields  large  bodies 
of  men,  and  the  troops,  to  act  efficiently,  must  be  disciplined 
and  commanded  by  able  officers.  He  but  said  what  he  had 
long  thought  and  often  said,  when  he  expressed  his  confidence 
in  the  ability  of  our  officers  to  meet  those  of  any  service — 
favorably  to  compare,  in  all  that  constitutes  the  soldier,  with 
any  army  in  the  world;  and  as  the  field  widened  for  the  ex 
hibition,  so  would  their  merits  shine  more  brightly  still. 

"  With  many  of  the  officers  now  serving  on  the  Rio  Grande 
he  had  enjoyed  a  personal  acquaintance,  and  hesitated  not  to 
say  that  all  which  skill,  and  courage,  and  patriotism  could 
perform,  might  be  expected  from  them.  He  had  forborne  to 
speak  of  the  general  commanding  on  the  Rio  Grande  on  any 
former  occasion ;  but  he  would  now  say  to  those  who  had  ex 
pressed  distrust,  that  the  world  held  not  a  soldier  better  qual 
ified  for  the  service  he  was  engaged  in  than  General  Taylor. 
Trained  from  his  youth  to  arms,  having  spent  the  greater 
portion  of  his  life  on  our  frontier,  his  experience  peculiarly 
fits  him  for  the  command  he  holds.  Such  as  his  conduct  was 
in  Fort  Harrison,  on  the  Upper  Mississippi,  in  Florida,  and 
on  the  Rio  Grande,  will  it  be  wherever  he  meets  the  enemy 
of  his  country. 


46  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON    DAVIS. 

"Those  soldiers,  to  whom  so  many  have  applied  deprecia 
tory  epithets,  upon  whom  it  has  been  so  often  said  no  reliance 
could  be  placed,  they  too  will  be  found,  in  every  emergency 
renewing  such  feats  as  have  recently  graced  our  arms,  bearing 
the  American  flag  to  honorable  triumphs,  or  falling  beneath 
its  folds,  as  devotees  to  our  common  cause,  to  die  a  soldier's 
death. 

"  He  rejoiced  that  the  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  (Mr. 
Black)  had  shown  himself  so  ready  to  pay  this  tribute  to  our 
army.  He  hoped  not  a  voice  would  be  raised  in  opposition  to 
it — that  nothing  but  the  stern  regret  which  is  prompted  by  re 
membrance  of  those  who  bravely  fought  and  nobly  died  will 
break  the  joy,  the  pride,  the  patriotic  gratulation  with  which 
we  hail  this  triumph  of  our  brethren  on  the  Eio  Grande." 

A  striking  feature  of  these  two  speeches,  as,  indeed,  of  all 
Mr.  Davis'  Congressional  speeches,  is  the  strong  and  outspoken 
national  feeling  which  pervades  them.  It  is  a  part  of  the 
history  of  these  times,  that  while  Jefferson  Davis  eloquently 
avowed  a  noble  and  generous  sympathy  with  his  heroic  com 
patriots  in  Mexico,  a  prominent  Northern  politician  bespoke 
for  the  American  army,  "a  welcome  with  bloody  hands  to 
hospitable  graves."  When,  a  few  months  afterwards,  the 
names  of  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  Mississippi  Rifles  were 
baptized  in  blood  amid  those  frowning  redoubts  at  Monterey, 
and  when,  upon  the  ensanguined  plain  of  Buena  Vista,  he 
fell  stricken  in  the  very  moment  of  victory,  just  as  his  genius 
and  the  valor  of  his  comrades  had  broken  that  last,  furious 
onset  of  the  Mexican  lancers,  New  England  and  her  leaders 
stood  indifferent  spectators  of  the  scene.*  Yet  the  same  New 

*  Massachusetts  even  refused  military  honors  to  the  remains  of  a  gal 
lant  son  of  her  own  soil,  (Captain  Lincoln,)  and  a  descendant  of  one 


DEBATE    WITH   ANDREW    JOHNSON.  47 

England  bounded  eagerly  to  the  conquest  and  spoliation  of 
their  countrymen,  and  the  same  leaders  clamored  valiantly  for 
the  humiliation,  for  the  blood  even,  of  Jefferson  Davis,  as  a 
traitor  and  a  rebel.  Quosque  tandem. 

An  interesting  sequel  of  this  speech  was  the  debate,  which 
it  occasioned  two  days  afterwards,  between  Mr.  Davis  and 
Andrew  Johnson,  now  President  of  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Johnson,  who  boasts  so  proudly  of  his  plebeian  origin,  and  is 
yet  said  to  be  morbidly  sensitive  of  the  slightest  allusion  to  it 
by  others,  excepted  to  Mr.  Davis'  reference  to  the  "  tailor  and 
blacksmith,"  warmly  eulogized  those  callings  and  mechanical 
avocations  in  general,  and  took  occasion  to  expatiate  exten 
sively  upon  the  virtue  and  intelligence  of  the  masses.  Mr. 
Davis,  whose  language  is  clearly  not  susceptible  of  any  inter 
pretation  disparaging  to  "  blacksmiths  and  tailors,"  disclaimed 
the  imputation,  saying  that  he  had  designed  merely  to  illus 
trate  his  argument,  that  the  profession  of  arms,  to  be  under 
stood,  must  be  studied,  and  that  a  mechanic  could  no  more  fill 
the  place  of  an  educated  soldier,  than  could  the  latter  supply 
the  qualifications  of  the  former.  Mr.  Johnson,  however,  was 
resolved  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  a  panegyric  upon  the 
populace,  and  no  explanations  could  avail.  The  Globe  reports 
this  debate  as,  "in  all  its  stages,  not  being  of  an  entirely 
pleasant  nature." 

As  an  appropriate  conclusion  to  this  sketch  of  Mr.  Davis' 
career  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  we  quote  the  follow 
ing  extract  from  an  interesting  work,*  published  some  years 

of  her  most  eminent  families,  who  was  killed  at  Buena  Vista.  Her 
fanatical  intolerance  would  not  forget  that  he  had  fallen  in  a  war  which 
she  did  not  approve. 

*  "  Our  Living  Representative  Men,"  by  Mr.  John  Savage. 


48  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

since :  "  John  Quincy  Adams  had  a  habit  of  always  observing 
new  members.  He  would  sit  near  them  on  the  occasion  of 
their  Congressional  debut,  closely  eyeing  and  attentively  list 
ening  if  the  speech  pleased  him,  but  quickly  departing  if  it 
did  not.  When  Davis  first  arose  in  the  House,  the  Ex- 
President  took  a  seat  close  by.  Davis  proceeded,  and  Adams 
did  not  move.  The  one  continued  speaking  and  the  other 
listening ;  and  those  who  knew  Mr.  Adams'  habits  were  fully 
aware  that  the  new  member  had  deeply  impressed  him.  At 
the  close  of  the  speech  the  '  Old  Man  Eloquent '  crossed  over 
to  some  friends  and  said,  'That  young  man,  gentlemen,  is  no 
ordinary  man.  He  will  make  his  mark  yet,  mind  me/  y' 


MILITARY   CHARACTER   OF   MR.  DAVIS.  49 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE  NAME  OP  JEFFERSON  DAVIS    INSEPARABLE   FROM   THE  HISTORY  OF  THE! 

MEXICAN  WAR HIS  ESSENTIALLY  MILITARY  CHARACTER  AND  TASTES JOINS 

GENERAL  TAYLOR'S  ARMY  ON  THE  RIO  GRANDE,  AS  COLONEL  OF  THE  FAMOUS 
"MISSISSIPPI  RIFLES" — MONTEREY — BUENA  VISTA — GENERAL  TAYLOR'S  AC 
COUNT  OF  DAVIS*  CONDUCT DAVIS'  REPORT  OF  THE  ACTION NOVELTY  AND 

ORIGINALITY  OF  HIS  STRATEGY  AT    BUENA    VISTA INTERESTING  STATEMENT 

OF  HON.  CALEB  GUSHING — RETURN  OF  DAVIS  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES — TRI 
UMPHANT  RECEPTION  AT  HOME PRESIDENT  POLK  TENDERS  HIM  A  BRIGA 
DIER' S  COMMISSION,  WHICH  HE  DECLINES  ON  PRINCIPLE. 

THE  name  of  Davis  is  inseparable  from  those  lettered  glo 
ries  of  the  American  Union,  which  were  the  brilliant 
trophies  of  the  Mexican  war.  In  those  bright  annals  it  was 
engraven  with  unfading  lustre  upon  the  conquering  banners  of 
the  Republic,  and  his  genius  and  valor  were  rewarded  with  a 
fame  which  rests  securely  upon  the  laurels  of  Monterey  and 
Buena  Vista. 

Jefferson  Davis  is  a  born  soldier.  Even  if  we  could  forget 
the  glories  of  the  assault  upon  Teneria  and  El  Diablo,  and 
banish  the  thrilling  recollection  of  that  movement  at  Buena 
Vista,  the  genius,  novelty,  and  intrepidity  of  which  electrified 
the  world  of  military  science,  and  extorted  the  enthusiastic 
admiration  of  the  victor  of  Waterloo,  we  must  yet  recognize 
the  impress  of  those  rare  gifts  and  graces  which  are  the  titles 
to  authority.  The  erect  yet  easy  carriage,  the  true  martial 
dignity  of  bearing,  which  is  altogether  removed  from  the 


50  LIFE    OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

supercilious  hauteur  of  the  mere  martinet,  the  almost  fascinat 
ing  expression  of  suaviter  in  modo,  which  yet  does  not  for  an 
instant  conceal  the  fortiter  in  re,  constitute  in  him  that  imperial 
semblance,  to  which  the  mind  involuntarily  concedes  the  right 
to  supreme  command.  It  is  impossible,  in  the  presence  of 
Mr.  Davis,  to  deny  this  recognition  of  his  intuitive  soldier 
ship.  Not  only  is  obvious  to  the  eye  the  commanding  mien 
of  the  soldier,  but  the  order,  the  discipline  of  the  educated  sol 
dier,  whose  nature,  stern  and  unflinching,  was  yet  plastic  to 
receive  the  impressions  of  an  art  with  which  it  felt  an  intuitive 
alliance.  This  military  precision  is  characteristic  of  Mr.  Davis 
in  every  aspect  in  which  he  appears.  There  is  the  constant 
fixedness  of  gaze  upon  the  object  to  be  reached,  and  the  cau 
tious  calculation  of  the  chances  of  success  with  the  means  and 
forces  ready  at  hand;  a  constant  regard  for  bases  of  supply 
and  a  proper  concern  for  lines  of  retreat,  and,  above  all,  the 
prompt  and  vigorous  execution,  if  success  be  practicable  and 
the  attack  determined  upon.  Even  in  his  oratory  and  states 
manship  are  these  characteristics  evinced.  In  the  former  there 
is  far  more  of  rhetorical  order,  harmony,  and  symmetry,  than 
of  rhetorical  ornament  and  display;  and  in  the  latter  there  is 
purpose,  consistency,  and  method,  with  little  regard  for  the 
shifts  of  expediency  and  the  suggestions  of  hap-hazard  te 
merity. 

The  attachment  of  Mr.  Davis  for  the  profession  of  arms  is 
little  less  than  a  passion — an  inspiration.  True,  he  volunta 
rily  abandoned  the  army,  at  an  age  when  military  life  is  most 
attractive  to  men,  but  the  field  of  politics  was  far  more  invit 
ing  to  a  commendable  aspiration  for  fame,  than  the  army  at  a 
season  of  profound  peace.  But  a  more  potent  consideration, 
of  a  domestic  nature,  urged  his  withdrawal  from  military  life. 


COJXXNEL,   OF    VOI.U^TKEKS.  51 

He  was  about  to  be  married,  and  preferred  not  to  remain  in 
the  army  after  having  assumed  the  responsibilities  of  that 
relation.  His  speeches  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  in 
dicating  his  earnest  interest  in  military  affairs,  his  solicitude 
in  behalf  of  the  army,  his  enthusiastic  championship  of  the 
Military  Academy,  and  his  thorough  information  respecting 
all  subjects  pertaining  to  the  military  interests  of  the  country, 
show  his  ambitious  and  absorbing  study  of  his  favorite  science. 

In  common  with  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Southern 
people,  he  had  favored  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  cordially 
sustained  Mr.  Folk's  Administration,  in  all  the  measures  which 
were  necessary  to  the  triumphant  success  of  its  policy.  While 
in  the  midst  of  his  useful  labors,  as  a  member  of  Congress,  in 
promoting  the  war  policy  of  the  Government,  he  received,  with 
delight,  the  announcement  of  his  selection  to  the  command  of 
the  First  Regiment  of  MississippL  Volunteers.  He  immedi 
ately  resigned  his  seat  in  Congress  and  started  to  take  com 
mand  of  his  regiment,  after  obtaining  for  it,  with  great  diffi 
culty,  the  rifles  which  were  afterwards  used  with  such  deadly 
effect  upon  the  enemy.  Overtaking  his  men,  who  were  already 
en  route  for  the  scene  of  action,  at  New  Orleans,  by  midsum 
mer  he  had  reinforced  General  Taylor  on  the  Rio  Grande. 

The  incidents  of  the  Mexican  war  are  too  fresh  in  the  rec 
ollection  of  the  country  to  justify  here  a  detailed  narrative  of 
the  operations  of  the  gallant  army  of  General  Taylor  in  its 
progress  toward  the  interior  from  the  scenes  of  its  splendid 
exploits  at  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  For  several 
weeks  after  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Davis  and  his  Mississippi-. 
ans,  active  hostilities  were  suspended.  When  the  preparations 
for  the  campaign  were  completed,  the  army  advanced,  and 
reached  Walnut  Springs,  about  three  miles  from  Monterey, 


62  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESOX   DAVIS. 

on  the  19th  of  September,  1846.  Two  days  afterwards  began 
those  series  of  actions  which  finally  resulted  in  the  capitula 
tion  of  a  fortified  city  of  great  strength,  and  defended  with 
obstinate  valor.  Of  the  part  borne  in  these  brilliant  opera 
tions  which  so  exalted  the  glory  of  the  American  name,  and 
immortalized  the  heroism  of  Southern  volunteers,  by  Colonel 
Davis  and  his  "  Mississippi  Rifles,"  an  able  and  graphic  pen 
shall  relate  the  story : 

"  In  the  storming  of  Monterey,  Colonel  Davis  and  his  rifle 
men  played  a  most  gallant  part.  The  storming  of  one  of  its 
strongest  forts  (Teneria)  on  the  21st  of  September  was  a  des 
perate  and  hard-fought  fight.  The  Mexicans  had  dealt  such 
death  by  their  cross-fires  that  they  ran  up  a  new  flag  in  exul 
tation,  and  in  defiance  of  the  assault  which,  at  this  time,  was 
being  made  in  front  and  rear.  The  Fourth  Infantry,  in  the 
advance,  had  been  terribly  xut  up,  but  the  Mississippians  and 
Tennesseeans  steadily  pressed  forward,  under  a  galling  fire  of 
copper  grape.  They  approached  to  within  a  hundred  yards 
of  the  fort,  when  they  were  lost  in  a  volume  of  smoke.  Mc 
Clung,*  inciting  a  company  which  formerly  had  been  under 
his  command,  dashed  on,  followed  by  Captain  Willis.  An 
ticipating  General  Quitman,  Colonel  Davis,  about  the  same 
time,  gave  the  order  to  charge.  "With  wild  desperation,  his 
men  followed  him.  The  escalade  was  made  with  the  fury  of 
a  tempest,  the  men  flinging  themselves  upon  the  guns  of  the 
enemy.  Sword  in  hand,  McClung  has  sprung  over  the  ditch. 
After  him  dashes  Davis,  cheering  on  the  Mississippians,  and 
then  Campbell,  with  his  Tennesseeans  and  others,  brothers  in 
the  fight,  and  rivals  for  its  honors.  Then  was  wild  work. 
The  assault  was  irresistible.  The  Mexicans,  terror-stricken, 
*  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  K.  McClung. 


MONTEREY.  53 

fled  like  an  Alpine  village  from  the  avalanche,  and,  taking 
position  in  a  strongly-fortified  building,  some  seventy-five 
yards  in  the  rear,  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry.  But, 
like  their  mighty  river,  nothing  could  stay  the  Mississippians. 
They  are  after  the  Mexicans.  Davis  and  McClung  are  simul 
taneously  masters  of  the  fortifications,  having  got  in  by  differ 
ent  entrances.  In  the  fervor  of  victory  the  brigade  does  not 
halt,  but,  led  on  by  Colonel  Davis,  are  preparing  to  charge 
on  the  second  post,  (El  Diablo,)  about  three  hundred  yards 
in  the  rear,  when  they  are  restrained  by  Quitman.  This 
desperate  conflict  lasted  over  two  hours.  The  charge  of  the 
Mississippi  Rifle  Regiment,  without  bayonets,  upon  Fort  Ten- 
eria,  gained  for  the  State  a  triumph  which  stands  unparal 
leled. 

"  Placed  in  possession  of  El  Diablo,  on  the  dawn  of  the 
23d  Colonel  Davis  was  exposed  to*  a  sharp  fire  from  a  half- 
moon  redoubt,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  distant, 
which  was  connected  with  heavy  stone  buildings  and  walls 
adjoining  a  block  of  the  city.  Returning  the  fire,  he  pro 
ceeded,  with  eight  men,  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  in  advance. 
Having  reported,  he  was  ordered,  with  three  companies  of 
his  regiment  and  one  of  Tennesseeans,  to  advance  on  the 
works. 

"  When  they  reached  the  half-moon  work  a  tremendous  fire 
was  opened  from  the  stone  buildings  in  the  rear.  Taking  a 
less-exposed  position,  Davis  was  reinforced,  and,  the  balance 
of  the  Mississippians  coming  up,  the  engagement  became  gen 
eral  in  the  street,  while,  from  the  house-tops,  a  heavy  fire  was 
kept  up  by  the  Mexicans.  '  The  gallant  Davis,  leading  the 
advance  with  detached  parties,  was  rapidly  entering  the  city, 
penetrating  into  buildings,  and  gradually  driving  the  enemy 


54  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

from  the  position/  when  General  Henderson  and  the  Texan 
Rangers  dismounted,  entered  the  city,  and,  through  musketry 
and  grape,  made  their  way  to  the  advance.  The  conflict  in 
creased,  and  still  Davis  continued  to  lead  his  command  through 
the  streets  to  within  a  square  of  the  Grand  Plaza,  when,  the 
afternoon  being  far  advanced,  General  Taylor  withdrew  the 
Americans  to  the  captured  forts."* 

Thus,  in  their  first  engagement,  the  Mississippians  and  their 
commander  achieved  a  reputation  which  shall  endure  so  long 
as  men  commemorate  deeds  of  heroism  and  devotion.  Veteran 
troops,  trained  to  despise  death  by  the  dangers  of  a  score  of 
battles,  have  been  immortalized  in  song  and  story  for  exploits 
inferior  to  those  of  the  "Mississippi  Rifles"  at  Monterey. 
Colonel  Davis  became  one  of  the  idols  of  the  army,  and  took 
a  prominent  place  among  the  heroes  of  the  war.  The  nation 
rang  with  the  fame  of  "  jQavis  and  his  Mississippi  Rifles ; " 
the  journals  of  the  day  were  largely  occupied  with  graphic 
descriptions  of  their  exploits ;  and  the  reports  of  superior  offi 
cers  contributed  their  proud  testimony  to  the  history  of  the 
country,  to  the  chivalrous  daring  and  consummate  skill  of 
Colonel  Davis.  A  becoming  acknowledgment  of  his  conduct 
was  made  by  General  Taylor  in  assigning  him  a  place  on  the 
commission  of  officers  appointed  to  arrange  with  the  Mexicans 
the  terms  of  capitulation.  The  result  of  the  negotiations, 

*For  this  spirited  account  of  the  operations  of  the  Mississippi  regiment 
at  Monterey,  the  author  is  indebted  to  a  sketch  of  Mr.  Davis  in  Mr.  John 
Savage's  "Living  Representative  Men,"  which  was  published  a  year  or 
two  prior  to  the  war.  Though  having  several  other  accounts,  possibly 
more  complete,  I  have  selected  this  as  the  most  graphic.  The  author 
readily  acknowledges  the  assistance  which  he  has  derived  from  the  work 
of  Mr.  Savage. 


BUENA  VISTA.  55 

though  approved  by  General  Taylor,  was  not  approved  by 
the  Administration,  which  ordered  a  termination  of  the  arm 
istice  agreed  upon  by  the  commissioners  from  the  respective 
armies  and  a  speedy  resumption  of  hostilities.  The  terms  of 
capitulation  were  assailed  by  many,  who  thought  them  too 
lenient  to  the  Mexicans;  among  others,  by  General  Quitman, 
the  warm,  personal,  and  political  friend  of  Colonel  Davis.  A 
very  important  portion  of  the  history  of  the  war  consists  of 
the  latter's  defense  of  the  terms  of  surrender  and  his  memo 
randa  of  the  incidents  occurring  in  the  conferences  with  the 
Mexican  officers. 

To  sustain  the  proud  prestige  of  Monterey — if  possible  to 
surpass  it,  became  henceforth  the  aspiration  of  the  Mississip- 
pians.  But  the  name  of  Mississippi  was  to  be  made  radiant 
with  a  new  glory,  beside  which  the  lustre  of  Monterey  paled, 
as  did  the  dawn  of  Lodi  by  the  full-orbed  splendor  of  Auster- 
litz.  All  the  world  knows  of  the  conduct  of  Jefferson  Davis 
at  Buena  Vista.  How  he  virtually  won  a  battle,  which,  con 
sidering  the  disparity  of  the  contending  forces,  must  forever 
be  a  marvel  to  the  student  of  military  science ;  how  like  Des- 
saix,  at  Marengo,  he  thought  there  was  "  still  time  to  win  an 
other  battle,"  even  when  a  portion  of  our  line  was  broken  and 
in  inglorious  retreat,  and  acting  upon  the  impulse  rescued 
victory  from  the  jaws  of  defeat ;  saving  an  army  from  destruc 
tion,  and  flooding  with  a  blaze  of  triumph  a  field  shrouded 
with  the  gloom  of  disaster,  are  memories  forever  enshrined  in 
the  Temple  of  Fame.  Americans  can  never  weary  of  listen 
ing  to  the  thrilling  incidents  of  that  ever-memorable  day.  By 
the  South,  the  lesson  of  Buena  Vista  and  kindred  scenes  of 
the  valor  of  her  children,  can  never  be  forgotten.  In  these 
days  of  her  humiliation  and  despair,  their  proud  memories 


56  LJFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

throng  upon  her,  as  do  a  thousand  noble  emotions  upon  the 
modern  Greek,  who  stands  upon  the  sacred  ground  of  Mara 
thon  and  Plsetea. 

The  following  vivid  and  powerful  description  of  the  more 
prominent  incidents  of  the  battle  is  from  the  pen  of  Hon.  J.  F. 
H.  Claiborne,  of  Mississippi : 

"  The  battle  had  been  raging  sometime  with  fluctuating  for 
tunes,  and  was  setting  against  us,  when  General  Taylor,  with 
Colonel  Davis  and  others,  arrived  on  the  field.  Several  regi 
ments  (which  were  subsequently  rallied  and  fought  bravely) 
were  in  full  retreat.  O'Brien,  after  having  his  men  and  horses 
completely  cut  up,  had  been  compelled  to  draw  off  his  guns, 
and  Bragg,  with  almost  superhuman  energy,  was  sustaining 
the  brunt  of  the  fight.  Many  officers  of  distinction  had  fallen. 
Colonel  Davis  rode  forward  to  examine  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  and  concluding  that  the  best  way  to  arrest  our  fugitives 
would  be  to  make  a  bold  demonstration,  he  resolved  at  once 
to  attack  the  enemy,  there  posted  in  force,  immediately  in 
front,  supported  by  cavalry,  and  two  divisions  in  reserve  in 
his  rear.  It  was  a  resolution  bold  almost  to  rashness,  but  the 
emergency  was  pressing.  With  a  handful  of  Indiana  volun 
teers,  who  still  stood  by  their  brave  old  colonel  (Bowles)  and 
his  own  regiment,  he  advanced  at  double-quick  time,  firing  as 
he  advanced.  His  own  brave  fellows  fell  fast  under  the  roll 
ing  musketry  of  the  enemy,  but  their  rapid  and  fatal  volleys 
carried  dismay  and  death  into  the  adverse  ranks.  A  deep 
ravine  separated  the  combatants.  Leaping  into  it,  the  Missis- 
sippians  soon  appeared  on  the  other  side,  and  with  a  shout  that 
was  heard  over  the  battle-field,  they  poured  in  a  well-directed 
fire,  and  rushed  upon  the  enemy.  Their  deadly  aim  and  wild 
enthusiasm  were  irresistible.  The  Mexicans  fled  in  confusion. 


A   SPIRITED    DESCRIPTION.  57 

to  their  reserves,  and  Davis  seized  the  commanding  position 
they  had  occupied.  He  next  fell  upon  a  party  of  cavalry  and 
compelled  it  to  fly,  with  the  loss  of  their  leader  and  other 
officers.  Immediately  afterwards  a  brigade  of  lancers,  one 
thousand  strong,  were  seen  approaching  at  a  gallop,  in  beauti 
ful  array,  with  sounding  bugles  and  fluttering  pennons.  It  was 
an  appalling  spectacle,  but  not  a  man  flinched  from  his  posi 
tion.  The  time  between  our  devoted  band  and  eternity  seemed 
brief  indeed.  But  conscious  that  the  eye  of  the  army  was 
upon  them,  that  the  honor  of  Mississippi  was  at  stake,  and 
knowing  that,  if  they  gave  way,  or  were  ridden  down,  our  un 
protected  batteries  in  the  rear,  upon  which  the  fortunes  of  the 
day  depended,  would  be  captured,  each  man  resolved  to  die  in 
his  place  sooner  than  retreat.  Not  the  Spartan  martyrs  at 
ThermopylaB — not  the  sacred  battalion  of  Epaminondas — not 
the  Tenth  Legion  of  Julius  Caesar — not  the  Old  Guard  of  Na 
poleon — ever  evinced  more  fortitude  than  these  young  volun 
teers  in  a  crisis  when  death  seemed  inevitable.  They  stood 
like  statues,  as  frigid  and  motionless  as  the  marble  itself. 
Impressed  with  this  extraordinary  firmness,  when  they  had 
anticipated  panic  and  flight,  the  lancers  advanced  more  delib 
erately,  as  though  they  saw,  for  the  first  time,  the  dark  shadow 
of  the  fate  that  was  impending  over  them.  Colonel  Davis  had 
thrown  his  men  into  the  form  of  a  reentering  angle,  (familiarly 
known  as  his  famous  V  movement,)  both  flanks  resting  on 
ravines,  the  lancers  coming  down  on  the  intervening  ridge. 
This  exposed  them  to  a  converging  fire,  and  the  moment  they 
came  within  rifle  range  each  man  singled  out  his  object,  and 
the  whole  head  of  the  column  fell.  A  more  deadly  fire  never 
was  delivered,  and  the  brilliant  array  recoiled  and  retreated, 
paralyzed  and  dismayed. 


58  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  Shortly  afterwards  the  Mexicans,  having  concentrated  a 
large  force  on  the  right  for  their  final  attack,  Colonel  Davis 
was  ordered  in  that  direction.  His  regiment  had  been  in 
action  all  day,  exhausted  by  thirst  and  fatigue,  much  reduced 
by  the  carnage  of  the  morning  engagement,  and  many  in  the 
ranks  suffering  from  wounds,  yet  the  noble  fellows  moved  at 
double-quick  time.  Bowles7  little  band  of  Indiana  volun 
teers  still  acted  with  them.  After  marching  several  hundred 
yards  they  perceived  the  Mexican  infantry  advancing,  in  three 
lines,  upon  Bragg's  battery,  which,  though  entirely  unsup 
ported,  held  its  position  with  a  resolution  worthy  of  his  fame. 
The  pressure  upon  him  stimulated  the  Mississippians.  They 
increased  their  speed,  and  when  the  enemy  were  within  one' 
hundred  yards  of  the  battery  and  confident  of  its  capture,  they 
took  him  in  flank  and  reverse,  and  poured  in  a  raking  and 
destructive  fire.  This  broke  his  right  line,  and  the  rest  soon 
gave  way  and  fell  back  precipitately.  Here  Colonel  Davis 
was  severely  wounded." 

The  wound  here  alluded  to  was  from  a  musket  ball  in  the 
heel,  and  was  exceedingly  painful,  though  Colonel  Davis  re 
fused  to  leave  the  field  until  the  action  was  over.  For  some 
time  grave  apprehensions  were  entertained  lest  it  should  prove 
dangerous  by  the  setting  in  of  erysipelas. 

General  Taylor,  who  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  large 
share  of  credit  due  to  Colonel  Davis,  in  his  official  report  of 
the  battle,  says:  "The  Mississippi  Riflemen,  under  Colonel 
Davis,  were  highly  conspicuous  for  their  gallantry  and  steadi 
ness,  and  sustained  throughout  the  engagement,  the  reputation 
of  veteran  troops.  Brought  into  action  against  an  immensely 
superior  force,  they  maintained  themselves  for  a  long  time,  un 
supported  and  with  heavy  loss,  and  held  an  important  part  of 


DAVIS'  REPORT   OF   THE   BATTLE.  59 

the  field  until  reinforced.  Colonel  Davis,  though  severely 
wounded,  remained  in  the  saddle  until  the  close  of  the  action. 
His  distinguished  coolness  and  gallantry,  at  the  head  of  his 
regiment  on  this  day,  entitle  him  to  the'  particular  notice  of 
the  Government." 

The  report  of  Colonel  Davis,  of  the  operations  of  his  regi 
ment,  is  highly  important  as  a  description  of  the  most  im 
portant  features  of  the  action,  and  as  an  explanation  of  his 
celebrated  strategic  movement.  We  omit  such  portions  as  em 
brace  mere  details  not  relevant  to  our  purpose. 

"SALTILLO,  MEXICO,  2d  March,  18.47. 

"  SIR  :  In  compliance  with  your  note  of  yesterday,  I  have 
the  honor  to  present  the  following  report  of  the  service  of  the 
Mississippi  Riflemen  on  the  23d  ultimo : 

"  Early  in  the  morning  of  that  day  the  regiment  was  drawn 
out  from  the  head-quarters  encampment,  which  stood  in  advance 
of  and  overlooked  the  town  of  Saltillo.  Conformably  to  in 
structions,  two  companies  were  detached  for  the  protection  of 
that  encampment,  and  to  defend  the  adjacent  entrance  of  the 
town.  The  remaining  eight  companies  were  put  in  march  to 
return  to  the  position  of  the  preceding  day,  now  known  as  the 
battle-field  of  Buena  Vista.  We  had  approached  to  within 
about  two  miles  of  that  position,  when  the  report  of  artillery 
firing,  which  reached  us,  gave  assurance  that  a  battle  had  com 
menced.  Excited  by  the  sound,  the  regiment  pressed  rapidly 
forward,  manifesting,  upon  this,  as  upon  other  occasions,  their 
more  than  willingness  to  meet  the  enemy.  At  the  first  con 
venient  place  the  column  was  halted  for  the  purpose  of  filling 
their  canteens  with  water;  and  the  march  being  resumed,  was 
directed  toward  the  position  which  had  been  indicated  to  me, 


60  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

on  the  previous  evening,  as  the  post  of  our  regiment.  As  we 
approached  the  scene  of  action,  horsemen,  recognized  as  of  our 
troops,  were  seen  running,  dispersed  and  confusedly  from  the 
field ;  and  our  first  view  of  the  line  of  battle  presented  the 
mortifying  spectacle  of  a  regiment  of  infantry  flying  disor 
ganized  from  before  the  enemy.  These  sights,  so  well  calcu 
lated  to  destroy  confidence  and  dispirit  troops  just  coming  into 
action,  it  is  my  pride  and  pleasure  to  believe,  only  nerved  the 
resolution  of  the  regiment  I  have  the  honor  to  command. 

"  Oar  order  of  march  was  in  column  of  companies,  advancing 
by  their  centers.  The  point  which  had  just  been  abandoned 
by  the  regiment  alluded  to,  was  now  taken  as  our  direction.  I 
rode  forward  to  examine  the  ground  upon  which  we  were  going 
to  operate,  and  in  passing  through  the  fugitives,  appealed  to 
them  to  return  with  us  and  renew  the  fight,  pointing  to  our 
regiment  as  a  mass  of  men  behind  which  they  might  securely 
form. 

"With  a  few  honorable  exceptions,  the  appeal  was  as  un 
heeded,  as  were  the  offers  which,  I  am  informed,  were  made  by 
our  men  to  give  their  canteens  of  water  to  those  who  com 
plained  of  thirst,  on  condition  that  they  would  go  back.  Gen 
eral  Wool  was  upon  the  ground  making  great  efforts  to  rally 
the  men  who  had  given  way.  I  approached  him  and  asked  if 
he  would  send  another  regiment  to  sustain  me  in  an  attack 
upon  the  enemy  before  us.  He  was  alone,  and,  after  promising 
the  support,  went  in  person  to  send  it.  Upon  further  examin 
ation,  I  found  that  the  slope  we  were  ascending  was  intersected 
by  a  deep  ravine,  which,  uniting  obliquely  with  a  still  larger 
one  on  our  right,  formed  between  them  a  point  of  land  diffi 
cult  of  access  by  us,  but  which,  spreading  in  a  plain  toward 
the  base  of  the  mountain,  had  easy  communication  with  the 


COLONEL   DAVIS'  REPORT.  61 

main  body  of  the  enemy.  This  position,  important  from  its 
natural  strength,  derived  a  far  greater  value  from  the  relation 
it  bore  to  our  order  of  battle  and  line  of  communication  with 
the  rear.  The  enemy,  in  number  many  times  greater  than  our 
selves,  supported  by  strong  reserves,  flanked  by  cavalry  and 
elated  by  recent  success,  was  advancing  upon  it.  The  moment 
seemed  to  me  critical  and  the  occasion  to  require  whatever  sac 
rifice  it  might  cost  to  check  the  enemy. 

"My  regiment,  having  continued  to  advance,  was  near  at 
hand.  I  met  and  formed  it  rapidly  into  order  of  battle;  the 
line  then  advanced  in  double-quick  time,  until  within  the  esti 
mated  range  of  our  rifles,  when  it  was  halted,  and  ordered  to 
'  fire  advancing/ 

"  The  progress  of  the  enemy  was  arrested.  "We  crossed  the 
difficult  chasm  before  us,  under  a  galling  fire,  and  in  good 
order  renewed  the  attack  upon  the  other  side.  The  contest 
was  severe — the  destruction  great  upon  both  sides.  We  steadily 
advanced,  and,  as  the  distance  diminished,  the  ratio  of  loss  in 
creased  rapidly  against  the  enemy ;  he  yielded,  and  was  driven 
back  on  his  reserves.  A  plain  now  lay  behind  us — the  enemy's 
cavalry  had  passed  around  our  right  flank,  which  rested  on  the 
main  ravine,  and  gone  to  our  rear.  The  support  I  had  ex 
pected  to  join  us  was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  I  therefore  ordered 
the  regiment  to  retire,  and  went  in  person  to  find  the  cavalry, 
which,  after  passing  round  our  right,  had  been  concealed  by 
the  inequality  of  the  ground.  I  found  them  at  the  first  point 
where  the  bank  was  practicable  for  horsemen,  in  the  act  of  de 
scending  into  the  ravine — no  doubt  for  the  purpose  of  charging 
upon  our  rear.  The  nearest  of  our  men  ran  quickly  to  my 
call,  attacked  this  body,  and  dispersed  it  with  some  loss.  I 
think  their  commander  was  among  the  killed. 


62  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

"  The  regiment  was  formed  again  in  line  of  battle  behind  the 
first  ravine  we  had  crossed;  soon  after  which  we  were  joined 
upon  our  left  by  Lieutenant  Kilbourn,  with  a  piece  of  light 
artillery,  and  Colonel  Lane's  (the  Third)  regiment  of  Indi 
ana  volunteers.  .  .  .  We  had  proceeded  but  a  short  distance 
when  I  saw  a  large  body  of  cavalry  debouche  from  his  cover 
upon  the  left  of  the  position  from  which  we  had  retired,  and 
advance  rapidly  upon  us.  The  Mississippi  regiment  was  filed 
to  the  right,  and  fronted  in  line  across  the  plain;  the  Indiana 
regiment  was  formed  on  the  bank  of  the  ravine,  in  advance  of 
our  right  flank,  by  which  a  reentering  angle  was  presented  to 
the  enemy.  Whilst  this  preparation  was  being  made,  Sergeant- 
Major  Miller,  of  our  regiment,  was  sent  to  Captain  Sherman  for 
one  or  more  pieces  of  artillery  from  his  battery. 

"  The  enemy,  who  was  now  seen  to  be  a  body  of  richly- 
caparisoned  lancers,  came  forward  rapidly,  and  in  beautiful 
order — the  files  and  ranks  so  closed  as  to  look  like  a  mass  of 
men  and  horses.  Perfect  silence  and  the  greatest  steadiness 
prevailed  in  both  lines  of  our  troops,  as  they  stood  at  shoul 
dered  arms  waiting  an  attack.  Confident  of  success,  and  anx 
ious  to  obtain  the  full  advantage  of  a  cross-fire  at  a  short 
distance,  I  repeatedly  called  to  the  men  not  to  shoot. 

"  As  the  enemy  approached,  his  speed  regularly  diminished, 
until,  when,  within  eighty  or  a  hundred  yards,  he  had  drawn 
up  to  a  walk,  and  seemed  about  to  halt.  A  few  files  fired 
without  orders,  and  both  lines  then  instantly  poured  in  a  vol 
ley  so  destructive  that  the  mass  yielded  to  the  blow  and  the 

survivors  fled At  this  time,  the  enemy  made  his 

last  attack  upon  the  right,  and  I  received  the  General's  order 
to  march  to  that  portion  of  the  field.  The  broken  character 
of  the  intervening  ground  concealed  the  scene  of  action  from 


COLONEL    DAVIS'   REPORT.  63 

our  view ;  but  the  heavy  firing  of  musketry  formed  a  sufficient 
guide  for  our  course.  After  marching  two  or  three  hundred 
yards,  we  saw  the  enemy's  infantry  advancing  in  three  lines 
upon  Captain  Bragg's  battery ;  which,  though  entirely  unsup 
ported,  resolutely  held  its  position,  and  met  the  attack  with  a 
fire  worthy  the  former  achievements  of  that  battery,  and  of  the 
reputation  of  its  present  meritorious  commander.  We  pressed 
on,  climbed  the  rocky  slope  of  the  plain  on  which  this  combat 
occurred,  reached  its  brow  so  as  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank 
and  reverse  when  he  was  about  one  hundred  yards  from  the 
battery.  Our  first  fire — raking  each  of  his  lines,  and  opened 
close  upon  his  flank — was  eminently  destructive.  His  right 
gave  way,  and  he  fled  in  confusion. 

"  In  this,  the  last  contest  of  the  day,  my  regiment  equaled — 
it  was  impossible  to  exceed — my  expectations.  Though  worn 
down  by  many  hours  of  fatigue  and  thirst,  the  ranks  thinned 
by  our  heavy  loss  in  the  morning,  they  yet  advanced  upon  the 
enemy  with  the  alacrity  and  eagerness  of  men  fresh  to  the 
combat.  In  every  approbatory  sense  of  these  remarks  I  wish 
to  be  included  a  party  of  Colonel  Bowies'  Indiana  regiment, 
which  served  with  us  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  un 
der  the  immediate  command  of  an  officer  from  that  regiment, 
whose  gallantry  attracted  my  particular  attention,  but  whose 
name,  I  regret,  is  unknown  to  me.  When  hostile  demonstra 
tions  had  ceased,  I  retired  to  a  tent  upon  the  field  for  surgical 
aid,  having  been  wounded  by  a  musket  ball  when  we  first 
went  into  action Every  part  of  the  action  hav 
ing  been  fought  under  the  eye  of  the  commanding  General, 
the  importance  and  manner  of  any  service  it  was  our  fortune 
to  render,  will  be  best  estimated  by  him.  But  in  view  of  my 
own  responsibility,  it  may  be  permitted  me  to  say,  in  relation 


64  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

to  our  first  attack  upon  the  enemy,  that  I  considered  the  ne 
cessity  absolute  and  immediate.  No  one  could  have  failed  to 
perceive  the  hazard.  The  enemy,  in  greatly  disproportionate 
numbers,  was  rapidly  advancing.  We  saw  no  friendly  troops 
coming  to  our  support,  and  probably  none  except  myself  ex 
pected  reinforcement.  Under  such  circumstances,  the  men 
cheerfully,  ardently  entered  into  the  conflict;  and  though  we 
lost,  in  that  single  engagement,  more  than  thirty  killed  and 
forty  wounded,  the  regiment  never  faltered  nor  moved,  except 
as  it  was  ordered.  Had  the  expected  reinforcement  arrived, 
we  could  have  prevented  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  passing  to 
our  rear,  results  more  decisive  might  have  been  obtained,  and 

a  part  of  our  loss  have  been  avoided.     . 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant.  "JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 

"Colonel  Mississippi  Rifles. 
"MAJOR  W.  W.  S.  BLISS,  Assistant  Adjutant- General11 

The  reputation  earned  by  Colonel  Davis  at  Buena  Vista 
could  not  fail  to  provoke  the  assaults  of  envy.  An  effort, 
equally  unwarranted  and  unsuccessful,  has  since  been  made  to 
deprive  him  of  a  portion  of  his  merited  fame  of  having  con 
ceived  and  executed  a  movement  decisive  of  the  battle.  It  has 
been  pretended,  in  disparagement  of  the  strategy  of  Colonel 
Davis,  that  his  celebrated  V  movement  (for  so  it  is,  and  will 
always  be  known)  had  not  the  merit  of  originality,  and  be 
sides  was  forced  upon  him  by  the  circumstances  in  which  he 
was  placed,  and  especially  by  the  conformation  of  the  ground, 
which  would  not  admit  of  a  different  disposition  of  his  troops. 
Such  a  judgment  is  merely  hypercritical.  There  is  no  account 
in  military  history,  from  the  campaigns  of  Caesar  to  those  of 
Napoleon,  of  such  a  tactical  conception,  unless  we  include  a 


INTERESTING   STATEMENT.  65 

slightly-analogous  case  at  Waterloo.  The  movement  in  the 
latter  engagement,  however,  differs  essentially  from  that  exe 
cuted  by  Davis  at  Buena  Vista.  A  party  of  Hanoverian  cav 
alry,  assailed  by  French  huzzars,  at  the  intersection  of  two 
roads,  by  forming  a  salient,  repulsed  their  assailants  almost  as 
effectually  as  did  the  reentrant  angle  of  the  Mississippians  at 
Buena  Vista.  As  to  the  second  criticism,  it  is  certainly  a 
novel  accusation  against  an  officer,  that  he  should,  by  a  quick 
appreciation  of  his  situation,  avail  himself  of  the  only  possible 
means  by  which  he  could  not  only  extricate  his  own  command 
from  imminent  peril  of  destruction,  but  also  avert  a  blow  de 
livered  at  the  safety  of  the  entire  army. 

In  a  lecture  on  "The  Expatriated  Irish  in  Europe  and 
America,"  delivered  in  Boston,  February  11,  1858,  the  Hon. 
Caleb  Gushing  thus  alludes  to  this  subject :  "  In  another  of 
the  dramatic  incidents  of  that  field,  a  man  of  Celtic  race  (Jef 
ferson  Davis)  at  the  head  of  the  Rifles  of  Mississippi,  had 
ventured  to  do  that  of  which  there  is,  perhaps,  but  one  other 
example  in  the  military  history  of  modern  times.  In  the  des 
perate  conflicts  of  the  Crimea,  at  the  battle  of  Inkermann,  in 
one  of  those  desperate  charges,  there  was  a  British  officer  who 
ventured  to  receive  the  charge  of  the  enemy  without  the  pre 
caution  of  having  his  men  formed  in  a  hollow  square.  They 
were  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  meeting  at  a  point  like  an  open 
fan,  and  received  the  charge  of  the  Russians  at  the  muzzle  of 
their  guns,  and  repelled  it.  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  for  this  feat 
of  arms,  among  others,  was  selected  as  the  man  to  retrieve  the 
fallen  fortunes  of  England  in  India.  He  did,  however,  but 
imitate  what  Jefferson  Davis  had  previously  done  in  Mexico, 
who,  in  that  trying  hour,  when,  with  one  last  desperate  effort 
to  break  the  line  of  the  American  army,  the  cavalry  of  Mex- 
5 


66  LIFE  OF  JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 

ico  was  concentrated  in  one  charge  against  the  American  line ; 
then,  I  say,  Jefferson  Davis  commanded  his  men  to  form  in 
two  lines,  extended  as  I  have  shown,  and  receive  that  charge 
of  the  Mexican  horse,  with  a  plunging  fire  from  the  right  and 
left  from  the  Mississippi  Rifles,  which  repelled,  and  repelled 
for  the  last  time,  the  charge  of  the  hosts  of  Mexico." 

These  puerile  criticisms,  however,  were  unavailing  against 
the  concurrent  testimony  of  Taylor,  Quitman,  and  Lane,  and 
the  grateful  plaudits  of  the  army,  to  shake  the  popular  judg 
ment,  which  rarely  fails,  in  the  end,  to  discriminate  between 
the  false  glare  of  cheaply-earned  glory  and  the  just  renown  of 
true  heroism. 

The  term  of  enlistment  of  his  regiment  having  expired, 
Colonel  Davis,  in  July,  1847,  just  twelve  months  after  the 
resignation  of  his  seat  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  re 
turned  to  the  United  States.  His  progress  toward  his  home 
was  attended  by  a  series  of  congratulatory  receptions,  the 
people  every-where  assembling  en  masse  to  do  honor  to  the 
"  Hero  of  Buena  Vista."  Mississippi  extended  a  triumphant 
greeting  to  her  soldier-statesman,  who,  resigning  the  civio 
trust  which  she  had  confided  to  his  keeping,  had  carried  her 
flag  in  triumph  amid  the  thunders  of  battle  and  the  wastes 
of  carnage,  carving  the  name  of  Mississippi  in  an  inscription 
of  enduring  renown. 

During  his  journey  homeward,  there  occurred  a  most  im 
pressive  illustration  of  that  strict  devotion  to  principle  which, 
above  all  other  considerations,  is  the  real  solution  of  every  act 
of  his  life,  public  and  private.  While  in  New  Orleans,  Col 
onel  Davis  was  offered,  by  President  Polk,  a  commission  as 
Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  an  honor  which  he  unhesitat 
ingly  declined,  on  the  ground  that  no  such  commission  could 


DECLINES   PROMOTION.  67 

be  conferred  by  Federal  authority,  either  by  appointment  of 
the  President  or  by  act  of  Congress.  As  an  advocate  of  States' 
Eights,  he  could  not  countenance,  even  for  the  gratification  of 
his  own  ambition,  a  plain  infraction  of  the  rights  of  the  States, 
to  which  respectively,  the  Constitution  reserves  the  appoint 
ment  of  officers  of  the  militia.*  The  soldier's  pride  in  de 
served  promotion  for  distinguished  services,  could  not  induce 
the  statesman  to  forego  his  convictions  of  Constitutional  right. 
The  declination  of  this  high  distinction  was  entirely  consistent 
with  his  opinions  previously  entertained  and  expressed.  Be 
fore  he  resigned  his  seat  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  the 
bill  authorizing  such  appointments  by  the  President  was  in 
troduced,  and  rapidly  pressed  to  its  passage.  Mr.  Davis  de 
tected  the  Constitutional  infraction  which  it  involved,  and 
opposed  it.  He  designed  to  address  the  House,  but  was  sud 
denly  called  away  from  Washington,  and  before  leaving  had 
an  understanding  with  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  from 
which  the  bill  had  come,  that  it  would  not  be  called  up  before 
the  ensuing  Monday.  On  his  return,  however,  he  found  that 
the  friends  of  the  measure  had  forced  its  passage  on  the  pre 
vious  Saturday. 

This  is  but  one  in  a  thousand  evidences  of  an  incorruptible 
loyalty  to  his  convictions,  which  would  dare  face  all  opposi 
tion  and  has  braved  all  reproach.  It  is  an  attribute  of  true 
greatness  in  the  character  of  Jefferson  Davis,  which  not  even 
his  enemies  have  called  in  question,  to  which  candor  must 
ever  accord  the  tribute  of  infinite  admiration. 

*  This  Constitutional  question  was  again  raised  by  Mr.  Davis,  while 
President  of  the  Confederacy,  and  his  action  with  reference  to  similar 
legislation  by  the  Confederate  Congress,  was  in  entire  accordance  with 
the  reason  assigned  for  declining  Mr.  Folk's  appointment. 


68  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

MR.  DAVIS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  SENATE,  FIRST  BY  EXECUTIVE  APPOINTMENT, 
AND  SUBSEQUENTLY  BY  UNANIMOUS  CHOICE  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE  OF  HIS 

STATE POPULAR  ADMIRATION  NOT  LESS  FOR  HIS  CIVIC  TALENTS  THAN  HIS 

MILITARY  SERVICES FEATURES  OF  HIS  PUBLIC  CAREER HIS  CHARACTER 

AND  CONDUCT  AS  A  SENATOR — AS  AN  ORATOR  AND  PARLIAMENTARY  LEADER 

HIS  INTREPIDITY AN  INCIDENT  WITH  HENRY  CLAY DAVIS  THE  LEADER 

OF  THE  STATES'  RIGHTS  PARTY  IN  CONGRESS — THE  AGITATION  OF  1850 — 
DAVIS  OPPOSES  THE  COMPROMISE — FOLLY  OF  THE  SOUTH  IN  ASSENTING  TO 

THAT  SETTLEMENT DAVIS  NOT  A  DISUNIONIST  IN  1850,  NOR  A  REBEL  IN 

1861 HIS  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 

LOGICAL  ABSURDITY  OF  CLAY'S  POSITION  EXPOSED  BY  DAVIS — THE  IDEAL 

UNION  OF  THE  LATTER WHY  HE  OPPOSED  THE  COMPROMISE THE  NEW 

MEXICO  BILL DAVIS'  GROWING  FAME  AT  THIS  PERIOD HIS  FREQUENT  EN 
COUNTERS  WITH  CLAY,  AND  WARM   FRIENDSHIP  BETWEEN    THEM SIGNAL 

TRIUMPH  OF  THE  UNION  SENTIMENT,  AND  ACQUIESCENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH. 

WITHIN  less  than  two  months  from  his  return  to  Mis 
sissippi,  Colonel  Davis  was  appointed  by  the  Governor 
of  the  State  to  fill  the  vacancy  in  the  United  States  Senate 
occasioned  by  the  death  of  General  Speight.  At  a  subsequent 
session  of  the  Legislature,  the  selection  of  the  Governor  was 
confirmed  by  his  unanimous  election  for  the  residue  of  the 
unexpired  term.  Seldom  has  there  been  a  tender  of  public 
honor  more  deserved  by  the  recipient,  and  more  cheerfully 
accorded  by  the  constituent  body.  It  was  the  grateful  trib 
ute  of  popular  appreciation  to  the  hero  who  had  risked  his 
life  for  the  glory  of  his  country,  and  the  worthy  recognition 


POPULAE   FAVOR.  69 

of  abilities  which  had  been  proven  adequate  to  the  responsi 
bilities  of  the  highest  civic  trust.  Doubtless  Colonel  Davis 
owed  much  of  the  signal  unanimity  and  enthusiasm  which 
accompanied  this  expression  of  popular  favor  to  his  brilliant 
services  in  Mexico.  The  military  passion  is  strong  in  the  hu 
man  breast,  and  the  sentiment  of  homage  to  prowess,  illustrated 
on  the  battle-field  and  in  the  face  of  danger,  is  one  of  the  few 
chivalrous  instincts  which  survive  the  influence  of  the  sordid 
vices  and  vulgarisms  of  human  nature.  In  all  ages  men  have 
declaimed  and  reasoned  against  the  expediency  of  confiding 
civil  authority  to  the  keeping  of  soldiers,  and  have  cautioned 
the  masses  against  the  risk  of  entrusting  the  public  liberties 
to  the  stern  and  dictatorial  will  educated  in  the  rugged  dis 
cipline  and  habits  of  the  camp.  Yet  the  masses,  in  all  time, 
will  continue  their  awards  of  distinction  to  martial  exploits 
with  a  fervor  not  characteristic  of  their  recognition  of  any 
other  public  service. 

But  the  tribute  had  a  higher  motive,  if  possible,  than  the 
generous  impulse  of  gratitude  to  the  "  Hero  of  Buena  Vista," 
in  the  universal  conviction  of  his  eminent  fitness  for  the  posi 
tion.  His  service  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  brief  as  it 
was,  had  designated  him,  months  before  his  Mexican  laurels 
had  been  earned,  as  a  man,  not  only  of  mark,  but  of  promise ; 
of  decided  and  progressive  intellectual  power ;  of  pronounced 
mental  and  moral  individuality. 

Of  all  the  public  men  of  America,  Jefferson  Davis  is  the 
least  indebted  for  his  long  and  noble  career  of  distinction  to 
adventitious  influences  or  merely  temporary  popular  impulses. 
The  sources  of  his  strength  have  been  the  elements  of  his 
character  and  the  resources  of  his  genius.  Never  hoping  to 
stumble  upon  success,  by  a  stolid  indifference  arnid  the  flue- 


70  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tuations  of  fortune,  nor  engaged  in  the  role  of  the  trimmer, 
who  adjusts  his  conduct  conformably  with  every  turn  of  the 
popular  current,  his  hopes  of  success  have  rested  upon  the 
merits  of  principle  alone.  He  has  succeeded  in  all  things 
where  success  was  possible,  and  failed,  at  last,  in  contradiction 
of  every  lesson  of  previous  experience,  with  the  light  of  all 
history  pleading  his  vindication,  and  to  the  disappointment 
of  the  nearly  unanimous  judgment  of  disinterested  mankind. 

A  peculiar  feature  in  the  public  career  of  Mr.  Davis  was 
its  steady  and  consecutive  development.  He  has  accepted 
service,  always  and  only,  in  obedience  to  the  concurrent  con 
fidence  of  his  fellow-citizens  in  his  peculiar  qualifications  for 
the  emergency.  From  the  beginning  he  gave  the  promise 
of  those  high  capacities  which  the  fervid  eulogy  of  Grattan 
accorded  to  Chatham — to  "strike  a  blow  in  the  world  that 
should  resound  through  its  history."  His  first  election  to 
Congress  was  the  spontaneous  acknowledgment  of  the  pro 
found  impression  produced  by  his  earliest  intellectual  efforts. 
The  consummate  triumph  of  his  genius  and  valor  at  Buena 
Vista  did  not  exceed  the  anticipations  of  his  friends,  who 
knew  the  ardor  and  assiduity  of  his  devotion  to  his  cherished 
science,  and  now  in  the  noble  arena  of  the  American  Senate 
his  star  was  still  to  be  in  the  ascendant. 

At  the  first  session  of  the  Thirtieth  Congress,  Jefferson 
Davis  took  his  seat  as  a  Senator  of  the  United  States  from 
the  State  of  Mississippi.  The  entire  period  of  his  connection 
with  the  Senate,  from  1847  to  1851,  and  from  1857  to  1861, 
scarcely  comprises  eight  years;  but  those  were  years  pregnant 
with  the  fate  of  a  nation,  and  in  their  brief  progress  he  stood 
in  that  august  body  the  equal  of  giant  intellects,  and  grap 
pled,  with  the  power  and  skill  of  a  master,  the  great  ideas 


UNITED   STATES   SENATOR.  71 

and  events  of  those  momentous  days.  Mr.  Davis  could  safely 
trust,  whatever  of  ambition  he  may  cherish  for  the  distin 
guished  consideration  of  posterity,  to  a  faithful  record  of  his 
service  in  the  Senate.  His  senatorial  fame  is  a  beautiful  har 
mony  of  the  most  pronounced  and  attractive  features  of  the 
best  parliamentary  models.  He  was  as  intrepid  and  defiant 
as  Chatham,  but  as  scholarly  as  Brougham;  as  elegant  and 
perspicuous  in  diction  as  Canning,  and  often  as  profound  and 
philosophical  in  his  comprehension  of  general  principles  as 
Burke;  when  roused  by  a  sense  of  injury,  or  by  the  force  of 
his  earnest  conviction,  as  much  the  incarnation  of  fervor  and 
zeal  as  Grattan,  but,  like  Fox,  subtle,  ready,  and  always  armed 
cap  a  pie  for  the  quick  encounters  of  debate.  ^ 

Among  all  the  eminent  associates  of  Mr.  Davis  in  that  body, 
there  were  very  few  who  possessed  his  peculiar  qualifications 
for  its  most  distinguished  honors.  His  character,  no  less  than 
his  demeanor,  may  be  aptly  termed  senatorial,  and  his  bearing 
was  always  attuned  to  his  noble  conception  of  the  Senate  as 
an  august  assemblage  of  the  embassadors  of  sovereign  States. 
He  carried  to  the  Senate  the  loftiest  sense  of  the  dignity  and 
responsibility  of  his  trust,  and  convictions  upon  political  ques 
tions,  which  were  the  result  of  the  most  thorough  and  elaborate 
investigation.  Never  for  one  instant  varying  from  the  princi 
ples  of  his  creed,  he  never  doubted  as  to  the  course  of  duty; 
profound,  accurate  in  information,  there  was  no  question  per 
taining  to  the  science  of  government  or  its  administration  that 
he  did  not  illuminate  with  a  light,  clear,  powerful,  and  orig 
inal. 

It  has  been  remarked  of  Mr.  Davis'  style  as  a  speaker,  that 
it  is  "  orderly  rather  than  ornate,"  and  the  remark  is  correct 
so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  mere  statement  of  the  conditions 


72  LIFE    OF    JUJWJdUSON    DAVIS. 

of  the  discussion.  For  mere  rhetorical  glitter,  Mr.  Davis' 
speeches  afford  but  poor  models,  but  for  clear  logic  and  con 
vincing  argument,  apt  illustration,  bold  and  original  imagery, 
and  genuine  pathos,  they  are  unsurpassed  by  any  ever  deliv 
ered  in  the  American  Senate.  Though  the  Senate  was,  un 
doubtedly,  his  appropriate  arena  as  an  orator,  and  though  it 
may  well  be  doubted  whether  he  was  rivaled  in  senatorial 
eloquence  by  any  contemporary,  Mr.  Davis  is  hardly  less  gifted 
in  the  attributes  of  popular  eloquence.  Upon  great  occasions 
he  will  move  a  large  crowd  with  an  irresistible  power.  As  a 
popular  orator,  he  does  not  seek  to  sway  and  toss  the  will  with 
violent  and  passionate  emotion,  but  his  eloquence  is  more  a 
triumph  of  argument  aided  by  an  enlistment  of  passion  and 
persuasion  to  reason  and  conviction.  He  has  less  of  the  char 
acteristics  of  Mirabeau,  than  of  that  higher  type  of  eloquence, 
of  which  Cicero,  Burke,  and  George  Canning  were  representa 
tives,  and  which  is  pervaded  by  passion,  subordinated  to  the 
severer  tribunal  of  intellect.  It  was  the  privilege  of  the 
writer,  on  repeated  occasions,  during  the  late  war,  to  witness 
the  triumph  of  Mr.  Davis'  eloquence  over  a  popular  assem 
blage.  Usually  the  theme  and  the  occasion  were  worthy  of 
the  orator,  and  difficult  indeed  would  it  be  to  realize  a  nobler 
vision  of  the  majesty  of  intellect.  To  a  current  of  thought, 
perennial  and  inexhaustible,  compact,  logical  and  irresistible, 
was  added  a  fire  that  threw  its  warmth  into  the  coldest  bosom, 
and  infused  a  glow  of  light  into  the  very  core  of  the  subject. 
His  voice,  flexible  and  articulate,  reaching  any  compass  that 
was  requisite,  attitude  and  gestures,  all  conspired  to  give  power 
and  expression  to  his  language,  and  the  hearer  was  impressed 
as  though  in  the  presence  of  the  very  transfiguration  of  elo 
quence.  The  printed  efforts  of  Mr.  Davis  will  not  only  live 


AS    A    PARLIAMENTARY    LEADER.  73 

as  memorials  of  parliamentary  and  popular  eloquence,  but  as 
invaluable  stores  of  information  to  the  political  and  historical 
student.  They  epitomize  some  of  the  most  important  peri 
ods  of  American  history,  and  embrace  the  amplest  discussion 
of  an  extended  range  of  subjects  pertaining  to  almost  every 
science. 

The  development  in  Mr.  I)avis  of  the  high  and  rare  quali 
ties,  requisite  to  parliamentary  leadership,  was  rapid  and  deci 
sive.  His  nature  instinctively  aspires  to  influence  and  power, 
and  under  no  circumstances  could  it  rest  contented  in  an  atti 
tude  of  inferiority.  Independence,  originality,  and  intrepidity, 
added  to  earnest  and  intelligent  conviction ;  unwavering  devo 
tion  to  principle  and  purpose ;  a  will  stern  and  inexorable,  and 
a  disposition  frank,  courteous,  and  generous,  are  features  of 
character  which  rarely  fail  to  make  a  representative  man. 
After  the  death  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  he  was  incomparably  the 
ablest  exponent  of  States'  Rights  principles,  and  even  during 
the  life  of  that  great  publicist,  Mr.  Davis,  almost  equally  with 
him,  shared  the  labors  and  responsibilities  of  leadership.  His 
personal  courage  is  of  that  knightly  order,  which  in  an  age  of 
chivalry  would  have  sought  the  trophies  of  the  tourney,  and 
his  moral  heroism  fixed  him  immovably  upon  the  solid  Tock 
of  principle,  indifferent  to  the  inconvenience  of  being  in  a 
minority  and  in  no  dread  of  the  storms  of  popular  passion. 
His  faith  in  his  principles  was  no  less  earnest  than  his  confi 
dence  in  his  ability  to  triumphantly  defend  them.  In  the 
midst  of  the  agitation  and  excitement  of  1850,  Henry  Clay, 
the  Great  Compromiser,  whose  brilliant  but  erring  genius  so 
long  and  fatally  led  estray,  from  the  correct  understanding  of 
the  vital  issue  at  stake  between  the  North  and  the  South,  a 
numerous  party  of  noble  and  true-hearted  Southern  gentle- 


74  LltfK   OB1   JEFFEKSoN   J>AVJS. 

men,  furnished  the  occasion  of  an  impressive  illustration  of 
this  quality.  Turning,  in  debate,  to  the  Mississippi  Sena 
tor,  he  notified  the  latter  of  his  purpose,  at  some  future  day, 
to  debate  with  him  elaborately,  an  important  question  of  prin 
ciple.  "Now  is  the  moment,"  was  the  reply  of  the  intrepid 
Davis,  ever  eager  to  champion  his  beloved  and  imperiled 
South,  equally  against  her  avowed  enemies,  and  the  not  less 
fatal  policy  of  those  who  were  but  too  willing  to  compromise 
upon  an  issue  vital  to  her  rights  and  dignity.  And  what  a 
shock  of  arms  might  then  have  been  witnessed,  could  Clay 
have  dispelled  thirty  years  of  his  ripe  three-score  and  ten ! 
Each  would  have  found  a  foeman  worthy  of  his  steel.  In  an 
swer  to  this  bold  defiance,  Clay,  like  Hotspur,  would  have 
rushed  to  the  charge,  with  visor  up  and  lance  couchant;  and 
Davis,  another  Saladin,  no  less  frank  than  his  adversary,  but 
far  more  dexterous,  would  have  met  him  with  a  flash  of  that 
Damascus  scymetar,  whose  first  blow  severed  the  neck  of  the 
foeman. 

That  would  have  been  a  bold  ambition  that  could  demand 
a  formal  tender  of  leadership  from  the  brilliant  array  of  gal 
lant  gentlemen,  ripe  scholars,  distinguished  orators  and  states 
men,  who,  for  twenty  years  before  the  war,  were  the  valiant 
champions  in  Congress  of  the  principles  and  aspirations  of  the 
South.  Yet  few  will  deny  the  preeminence  of  Mr.  Davis,  in 
the  eye  of  the  country  and  the  world,  among  States'  Eights 
leaders.  Equally  with  Mr.  Calhoun,  as  the  leader  of  a  great 
intellectual  movement,  he  stamped  his  impress  upon  the  en 
during  tablets  of  time. 

Like  Mr.  Calhoun,  too,  Mr.  Davis  gave  little  evidence  of 
capacity  or  taste  for  mere  party  tactics.  Neither  would  have 
performed  the  duties  of  drill-sergeant,  in  local  organizations, 


VIEWS  UPON  PUBLIC  AFFAIRS.  75 

for  the  purposes  of  a  political  canvass,  so  well  as  hundreds 
of  men  of  far  lighter  calibre  and  less  stability.  Happily,  both 
sought  and  found  a  more  congenial  field  of  action. 

The  unexpired  term,  for  which  Mr.  Davis  had  been  elected 
in  1847,  ended  in  1851,  and,  though  he  was  immediately  re- 
elected,  in  consequence  of  his  subsequent  resignation  his  first 
service  in  the  Senate  ended  with  the  term  for  which  he  had 
first  been  elected.  A  recurrence  to  the  records  of  Congress  will 
exhibit  the  eventful  nature  of  this  period,  especially  in  its  con 
clusion.  In  the  earlier  portion  of  his  senatorial  service,  Mr. 
Davis  participated  conspicuously  in  debate  and  in  the  general 
business  of  legislation.  Here,  as  in  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  his  views  upon  military  affairs  were  always  received  with 
marked  respect,  and  no  measure  looking  to  the  improvement 
of  the  army  failed  to  receive  his  cordial  cooperation. 

The  extensive  conquests  of  the  army  in  Mexico,  and  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  in  the  conquered  country  until  the  objects  of  the  war 
could  be  consummated,  created  considerable  embarrassment. 
Upon  this  subject  Mr.  Davis  spoke  frequently  and  intelli 
gently.  His  sagacity  indicated  a  policy  equally  protective  of 
the  advantages  which  the  valor  of  the  army  had  achieved, 
and  humane  to  the  conquered.  In  a  debate  with  Mr.  John 
Bell,  in  February,  1848,  he  defined  himself  as  favoring  such 
a  military  occupation  as  would  "prevent  the  General  Gov 
ernment  of  Mexico,  against  which  this  war  had  been  directed, 
from  reestablishing  its  power  and  again  concentrating  the  scat 
tered  fragments  of  its  army  to  renew  active  hostilities  against 
us."  He  disclaimed  the  motive,  in  this  policy,  of  territorial 
acquisition,  and  earnestly  deprecated  interference  with  the  po 
litical  institutions  of  the  Mexicans.  The  estimate  entertained 


76  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

by  the  Senate,  of  his  judgment  and  information  upon  military 
subjects,  was  indicated  by  his  almost  unanimous  election,  (thirty- 
two  for  Mr.  Davis,  and  five  for  all  others,)  during  the  session  of 
the  Thirty-first  Congress,  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs.  His  speeches  on  the  subject  of  offering  con 
gratulations  to  the  French  people  upon  their  recent  successful 
political  revolution,  resulting  in  the  establishment  of  a  repub 
lican  form  of  government,  the  proposed  organization  of  the 
territorial  government  of  Oregon,  upon  various  subjects  of 
practical  and  scientific  interest,  and  his  incidental  discussions 
of  the  subject  of  slavery,  were  able,  eloquent,  and  character 
istic. 

The  session  of  Congress  in  1849  and  1850  brought  with  it 
a  most  angry  and  menacing  renewal  of  sectionaf  agitation. 
Previous  events  and  innumerable  indications  of  popular  sen 
timent  had  clearly  revealed  to  candid  minds,  every-where,  that 
the  increasing  sectional  preponderance  of  the  North,  and  its 
growing  hostility  to  slavery,  portended  results  utterly  ruinous 
to  the  rights  and  institutions  of  the  South.  To  the  South  it  was 
literally  a  question  of  vitality,  to  secure  some  competent  check 
upon  the  aggressive  strength  of  the  North.  To  maintain  any 
thing  like  a  sectional  balance,  the  South  must  necessarily  se 
cure  to  her  institutions,  at  least,  a  fair  share  of  the  common 
domain  to  be  hereafter  created  into  States.  The  immense  terri 
torial  acquisitions  resulting  from  the  Mexican  war  were  now 
the  subjects  of  controversy.  After  a  contest,  protracted  through 
several  months,  and  eliciting  the  most  violent  exhibitions  of 
sectional  feeling,  a  plan  of  adjustment,  under  the  auspices 
chiefly  of  Henry  Clay,  whose  fatal  gift  was  to  preserve,  for 
a  time,  the  peace  of  the  country  by  the  concession  of  the  most 
precious  and  vital  rtghts  of  his  section  to  an  insolent  and  in- 


COMPROMISE   OF   1850.  77 

satiate  fanaticism,  was  finally  reached.  This  settlement,  known, 
by  way  of  distinction,  as  the  ".Compromise  of  1850,"  averting 
for  the  time  the  dangers  of  disunion  and  civil  war,  met  the 
approval  of  the  advocates  of  expediency,  but  was  opposed,  with 
heroic  pertinacity,  by  Mr.  Davis  and  his  associates  of  the  States' 
Eights  party.  They  saw  the  hollowness  of  its  pretended  just 
ice,  its  utter  worthlessness  as  a  guarantee  to  the  South,  and 
sought  to  defeat  it — first  in  Congress,  and  afterwards  by  the 
popular  voice.  But  the  sentiment  of  attachment  to  the  Union 
triumphed  over  every  consideration  of  interest,  principle,  even 
security,  and  the  snare  succeeded.  Again  the  South  receded, 
again  received  the  stone  instead  of  the  asked-for  loaf,  and  again 
did  she  compromise  her  most  sacred  rights  and  dearest  interests, 
receiving,  if[  return,  the  reluctant  and  insincere  guarantee  of 
the  recovery  of  her  stolen  slaves. 

The  folly  of  the  South  in  assenting  to  this  adjustment  is 
now  obvious  to  the  dullest  understanding,  and  subsequent 
events  were  swift  to  vindicate  the  wisdom,  patriotism,  and 
foresight  of  Mr.  Davis  and  those  who  sustained  him  in  oppo 
sition  to  the  much-vaunted  Union-saving  compromise.  Yet, 
they  were  no  more  disunionists  in  1850  than  rebels  and  trai 
tors  in  1861.  The  charge  of  disunionism  was  freely  iterated 
against  them,  and  not  without  effect,  even  in  their  own  section, 
where  the  sentimental  attachment  to  the  Union  was  stronger, 
just  as  its  sacrifices  in  behalf  of  the  Union  were  greater,  than 
those  of  the  North.  Jefferson  Davis  never  was  a  disunionist, 
not  even  in  his  subsequent  approval  of  secession,  in  the  sense 
of  a  wanton  and  treasonable  disposition  to  sever  the  bonds  of 
that  association  of  co-equal  sovereignties  which  the  founders 
of  the  Federal  Government  bequeathed  to  their  posterity. 

His  action,  at  all  times,  has  been  thoroughly  consistent  with 


78  JYIF.E    OF    JKFFKUSON    1>AVJS. 

his  declared  opinions,  and  with  the  earnest  attachment  to  the 
Union,  avowed  in  his  congressional  speeches  and  in  his  public 
addresses  every- where.  In  1850  and  in  1861  his  course  was 
the  logical  sequence  of  his  opinions,  maintained  and  asserted 
from  his  introduction  to  public  life.  To  save  the  Union,  upon 
the  only  basis  upon  which  it  could  rest  as  a  guarantee  of  liberty, 
— the  basis  of  absolute  equality  among  the  States;  to  blend 
Federal  power  and  States'  Rights,  was  the  grand,  paramount 
object  to  which  all  his  aspirations  and  all  his  investigations 
of  political  science  were  directed.  ^Repudiating  the  power  of 
a  State  to  nullify  an  act  of  Congress,  and  yet  not  surrender 
its  normal  relations  as  a  member  of  the  Union,  he  always  as 
serted  the  right  of  secession,  in  the  last  resort,  as  an  original, 
inherent,  and  vital  attribute  of  State  Sovereignty^  The  Fed 
eral  Government,  to  his  mind,  was  a  mere  agent  of  the  States, 
created  by  them  for  a  few  general  and  intestate  purposes,  but 
having  in  it  no  principle  subversive  of  the  paramount  sover 
eignty  of  the  States.  Rapidly  extending  its  power  by  enact 
ments  of  Congress  and  judicial  constructions,  he  foresaw,  and 
sought  to  counteract,  its  tendency  to  obliterate  all  State  indi 
viduality,  and  ultimately  absorb  into  its  own  keeping  the 
liberties  of  the  people.  With  dread  and  indignation,  he  con 
templated  its  progress  towards  that  monstrum  horrendum,  a 
consolidated  democracy — the  Union  of  to-day,  in  which  we 
see  that  the  will  of  the  majority  is  the  sole  measure  of  its 
powers. 

Such  was  his  consistency,  and  such  his  sagacity,  as  vindi 
cated  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  and  patent  to  the  eyes 
of  the  world  to-day.  Who  can  now  doubt  which  was  the 
better  and  more  logical  theory  ?  Clay  said :  "  I  owe  allegiance 
to  two  sovereignties,  and  only  two :  one  is  to  the  sovereignty 


DAVIS'  IDEAL   UNION.  79 

of  this  Union,  and  the  other  is  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
of  Kentucky."  Thus  he  held  to  the  paradox  of  an  imperium 
in  imperio,  that  obvious  absurdity  in  our  system  of  govern 
ment,  a  divided  sovereignty.  In  his  ardent  Unionism,  the 
great  exponent  of  expediency  disavowed  allegiance  to  the 
South,  though  still  holding  to  his  allegiance  to  Kentucky. 
But  suppose  Kentucky  asserts  her  sovereignty,  and  chooses 
to  unite  with  the  South,  what,  then,  becomes  of  State  Sover 
eignty  and  State  allegiance?  Just  here  was  the  hiatus  in  Clay's 
logic,  and,  closely  pressed  by  Davis,  he  emphatically  declared 
his  first  allegiance  to  the  Union  as  the  supreme  authority ;  and 
the  State  Sovereignty  of  Clay's  conception  was  seen  to  be  as 
intangible  and  unreal  as  the  "  baseless  fabric  of  a  vision." 

Far  more  fair  in  its  semblance,  noble  in  its  proportions,  and 
beautiful  in  its  harmonies,  was  the  ideal  of  Davis.  In  his 
speech  on  the  compromise  measures,  July  31,  1850,  he  said: 

"Give  to  each  section  of  the  Union  justice;  give  to  every  citi 
zen  of  the  United  States  his  rights  as  guaranteed  by  the  Consti 
tution  ;  leave  this  Confederacy  to  rest  upon  that  basis  from  which 
it  arose — the  fraternal  feelings  of  the  people — and  I,  for  one,  have 
no  fear  of  its  perpetuity ;  none  that  it  will  not  survive  beyond  the 
limits  of  human  speculation,  expanding  and  hardening  with  the 
lapse  of  time,  to  extend  its  blessings  to  ages  unnumbered,  and  a 
people  innumerable;  to  include  within  its  empire  all  the  useful 
products  of  the  earth,  and  exemplify  the  capacity  of  a  confeder 
acy,  with  general,  well-defined  powers,  to  extend  inimitably  with 
out  impairing  its  harmony  or  its  strength." 

The  grounds  of  Mr.  Davis'  opposition  to  the  so-called  "  Com 
promise"  programme  of  Mr.  Clay  were  far  otherwise  than  a 
factious  and  impracticable  hostility  to  an  amicable  adjustment 


80  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

of  sectional  differences.  He  conscientiously  doubted  the  dis 
position  of  the  North  to  abstain  from  all  future  interference 
with  Southern  institutions,  and  he  detected  and  exposed  the 
utter  want  of  efficacy  of  the  compromise  measures  as  an  as 
surance  of  protection  against  future  aggression.  He  abhorred 
the  substitution  of  expediency  for  principle ;  could  see  no  com 
promise  where  one  side  simply  surrendered  what  the  other  had 
no  right  to  demand,  and  correctly  estimated  this  settlement, 
like  those  which  had  preceded  it,  as  but  an  invitation  to  still 
more  intolerable  exactions  by  an  implacable  sectional  majority. 
While  discussing,  in  private  conversation  with  Mr.  Clay,  the 
merits  of  Mr.  Webster's  memorable  speech  of  the  7th  of 
March,  1850,  a  few  days  after  its  delivery,  he  briefly,  but 
sufficiently  denned  his  position.  "Come,"  said  Mr.  Clay, 
"my  young  friend;  join  us  in  these  measures  of  pacification. 
Let  us  rally  Congress  and  the  people  to  their  support,  and 
they  will  assure  to  the  country  thirty  years  of  peace.  By 
that  time"  (turning  to  John  M.  Berrien,  who  was  a  party  to 
the  conversation)  "you  and  I  will  be  under  the  sod,  and  my 
young  friend  may  then  have  trouble  again."  "No,"  said 
Davis,  "  I  can  not  consent  to  transfer  to  posterity  a  question 
which  is  as  much  ours  as  theirs,  when  it  is  evident  that  the 
sectional  inequality,  as  it  will  be  greater  then  than  now,  will 
render  hopeless  the  attainment  of  justice." 

His  clear,  penetrating  glance  discovered,  under  the  guise  of 
a  friendly  and  pacific  purpose,  the  insidious  presence  so  mis 
chievous  to  Southern  interests,  just  as  George  Mason,  more 
than  fifty  years  before,  had  seen  the  "poison  under  the  wing 
of  the  Federal  Constitution."  While  the  bill  for  the  organ 
ization  of  the  Territory  of  New  Mexico  was  pending,  the  vig 
ilance  and  sagacity  of  Mr.  Davis  elicited  the  most  flattering 


HIS   OPPOSITION    TO   THE   COMPROMISE.  81 

commendation  from  his  Southern  associates.  In  this  bill  there 
was  a  general  grant,  in  loose  and  ambiguous  phraseology,  of 
legislative  power,  with  a  reservation  that  no  law  should  be 
passed  "  in  respect  to  African  slavery."  Strangely  enough,  this 
provision,  though  obviously  involving  an  inhibition  against 
the  enactment  of  laws  for  the  protection  of  Southern  property, 
escaped  general  detection.  Mr.  Davis  promptly  exposed  its 
purpose,  and  offered  an  amendment,  striking  out  the  restraint 
against  legislation  "in  respect  to  African  slavery,"  and  pro 
hibiting  the  enactment  of  any  law  interfering  "with  those 
rights  of  property  growing  out  of  the  institution  of  African 
slavery  as  it  exists  in  any  of  the  States  of  this  Union."  To 
meet  the  concurrence  of  other  Senators,  the  amendment  was 
variously  modified,  until,  as  explained  by  Mr.  Davis,  it  em 
bodied  "the  general  proposition  that  the  Territorial  Legisla 
ture  should  not  be  prevented  from  passing  the  laws  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  property  of  every  kind 
which  might  be  legally  and  constitutionally  held  in  that  ter 
ritory."  It  is  needless  to  say  that  so  just  a  proposition, 
affording  equal  protection  to  Southern  with  Northern  insti 
tutions,  was  defeated. 

While  there  was  little  in  Mr.  Clay's  plan  of  pacification  to 
recommend  it  to  Southern  support,  beyond  the  merely  tempo 
rary  staving  off  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  and  civil  war, 
it  embodied  propositions  utterly  incompatible  with  the  security 
of  the  South.  Mr.  Davis  especially  and  persistently  com 
bated  its  provision  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  and  the  concession  that  slavery  did  not 
legally  exist  in  the  newly-acquired  territory.  His  position 
upon  the  general  issues  involved  can  not  be  more  clearly  and 

forcibly  stated  than  in  his  own  language: 
6 


82  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  But,  sir,  we  are  called  upon  to  receive  this  as  a  measure  of 
compromise ! — as  a  measure  in  which  we  of  the  minority  are  to 
receive  something.  A  measure  of  compromise!  I  look  upon  it  as 
a  modest  mode  of  taking  that,  the  claim  to  which  has  been  more 
boldly  asserted  by  others ;  and  that  I  may  be  understood  upon 
this  question,  and  that  my  position  may  go  forth  to  the  country  in 
the  same  columns  that  convey  the  sentiments  of  the  Senator  from 
Kentucky,  I  here  assert  that  never  will  I  take  less  than  the  "Mis 
souri  Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  with  specific  right  to 
hold  slaves  in  the  territory  below  that  line ;  and  that  before  such 
territories  are  admitted  into  the  Union  as  States,  slaves  may  be 
taken  there  from  any  of  the  United  States,  at  the  option  of  the 
owners.  I  can  never  consent  to  give  additional  power  to  a  ma 
jority  to  commit  further  aggression  upon  the  minority  in  this 
Union ;  and  I  will  never  consent  to  any  proposition  which  will 
have  such  a  tendency  without  a  full  guarantee  or  counteracting 
measure  is  connected  with  it." 

The  parliamentary  annals  of  the  Union  embrace  no  period 
more  prolific  of  grand  intellectual  efforts  than  the  debates  in 
cident  to  this  gigantic  struggle.  The  prominence  of  Mr.  Da 
vis,  with,  his  extreme  ardor  in  behalf  of  the  rights  and  interests 
of  his  section,  brought  him  constantly  into  conflict  with  the 
most  eminent  leaders  of  both  the  great  political  parties,  who 
bad  cordially  agreed  to  ignore  all  minor  issues  and  unite  in 
the  paramount  purpose  of  saving  the  Union.  Cass,  Douglas, 
Bright,  Dickinson,  and  King,  earnestly  cooperated  with  Clay, 
Webster,  and  other  Whig  champions,  in  tbe  advocacy  of  the 
measures  of  compromise.  That  Davis,  younger  in  years  and 
experience  than  most  of  these  distinguished  men,  amply  sus 
tained  bis  honorable  and  responsible  role  as  tbe  foremost  cham 
pion  of  the  Soutb,  contemporary  public  opinion  and  the  Con- 


MR.  CLAY'S  REGARD  FOR  DAVIS.        83 

gressional  records  give  abundant  testimony.  The  great  com 
promise  chieftain,  between  whom  and  Davis  occurred  such 
obstinate  and  protracted  encounters  in  debate,  delighted  to 
testify  his  respect  for  the  talents  and  intrepidity  of  his  "  young 
friend,"  which  was  his  habitual  salutation  to  Davis.  Despite 
the  pronounced  antagonism  between  them,  on  all  measures  of 
public  policy,  and  their  comparatively  brief  acquaintance,  Mr. 
Clay  repeatedly  evinced,  in  a  most  touching  manner,  his  warm 
regard  for  one  who  had  been  the  companion-in-arms  and  cher 
ished  friend  of  a  noble  son,*  who  lost  his  life  on  the  same 
field,  upon  which  Davis  won  such  deathless  distinction.  "  My 
poor  boy,"  were  his  words  to  the  latter,  upon  his  return  from 
Mexico,  "  usually  occupied  about  one-half  of  his  letters  home 
in  praising  you."  A  still  more  touching  incident,  illustrative 
of  his  friendly  regard,  at  the  moment  not  understood  by  those 
present,  occurred,  in  the  heat  of  discussion  during  the  exciting 
period,  which  we  have  had  under  consideration.  Replying  to 
Davis,  said  Mr.  Clay :  "  My  friend  from  Mississippi — and  I 
trust  that  he  will  permit  me  to  call  him  my  friend,  for  between 
us  there  is  a  tie,  the  nature  of  which  we  both  well  understand." 
At  this  moment  the  utterance  of  the  aged  statesman  became 
tremulous  with  emotion,  and,  bowing  his  head,  his  eyes  were 
seen  to  fill  with  tears.  This  friendship  was  warmly  recipro 
cated  by  Mr.  Davis,  and  its  recollections  are  among  those  the 
most  highly-cherished  of  his  public  life. 

With  the  defeat  of  those  who  had  opposed  the  compromise, 
terminated,  for  the  present,  Southern  resistance  in  Congress, 
though  it  did  not  for  an  instant  check  Northern  aggression. 
Yet  many  prominent  public  characters  at  the  South,  and,  as  the 

*  Henry  Clay,  Jr.,  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  volunteers.     He  fell  at  Buena  Vista. 


84  LIFE   OF   JEFFEBSON   DAVIS. 

sequel  demonstrated,  indorsed  by  popular  sentiment,  avowed 
themselves  fully  satisfied  with  a  mere  show  of  triumph  and 
pretense  of  justice — a  few  paltry  concessions,  not  worth  the 
parchment  upon  which  they  were  written.  In  the  meantime, 
upon  another  arena,  Mr.  Davis  entered  upon  a  gallant  strug 
gle,  in  opposition  to  a  policy  from  which  he  foresaw  and  pre 
dicted  a  fruitful  yield  of  disaster  in  the  future. 


THE  COMPROMISE  BEFORE  THE  PEOPLE.        85 


CHAPTER    V. 

OPPOSITION  TO  THE  COMPROMISE  IN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  AND  MISSISSIPPI  —  DAVIS 
A  CANDIDATE  FOR  GOVERNOR  —  HIS  DEFEAT  REALLY  A  PERSONAL  TRIUMPH  — 
IN  RETIREMENT,  SUPPORTS  GENERAL  PIERCE'  S  ELECTION  -  DECLINES  AN  AP 

POINTMENT  IN  PIERCE'  s  CABINET,  BUT  SUBSEQUENTLY  ACCEPTS  SECRETARY 

SHIP  OF  WAR  -  REMARKABLE  UNITY  OF  PIERCE'  S  ADMINISTRATION,  AND 
HIGH  CHARACTER  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  —  DAVIS  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  —  KAN 
SAS-NEBRASKA  BILL  AND  THE  EXCITEMENT  WHICH  FOLLOWED  -  DAVIS  AGAIN 
ELECTED  TO  THE  SENATE  -  SPEECHES  AT  PASS  CHRISTIAN  AND  OTHER  POINTS 
WHILE  ON  HIS  WAY  TO  WASHINGTON. 


,  though  the  battle  had  been  fought  and  won  in  Con- 
gress,  and  it  was  evident,  at  an  early  date,  that  the  weight 
of  great  names  in  favor  of  the  Compromise,  aided  by  the  ever- 
timid  counsels  of  capital  and  commerce,  would  command  for 
that  measure  the  overwhelming  support  of  the  country,  the 
States'  Rights  men  were  resolved  upon  a  test  of  popular  senti 
ment.  Accordingly,  in  South  Carolina  and  Mississippi,  States 
at  all  times  the  most  advanced  in  Southern  feeling,  the  oppo 
nents  of  the  Compromise  organized,  as  did  its  friends  also. 
The  issue,  though  substantially  the  same,  was  presented  in  a 
somewhat  different  form  in  these  two  States. 

In  South  Carolina,  where  public  sentiment  was  always  sin 
gularly  unanimous,  upon  all  questions  affecting  the  honor  and 
interests  of  the  South,  and  in  entire  accord  as  to  the  mode 
and  measure  of  redress  for  the  grievances  of  the  States,  the 
propriety  of  resistance  was  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  only 


86  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

question  was,  whether  South  Carolina  should  act  separately, 
or  await  the  cooperation  of  other  Southern  States.  The  party 
of  cooperation  triumphed  in  the  election  of  members  to  a  State 
convention,  by  the  decisive  popular  majority  of  seven  thousand 
votes. 

In  Mississippi  the  issue  was  one  of  resistance  or  acquiescence. 
The  States'  Rights,  or  resistance  party,  embraced  four-fifths  of 
the  Democracy  of  the  State  and  a  small  accession  of  States' 
Rights  Whigs ;  while  the  Union,  or  Compromise  party,  was 
composed  of  the  Clay  Whigs  and  a  fraction  of  the  Democracy. 

The  Legislature  provided  an  election  for  members  of  a  State 
convention  to  consider  the  subject  of  Federal  aggressions,  to 
be  held  in  September,  1851,  and,  in  the  ensuing  November  the 
regular  election  of  Governor  occurred.  Much  interest  centred 
upon  the  gubernatorial  contest,  and  the  State  was  for  months 
previous  to  the  election  the  scene  of  great  excitement.  Gen 
eral  John  A.  Quitman,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  officers 
of  the  army,  during  the  Mexican  war,  a  man  of  the  loftiest 
character,  a  reliable  statesman,  and  sterling  patriot,  was  nomi 
nated  by  the  States'  Rights  Convention.  Mr.  Henry  S.  Foote, 
then  a  Senator  from  Mississippi,  and  an  active  supporter  of 
the  Compromise  measures,  was  the  candidate  of  the  Union 
party.  While  an  exceedingly  animated  canvass  between  these 
candidates  was  still  in  progress,  the  election  for  members  of 
the  convention  resulted  in  an  aggregate  majority  of  seven 
thousand  five  hundred  votes  for  the  Union  candidates.  Gen 
eral  Quitman,  disappointed  by  such  an  unexpected  and  deci 
sive  exhibition  of  public  sentiment,  and  viewing  it  as  the 
forerunner  of  the  result  of  the  gubernatorial  election  in  No 
vember,  withdrew  from  the  contest. 

Mr.  Davis,  who  had  already  been  elected  for  a  second  term 


CANDIDATE    FOR   GOVERNORSHIP.  87 

to  the  Senate,  was  now  looked  to  as  almost  the  sole  depend 
ence  of  the  States'  Eights  men,  and  they  summoned  him  to 
take  the  field  as  the  adversary  of  Mr.  Foote.  There  was  little 
inducement,  had  he  consulted  selfish  considerations,  to  relin 
quish  a  high  position,  already  secured,  and  become  the  leader 
of  a  forlorn  hope.  Though  greatly  enfeebled  in  health,  and 
at  that  time  an  acute  sufferer,  he  accepted  the  nomination. 
His  sense  of  duty  and  devotion  to  his  principles  triumphed 
even  over  his  physical  infirmities,  and,  resigning  his  seat  in 
the  Senate,  he  entered  upon  the  canvass. 

The  result  was,  as  had  been  foreseen,  the  defeat  of  Mr.  Da 
vis.  Mr.  Foote,  a  man  of  more  than  average  ability,  and  of 
varied  and  extensive  attainments,  whose  excessive  garrulity  and 
total  want  of  discretion  disqualified  him  for  usefulness  as  a 
member  of  a  legislative  body,  or  for  any  practical  end  of 
statesmanship,  was,  nevertheless,  an  adroit  party  tactician. 
"With  great  dexterity  he  had  conducted  the  canvass  with  Gen 
eral  Quitman,  by  skillfully  evading  the  real  issue,  introducing 
side  questions,  and  thus  breaking  the  force  of  the  plain  and 
statesman-like  arguments  of  his  more  open  and  less  dexterous 
adversary.  When  Mr.  Davis  entered  the  field,  under  all  the 
disadvantages  to  which  we  have  alluded,  the  election  of  Foote 
was  almost  universally  conceded.  Had  the  canvass  lasted  a 
few  weeks,  however,  the  result,  in  all  probability,  would  have 
been  different.  The  popularity  of  Mr.  Davis  was  indicated 
by  the  paltry  majority  (nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  votes) 
given  against  him,  as  compared  with  the  Union  majority  at 
the  election  in  September,  for  members  of  the  convention. 
Under  all  the  circumstances,  his  friends  rightly  viewed  it  as  a 
personal  triumph,  and  he  emerged  from  the  contest  with  in 
creased  reputation  and  public  regard. 


LIFE    OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

The  results  of  these  appeals  to  popular  judgment  were 
scarcely  less  decisive,  in  favor  of  the  Compromise,  than  had 
been  its  congressional  victory.  It  was  evident  that  the 
Southern  people  were  yet  far  from  being  ready  for  organized 
and  practical  resistance,  and  were  not  likely  to  be,  until  some 
flagrant  outrage  should  arouse  their  resentment. 

Mr.  Davis  was  now  in  retirement,  and,  though  abiding  the 
decision  of  Mississippi,  he  was  yet  avowedly  determined  to 
devote  his  energies  to  the  efficient  organization  of  the  States' 
Eights  party  for  future  struggles.  Yet  nothing  was  farther 
from  his  purpose  than  a  factious  agitation.  His  aim  was  to 
secure  for  the  States'  Rights  principle  a  moral  and  numerical 
support  in  the  ranks  of  the  Democracy,  which  should  enable 
its  friends  to  wield  an  appropriate  influence  upon  the  policy 
of  that  party.  He  contemplated  no  organization  outside  of 
the  Democracy,  for  the  promotion  of  disunionism  per  se  ;  and, 
in  the  Presidential  canvass  of  1852,  separated  himself  from 
many  of  his  closest  personal  and  political  friends,  who  had 
nominated  the  Presidential  ticket  of  Troup  and  Quitman, 
upon  the  distinctive  platform  of  States'  Rights  and  separa 
tion. 

The  nomination  of  Franklin  Pierce,  upon  the  Baltimore  plat 
form,  met  his  cordial  approbation,  and  received  his  active  sup 
port.  With  General  Pierce,  Mr.  Davis  held  the  most  friendly 
relations,  and  in  his  constitutional  opinions  he  had  entire  con 
fidence.  His  support  of  the  platform  was  quite  as  consistent 
as  his  advocacy  of  the  nominee.  Both  indorsed,  with  em 
phasis,  the  Compromise,  which  he  had  opposed,  but  which  Mis 
sissippi  had  ratified,  and  both  avowed  their  acceptance  of  it, 
as  a  finality,  beyond  which  there  was  to  be  no  farther  agitation 
of  the  slavery  question.  In  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Ten- 


SECRETARY   OF   WAR.  89 

nessee  he  participated  actively  in  the  canvass,  and  rendered 
most  efficient  service  to  his  party,  especially  in  the  two  latter 
States. 

General  Pierce  indicated  his  estimate  of  Davis,  by  a  prompt 
tender  of  a  position  in  his  Cabinet.  Considering  himself  com 
mitted  to  the  fortunes  of  his  principles  in  Mississippi,  he  pre 
ferred  to  "remain  and  fight  the  issue  out  there/7  and  reluc 
tantly  declined.  Subsequently  the  President-elect  addressed 
him  a  letter  expressing  a  desire  that,  upon  personal  grounds 
at  least,  Mr.  Davis  should  be  present  at  his  inauguration. 
After  he  had  reached  Washington  the  tender  of  a  Cabinet  ap 
pointment  was  repeated.  The  obvious  advantages  to  the  States' 
Eights  party  of  representation  in  the  Government,  an  argu 
ment  earnestly  urged  upon  him  by  prominent  Southern  states 
men,  at  length  overcame  his  personal  preference,  and  he  ac 
cepted  the  position  of  Secretary  of  War. 

With  the  policy  of  President  Pierce's  administration,  Secre 
tary  Davis  was,  of  course,  fully  identified.  Whatever  of  in 
fluence  and  sympathy  he  could  command,  were  employed  in 
promoting  its  success,  and  between  the  President  and  himself 
there  was  an  uninterrupted  harmony  of  personal  and  official 
intercourse.  Indeed  the  glory  of  this  administration  and  the 
explanation  of  its  title  to  that  high  award  which  it  earned 
from  impartial  criticism,  for  its  courageous  pursuit  of  an  up 
right,  constitutional  policy,  was  the  characteristic  unity  which 
prevailed  between  its  head  and  his  advisers.  During  the  four 
years  of  its  existence  the  Cabinet  of  President  Pierce  continued 
unchanged,  at  its  close  the  head  of  each  department  surrender 
ing  the  seals  of  office  which  he  had  received  at  its  inaugur 
ation.  The  history  of  no  other  administration  is  adorned  with 
such  an  instance  of  cordial  and  unbroken  cooperation,  and  the 


90  LIFE   OF    JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

fact  is  equally  creditable  to  the  sagacity  of  General  Pierce  in 
the  selection  of  his  advisers,  and  his  consummate  tact  in  the 
reconciliation  of  those  antagonisms,  which  are  hardly  to  be 
avoided  in  the  operations  of  the  complicated  machinery  of 
Government. 

A  common  statement  of  its  enemies,  that  the  administration 
must  eventually  break  down  by  disorganization,  in  consequence 
of  the  utterly  discordant  elements  which  composed  it,  was  never 
realized.  At  one  time  Mr.  Marcy,  the  Secretary  of  State,  was 
the  wily  Macchiavelli,  against  whose  intrigues  the  rest  of  the 
Cabinet  was  in  arms,  while  Mr.  Davis  was  charged  with  play 
ing  alternately  the  roles  of  Richelieu  and  Marplot. 

Of  all  American  executives,  Franklin  Pierce  is  preemi 
nently  entitled  to  the  designation  of  the  constitutional  Presi 
dent.  The  great  covenant  of  American  liberty,  so  ruthlessly 
despoiled  in  these  degenerate  days,  when  opportunity  and  pre 
text  are  the  sufficient  justification  of  flagrant  violations  of 
justice,  was  the  guide  whose  precepts  he  followed  without  de 
viation.  His  Northern  birth  and  training  did  not  swerve  from 
his  obligations  to  extend  an  equal  protection  to  the  interests 
of  other  sections,  the  patriotic  executive,  whom  posterity  will 
delight  to  honor,  for  his  wisdom,  purity,  and  impartiality,  just 
in  proportion  as  those  qualities  provoke  the  clamor  of  the 
dominant  ignorance  and  passion  of  to-day. 

In  a  Cabinet,  noted  for  its  ability,  of  which  "William  L. 
Marcy  was  the  Premier,  and  Caleb  Cushing  the  Attorney- 
General,  Secretary  Davis  occupied  a  position  worthy  of  his 
abilities  and  his  previous  reputation,  and  peculiarly  gratifying 
to  his  military  tastes.  It  is  no  disparagement  of  his  associates 
to  say  that  his  strongly-marked  character  commanded  a  con 
stant  and  emphatic  recognition  in  the  policy  of  the  Government. 


SECRETARY    OF    WAR.  91 

Under  his  control  the  department  of  war  was  greatly  ad 
vanced  in  dignity  and  importance,  receiving  a  character  far 
more  distinctive  and  independent  of  other  branches  of  the 
Government  than  it  had  previously  claimed.  He  infused  into 
all  its  operations  an  energy  till  then  unknown,  introducing  im 
provements  so  extensive  and  comprehensive  as  to  occasion  ap 
prehension  of  an  almost  too  powerful  and  independent  system 
of  military  organization.  It  is  a  fact  universally  conceded 
that  his  administration  of  the  War  Office  was  incomparably 
superior  to  that  of  any  official  who  has  filled  that  position-^ 
contributing  more  to  the  promotion  of  efficiency  in  the  army, 
to  the  advancement  of  those  great  national  establishments  so 
vital  to  the  security  of  the  nation,  and  to  the  systematic,  prac 
tical  management  of  the  details  of  the  office.  In  reviewing 
Mr.  Davis'  conduct  of  this  important  department  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  the  splendid  improvements  which  he  inaugurated,  his 
earnest  and  unceasing  labors  in  behalf  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
army,  it  is  impossible  to  overestimate  his  eminent  services  to 
the  Union,  which  even  at  that  time  his  traducers  and  those  of 
the  South  would  pretend  he  was  plotting  to  destroy.  In  the 
Cabinet,  as  in  the  Senate,  there  was  no  measure  of  national  ad 
vantage  to  which  he  did  not  give  his  cordial  support,  no  great 
national  institution  which  he  would  not  have  fostered  with 
generous  and  timely  sympathy;  nothing  to  which  he  was  not 
zealously  committed,  promising  to  redound  to  the  glory,  pros 
perity,  and  perpetuity  of  that  Union,  in  whose  service  he  had 
been  trained,  whose  uniform  he  had  proudly  worn,  and  beneath 
whose  banner  he  had  braved  a  soldier's  death. 

Secretary  Davis  made  many  recommendations  contemplat 
ing  radical  alterations  in  the  military  system  of  the  Union. 
One  of  his  first  measures  was  a  recommendation  for  the  thor- 


92  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

ough  revision  of  the  army  regulations.  He  opposed  the  plac 
ing  of  officers,  at  an  early  period  of  service,  permanently  upon 
the  staff,  and  advocated  a  system,  which,  he  contended,  would 
improve  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  officers,  "  whereby  the 
right  of  command  should  follow  rank  by  one  certain  rule." 
The  increase  of  the  medical  corps ;  the  introduction  of  camels ; 
the  introduction  of  the  light  infantry  or  rifle  system  of  tac 
tics,  rifled  muskets,  and  the  Minie-ball  were  all  measures  ad 
vocated  by  Secretary  Davis,  and  discussed  in  his  official  papers 
with  a  force  and  intelligence  that  make  them  highly  valuable 
to  the  military  student.  He  urged  a  thorough  exploration  of 
the  Western  frontier,  and  important  changes  in  the  arrange 
ment  of  defenses  against  the  Indians,  demonstrai  ing  the  ineffi 
ciency  of  the  system  of  small  forts  for  the  purposes  of  war 
with  the  savages.  To  obviate,  in  a  measure,  the  expense,  and 
almost  useless  trouble,  of  locating  military  posts  in  advance 
of  settlement,  he  suggested  the  plan  of  maintaining  large  gar 
risons  at  certain  points,  situated  favorably  for  obtaining  sup 
plies  and  accessible  by  steamboat  or  railway.  From  these 
posts  strong  detachments  could  be  supplied  and  equipped  for 
service  in  the  Indian  country.  His  efforts  were  most  strenu 
ous  to  obtain  an  increase  of  pay  to  officers  of  the  army,  and 
pensions  to  the  widows  and  orphans  of  officers  and  men,  upon 
a  basis  similar  to  that  of  the  navy. 

During  the  Crimean  war,  Secretary  Davis  sent  a  commis 
sion,  of  which  Major-General  McClellan,  then  a  captain  of 
cavalry,  was  a  member,  to  study  and  report  upon  the  science 
of  war  and  the  condition  of  European  armies,  as  illustrated  in 
the  operations  incident  to  that  struggle.  At  his  suggestion 
four  new  regiments — two  of  cavalry — were  added  to  the  army, 
and  numerous  appropriations  made  for  the  construction  of  new 


REVIVAL   OF   AGITATION.  93 

forts,  improvements  in  small  arms,  and  the  accumulation  of 
munitions  of  war. 

The  Presidential  term  of  Pierce  expired  on  the  4th  of 
March,  1857,  and  with  it  terminated  the  connection  of  Mr. 
Davis  with  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government.  He  re 
tired  with  the  hearty  respect  of  his  associates,  and  in  the 
enjoyment  of  the  most  confiding  friendship  with  the  late 
head  of  the  Government,  a  feeling  which  is  cherished  by 
both,  with  unabated  warmth,  at  this  day.  All  parties  con 
curred  in  pronouncing  Mr.  Davis'  conduct  of  his  department 
successful,  able,  and  brilliant,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  tide 
of  misrepresentation,  with  which,  during  and  since  the  war, 
it  has  been  sought  to  overwhelm  his  reputation,  the  least 
candid  of  his  accusers  have  been  compelled  to  this  reluctant 
confession. 

Incidental  to  the  late  administration,  but  by  no  means 
traceable  to  its  influence,  had  been  legislation  by  Congress  of 
a  most  important  character,  which  was  to  give  a  powerful  im 
pulse  to  agencies  long  tending  to  the  destruction  of  the  Union. 
The  election  of  Pierce  had  been  carried  with  a  unanimity  un 
precedented,  upon  the  distinct  pledge  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
Compromise  as  a  finality.  The  country,  for  months  subse 
quently,  reposed  in  profound  quiet,  produced  by  its  confidence 
in  an  approaching  season  of  unequaled  prosperity,  and  exempt 
from  all  danger  of  political  agitation.  This  hallucination  was 
destined  to  be  speedily  and  rudely  dispelled  by  events,  which 
aiford  striking  evidence  of  how  completely  the  peace  and  hap 
piness  of  the  American  people  have  always  been  at  the  mercy 
of  aspiring  and  unscrupulous  demagogues.  Mr.  Stephen  A. 


94  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

Douglas  must  ever  be  held,  equally  by  both  sections,  respon 
sible  for  the  disastrous  agitation,  which  followed  his  introduc 
tion  of  certain  measures,  under  the  pretense  of  a  sentimental 
justice,  or  a  concession  of  principle  to  the  South,  but  in  reality 
prompted  by  his  personal  ambition,  and  which  greatly  aided 
to  precipitate  the  catastrophe  of  disunion. 

Upon  the  application  of  the  Territory  of  Nebraska  for  ad 
mission  into  the  Union,  Senator  Douglas,  from  the  Committee 
on  Territories,  submitted  a  bill  creating  the  two  Territories  of 
Nebraska  and  Kansas,  and  affirming  the  supersession  of  the 
Missouri  restriction  of  1820,  which  prohibited  slavery  north 
of  36°  30',  by  the  Compromise  of  1850.  It  declared  the  Mis 
souri  restriction  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  non-inter 
vention  by  Congress  with  territorial  affairs,  which  had  been 
adopted  in  the  settlement  of  1850,  and  therefore  inoperative. 

This  bill  was  apparently  a  mere  concession  of  principle  to 
the  South,  not  likely  to  be  of  much  practical  value,  but  still 
gratifying,  as  it  gave  to  her  citizens  the  right  to  carry  their 
property  into  districts  from  which  it  had  been  hitherto  in 
hibited.  Passing  both  houses  of  Congress,  in  1854,  it  was 
approved  by  the  Pierce  administration,*  sanctioned  by  the 

*  The  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  has  been  commonly  alluded 
to  as  the  special  and  leading  measure  of  the  Pierce  administration.  It 
was,  in  reality,  not  an  administration  measure.  The  well-known  cor 
diality  of  Mr.  Davis'  relations  with  President  Pierce  induced  a  number 
of  Senators  to  call  upon  Mr.  Davis,  on  the  Sunday  morning  previous  to 
the  introduction  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill,  and  ask  his  aid  in  securing 
them  the  pledge  of  the  President's  approval.  They  represented  the  meas 
ure  as  contemplating  merely  the  assertion  of  the  rights  of  property,  slavery 
included,  in  the  Territories.  Mr.  Davis  objected,  at  first,  to  an  interrup 
tion  of  the  President,  on  the  Sabbath,  for  such  a  purpose,  but  finally 
yielded.  The  President  promptly  signified  his  approbation  of  a  measure 
contemplating  such  a  purpose.  It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  the  legis 
lation  of  Congress  embraced  a  far  greater  scope  than  that  indicated.  The 


ELECTED   UNITED   STATES   SENATOR.  95 

Democracy  generally,  and  greeted  by  the  South  as  a  triumph. 
It  was  not  imagined  that  a  victory,  so  purely  sentimental 
and  intangible,  could  be  accepted  by  the  North,  as  a  pretext 
for  violent  eruptions  of  sectional  jealousy,  and  least  of  all  did 
the  South  believe  its  author  capable  of  the  subsequent  duplic 
ity  with  which,  by  specious  arguments  and  verbal  ingenuity, 
he  claimed  for  the  measure,  a  construction  far  more  insidious, 
but  not  less  fatal  to  her  interests,  than  the  designs  of  pro 
claimed  Abolitionists.  The  immediate  result  was  a  tempest 
of  excitement  in  the  Northern  States,  in  the  midst  of  which 
the  so-called  Republican  party,  for  the  first  time,  appeared  as 
a  formidable  contestant  in  political  struggles,  and  defeated  the 
Democracy  in  almost  every  State  election.  The  latter,  with 
extreme  difficulty,  elected  Mr.  Buchanan  to  the  Presidency  two 
years  afterwards. 

In  the  meantime,  while  his  term  of  office  as  Secretary  of 
War  was  still  unexpired,  Mr.  Davis  had  been  elected,  by  the 
Legislature  of  Mississippi,  to  the  Senate,  for  the  term  beginning 
March  4,  1857.  On  his  return  home,  he  was  received  by  the 
Democracy  of  the  State  with  distinguished  honors.  Dinners, 
receptions,  and  public  entertainments  of  various  kinds  were 
tendered  him;  and,  during  the  summer  and  autumn,  previous 
to  his  departure  for  Washington,  he  addressed  numerous  large 
popular  gatherings  with  his  accustomed  force  and  boldness 
upon  pending  issues.  These  addresses  commanded  universal 
attention,  and  were  highly  commended  for  their  able,  dispas 
sionate,  and  statesman-like  character. 

administration  indorsed  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  in  full,  because  the 
principle  was  correct,  though  its  assertion  then  was  wholly  unnecessary, 
unprofitable,  and  likely  to  lead  to  mischievous  results.  This  was  the  real 
connection  of  the  Pierce  administration  with  a  measure  for  whose  conse 
quences  the  ambition  of  Judge  Douglas  was  almost  solely  responsible. 


96  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

His  speech  at  Pass  Christian,  while  on  his  journey  to  Wash 
ington,  was  a  masterly  and  eloquent  review  of  the  condition 
of  the  country,  with  its  causes  and  remedies.  He  attributed 
the  national  difficulties  chiefly  to  the  puritanical  intolerance 
and  growing  disregard  of  constitutional  obligations  of  the 
North.  These  influences  seriously  menaced  the  safety  of  the 
Union,  for  which  he  had  no  hope,  unless  in  the  event  of  a 
reaction  in  Northern  sentiment,  or  of  such  resolute  action  by 
a  united  South  as  should  compel  her  enemies  to  respect  their 
constitutional  duties.  To  the  latter  policy  he  looked  as  the 
best  guarantee  of  the  security  of  the  South  and  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union.  Interference  by  one  State  with  the  in 
stitutions  of  another  could  not,  under  any  circumstances,  be 
tolerated,  even  though  resistance  should  eventually  result  in 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  The  latter  event  was  possible — 
indeed,  might  become  necessary — but  should  never  be  under 
taken  save  in  the  last  extremity.  He  would  not  disguise  the 
profound  emotion  with  which  he  contemplated  the  possibility 
of  disunion.  The  fondest  reminiscences  of  his  life  were  asso 
ciated  with  the  Union,  into  whose  military  service,  while  yet 
a  boy,  he  had  entered.  In  his  matured  manhood  he  had  fol 
lowed  its  flag  to  victory;  had  seen  its  graceful  folds  wave 
in  the  peaceful  pageant,  and,  again,  its  colors  conspicuous 
amid  the  triumphs  of  the  battle-field;  he  had  seen  that  flag 
in  the  East,  brightened  by  the  sun  at  its  rising,  and,  in  the 
"West,  gilded  by  his  declining  rays — and  the  tearing  of  one 
star  from  its  azure  field  would  be  to  him  as  would  the  loss  of 
a  child  to  a  bereaved  parent. 

This  speech — one  of  the  most  eloquent  he  has  ever  made — 
was  received  by  his  audience  with  unbounded  enthusiasm,  and 
was  approvingly  noticed  by  the  press  of  both  sections. 


VIEWS  UPON   IMPORTANT   QUESTIONS.  97 

At  Mississippi  City  he  delivered  an  address  in  explanation 
of  his  personal  course,  and  in  vindication  of  the  administra 
tion  of  which  he  had  lately  been  a  member.  He  had  obeyed 
the  will  of  Mississippi,  respecting  the  legislation  of  1850, 
though  against  his  convictions,  and,  in  the  present  disorders 
in  Kansas,  he  saw  the  fruits  of  the  unwise  substitution  of 
expediency  for  principle.  Of  President  Pierce  he  could  speak 
only  in  terms  of  eulogy,  defended  his  vetoes  of  bills  "for  in 
ternal  improvements  and  eleemosynary  purposes/'  depicting, 
in  passages  of  rare  and  fervent  eloquence,  his  heroic  adherence 
to  the  Constitution,  elevated  patriotism,  and  distinguished  vir 
tues.  Contrasting  the  conduct  of  the  Fillmore  and  Pierce 
administrations  concerning  the  Cuban  question,  he  avowed 
his  belief  that  Cuba  would  then  be  in  possession  of  the  United 
States  had  Congress  sustained  General  Pierce  in  his  prompt 
and  decided  suggestions  as  to  the  Black  Warrior  difficulty. 

Mr.  Davis  expressed  his  approbation  of  the  course  pursued 
by  the  late  administration  with  reference  to  Nicaragua.  "  Un 
lawful  expeditions"  should  be  suppressed,  though  he  should 
rejoice  at  the  establishment  of  American  institutions  in  Cen 
tral  America,  and  maintained  the  ri^ht  of  the  United  States 

'  O 

to  a  paramount  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  continent,  with 
which  European  interference  should  be,  at  all  times,  promptly 
checked. 

When  the  Thirty-fifth  Congress  assembled  in  December, 
1857,  the  Kansas  question  had  already  developed  a  difficult 
and  critical  phase.  The  rock  upon  which  Mr.  Buchanan's 
administration  was  to  split  had  been  encountered,  and  the 
wedge  prepared,  with  which  the  Democratic  party  was  des 
tined  to  be  torn  asunder. 
7 


98  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

RETURN  OF  MR.  DAVIS  TO  THE  SENATE OPENING  EVENTS  OF  MR.  BUCHANAN'S 

ADMINISTRATION TRUE    INTERPRETATION    OF   THE    LEGISLATION    OF    1854 

SENATOR  DOUGLAS  THE  INSTRUMENT  OF  DISORGANIZATION  IN  THE  DEMO 
CRATIC  PARTY HIS  ANTECEDENTS  AND  CHARACTER AN  ACCOMPLISHED  DEM 
AGOGUE DAVIS  AND  DOUGLAS  CONTRASTED BOTH  REPRESENTATIVES  OF 

THEIR    RESPECTIVE    SECTIONS DOUGLAS   AMBITION HIS    COUP   D'ETAT,    AND 

ITS  RESULTS THE  KANSAS  QUESTION DOUGLAS'  TRIUMPHS  OVER  THE  SOUTH 

AND  THE  UNITY  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  LOST — "  SQUATTER  SOVER 
EIGNTY*' PROPERLY  CHARACTERIZED  — DAVIS'  COURSE  IN  THE  KANSAS 

STRUGGLE DEBATE    WITH    SENATOR    FESSENDEN PEN-AND-INK    SKETCH    OF 

MR.    DAVIS    AT    THIS   PERIOD TRUE    SIGNIFICANCE   OF   POLITICAL    EVENTS    TO 

THE  SOUTH SHE  RIGHTLY  INTERPRETS  THEM MR.  DAVIS'  COURSE  SUBSE 
QUENT  TO  THE  KANSAS  IMBROGLIO — HIS  DEBATES  WITH  DOUGLAS TWO  DIF 
FERENT  SCHOOLS  OF  PARLIAMENTARY  SPEAKING DAVIS  THE  LEADER  OF  THE 

REGULAR   DEMOCRACY  IN  THE  THIRTY-SIXTH  CONGRESS HIS  RESOLUTIONS 

HIS  CONSISTENCY COURSE  AS  TO  GENERAL  LEGISLATION VISITS  THE  NORTH 

SPEAKS  IN  PORTLAND,  BOSTON,  NEW  YORK,  AND  OTHER  PLACES REPLY  TO 

AN    INVITATION    TO    ATTEND    THE  WEBSTER   BIRTH-DAY    FESTIVAL MR.    SEW- 

ARD'S  ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  THE  "IRREPRESSIBLE  CONFLICT" MR.  DAVIS  BE 
FORE  MISSISSIPPI  DEMOCRATIC  STATE  CONVENTION PROGRESS  OF  DISUNION — 

DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY — SPEECHES  OF  MR.  DAVIS  AT  PORT 
LAND  AND  IN  SENATE. 

MR.  DAVIS  returned  to  the  Senate  at  a  period  marked 
by  agitation,  no  less  menacing  to  the  Union  than  that 
which  had  so  seriously  threatened  it  in  1850.  His  health  at 
this  time  was  exceedingly  infirm,  and  for  several  months  he 
was  so  much  prostrated  by  his  protracted  sufferings,  that  a 
proper  regard  for  the  suggestions  of  prudence  would  have  jus- 


RETURNS   TO   THE   SENATE.  99 

tified  his  entire  abstinence  from  the  labors  and  excitements  of 
this  stormy  period.  Again  and  again,  however,  did  his  heroic 
devotion  carry  him  from  his  sick  bed  to  the  capitol,  to  engage 
in  the  death-struggle  of  the  South,  with  her  leagued  enemies, 
for  safety  in  the  Union,  which  she  was  still  loath  to  abandon, 
even  under  the  pressure  of  intolerable  wrong.  Frequently, 
with  attenuated  frame  and  bandaged  eyes,  he  was  to  be  seen 
in  the  Senate,  at  moments  critical  in  the  fierce  sectional  con 
flict;  and  at  the  final  struggle  upon  the  Kansas  question,  not 
even  the  earnest  admonitions  of  his  physiciaix^that  to  leave 
his  chamber  would  probably  be  followed  by  the  most  dan 
gerous  results,  were  availing  to  induce  his  absence  from  the 
scene. 

The  opening  events  of  the  first  session  of  the  Thirty -fifth 
Congress,  (the  first  incidental  to  the  administration  of  Mr. 
Buchanan,)  were  far  from  being  auspicious  of  the  continued 
unity  of  the  Democratic  party,  which,  for  several  years  past, 
the  intelligence  of  the  country  had  correctly  appreciated  as  an 
essential  condition  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 

Mainly  through  the  undivided  support  given  him  by  the 
South,  Mr.  Buchanan  was  elected  upon  the  Cincinnati  plat 
form  of  1856,  which  was  a  re-affirmation  of  the  cardinal  tenets 
of  the  Democratic  faith,  involving  also  emphatic  approval  of 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  legislation,  two  years  previous.  Not 
until  months  after  his  inauguration  were  there  any  indications 
of  hostility  to  his  administration  within  the  ranks  of  his  own 
party.  Nor  had  there  been  any  avowed  difference  of  construc 
tion  as  to  the  end  and  effect  of  the  legislation  of  1854.  The 
rare  unanimity  with  which  the  South  had  been  rallied  to  the 
support  of  the  Democracy  was  based  upon  the  unreserved 
admission,  by  all  parties,  that  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  was 


100  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

designedly  friendly  in  its  spirit,  at  all  events,  to  Southern  in 
terests.  No  Southern  statesman,  for  a  moment,  dreamed  that 
it  was  capable  of  an  interpretation  unfriendly  to  his  section. 
That  the  plain  purpose  of  the  bill  was  to  remove  the  subject 
of  slavery  outside  the  bounds  of  congressional  discussion,  and 
to  place  it  in  the  disposition  of  the  States  separately,  and  in 
the  Territories,  when  organizing  for  admission  as  States,  was 
regarded  by  the  South  as  the  leading  vital  principle  which 
challenged  her  enthusiastic  support.  Such,  indeed,  was  the  doc 
trine  asserted  by  the  entire  Democratic  party  of  the  South, 
enunciated  by  the  administration,  and  tacitly  approved  by  the 
Northern  Democracy.  Very  soon,  however,  after  the  meeting 
of  Congress,  the  action  of  Senator  Douglas  revealed  him  as  the 
instrument  of  disorganization  in  his  party.  To  a  proper  un^ 
derstanding  of  his  motives  and  conduct  at  this  conjuncture,  a 
brief  statement  of  his  antecedents  is  essential. 

Stephen  A.  Douglas  was  now  in  the  meridian  of  life  and 
the  full  maturity  of  his  unquestionably  vigorous  intellectual 
powers.  For  twenty-five  years  he  had  been  prominent  in  the 
arena  of  politics,  and  as  a  member  of  Congress  his  course  had 
been  so  eminently  politic  and  judicious  as  to  make  him  a  favor 
ite  with  the  Democracy,  both  North  and  South.  To  an  unex 
ampled  degree  his  public  life  illustrated  the  combination  of 
those  characteristics  of  the  demagogue,  a  fertile  ingenuity,  facile 
accommodation  to  circumstances,  and  wonderful  gifts  of  the  ad 
captandum  species  of  oratory,  so  captivating  to  the  populace, 
which  in  America  peculiarly  constitute  the  attributes  of  the 
"  rising  man."  Douglas  was  not  wanting  in  noble  and  attrac 
tive  qualities  of  manhood.  His  courage  was  undoubted,  his 
generosity  was  princely  in  its  munificence  to  his  personal 
friends,  and  he  frequently  manifested  a  lofty  magnanimity.  In 


A   CONTRAST — DAVIS   Als'D'  D'GUGiLAS.  101- 

his  early  youth,  deprived  of  the  advantages  of  fortune  and  po 
sition,  the  discipline  of  his  career  was  not  propitious  to  the 
development  of  the  higher  qualities  of  statesmanship — with 
which,  indeed,  he  was  scantily  endowed  by  nature.  It  is  as 
the  accomplished  politician,  subtle,  ready,  fearless,  and  inde 
fatigable,  that  he  must  be  remembered.  In  this  latter  charac 
ter  he  was  unrivaled. 

Not  less  than  Davis  was  Douglas^  a  representative  man,  yet 
no  two  men  were  more  essentially  dissimilar,  and  no  two  lives 
ever  actuated  by  aspirations  and  instincts  more  unlike.  Doug 
las  was  the  representative  of  expediency — Davis  the  exponent 
of  principles.  In  his  party  associations  Douglas  would  toler 
ate  the  largest  latitude  of  individual  opinion,  while  Davis  was 
always  for  a  policy  clearly  defined  and  unmistakable;  and 
upon  a  matter  of  vital  principle,  like  Percy,  would  reluctantly 
surrender  even  the  "  ninth  part  of  a  hair."  To  maintain  the 
united  action  of  the  Democratic  party  on  election  day,  to  de 
feat  its  opponents,  to  secure  the  rewards  of  success,  Douglas 
would  allow  a  thousand  different  constructions  of  the  party 
creed  by  as  many  factions.  Davis,  on  the  other  hand,  would, 
and  eventually  did,  approve  the  dissolution  of  the  party,  when 
it  refused  an  open,  manly  enunciation  of  its  faith.  For  mere 
party  success  Douglas  cared  every  thing,  and  Davis  nothing, 
save  as  it  ensured  the  triumph  of  Constitutional  principles. 
Both  loved  the  Union  and  sought  its  perpetuity,  but  by  differ 
ent  methods ;  Douglas  by  never-ending  compromises  of  a  quar 
rel,  which  he  should  have  known  that  the  North  would  never 
permit  to  be  amicably  settled;  by  staving  off  and  ignoring 
issues  which  were  to  be  solved  only  by  being  squarely  met. 
Davis,  too,  was  not  unwilling  to  compromise,  but  he  wearied 
of  perpetual  concession  by  the  South,  in  the  meanwhile  the 


U'.FJB  OF'  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

North  continuing  its  hostility,  both  open  and  insidious,  and 
urged  a  settlement  of  all  differences  upon  a  basis  of  simple  and 
exact  justice  to  both  sections. 

Douglas  was  preeminently  the  representative  politician  of 
his  section,  and  throughout  his  career  was  a  favorite  with  that 
boastful,  bloated,  and  mongrel  element,  which  is  violently 
called  the  "American  people,"  and  which  is  the  ruling  element 
in  elections  in  the  Northern  cities.  In  character  and  conduct 
he  embodied  many  of  its  materialistic  and  socialistic  ideas,  its 
false  conception  of  liberty,  its  pernicious  dogmas  of  equality, 
and  not  a  little  of  its  rowdyism. 

Davis  was  the  champion  of  the  South,  her  civilization, 
rights,  honor,  and  dignity.  He  was  the  fitting  and  adequate 
exponent  of  a  civilization  which  rested  upon  an  intellectual 
and  aesthetical  development,  upon  lofty  and  generous  senti 
ments  of  manhood,  a  dignified  conservatism,  and  the  proud 
associations  of  ancestral  distinction  in  the  history  of  the  Union. 
Always  the  Senator  in  the  sense  of  the  ideal  of  dignity  and 
courtesy  which  is  suggested  by  that  title,  he  was  also  the  gen 
tleman  upon  all  occasions;  never  condescending  to  flatter  or 
soothe  the  mob,  or  to  court  popular  favor,  he  lost  none  of  that 
polished  and  distinguished  manner,  in  the  presence  of  a  "  fierce 
Democracie,"  which  made  him  the  ornament  of  the  highest 
school  of  oratory  and  statesmanship  of  his  country. 
\C  The  ambition  of  Douglas  was  unbounded.  The  recognized 
leader,  for  several  years,  of  the  Northern  Democracy,  his  many 
fine  personal  qualities  and  courageous  resistance  of  the  ultra 
Abolitionists  secured  for  him  a  considerable  number  of  sup 
porters  in  the  Southern  wing  of  that  party.  The  Presidency 
was  the  goal  of  his  ambition,  and  for  twenty  years  his  course 
had  been  sedulously  adjusted  to  the  attainment  of  that  most 


DOUGLAS7    COUP   D'ETAT.  103 

coveted  of  prizes  to  the  American  politician.  On  repeated 
occasions  he  had  been  flattered  by  a  highly  complimentary 
vote  in  the  nominating  conventions  of  the  Democracy.  Hith 
erto  he  had  been  compelled  to  yield  his  pretensions  in  favor 
of  older  members  of  his  party  or  upon  considerations  of  tem 
porary  availability.  It  was  evident,  however,  that  in  order  to 
be  President,  he  must  secure  the  nomination  in  1860.  The 
continued  ascendancy  of  the  Democracy  was  no  longer,  as  here 
tofore,  a  foregone  conclusion,  and,  besides,  there  were  others 
equally  aspiring  and  available.  His  Presidential  aspirations 
appeared,  indeed,  to  be  without  hope  or  resource,  save  through 
the  agency  of  some  adroit  coup  d'etat,  by  which  the  truculent 
and  dominant  free-soil  sentiment  of  the  North,  which  he  had 
so  much  affronted  by  his  bid  for  Southern  support  in  the  in 
troduction  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  could  be  conciliated. 
In  Illinois,  his  own  State,  the  Abolition  strength  was  alarm 
ingly  on  the  increase,  and  to  secure  his  return  to  the  Senate 
at  the  election  to  be  held  in  1858,  an  object  of  prime  impor 
tance  in  the  promotion  of  his  more  ambitious  pretensions,  he 
did  not  scruple  to  assume  a  position,  falsifying  his  previous 
record,  wantonly  insulting  and  defiant  to  his  Southern  associ 
ates,  and  in  bold  antagonism  to  a  Democratic  administration. 
The  sequel  of  this  rash  and  ill-judged  course  was  the  over 
throw  of  his  own  political  fortunes,  the  disintegration  of  his 
party,  and  the  attempted  dissolution  of  the  Union. 

The  earliest  recommendations  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  respecting 
the  Kansas  controversy,  which,  several  months  since,  had  de 
veloped  in  that  Territory  into  a  species  of  predatory  warfare, 
marked  by  deeds  of  violence  and  atrocity,  between  the  Abo 
lition  and  Pro-slavery  parties,  were  signalized  by  a  coalition 
of  the  followers  of  Douglas  with  the  Abolitionists  and  other 


104  LIFE    OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

opponents  of  the  administration.  The  speedy  pacification  of 
the  disorders  in  Kansas,  by  the  prompt  admission  of  that 
Territory,  was  the  condition  essential  to  the  success  of  Mr. 
Buchanan's  entire  policy.  He  accordingly  recommended  the 
admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union,  with  the  "  Lecompton  " 
constitution,  which  had  been  adopted  in  September,  1857,  by 
the  decisive  vote  of  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-six 
in  favor  of  that  constitution,  with  slavery,  and  five  hundred 
and  nine  for  it,  without  slavery.  A  rival  instrument,  adopted 
by  an  election  notoriously  held  exclusively  under  the  con 
trol  of  Abolitionists,  prohibiting  slavery,  was  likewise  pre 
sented. 

For  months  the  controversy  was  waged  in  Congress  between 
the  friends  of  the  administration  and  its  enemies,  and  finally 
resulted  in  a  practical  triumph  of  the  Free-soil  principle.  The 
Anti-Lecompton  coalition  of  Douglas  and  the  Abolitionists, 
aided  by  the  defection  of  a  few  Southern  members,  success 
fully  embarrassed  the  policy  of  the  administration  by  defeat 
ing  its  recommendations,  and  eventually  carried  a  measure 
acceptable  to  Northern  sentiments  and  interests. 

Mr.  Douglas  thus  triumphed  over  a  Democratic  adminis 
tration,  at  the  same  time  giving  a  shock  to  the  unity  of  the 
Democratic  party,  from  which  it  has  never  recovered,  and 
effectually  neutralized  its  power  as  a  breakwater  of  the  Union 
against  the  waves  of  sectional  dispute.  The  alienation  be 
tween  himself  and  his  former  associates  was  destined  never  to 
be  adjusted,  as  indeed  it  never  should  have  been,  in  considera 
tion  of  his  inexcusable  recreancy  to  the  immemorial  faith  of 
his  party.  Mr.  Douglas  simply  abandoned  the  South,  at  the 
very  first  moment  when  his  aid  was  seriously  demanded. 
Nay,  more;  he  carried  with  him  a  quiver  of  Parthian  arrows, 


SQUATTER   SOVEKEIGNTY.  105 

which  he  discharged  into  her  bosom  at  a  most  critical  moment 
in  her  unequal  contest. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  Mr.  Douglas'  new  interpretation 
of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  was  urged  by  himself  and  his  ad 
vocates  as  having  a  merit  not  to  be  overlooked  by  the  North, 
in  its  suggestion  of  a  method  of  restricting  slavery,  presenting 
superior  advantages.  "  Squatter  sovereignty,"  as  advocated  by 
Mr.  Douglas,  proposing  the  decision  of  the  slavery  question 
by  the  people  of  the  Territories,  while  yet  unprepared  to  ask 
admission  as  States,  was  far  more  effectual  in  its  plans  against 
slavery,  and  only  less  prompt  and  open,  than  the  designs  of 
the  Abolitionists.  It  would  enable  the  "  Emigrant  Aid  Socie 
ties/7  and  imported  janizaries  of  Abolition  to  exclude  the  insti 
tutions  of  the  South  from  the  Territories,  the  joint  possessions 
of  the  two  sections,  acquired  by  an  enormously  dispropor 
tionate  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  South,  with  a  certainty  not 
to  be  realized,  for  years  to  come,  perhaps,  from  the  Abolition 
policy  of  congressional  prohibition.*  According  to  Mr.  Doug- 
las'  theory,  the  existence  of  slavery  in  all  the  Territories  was 
to  depend  upon  the  verdict  of  a  few  hundred  settlers  or 
"  squatters  "  upon  the  public  lands.  It  practically  conceded  to 
Northern  interests  and  ideas  every  State  to  be  hereafter  ad 
mitted,  and  under  the  operation  of  such  a  policy  it  was  not 
difficult  to  anticipate  the  fate  of  slavery,  at  last  even  in  the 
States. 

From  the  inception  of  this  controversy  until  its  close  Mr. 
Davis  was  fully  committed  to  the  policy  of  Mr.  Buchanan, 
and  his  position  was  in  perfect  harmony  with  that  of  all  the 
leading  statesmen  of  the  South.  Less  prominent,  perhaps,  in 

*  Governor  Wise,  of  Virginia,  characterized  "squatter  sovereignty"  as 
a  "  short  cut  to  all  the  ends  of  Black  Republicanism." 


106  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

debate,  from  his  constant  ill-health  during  the  first  session,  than 
at  any  other  period  of  his  public  life,  he  was  still  zealous  and 
influential. 

An  interesting  incident  of  the  session  was  a  discussion  be 
tween  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr.  Fessenden,  of  Maine,  a  Senator 
second  only  to  Mr.  Seward  among  Abolition  leaders,  in  point 
of  intellect,  and  behind  none  in  his  truculent  animosity  to 
Southern  institutions.  Reviewing  the  message  of  Mr.  Buch 
anan  with  great  severity,  Fessenden  took  occasion  to  discuss 
elaborately  the  slavery  question,  with  all  its  incidental  issues. 
Mr.  Davis  replied,  not  at  great  length,  but  with  much  force 
and  spirit.  The  discussion  terminated  with  the  following  col 
loquy,  which  is  interesting  chiefly  in  its  personal  allusions: 

"MR.  FESSENDEN Sir,  I  have  avowed  no  dis 
union  sentiments  on  this  floor — neither  here  nor  elsewhere.  Can 
the  honorable  gentleman  from  Mississippi  say  as  much? 

"MR.  DAVIS.     Yes. 

"MR.  FESSENDEN.     I  am  glad  to  hear  it,  then. 

"  MR.  DAVIS.  Yes.  I  have  long  sought  for  a  respectable  man 
who  would  allege  the  contrary. 

"  MR.  FESSENDEN.  I  make  no  allegation.  I  asked  if  he  could 
say  as  much.  I  am  glad  to  hear  him  say  so,  because  I  must  say 
to  him  that  the  newspapers  have  represented  him  as  making  a 
speech  in  Mississippi,  in  which  he  said  he  came  into  General 
Pierce's  cabinet  a  disunion  man.  If  lie  never  made  it,  very  well. 

"  MR.  DAVIS.     I  will  thank  you  to  produce  that  newspaper. 

"MR.  FESSENDEN.  I  can  not  produce  it,  but  I  can  produce  an 
extract  from  it  in  another  paper. 

"MR.  DAVIS.     An  extract!  then  that  falsifies  the  text. 

"  MR.  FESSENDEN.  I  am  very  glad  to  hear  the  Senator  say  so. 
I  made  no  accusation — I  put  the  question  to  him.  If  he  denies 


DEBATE   WITH   MB.    FESSENDEN.  107 

it,  very  well.  I  only  say  that,  with  all  the  force  and  energy  with 
which  he  denies  it,  so  do  I.  The  accusation  never  has  been  made 
against  me  before.  On  what  ground  does  the  Senator  now  put 
it?  ... 

"MR.  DAVIS.     Does  the  Senator  ask  me  for  an  answer? 

aMR.  FESSENDEN.  Certainly,  if  the  Senator  feels  disposed  to 
give  one. 

"  MR.  DAVIS.  If  you  ask  me  for  an  answer,  it  is  easy.  I  said 
your  position  was  fruitful  of  such  a  result.  I  did  not  say  you 
avowed  the  object — nothing  of  the  sort,  but  the  reverse.  .  .  . 

"MR.  FESSENDEN.  That  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  on  which  I 
have  a  right  to  entertain  my  view  as  well  as  the  Senator  his.  .  .  . 

"MR.  DAVIS.  Mr.  President,  I  rise  principally  for  the  pur 
pose  of  saying  that  I  do  not  know  whence  springs  this  habit  of 
talking  about  intimidation.  I  am  not  the  first  person  toward 
whom  a  reply  has  been  made,  that  we  are  not  to  carry  our  ends 
by  intimidation.  I  try  to  intimidate  nobody ;  I  threaten  nobody ; 
and  I  do  not  believe — let  me  say  it  once  for  all — that  any  body 
is  afraid  of  me — and  I  do  not  want  any  body  to  be  afraid  of  me. 

"MR.  FESSENDEN.     I  am.     [Laughter.] 

"  MR.  DAVIS.  I  am  sorry  to  hear  it ;  and  if  the  Senator  is 
really  so,  I  shall  never  speak  to  him  in  decided  terms  again. 

"MR.  FESSENDEN.  I  speak  of  it  only  in  an  intellectual  point 
of  view.  [Laughter.] 

"MR.  DAVIS.  Then,  sir,  the  Senator  was  in  a  Pickwickian 
sense  when  he  began;  there  were  no  threats,  no  intimidations, 
and  he  is  just  where  he  would  have  been  if  he  had  said  nothing." 
[Laughter.]  .... 

"While  the  Kansas  question  was  pending  in  Congress,  a 
sketch  of  Mr.  Davis,  in  connection  with  two  other  prominent 
Southern  Senators,  which  appeared  in  the  correspondence  of 
a  leading  journal,  was  extensively  copied  in  the  newspapers 


108  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

of  the  day.  We  extract  that  portion  which  relates  specially 
to  Mr.  Davis.  The  portrait  is  from  the  pen  of  one  who  had 
no  sympathy  with  his  political  views : 

DAVIS,  HUNTER,  AND  TOOMBS, 

THE  SOUTHERN  TRIUMVIRATE. 
[Correspondence  of  the  Missouri  Democrat.] 

"WASHINGTON  CITY,  January  21. 

"  Yesterday,  when  Hale  was  speaking,  the  right  side  of  the  cham 
ber  was  empty,  (as  it  generally  is  during  the  delivery  of  an  anti- 
slavery  speech,)  with  the  exception  of  a  group  of  three  who  sat 
near  the  centre  of  the  vacant  space.  This  remarkable  group,  which 
wore  the  air  if  not  the  ensigns  of  power,  authority,  and  public 
care,  was  composed  of  Senators  Davis,  Hunter,  and  Toombs.  They 
were  engaged  in  an  earnest  colloquy,  which,  however,  was  foreign 
to  the  argument  Hale  was  elaborating;  for  though  the  connection 
of  their  words  was  broken  before  it  reached  the  gallery,  their 
voices  were  distinctly  audible,  and  gave  signs  of  their  abstrac 
tion.  They  were  thinking  aloud.  If  they  had  met  together, 
under  the  supervision  of  some  artist  gifted  with  the  faculty  of 
illustrating  history  and  character  by  attitude  and  expression,  who 
designed  to  paint  them,  in  fresco,  on  the  walls  of  the  new  Senate 
chamber,  the  combination  could  not  have  been  more  appropriately 
arranged  than  chance  arranged  it  on  this  occasion.  Toombs  sits 
among  the  opposition  on  the  left,  Hunter  and  Davis  on  the  right ; 
and  the  fact  that  the  two  first  came  to  Davis'  seat — the  one  gravi 
tating  to  it  from  a  remote,  the  other  from  a  near  point — may  be 
held  to  indicate  which  of  the  three  is  the  preponderating  body  in 
the  system,  if  preponderance  there  be;  and  whose  figure  should 
occupy  the  foreground  of  the  picture  if  any  precedence  is  to  be 
accorded.  Davis  sat  erect  and  composed ;  Hunter,  listening,  rested 
his  head  on  his  hand;  and  Toombs,  inclining  forward,  was  speaking 


A   PEN-AND-INK   SKETCH.  109 

vehemently.  Their  respective  attitudes  were  no  bad  illustration 
of  their  individuality.  Davis  impressed  the  spectator,  who  ob 
served  the  easy  but  authoritative  bearing  with  which  he  put  aside 
or  assented  to  Toomb's  suggestions,  with  the  notion  of  some  slight 
superiority,  some  hardly-acknowledged  leadership;  and  Hunter's 
attentiveness  and  impassibility  were  characteristic  of  his  nature, 
for  his  profundity  of  intellect  wears  the  guise  of  stolidity,  and 
his  continuous  industry  that  of  inertia;  while  Tooinb's  quick  ut 
terance  and  restless  head  bespoke  his  nervous  temperament  and 
activity  of  mind.  But,  though  each  is  different  from  either  of 
the  others,  the  three  have  several  attributes  in  common.  They 
are  equally  eminent  as  statesmen  and  debaters;  they  are  devoted 
to  the  same  cause;  they  are  equals  in  rank,  and  rivals  in  ambi 
tion;  and  they  are  about  the  same  age,  and  none  of  them — let 
young  America  take  notice — wears  either  beard  or  mustache.  I 
come  again  to  the  traits  which  distinguish  them  from  each  other. 
In  face  and  form,  Davis  represents  the  Norman  type  with  singu 
lar  fidelity,  if  my  conception  of  that  type  be  correct.  He  is  tall 
and  sinewy,  with  fair  hair,  gray  eyes,  which  are  clear  rather  than 
bright,  high  forehead,  straight  nose,  thin,  compressed  lips,  and 
pointed  chin.  His  cheek  bones  are  hollow,  and  the  vicinity  of 
his  mouth  is  deeply  furrowed  with  intersecting  lines.  Leanness 
of  face,  length  and  sharpness  of  feature,  and  length  of  limb,  and 
intensity  of  expression,  rendered  acute  by  angular,  facial  outline, 
are  the  general  characteristics  of  his  appearance."  P\ 

The  controversy,  excited  by  the  question  of  the  admission 
of  Kansas,  can  not  be  viewed  as  having  terminated  with  the 
mere  practical  decision  of  her  status,  as  a  State  tolerating  or 
prohibiting  .slavery.  Southern  men  had  freely  admitted  the 
improbability  of  the  permanent  abiding  of  the  institution  in 
that  Territory,  or  elsewhere,  north  of  the  line  of  36°  30',  and 
their  defeat  had  a  far  more  alarming  significance  than  the  ex- 


110  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

elusion  of  slavery  from  soil  where  the  laws  of  nature  opposed 
its  location.  Important  conclusions  were  deducible  from  the 
lesson  of  Kansas,  which  the  South  must  have  been  smitten 
with  voluntary  blindness  not  to  have  accepted.  Of  the  pur 
pose  of  the  Republican  party,  never  to  consent  to  the  admission 
of  additional  slave  States,  there  was  added  to  constantly  accu 
mulating  proof  from  other  sources,  the  bold  declarations  of 
Abolition  members  of  Congress.  Recent  experience  clearly 
demonstrated  that  the  South  could  no  longer  rely  upon  the 
Northern  Democracy  in  support  of  the  plainest  guarantees  of 
the  Constitution,  for  the  protection  of  her  property,  when  they 
were  in  conflict  with  the  dominant  fanaticism  of  that  section. 
Accordingly,  the  Southern  Democracy,  wisely  and  bravely  re 
solved,  and  the  unfortunate  issue  should  not  prejudge  their 
action,  to  require  of  their  Northern  associates,  as  the  condition 
of  continued  cooperation,  a  pledge  of  better  faith  in  the  future. 

It  was  in  the  progress  of  events,  which  may  be  justly  called 
the  sequel  of  the  Kansas  controversy,  that  Mr.  Davis  was  most 
conspicuous  during  his  second  service  in  the  Senate.  His 
course  was  such  as  might  have  been  anticipated  from  his  zeal 
ous  and  vigilant  regard  for  constitutional  principles,  and  the 
rights  and  interests  of  his  section.  His  feeble  health  had  pre 
vented  his  frequent  participation  in  the  struggles  incidental  to 
the  Kansas  question,  but  in  those  subsequent  struggles,  which 
marked  the  dissolution  of  the  Democratic  party,  he  was  the 
constant,  bold,  and  able  adversary  of  Douglas.  The  ingenious 
sophistries  of  the  latter  were  subjected  to  no  more  searching 
and  scathing  refutations  than  those  with  which  Davis  met  his 
every  attempt  at  their  illustration. 

At  this  period  the  position  of  Mr.  Davis  was  no  less  prom 
inent  than  in  1850,  though  his  speeches  were  less  frequent 


PARLIAMENTARY   CONTESTS   WITH    DOUGLAS.  Ill 

and  voluminous.  Upon  both  occasions  his  elevation  was  an 
ample  reward  to  honorable  ambition,  but  would  have  been 
perilous  in  the  extreme  had  he  been  deficient  in  those  great 
and  rare  qualities  which  were  necessary  to  its  maintenance. 
Among  his  numerous  contests  with  the  distinguished  expo 
nents  of  the  sentiment  in  opposition  to  the  South,  none  are 
more  memorable  than  his  collisions  with  Douglas. 

Of  these  the  most  striking  occurred  on  the  23d  of  Febru 
ary,  1859,  and  on  the  16th  and  17th  of  May,  1860.  To  have 
matched  Douglas  with  an  ordinary  contestant,  must  always 
have  resulted  in  disaster ;  it  would  have  been  to  renew  the 
contest  of  Athelstane  against  Ivanhoe.  Douglas  was  accus 
tomed  to  testify,  cheerfully,  to  the  power  of  Davis,  as  evinced 
in  their  senatorial  struggles;  and  it  is  very  certain  that  at  no 
other  hands  did  he  fare  so  badly,  unless  an  exception  be  made 
in  favor  of  the  remarkable  speech  of  Senator  Benjamin,  of 
Louisiana.  The  latter  was  an  adept  in  the  strategy  of  debate, 
a  parliamentary  Suchet. 

The  23d  of  February,  1859,  was  the  occasion  of  a  pro 
tracted  battle  between  Davis  and  Douglas,  lasting  from  mid 
day  until  nearly  night.  This  speech  of  Mr.  Davis  is,  in  many 
respects,  inferior  to  his  higher  oratorical  efforts,  realizing  less 
of  the  forms  of  oratory  which  he  usually  illustrated  so  happily, 
and  is  wanting  somewhat  in  that  symmetry,  harmony,  and 
comeliness  in  all  its  features,  with  which  his  senatorial  efforts 
are  generally  wrought  to  the  perfection  of  expression.  The 
circumstances  under  which  it  was  delivered,  however,  fully 
meet  this  criticism,  and  show  a  most  remarkable  readiness  for 
the  instantaneous  and  hurried  grapple  of  debate,  and  this  latter 
quality  was  the  strong  point  of  Douglas7  oratory J\  The  latter 
had  replied  at  great  length,  and  with  evident  preparation,  to  a 


112  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

speech  made  by  Mr.  Davis7  colleague  (Mr.  Brown),  who  was 
not  present  during  Douglas'  rejoinder.  Without  hesitation 
Mr.  Davis  assumed  the  place  of  his  absent  colleague,  and  the 
result  was  a  running  debate,  lasting  several  hours,  and  exhib 
iting  on  both  sides  all  the  vivacious  readiness  of  a  gladiatorial 
combat. 

In  their  ordinary  and  characteristic  speeches  there  was  an 
antithesis,  no  less  marked  than  in  their  characters  as  men. 
Douglas  was  peculiarly  American  in  his  style  of  speaking.  He 
dealt  largely  in  the  argumentum  ad  hominem;  was  very  adroit 
in  pointing  out  immaterial  inconsistencies  in  his  antagonists; 
he  rarely  discussed  general  principles;  always  avoided  ques 
tions  of  abstract  political  science,  and  struggled  to  force  the 
entire  question  into  juxtaposition  with  the  practical  consider 
ations  of  the  immediate  present. 

In  nearly  all  of  Davis'  speeches  is  recognized  the  pervasion 
of  intellect,  which  is  preserved  even  in  his  most  impassioned 
passages.  He  goes  to  the  very  "  foundations  of  jurispru 
dence/'  illustrates  by  historical  example,  and  throws  upon  his 
subject  the  full  radiance  of  that  noble  light  which  is  shed  by 
diligent  inquiry  into  the  abstract  truths  of  political  and  moral 
science.  Strength,  animation,  energy  without  vehemence,  clas 
sical  elegance,  and  a  luminous  simplicity,  are  features  in  Mr. 
Davis'  oratory  which  rendered  him  one  of  the  most  finished, 
logical,  and  effective  of  contemporary  parliamentary  speakers. 

During  the  Thirty-sixth  Congress,  which  assembled  in  De 
cember,  1859,  Mr.  Davis  was  the  recognized  leader  of  the 
Democratic  majority  of  the  Senate.  His  efforts,  during  this 
session,  were  probably  the  ablest  of  his  life,  and  never  did  his 
great  powers  of  analysis  and  generalization  appear  to  greater 
advantage.  ^  On  the  second  of  February,  I860,  Mr.  Davis  pre- 


RESOLUTIONS.  113 

sented  a  series  of  seven  resolves,  which  embodied  the  views  of 
the  administration,  of  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Dem 
ocratic  members  of  the  Senate,  and  of  the  Southern  Democ 
racy,  and  were  opposed  by  Mr.  Douglas  (though  absent  from 
the  Senate  by  sickness),  Mr.  Pugh,  and  by  the  Abolition 
Senators.  They  are  important  as  the  substantial  expression 
of  the  doctrines  upon  which  the  Southern  Democracy  were 
already  prepared  to  insist  at  the  approaching  National  Con 
vention. 

The  first  resolution  affirms  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  and 
their  delegation  of  authority  to  the  Federal  Government,  to 
secure  each  State  against  domestic  no  less  than  foreign  clan 
gers.  This  resolution  was  designed  with  special  reference  to 
the  recent  outrages  of  John  Brown  and  his  associate  conspira 
tors,  several  of  whom  had  expiated  their  crimes  upon  the  gal 
lows,  at  the  hands  of  the  authorities  of  Virginia. 

Resolution  second  affirms  the  recognition  of  slavery  as  prop 
erty  by  the  Constitution,  and  that  all  efforts  to  injure  it  by 
citizens  of  non-slaveholding  States  are  violations  of  faith. 

Third  insists  upon  the  absolute  equality  of  the  States. 

The  fourth  resolution  of  the  series,  which  embodied  the  ma 
terial  point  of  difference  between  Mr.  Douglas  and  the  major 
ity  of  Democratic  Senators,  was  modified,  as  stated  by  Mr. 
Davis,  "after  conference  with  friends,"  and  finally  made  to 
read  thus: 

"  Resolved,  That  neither  Congress  nor  a  Territorial  Legislature, 
whether  by  direct  legislation,  or  legislation  of  an  indirect  and  un 
friendly  character,  possesses  power  to  annul  or  impair  the  consti 
tutional  right  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  to  take  his  slave 
property  into  the  common  Territories,  and  there  hold  and  enjoy 

the  same  while  the  territorial  condition  remains." 
8 


114  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Fifth  declares  it  the  duty  of  Congress  to  supply  any  needed 
protection  to  constitutional  rights  in  a  Territory,  provided  the 
executive  and  judicial  authority  has  not  the  adequate  means. 

The  sixth  resolution  was  an  emphatic  repudiation  of  what 
Mr.  Douglas,  by  an  ingenious  perversion  of  terms,  and  a  bold 
array  of  sophisms,  was  pleased  to  designate  "popular  sover 
eignty  " — reading  thus : 

"Resolved,  That  the  inhabitants  of  a  Territory  of  the  United 
States,  when  they  rightfully  form  a  constitution  to  be  admitted 
as  a  State  into  the  Union,  may  then,  for  the  first  time,  like  the 
people  of  a  State  when  forming  a  new  constitution,  decide  for 
themselves  whether  slavery,  as  a  domestic  institution,  shall  be 
maintained  or  prohibited  within  their  jurisdiction;  and  'they  shall 
be  admitted  into  the  Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as  their  con 
stitution  may  prescribe  at  the  time  of  their  admission.' " 

The  seventh  and  last  of  the  series  affirmed  the  validity  and 
sanctity  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  and  denounced  all  acts, 
whether  of  individuals  or  of  State  Legislatures,  to  defeat  its 
action. 

The  struggle  upon  these  resolutions  lasted  more  than  three 
months,  the  Senate  not  reaching  a  vote  upon  the  first  of  the 
series  until  May  24,  1860.  They  constituted  substantially  the 
platform  presented  by  the  South  at  the  Charleston  Democratic 
Convention,  in  April,  and  upon  which,  after  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Southern  delegations,  the  Presidential  ticket  of  Breck- 
inridge  and  Lane  was  nominated,  and  supported  in  the  ensu 
ing  canvass,  receiving  the  electoral  votes  of  eleven  States  of 
the  South. 

It  was  alleged  against  these  resolutions,  and  the  general 
principle  of  protection  to  Southern  property  in  the  Territo- 


DAVIS'   CONSISTENCY.  •        115 

ries,  which  their  advocates  demanded  should  be  asserted  in 
the  Democratic  creed,  that  they  involved  a  new  issue,  raised 
for  factious  purposes,  and  were  not  sanctioned  by  any  previous 
action  of  the  party.  This,  even  if  it  had  been  true,  which 
assuredly  it  was  not,  constituted  no  sufficient  reason  for  deny 
ing  a  plain  constitutional  right. 

But,  however  sustained  might  have  been  this  charge  of  in 
consistency  against  other  Southern  leaders,  it  had  no  application 
to  Davis.  Indeed,  Douglas  unequivocally  admitted  that  the 
position  assumed  by  Davis  in  1860  was  precisely  that  to  which 
he  had  held  for  twenty  years  previous.  While  the  Oregon 
Bill  was  pending  in  the  Senate,  on  the  23d  of  June,  1848,  Mr. 
Davis  offered  this  amendment: 

"Provided,  That  nothing  contained  in  this  act  shall  be  so  con 
strued  as  to  authorize  the  prohibition  of  domestic  slavery  in  said 
Territory  whilst  it  remains  in  the  condition  of  a  Territory  of  the 
United  States.'" 

Eleven  years  afterwards,  in  his  address  before  the  Missis 
sippi  Democratic  Convention,  July  5,  1859,  he  said: 

"  But  if  the  rules  of  proceeding  remain  unchanged,  then  all  the 
remedies  of  the  civil  law  would  be  available  for  the  protection  of 
property  in  slaves;  or  if  the  language  of  the  organic  act,  by  spec 
ifying  chancery  and  common-law  jurisdiction,  denies  to  us  the 
more  ample  remedies  of  the  civil  law,  then  those  known  to  the 
common  law  are  certainly  in  force;  and  these,  I  have  been  as 
sured  by  the  highest  authority,  will  be  found  sufficient.  If  this 
be  so,  then  we  are  content;  if  it  should  prove  otherwise,  then  we 
but  ask  what  justice  can  not  deny — the  legislation  needful  to  en 
able  the  General  Government  to  perform  its  legitimate  functions; 
and,  in  the  meantime,  we  deny  the  power  of  Congress  to  abridge 


116  LIFE   OF   JEFFEfiSON   DAVIS. 

or  to  destroy  our  constitutional  rights,  or  of  the  Territorial  Leg 
islature  to  obstruct  the  remedies  known  to  the  common  law  of  the 
United  States." 

* 
In  1848  he  advocated  General  Cass'  election  in  spite  of  the 

Nicholson  letter,  and  not  because  he  either  approved  or  failed 
to  detect  the  dangerous  heresies  which  it  contained.  As  a 
choice  of  evils,  he  preferred  .Cass,  even  upon  the  Nicholson 
letter,  to  General  Taylor,  his  father-in-law,  both  because  Cass 
was  the  choice  of  his  own  party,  and  he  distrusted  the  influ 
ences  which  he  foresaw  would  govern  the  administration  of 
Taylor. 

The  attention  of  Mr.  Davis  was  far  from  being  confined 
to  the  slavery  question  and  the  issues  which  grew  out  of  it 
during  the  important  period  which  we  have  sketched.  His 
extensive  acquaintance  with  the  practical  labors  of  legisla 
tion,  and  his  uniformly  thorough  information  upon  all  ques 
tions  of  domestic  economy,  foreign  affairs,  the  finances,  and 
the  army,  were  amply  exemplified,  to  the  great  benefit  of  the 
country. 

During  the  debate  in  the  Thirty-fifth  Congress,  on  the  bill 
proposing  the  issue  of  $  20,000,000  of  Treasury  notes,  which 
he  opposed,  he  avowed  himself  in  favor  of  the  abolition  of 
custom-houses,  and  the  disbanding  of  the  army  of  retainers 
employed  to  collect  the  import  duties.  Free  trade  was  always 
an  important  article  of  his  political  creed.  He  valued  its  fra 
ternizing  effects  upon  mankind,  its  advantages  to  the  laboring 
classes ;  and  held  that,  under  a  system  of  free  trade,  the  Gov 
ernment  would  not  be  defrauded.  He  traced  the  financial 
distress  of  the  country,  in  the  "  crisis"  of  1857,  to  its  commer 
cial  dependence  on  New  York,  whose  embarrassments  must,  so 
long  as  that  dependence  continued,  always  afflict  the  country 


VISITS   THE    NORTH.  117 

at  large.  The  army,  as  on  previous  occasions,  received  a  large 
share  of  his  attention,  and  he  advocated  its  increase  on  a  plan 
similar  to  that  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  when  Secretary  of  War  under 
President  Monroe,  providing  a  skeleton  organization  in  peace, 
capable  of  expansion  in  the  event  of  war.  The  fishing  boun 
ties  he  opposed,  as  being  obnoxious  to  the  objections  urged 
against  class  legislation. 

In  the  summer  of  1858,  during  the  recess  of  Congress,  Mr: 
Davis  visited  the  North,  with  a  view  to  the  recuperation  of 
his  health.  Sailing  from  Baltimore  to  Boston,  he  traversed 
a  considerable  portion  of  New  England,  and  sojourned  for 
some  time  in  Portland,  Maine.  His  health  was  materially 
benefited  by  the  bracing  salubrity  of  that  delightful  locality, 
and,  both  here  and  at  other  points,  he  was  received  with  dem 
onstrations  of  profound  respect.  Upon  several  occasions  he 
was  persuaded  to  deliver  public  addresses,  which  were  largely 
read  and  criticized.  They  were  every- where  commended  for 
their  admirable  catholicity  of  sentiment,  and  not  less  for  their 
bold  assertions  of  principles  than  for  their  emphatic  avowals  of 
attachment  to  the  union  of  the  States.  His  speech  at  Port 
land,  Maine,*  was  especially  admired  for  its  statesman-like 
dignity,  and  was  singularly  free  from  partisan  or  sectional 
temper.  In  his  journey  through  the  States  of  Massachusetts 
and  New  York,  he  was  tendered  distinguished  honors,  and 
addressed  the  people  of  the  leading  cities.  On  the  10th  of 
October,  he  spoke  in  Faneuil  Hall,  Boston,  and,  on  the  19th, 
he  addressed  an  immense  Democratic  ratification  meeting  in 
New  York. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  his  address  upon  the  lat 
ter  occasion: 

*  To  be  found  at  the  conclusion  of  this  chapter. 


118  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  To  each  community  belongs  the  right  to  decide  for  itself  what 
institutions  it  will  have — to  each  people  sovereign  in  their  own 
sphere.  It  belongs  only  to  them  to  decide  what  shall  be  property. 
You  have  decided  it  for  yourselves,  Mississippi  has  done  so.  Who 
has  the  right  to  gainsay  it?  [Applause.]  It  was  the  assertion  of 
the  right  of  independence — of  that  very  right  which  led  your 
fathers  into  the  war  of  the  Revolution.  [Applause.]  It  is  that 
which  constitutes  the  doctrine  of  State  Rights,  on  which  it  is  my 
pleasure  to  stand.  Congress  has  no  power  to  determine  what  shall 
be  property  anywhere.  Congress  has  only  such  grants  as  are  con 
tained  in  the  Constitution ;  and  it  conferred  no  power  to  rule  with 
despotic  hands  over  the  independence  of  the  Territories." 

The  second  session  of  the  Thirty-fifth  Congress  was  com 
paratively  uneventful.  Mr.  Davis  was  an  influential  advocate 
of  the  Pacific  Railroad  by  the  Southern  route.  His  most  elab 
orate  effort  during  this  session  was  his  argument  against  the 
French  Spoliation  Bill — denying  that  the  failure  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  in  its  earlier  history,  to  prosecute  the  just  claims  of 
American  citizens  on  the  Government  of  France,  made  it  in 
cumbent  upon  the  present  generation  to  satisfy  the  obligations 
of  justice  incurred  in  the  past. 

In  reply  to  an  invitation  to  attend  the  Webster  Birthday 
Festival,  held  in  Boston,  in  January,  1859,  Mr.  Davis  wrote 
as  follows : 

"At  a  time  when  partisans  avow  the  purpose  to  obliterate  the 
landmarks  of  our  fathers,  and  fanaticism  assails  the  barriers  they 
erected  for  the  protection  of  rights  coeval  with  and  essential  to 
the  existence  of  the  Union — when  Federal  offices  have  been  sought 
by  inciting  constituencies  to  hostile  aggressions,  and  exercised,  not 
as  a  trust  for  the  common  welfare,  but  as  the  means  of  disturbing 
domestic  tranquillity — when  oaths  to  support  the  Constitution  have 


PATEIOTIC   SENTIMENTS.  119 

been  taken  with  a  mental  reservation  to  disregard  its  spirit,  and 
subvert  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  established — surely  it  be 
comes  all  who  are  faithful  to  the  compact  of  our  Union,  and  who 
are  resolved  to  maintain  and  preserve  it,  to  compare  differences 
on  questions  of  mere  expediency,  and,  forming  deep  around  the 
institutions  we  inherited,  stand  united  to  uphold,  with  unfaltering 
intent,  a  banner  on  which  is  inscribed  the  Constitutional  Union 
of  free,  equal,  and  independent  States. 

"  May  the  vows  of  '  love  and  allegiance,'  which  you  propose  to 
renew  as  a  fitting  tribute  to  the  memory  of  the  illustrious  states 
man  whose  birth  you  commemorate,  find  an  echo  in  the  heart  of 
every  patriot  in  our  land,  and  tend  to  the  revival  of  that  frater 
nity  which  bore  our  fathers  through  the  Revolution  to  the  con 
summation  of  the  independence  they  transmitted  to  us,  and  the 
establishment  of  the  more  perfect  Union  which  their  wisdom  de 
vised  to  bless  their  posterity  for  ever  ! 

"Though  deprived  of  the  pleasure  of  mingling  my  affectionate 
memories  and  aspirations  with  yours,  I  send  you  my  cordial  greet 
ing  to  the  friends  of  the  Constitution,  and  ask  to  be  enrolled 
among  those  whose  mission  is,  by  fraternity  and  good  faith  to  every 
constitutional  obligation,  to  insure  that,  from  the  Aroostook  to 
San  Diego,  from  Key  West  to  Puget's  Sound,  the  grand  arch  of 
our  political  temple  shall  stand  unshaken." 


In  the  meantime  a  variety  of  events  measurably  added  to 
the  vehemence  of  the  sectional  dispute,  which  never,  for  a  mo 
ment/  had  exhibited  any  abatement  since  the  opening  of  the 
Kansas  imbroglio.  The  antagonism  between  the  two  sections, 
becoming  more  and  more  pronounced  each  day,  rapidly  de 
veloped  the  true  character  of  the  struggle,  as  one  for  existence 
on  the  part  of  the  South,  against  the  revolutionary  designs  of 
the  North.  Mr.  Seward,  the  Ajax  of  Black  Republicanism, 


120  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

the  founder  and  leader  of  the  party  organized  for  the  destruc 
tion  of  Southern  institutions,  in  the  fall  of  1858,  at  the  city  of 
Rochester,  for  the  first  time  proclaimed  his  revolutionary  doc 
trine  of  an  "  irrepressible  conflict "  between  the  civilizations  of 
the  two  sections.  This  announcement,  from  such  a  source, 
could  only  be  accepted  by  the  South  as  a  menace  to  her  peace 
and  security.  Such  was  her  construction  of  it. 

In  his  address  before  the  Mississippi  Democratic  Conven 
tion,  in  July,  1859,  from  which  we  have  already  quoted,  Mr. 
Davis  said : 

"We  have  witnessed  the  organization  of  a  party  seeking  the 
possession  of  the  Government,  not  for  the  common  good,  not  for 
their  own  particular  benefit,  but  as  the  means  of  executing  a  hos 
tile  purpose  against  a  portion  of  the  States." 

Approaching  more  directly  the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Seward,  he 
said: 

"The  success  of  such  a  party  would  indeed  produce  an  'irre 
pressible  conflict.'  To  you  would  be  presented  the  question,  Will 
you  allow  the  Constitutional  Union  to  be  changed  into  the  des 
potism  of  a  majority?  Will  you  become  the  subjects  of  a  hostile 
Government?  or  will  you,  outside  of  the  Union,  assert  the  equal 
ity,  the  liberty  and  sovereignty  to  which  you  were  born?  For 
myself  I  say,  as  I  said  on  a  former  occasion,  in  the  contingency 
of  the  election  of  a  President  on,  the  platform  of  Mr.  Seward's 
Rochester  speech,  let  the  Union  be  dissolved.  Let  the  '  great,  but 
not  the  greatest,  evil '  come  j  for,  as  did  the  great  and  good  Cal- 
houn,  from  whom  is  drawn  that  expression  of  value,  I  love  and 
venerate  the  Union  of  these  States,  but  I  love  liberty  and  Missis 
sippi  more." 

When  Congress  assembled,  in  December,  1859,  the  lawless 


DEMOCRATIC    PARTY   DISSOLVED.  121 

expedition  of  John  Brown  had  greatly  accelerated  the  inevit 
able  climax  of  disunion.  Thenceforward  the  incipient  revo 
lution  was,  to  a  great  extent,  transferred  from  the  hands  of 
Congress,  whose  action  was  but  lightly  regarded  in  comparison 
with  the  animated  scenes  which  marked  the  State  conventions 
and  popular  assemblages,  held  with  reference  to  the  approach 
ing  presidential  nominations. 

Mr.  Davis  approved  the  test  made  at  the  Charleston  Con 
vention,  by  the  Southern  Democracy,  as  to  the  construction  of 
the  Cincinnati  platform,  and  the  demand  for  a  more  explicit 
announcement^  of  the  position  of  the  party  concerning  slavery 
in  the  Territories.  His  speech,  in  reply  to  Judge  Douglas, 
on  the  16th  and  17th  of  May,  1860,  is  a  vindication  of 
Southern  action  at  Charleston,  and  an  exhaustive  discussion 
of  all  the  phases  of  the  issue  upon  which  the  Democracy  had 
divided. 

Events  soon  demonstrated  the  irreconcilable  nature  of  the 
antagonism  which  had  severed  this  giant  organization.  It  had 
simply  realized  the  destiny  of  political  parties.  In  one  genera 
tion  they  rise,  as  a  virtue  and  a  necessity,  to  remedy  disorders 
and  reform  abuses ;  in  another  generation,  they  are  themselves 
the  apologists  of  corruption  and  the  perpetrators  of  wrong. 
The  Democratic  party  became  insensible  to  the  appeals  of  prin 
ciple,  and  its  fifty  years'  lease  of  power  terminated,  not  speedily 
to  be  recovered. 

HON.  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  AT  PORTLAND,  MAINE. 

[From  the  Eastern  Argus.] 

We  are  gratified  in  being  able  to  offer  our  readers  a  faithful 
and  quite  full  report  of  the  speech  of  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  of 
Mississippi,  on  the  occasion  of  the  serenade  given  him  by  the 


122  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

citizens  of  Portland,  without  distinction  of  party,  on  Friday  even 
ing  last.  It  will  be  read  with  interest  and  pleasure,  and  we  can 
not  doubt  that  every  sentiment,  uttered  by  the  distinguished  Mis- 
sissippian,  will  find  a  hearty  response  and  approval  from  the  citi 
zens  of  Maine.  The  occasion  was  indeed  a  pleasing,  a  hopeful  one. 
It  was  in  every  respect  the  expression  of  generous  sentiments,  of 
kindness,  hospitality,  friendly  regard,  and  the  brotherhood  of 
American  citizenship.  Prominent  men  of  all  parties  were  present, 
and  the  expression,  without  exception,  so  far  as  we  have  heard, 
has  been  that  of  unmingled  gratification;  and  the  scene  was 
equally  pleasant  to  look  upon.  The  beautiful  mansion  of  Hen- 
sallaer  Cram,  Esq.,  directly  opposite  to  Madame  Blanchard's,  was 
illuminated,  and  the  light  thrown  from  the  windows  of  the  two 
houses  revealed  to  view  the  large  and  perfectly  orderly  assemblage 
with  which  Park  and  Danforth  Streets  were  crowded.  We  regret 
that  our  readers  can  get  no  idea  of  the  musical  voice  and  inspiring 
eloquence  of  the  speaker  from  a  report  of  his  remarks ;  but  it  is 
the  best  we  can  do  for  them.  After  the  music  had  ceased,  Mr. 
Davis  "appeared  upon  the  steps,  and  as  soon  as  the  prolonged 
applause  with  which  he  was  greeted  had  subsided,  he  spoke  in 
substance  as  follows: 

FELLOW-CITIZENS:  Accept  my  sincere  thanks,  for  this  mani 
festation  of  your  kindness.  Vanity  does  not  lead  me  so  far  to 
misconceive  your  purpose  as  to  appropriate  the -demonstration  to 
myself;  but  it  is  not  the  less  gratifying  to  me  to  be  made  the 
medium  through  which  Maine  tenders  an  expression  of  regard  to 
her  sister,  Mississippi.  It  is,  moreover,  with  feelings  of  profound 
gratification  that  I  witness  this  indication  of  that  national  senti 
ment  and  fraternity  which  made  us,  and  which  alone  can  keep  us, 
one  people.  At  a  period  but  as  yesterday,  when  compared  with 
the  life  of  nations,  these  States  were  separate,  and,  in  some  re 
spects,  opposing  colonies,  their  only  relation  to  each  other  was 


SPEECH   AT   PORTLAND.  123 

that  of  a  common  allegiance  to  the  Government  of  Great  Britain. 
So  separate,  indeed  almost  hostile,  was  their  attitude,  that  when 
General  Stark,  of  Bennington  memory,  was  captured  by  savages  on 
the  headwaters  of  the  Kennebec,  he  was  subsequently  taken  by 
them  to  Albany,  where  they  went  to  sell  furs,  and  again  led  away 
a  captive,  without  interference  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of 
that  neighboring  colony  to  demand  or  obtain  his  release.  United 
as  we  now  are,  were  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  as  an  act  of 
hostility  to  our  country,  imprisoned  or  slain  in  any  quarter  of  the " 
world,  whether  on  land  or  sea,  the  people  of  each  and  every  State 
of  the  Union,  with  one  heart  and  with  one  voice,  would  demand 
redress,  and  woe  be  to  him  against  whom  a  brother's  blood  cried 
to  us  from  the  ground.  Such  is  the  fruit  of  the  wisdom  and  the 
justice  with  which  our  fathers  bound  contending  colonies  into 
confederation,  and  blended  different  habits  and  rival  interests  into 
a  harmonious  whole,  so  that,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  they  entered  on 
the  trial  of  the  Revolution,  and  step  with  step  trod  its  thorny 
paths  until  they  reached  the  height  of  national  independence,  and 
founded  the  constitutional  representative  liberty  which  is  our 
birthright. 

When  the  mother  country  entered  upon  her  career  of  oppres 
sion,  in  disregard  of  chartered  and  constitutional  rights,  our  fore 
fathers  did  not  stop  to  measure  the  exact  weight  of  the  burden,  or 
to  ask  whether  the  pressure  bore  most  upon  this  colony  or  upon 
that,  but  saw  in  it  the  infraction  of  a  great  principle,  the  denial  of 
a  common  right,  in  defense  of  which  they  made  common  cause — 
Massachusetts,  Virginia,  and  South  Carolina  vieing  with  each  other 
as  to  who  should  be  foremost  in  the  struggle,  where  the  penalty 
of  failure  would  be  a  dishonorable  grave.  Tempered  by  the  trials 
and  sacrifices  of  the  Revolution,  dignified  by  its  noble  purposes, 
elevated  by  its  brilliant  triumphs,  endeared  to  each  other  by  its 
glorious  memories,  they  abandoned  the  Confederacy,  not  to  fly 
apart  when  the  outward  pressure  of  hostile  fleets  and  armies  were 


124  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

removed,  but  to  draw  closer  their  embrace  in  the  formation  of  a 
more  perfect  Union. 

By  such  men,  thus  trained  and  ennobled,  our  Constitution  was 
framed.  It  stands  a  monument  of  principle,  of  forecast,  and,  above 
all,  of  that  liberality  which  made  each  willing  to  sacrifice  local 
interest,  individual  prejudice,  or  temporary  good  to  the  general 
welfare  and  the  perpetuity  of  the  republican  institutions  which 
they  had  passed  through  fire  and  blood  to  secure.  The  grants 
were  as  broad  as  were  necessary  for  the  functions  of  the  general 
agent,  and  the  mutual  concessions  were  twice  blessed,  blessing 
him  who  gave  and  him  who  received.  Whatever  was  necessary  for 
domestic  government — requisite  in  the  social  organization  of  each 
community — was  retained  by  the  States  and  the  people  thereof; 
and  these  it  was  made  the  duty  of  all  to  defend  and  maintain. 
Such,  in  very  general  terms,  is  the  rich  political  legacy  our  fathers 
bequeathed  to  us.  Shall  we  preserve  and  transmit  it  to  posterity? 
Yes,  yes,  the  heart  responds;  and  the  judgment  answers,  the  task 
is  easily  performed.  It  but  requires  that  each  should  attend  to 
that  which  most  concerns  him,  and  on  which  alone  he  has  rightful 
power  to  decide  and  to  act;  that  each  should  adhere  to  the  terms 
of  a  written  compact,  and  that  all  should  cooperate  for  that  which 
interest,  duty,  and  honor  demand. 

For  the  general  affairs  of  our  country,  both  foreign  and  domes 
tic,  we  have  a  national  Executive  and  a  national  Legislature. 
Representatives  and  Senators  are  chosen  by  districts  and  by 
States,  but  their  acts  affect  the  whole  country,  and  their  obliga 
tions  are  to  the  whole  people.  He  who,  holding  either  seat,  would 
confine  his  investigations  to  the  mere  interests  of  his  imme 
diate  constituents,  would  be  derelict  to  his  plain  duty ;  and  he  who 
would  legislate  in  hostility  to  any  section,  would  be  morally  unfit 
for  the  station,  and  surely  an  unsafe  depository,  if  not  a  treach 
erous  guardian,  of  the  inheritance  with  which  we  are  blessed.  No 
one  more  than  myself  recognizes  the  binding  force  of  the  alle- 


SPEECH   AT   PORTLAND.  125 

glance  which  the  citizen  owes  to  the  State  of  his  citizenship,  but 
that  State  being  a  party  to  our  compact,  a  member  of  the  Union, 
fealty  to  the  Federal  Constitution  is  not  in  opposition  to,  but 
flows  from  the  allegiance  due  to  one  of  the  United  States.  Wash 
ington  was  not  less  a  Virginian  when  he  commanded  at  Boston, 
nor  did  Gates  or  Greene  weaken  the  bonds  which  bound  them  to 
their  several  States  by  their  campaigns  in  the  South.  In  propor 
tion  as  a  citizen  loves  his  own  State,  will  he  strive  to  honor  by 
preserving  her  name  and  her  fame  free  from  the  tarnish  of  having 
failed  to  observe  her  obligations  and  to  fulfill  her  duties  to  her 
sister  States.  Each  page  of  our  history  is  illustrated  by  the 
names  and  deeds  of  those  who  have  well  understood  and  dis 
charged  the  obligation.  Have  we  so  degenerated  that  we  can  no 
longer  emulate  their  virtues?  Have  the  purposes  for  which  our 
Union  was  formed  lost  their  value?  Has  patriotism  ceased  to  be 
a  virtue,  and  is  narrow  sectionalism  no  longer  to  be  counted  a 
crime?  Shall  the  North  not  rejoice  that  the  progress  of  agricul 
ture  in  the  South  has  given  to  her  great  staple  the  controlling 
influence  of  the  commerce  of  the  world,  and  put  manufacturing 
nations  under  bond  to  keep  the  peace  with  the  United  States? 
Shall  the  South  not  exult  in  the  fact  that  the  industry  and  per 
severing  intelligence  of  the  North  has  placed  her  mechanical  skill 
in  the  front  ranks  of  the  civilized  world — that  our  mother  country, 
whose  haughty  Minister,  some  eighty  odd  years  ago,  declared  that 
not  a  hob-nail  should  be  made  in  the  colonies,  which  are  now  the 
United  States,  was  brought,  some  four  years  ago,  to  recognize  our 
preeminence  by  sending  a  commission  to  examine  our  workshops 
and  our  machinery,  to  perfect  their  own  manufacture  of  the  arms 
requisite  for  their  defense  ?  Do  not  our  whole  people,  interior  and 
seaboard,  North,  South,  East  and  West,  alike  feel  proud  of  the 
hardihood,  the  enterprise,  the  skill,  and  the  courage  of  the  Yankee 
sailor,  who  has  borne  our  flag  far  as  the  ocean  bears  its  foam,  and 
caused  the  name  and  character  of  the  United  States  to  be  known 


126  LIFE    OF   JEFFERSOX   DAVIS. 

and  respected  wherever  there  is  wealth  enough  to  woo  commerce 
and  intelligence  to  honor  merit?  So  long  as  we  preserve  and 
appreciate  the  achievements  of  Jefferson  and  Adams,  of  Franklin 
and  Madison,  of  Hamilton,  of  Hancock,  and  of  Rutledge,  men 
who  labored  for  the  whole  country,  and  lived  for  mankind,  we  can 
not  sink  to  the  petty  strife  which  would  sap  the  foundations  and 
destroy  the  political  fabric  our  fathers  erected  and  bequeathed  as 
an  inheritance  to  our  posterity  forever. 

Since  the  formation  of  the  Constitution  a  vast  extension  of  ter 
ritory,  and  the  varied  relations  arising  therefrom,  have  presented 
problems  which  could  not  have  been  foreseen.  It  is  just  cause 
for  admiration,  even  wonder,  that  the  provisions  of  the  funda 
mental  law  should  have  been  so  fully  adequate  to  all  the  wants 
of  government,  new  in  its  organization,  and  new  in  many  of  the 
principles  on  which  it  was  founded  Whatever  fears  may  have 
once  existed  as  to  the  consequences  of  territorial  expansion  must 
give  way  before  the  evidence  which  the  past  affords.  The  General 
Government,  strictly  confined  to  its  delegated  functions,  and  the 
State  left  in  the  undisturbed  exercise  of  all  else,  we  have  a  theory 
and  practice  which  fits  our  Government  for  immeasurable  domain, 
and  might,  under  a  millennium  of  nations,  embrace  mankind. 

From  the  slope  of  the  Atlantic  our  population,  with  ceaseless 
tide,  has  poured  into  the  wide  and  fertile  valley  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  with  eddying  whirl  has  passed  to  the  coast  of  the  Pacific ; 
from  the  West  and  the  East  the  tides  are  rushing  toward  each 
other,  and  the  mind  is  carried  to  the  day  when  all  the  cultivable 
land  will  be  inhabited,  and  the  American  people  will  sigh  for 
more  wildernesses  to  conquer.  But  there  is  here  a  physico-polit- 
ical  problem  presented  for  our  solution.  Were  it  purely  physical 
your  past  triumphs  would  leave  but  little  doubt  of  your  capacity 
to  solve  it.  A  community  which,  when  less  than  twenty  thousand, 
conceived  the  grand  project  of  crossing  the  White  Mountains,  and 
unaided,  save  by  the  stimulus  which  jeers  and  prophecies  of  failure 


SPEECH    AT    PORTLAND.  127 

gave,  successfully  executed  the  Herculean  work,  might  well  be 
impatient  if  it  were  suggested  that  a  physical  problem  was  before 
us  too  difficult  for  mastery.  The  history  of  man  teaches  that  high 
mountains  and  wide  deserts  have  resisted  the  permanent  extension 
of  empire,  and  have  formed  the  immutable  boundaries  of  States. 
From  time  to  time,  under  some  able  leader,  have  the  hordes  of 
the  upper  plains  of  Asia  swept  over  the  adjacent  country,  and 
rolled  their  conquering  columns  over  Southern  Europe.  Yet,  after 
the  lapse  of  a  few  generations,  the  physical  law,  to  which  I  have 
referred,  has  asserted  its  supremacy,  and  the  boundaries  of  those 
States  differ  little  now  from  those  which  were  obtained  three  thou 
sand  years  ago. 

Rome  flew  her  conquering  eagles  over  the  then  known  world, 
and  has  now  subsided  into  the  little  territory  on  which  the  great 
city  was  originally  built.  The  Alps  and  the  Pyranees  have  been 
unable  to  restrain  imperial  France ;  but  her  expansion  was  a  fever 
ish  action,  her  advance  and  her  retreat  were  tracked  with  blood, 
and  those  mountain  ridges  are  the  reestablished  limits  of  her  em 
pire.  Shall  the  Rocky  Mountains  prove  a  dividing  barrier  to  us? 
Were  ours  a  central  consolidated  Government,  instead  of  a  Union 
of  sovereign  States,  our  fate  might  be  learned  from  the  history  of 
other  nations.  Thanks  to  the  wisdom  and  independent  spirit  of 
our  forefathers,  this  is  not  the  case.  Each  State  having  sole  charge 
of  its  local  interests  and  domestic  affairs,  the  problem,  which  to 
others  has  been  insoluble,  to  us  is  made  easy.  Rapid,  safe,  and 
easy  communication  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  will  give 
co-intelligence,  unity  of  interest,  and  cooperation  among  all  parts 
of  our  continent-wide  Republic.  The  net-work  of  railroads  which 
bind  the  North  and  the  South,  the  slope  of  the  Atlantic  and  the 
valley  of  the  Mississippi,  together  testify  that  our  people  have  the 
power  to  perform,  in  that  regard,  whatever  it  is  their  will  to  do. 

We  require  a  railroad  to  the  States  of  the  Pacific  for  present 
uses ;  the  time  no  doubt  will  come  when  we  shall  have  need  of 


128  LIFE  OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

two  or  three,  it  may  be,  more.  Because  of  the  desert  character 
of  the  interior  country  the  work  will  be  difficult  and  expensive. 
It  will  require  the  efforts  of  a  united  people.  The  bickerings  of 
little  politicians,  the  jealousies  of  sections  must  give  way  to  dig 
nity  of  purpose  and  zeal  for  the  common  good.  If  the  object  be 
obstructed  by  contention  and  division  as  to  whether  the  route 
shall  be  Northern,  Southern,  or  Central,  the  handwriting  is  on  the 
wall,  and  it  requires  little  skill  to  see  that  failure  is  the  interpre 
tation  of  the  inscription.  You  are  practical  people,  and  may  ask, 
How  is  that  contest  to  be  avoided?  By  taking  the  question  out 
of  the  hands  of  politicians  altogether.  Let  the  Government  give 
such  aid  as  it  is  proper  for  it  to  render  to  the  company  which 
shall  propose  the  most  feasible  plan ;  then  leave  to  capitalists  with 
judgment,  sharpened  by  interest,  the  selection  of  the  route,  and 
the  difficulties  will  diminish,  as  did  those  which  you  overcame 
when  you  connected  your  harbor  with  the  Canadian  provinces. 

It  would  be  to  trespass  on  your  kindness  and  to  violate  the  pro 
prieties  of  the  occasion  were  I  to  detain  the  vast  concourse  which 
stands  before  me  by  entering  on  the  discussion  of  controverted 
topics,  or  by  further  indulging  in  the  expression  of  such  reflec 
tions  as  circumstances  suggest.  I  came  to  your  city  in  quest  of 
health  and  repose.  From  the  moment  I  entered  it  you  have  show 
ered  upon  me  kindness  and  hospitality.  Though  my  experience 
has  taught  me  to  anticipate  good  rather  than  evil  from  my  fellow- 
man,  it  had  not  prepared  me  to  expect  such  unremitting  atten 
tion  as  has  here  been  bestowed.  I  have  been  jocularly  asked  in 
relation  to  my  coming  here,  whether  I  had  secured  a  guarantee  for 
my  safety,  and  lo !  I  have  found  it.  I  stand  in  the  midst  of  thou 
sands  of  my  fellow-citizens.  But,  my  friends,  I  came  neither  dis 
trusting  nor  apprehensive,  of  which  you  have  proof  in  the  fact 
that  I  brought  with  me  the  objects  of  tenderest  affection  and  solic 
itude,  my  wife  and  my  children  ;  they  have  shared  with  me  your 
hospitality,  and  will  alike  remain  your  debtors.  If,  at  some  future 


SPEECH   AT   POKTLAKD.  129 

time,  when  I  am  mingled  with  the  dust,  and  the  arm  of  my  in 
fant  son  has  been  nerved  for  deeds  of  manhood,  the  storm  of  war 
should  burst  upon  your  city,  I  feel  that,  relying  upon  his  inher 
iting  the  instincts  of  his  ancestors  and  mine,  I  may  pledge  him  in 
that  perilous  hour  to  stand  by  your  side  in  the  defense  of  your 
hearth-stones,  and  in  maintaining  the  honor  of  a  flag  whose  con 
stellation,  though  torn  and  smoked  in  many  a  battle  by  sea  and 
laud,  has  never  been  stained  with  dishonor,  and  will,  I  trust,  for 
ever  fly  as  free  as  the  breeze  which  unfolds  it. 

A  stranger  to  you,  the  salubrity  of  your  location,  and  the  beauty 
of  its  scenery  were  not  wholly  unknown  to  me,  nor  were  there 
wanting  associations  which  busy  memory  connected  with  your 
people.  You  will  pardon  me  for  alluding  to  one  whose  genius 
shed  a  lustre  upon  all  it  touched,  and  whose  qualities  gathered 
about  him  hosts  of  friends  wherever  he  was  known.  Prentiss,  a 
native  of  Portland,  lived  from  youth  to  middle  age  in  the  county 
of  my  residence ;  and  the  inquiries  which  have  been  made  show 
me  that  the  youth  excited  the  interest  which  the  greatness  of  the 
man  justified,  and  that  his  memory  thus  remains  a  link  to  con 
nect  your  home  with  mine.  A  cursory  view,  when  passing  through 
your  town  on  former  occasions,  had  impressed  me  with  the  great 
advantages  of  your  harbor,  its  easy  entrance,  its  depth,  and  its 
extensive  accommodations  for  shipping.  But  its  advantages  and 
its  facilities,  as  they  have  been  developed  by  closer  inspection, 
have  grown  upon  me,  until  I  realize  that  it  is  no  boast,  but  the 
language  of  sober  truth,  which,  in  the  present  state  of  commerce, 
pronounces  them  unequaled  in  any  harbor  of  our  country. 

And  surely  no  place  could  be  more  inviting  to  an  invalid  who 
sought  refuge  from  the  heat  of  Southern  summer.  Here  waving 
elms  offer  him  shaded  walks,  and  magnificent  residences,  sur 
rounded  by  flowers,  fill  the  mind  with  ideas  of  comfort  and  rest. 
If,  weary  of  constant  contact  with  his  fellow-men,  he  seeks  a  deeper 
seclusion,  there,  in  the  background  of  this  grand  amphitheater, 
9 


130  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

lie  the  eternal  mountains,  frowning  with  brow  of  rock  and  cap  of 
snow  upon  smiling  fields  beneath,  and  there  in  its  recesses  may  be 
found  as  much  wildness  and  as  much  of  solitude  as  the  pilgrim, 
weary  of  the  cares  of  life,  can  desire.  If  he  turn  to  the  front, 
your  capacious  harbor,  studded  with  green  islands  of  ever-varying 
light  and  shade,  and  enlightened  by  all  the  stirring  evidences  of 
commercial  activity,  offer  him  the  mingled  charms  of  busy  life 
and  nature's  calm  repose.  A  few  miles  further,  and  he  may  sit 
upon  the  quiet  shore  to  listen  to  the  murmuring  wave  until  the 
troubled  spirit  sinks  to  rest;  and  in  the  little  sail  that  vanishes 
on  the  illimitable  sea  we  find  the  type  of  the  voyage  which  he  is 
soon  to  take,  when,  his  ephemeral  existence  closed,  he  embarks  for 
that  better  state  which  lies  beyond  the  grave. 

Richly  endowed  as  you  are  by  nature  in  all  which  contributes 
to  pleasure  and  to  usefulness,  the  stranger  can  not  pass  without 
paying  a  tribute  to  the  much  which  your  energy  has  achieved  for 
yourselves.  Where  else  will  one  find  a  more  happy  union  of  mag 
nificence  and  comfort?  Where  better  arrangements  to  facilitate 
commerce  ?  Where  so  much  of  industry  with  so  little  noise  and 
bustle  ?  Where,  in  a  phrase,  so  much  effected  in  proportion  to 
the  means  employed?  We  hear  the  puff  of  the  engine,  the  roll 
of  the  wheel,  the  ring  of  the  ax  and  the  saw,  but  the  stormy, 
passionate  exclamation  so  often  mingled  with  the  sounds  are  no 
where  heard.  Yet  neither  these  nor  other  things  which  I  have 
mentioned,  attractive  though  they  be,  have  been  to  me  the  chief 
charm  which  I  have  found  among  you.  Far  above  all  these,  I 
place  the  gentle  kindness,  the  cordial  welcome,  the  hearty  grasp 
which  made  me  feel  truly  and  at  once,  though  wandering  afar, 
that  I  was  still  at  home.  My  friends,  I  thank  you  for  this  addi 
tional  manifestation  of  your  good-will. 


REPLY  TO   SENATOR   DOUGLAS.  131 

REPLY  OF  HON.  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  OF  MISSISSIPPI,  TO  THE 
SPEECH  OF  SENATOR  DOUGLAS,  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
SENATE,  MAY  16  AND  17,  1860. 

[The  Senate  resumed  the  consideration  of  the  resolutions  submitted  by 
Mr.  Da.vis  on  the  first  of  March,  relative  to  State  rights,  the  institution  of 
slavery  in  the  States,  and  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  several  States  in  the 
Territories.] 

MR.  DOUGLAS  having  concluded  his  speech — 

MR.  DAVIS  arose  and  said: 

Mr.  President:  When  the  Senator  from  Illinois  commenced  his 
speech,  he  announced  his  object  to  be  to  answer  to  an  arraign 
ment,  or,  as  he  also  termed  it,  an  indictment,  which  he  said  I  had 
made  against  him.  He  therefore  caused  extracts  to  be  read  from 
my  remarks  to  the  Senate.  Those  extracts  announce  that  I  have 
been  the  uniform  opponent  of  what  is  called  squatter  sovereignty, 
and  that,  having  opposed  it  heretofore,  I  was  now,  least  of  all, 
disposed  to  give  it  quarter.  At  a  subsequent  period,  the  fact  was 
stated  that  the  Senator  from  Illinois  and  myself  had  been  opposed 
to  each  other,  on  those  questions  which  I  considered  as  most  dis 
tinctly  involving  Southern  interests  in  1850.  He  has  not  answered 
to  the  allegation.  He  has  not  attempted  to  show  that  he  did  not 
stand  in  that  position.  It  is  true  he  has  associated  himself  with 
Mr.  Clay,  and,  before' closing,  I  will  show  that  the  association  does 
not  belong  to  him;  that  upon  those  test  questions  they  did  not 
vote  together.  He  then,  somewhat  vauntingly,  reminded  me  that 
he  was  with  the  victorious  party,  asserted  that  the  Democracy  of 
the  country  then  sustained  his  doctrine,  and  that  I  was  thus  out 
side  of  that  organization.  With  Mr.  Clay!  If  he  had  been  with 
him,  he  would  have  been  in  good  company;  but  the  old  Jackson 
Democracy  will  be  a  little  surprised  to  learn  that  Clay  was  the 
leader  of  our  party,  and  that  a  man  proves  his  allegiance  to  it  by 
showing  how  closely  he  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Henry  Clay. 


132  LIFE   OF   JEFFEFwSON   DAVIS. 

When  the  Senator  opened  his  argument,  by  declaring  his  pur 
pose  to  be  fair  and  courteous,  I  little  supposed  that  an  .explanation 
made  by  me  in  favor  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  which  could 
not  at  all  disturb  the  line  of  his  argument,  would  have  been  fol 
lowed  by  the  rude  announcement  that  he  could  not  permit  inter 
ruption  thereafter.  A  Senator  has  the  right  to  claim  exemption 
from  interruption  if  he  will  follow  the  thread  of  his  argument, 
direct  his  discourse  to  the  question  at  issue,  and  confine  himself  to 
it ;  but  if  he  makes  up  a  medley  of  arraignments  of  the  men  who 
have  been  in  public  life  for  ten  years  past,  and  addressing  indi 
viduals  in  his  presence,  he  should  permit  an  interruption  to  be 
made  for  correction  as  often  as  he  misrepresents  their  position.  It 
would  have  devolved  on  me  more  than  once,  if  I  had  been  re 
sponsible  for  his  frequent  references  to  me,  to  correct  him  and 
show  that  he  misstated  facts;  but  as  he  would  not  permit  himself 
to  be  interrupted,  I  am  not  responsible  for  any  thing  he  has  im 
puted  to  me. 

The  Senator  commenced  with  a  disclaimer  of  any  purpose  to 
follow  what  he  considered  a  bad  practice  of  arraigning  Senators 
here  on  matters  for  which  they  stood  responsible  to  their  constitu 
ents  ;  but  straightway  proceeded  to  make  a  general  arraignment 
of  the  present  and  the  absent.  I  believe  I  constitute  the  only 
exception  to  whom  he  granted  consistency,  and  that  at  the  expense 
of  party  association,  and,  he  would  have  it,  at  the  expense  of  sound 
judgment.  He  not  only  arraigned  individuals,  but  even  States — 
Florida,  Alabama,  and  Georgia — were  brought  to  answer  at  the  bar 
of  the  Senate  for  the  resolutions  they  had  passed ;  Virginia  was 
held  responsible  for  her  policy ;  Mississippi  received  his  critical 
notice.  Pray,  sir,  what  had  all  this  to  do  with  the  question? 
Especially,  what  had  all  this  to  do  with  what  he  styled  an  in 
dictment  against  him?  It  is  a  mere  resort  to  a  species  of  dec 
lamation  which  has  not  been  heard  to-day  for  the  first  time ;  a 
pretext  to  put  himself  in  the  attitude  of  a  persecuted  man,  and, 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  133 

like  the  satyr's  guest,  blowing  hot  and  cold  in  the  same  breath, 
in  the  midst  of  his  complaint  of  persecution,  vaunts  his  supreme 
power.  If  his  opponents  be  the  very  small  minority  which  he  de 
scribes,  what  fear  has  he  of  persecution  or  proscription  ? 

Can  he  not  draw  a  distinction  between  one  who  says:  "I  give 
no  quarter  to  an  idea,"  and  one  who  proclaims  the  policy  of  put 
ting  the  advocates  of  that  idea  to  the  sword  ?  Such  was  his  figur 
ative  language.  That  figure  of  the  sword,  however,  it  seemed,  as 
he  progressed  in  his  development,  referred  to  the  one  thought 
always  floating  through  his  brain — exclusion  from  the  spoils  of 
office,  for,  at  last,  it  seemed  to  narrow  down  to  the  supposition  that 
no  man  who  agreed  with  him  was,  with  our  consent,  to  be  either 
a  Cabinet  officer  or  a  collector.  Who  has  advanced  any  such  doc 
trine?  Have  I,  at  this  or  any  other  period  of  my  acquaintance 
with  him,  done  any  thing  to  justify  him  in  attributing  that  opinion 
to  me?  I  pause  for  his  answer. 

MR.  DOUGLAS.  I  do  not  exactly  understand  the  Senator.  I 
have  no  complaint  to  make  of  the  Senator  from  Mississippi  of  ever 
having  been  unkind  or  ungenerous  towards  me,  if  that  is  what  he 
means  to  say. 

MR.  DAVIS.  Have  I  ever  promulgated  a  doctrine  which  indi 
cated  that  if  my  friends  were  in  power,  I  would  sacrifice  every  other 
wing  of  the  Democratic  party? 

MR.  DOUGLAS.  I  understood  the  making  of  a  test  on  this  issue 
"against  me  would  reach  every  other  man  that  held  my  opinions ; 
and,  therefore,  if  I  was  not  sound  enough  to  hold  office,  no  man 
agreeing  with  me  would  be ;  and  hence,  every  man  of  my  opinions 
would  be  excluded. 

MR.  DAVIS.  Ah,  Mr.  President ;  I  believe  I  now  have  caught 
the  clue  to  the  argument;  it  was  not  before  apprehended.  I  was 
among  those  who  thought  the  Senator,  with  his  opinions,  ought 
not  to  be  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Territories.  This,  I  sup 
pose,  then,  is  the  whole  imposition.  But  have  I  not  said  to  the 


134  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Senator,  at  least  once,  that  I  had  no  disposition  to  question  his 
Democracy ;  that  I  did  not  wish  to  withhold  from  him  any  tribute 
which  was  due  to  his  talent  and  his  worth  ?  Did  I  not  offer  to  re 
sign  the  only  chairmanship  of  a  committee  I  had  if  the  Senate 
would  confer  it  upon  him  ?  Then,  where  is  this  spirit  of  proscrip 
tion,  the  complaint  of  which  has  constituted  some  hours  of  his 
speech?  If  others  have  manifested  it,  I  do  not  know  it;  and  as 
the  single  expression  of  "  no  quarter  to  the  doctrine  of  squatter 
sovereignty"  was  the  basis  of  his  whole  allegation,  I  took  it  for 
granted  his  reference  to  a  purpose  to  do  him  and  his  friends  such 
wrong  must  have  been  intended  for  me. 

The  fact  that  the  Senator  criticised  the  idea  of  the  States  pre 
scribing  the  terms  on  which  they  will  act  in  a  party  convention 
recognized  to  be  representative,  is  suggestive  of  an  extreme  mis 
conception  of  relative  position ;  and  the  presumption  with  which 
the  Senator  censured  what  he  was  pleased  to  term  "  the  seceders," 
suggested  to  me  a  representation  of  the  air  of  the  great  monarch 
of  France  when,  feeling  royalty  and  power  all  concentrated  in  his 
own  person,  he  used  the  familiar  yet  remarkable  expression,  "the 
State,  that's  me."  Does  the  Senator  consider  it  a  modest  thing  in 
him  to  announce  to  the  Democratic  Convention  on  what  terms  he 
will  accept  the  nomination;  but  presumptuous  in  a  State  to  de 
clare  the  principle  on  which  she  will  give  him  her  vote?  It  is  an 
advance  on  Louis  Quatorze. 

I  Nothing  but  the  most  egregious  vanity,  something  far  surpassing 
even  the  bursting  condition  of  swollen  pride,  could  have  induced 
the  Senator  to  believe  that  I  could  not  speak  of  squatter  sover 
eignty  without  meaning  him. 

Towards  the  Senator,  personally,  I  have  never  manifested  hos 
tility — indeed,  could  not,  because  I  have  ever  felt  kindly.  Many 
years  of  association,  very  frequent  cooperation,  manly  support 
from  him  in  times  of  trial,  are  all  remembered  by  me  gratefully. 
The  Senator,  therefore,  had  no  right  to  assume  that  I  was  making 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  135 

war  upon  him.  I  addressed  myself  to  a  doctrine  of  which  he  was 
not  the  founder,  though  he  was  one  of  the  early  disciples ;  but  he 
proved  an  unprofitable  follower,  for  he  became  rebellious,  and 
ruined  the  logic  of  the  doctrine.  It  was  logical  in  Mr.  Cass's 
mind ;  he  claimed  the  power  to  be  inherent  in  the  people  who 
settled  a  new  Territory,  and  by  this  inherent  power  he  held  that 
they  might  proceed  to  form  government  and  to  exercise  its  func 
tions.  There  was  logic  in  that — logic  up  to  the  point  of  sover 
eignty.  Not  so  with  the  Senator.  He  says  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Territories  derive  their  power  to  form  a  government  from  the  con 
sent  of  Congress;  that  when  we  decide  that  there  are  enough  of 
them  to  constitute  a  government,  and  enact  an  organic  law,  then 
they  have  power  to  legislate  according  to  their  will.  This  power 
being  derived  from  an  act  of  Congress — a  limited  agency  tied  down 
to  the  narrow  sphere  of  the  constitutional  grant — is  made,  by  that 
supposition,  the  bestower  of  sovereignty  on  its  creature. 

I  had  occasion  the  other  day  to  refer  to  the  higher  law  as  it 
made  its  first  appearance  on  earth — the  occasion  when  the  tempter 
entered  the  garden  of  Eden.  There  is  another  phase  of  it.  Who 
ever  attempts  to  interpose  between  the  supreme  law  of  the  Creator 
and  the  creature,  whether  it  be  in  the  regions  of  morals  or  politics, 
proclaims  a  theory  that  wars  upon  every  principle  of  government. 
When  Congress,  the  agent  for  the  States,  within  the  limits  of  its 
authority,  forms,  as  it  were,  a  territorial  constitution  by  its  organic 
act,  he  who  steps  in  and  proclaims  to  the  settlers  in  that  Territory 
that  they  have  the  right  to  overturn  the  Government,  to  usurp  to 
themselves  powers  not  delegated,  is  preaching  the  higher  law  in 
the  domain  of  politics,  which  is  only  less  mischievous  than  its 
other  form,  because  the  other  involves  both  politics  and  morals  in 
one  ruinous  confusion. 

The  Senator  spoke  of  the  denial  of  Democratic  fellowship  to 
him.  After  what  has  been  said  and  acknowledged  by  the  Senator, 
it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  it  could  have  any  application  to  me. 


136  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

It  may  be  proper  to  add,  I  know  of  no  such  denial  on  the  part  of 
other  Democratic  Senators.  Far  be  it  from  me  to  vaunt  the  fact  of 
being  in  a  majority,  and  to  hold  him  to  the  hard  rule  he  prescribes 
to  us,  of  surrendering  an  opinion  where  we  may  happen  to  have 
been  in  a  minority.  Were  I  to  return  now  to  him  the  measure 
with  which  he  metes  to  us,  when  he  assumes  that  a  majority  in  the 
Charleston  Convention  has  a  right  to  prescribe  what  shall  be  our 
tenets,  I  might,  in  reply  to  him,  say,  as  a  sincere  adherent  of  the 
Democratic  party,  how  can  you  oppose  the  resolutions  pending 
before  the  Senate  ?  If  twenty-seven  majority  in  a  body  of  three 
hundred  and  three  constituent  members  had,  as  he  assumes,  the 
power  to  lay  down  a  binding  law,  what  is  to  be  said  of  him  who, 
with  a  single  adherent,  stands  up  against  the  whole  of  his  Dem 
ocratic  associates?  He  must  be  outside  of  the  party,  according  to 
his  enunciation ;  he  must  be  wandering  in  the  dark  regions  to 
which  he  consigns  the  followers  of  Mr.  Yancey. 

The  Senator  said  he  had  no  taste  for  references  to  things  which 
were  personal,  and  then  proceeded  to  discuss  that  of  which  he 
showed  himself  profoundly  ignorant — the  condition  of  things  in 
Mississippi.  It  is  disagreeable  for  me  to  bring  before  the  Senate 
matters  which  belong  to  my  constituents  and  myself,  and  I  should 
not  do  so  but  for  the  fact  of  their  introduction  into  the  Senator's 
elaborate  speech,  which  is  no  doubt  to  be  spread  over  all  parts  of  the 
country.  The  Senator,  by  some  means  or  other,  has  the  name  of 
very  many  citizens  of  Mississippi,  and  as  there  is  nothing  in  our 
condition  to  attract  his  special  attention,  his  speech  is  probably  to 
be  sent  over  a  wide  field  of  correspondence  j  and  it  is,  therefore, 
the  more  incumbent  on  me  to  notice  his  attempt  to  give  a  history 
of  affairs  that  were  transacted  in  Mississippi.  He  first  announces 
that  Mississippi  rebuked  the  idea  of  intervention  asserted  in  1850; 
then  that  Mississippi  rejected  my  appeal ;  that  Mississippi  voted 
on  the  issue  made  up  by  the  compromise  measure  of  1850,  and 
vaunts  it  as  an  approval  of  that  legislation  of  which  he  was  the 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  137 

advocate  and  I  the  opponent.  Now,  Mississippi  did  none  of  these 
things.  Mississippi  instructed  her  Senators,  and  I  obeyed  her 
instructions.  I  introduced  into  this  body  the  resolutions  which 
directed  my  course.  On  that  occasion  I  vindicated  Mississippi, 
and  especially  the  Southern  rights  men,  from  the  falsehood  of 
that  day,  and  reiterated  now,  of  a  purpose  to  dissolve  the  Union. 
I  vindicated  her  by  extracts  from  the  proceedings  as  well  of  her 
convention  as  of  her  primary  assemblies ;  and  my  remarks  on  that 
occasion,  as  fully  as  the  events  to  which  he  referred  in  terms  of 
undeserved  compliment,  justified  the  Senator  in  saying  to-day  that 
he  knew  I  had  always  been  faithful  to  the  Government  of  which  I 
was  a  part. 

Acting  under  the  instructions  from  Mississippi — not  merely 
voting  and  yielding  reluctant  compliance ;  but,  according  to  my 
ideas  of  the  obligation  of  a  Senator,  laboring  industriously  and 
zealously  to  carry  out  the  instructions  which  my  State  gave  me,  I 
took  and  maintained  the  position  I  held  in  relation  to  the  meas 
ures  of  1850.  As  it  was  with  me  a  cordial  service,  I  went  home 
to  vindicate  the  position  which  was  hers,  as  well  as  my  own. 
Shortly  after  that  a  canvass  was  opened,  in  which  a  distinguished 
gentlemen  of  our  party,  who  had  not  been  a  member  of  Congress, 
was  nominated  for  Governor.  Questions  other  than  the  compro 
mise  measures  of  1850  arose  in  that  canvass ;  they  were  discussed 
in  a  great  degree  to  the  exclusion  of  a  consideration  of  the  merits 
of  the  action  of  Congress  in  1850;  and,  at  the  election  in  Septem 
ber,  for  delegates  to  a  convention,  we  had  fallen  from  a  party  ma 
jority  of  some  eight  thousand  to  a  minority  of  nearly  the  same 
number.  It  was  after  the  decision  of  the  question  involved  in 
calling  a  convention — after  our  party  was  defeated — after  the  can 
didate  for  Governor  had  retired,  that  the  Democracy  of  Mississippi 
called  upon  me  to  bear  their  standard.  It  was  esteemed  a  forlorn 
hope,  therefore  an  obligation  of  honor  not  to  decline  the  invita 
tion.  But  so  far  as  the  action  in  the  Senate  in  1850  was  con- 


138  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

cerned,  if  it  Lad  any  effect,  it  must  have  been  the  reverse  of  that 
assumed,  as,  in  the  subsequent  election  for  State  officers  on  the 
first  Monday  in  November,  this  majority  of  nearly  eight  thousand 
against  us  was  reduced  to  about  one  thousand. 

But  when  this  convention  assembled,  though  a  large  majority 
of  the  members  belonged  to  the  party  which  the  Senator  has  been 
pleased  to  term  the  "  Submissionists  " — a  name  which  they  always 
rejected — this  convention  of  the  party  most  adverse  to  me,  when 
they  came  to  act  on  the  subject  said,  after  citing  the  "compro 
mise"  measures  of  the  Congress  of  1850  : 

"  And  connected  with  them,  the  rejection  of  the  proposition  to 
exclude  slavery  from  the  Territories  of  the  United  States,  and  to 
abolish  it  in  the  District  of  Columbia ;  and,  while  they  do  not 
entirely  approve,  will  abide  by  it  as  a  permanent  adjustment  of  this 
sectional  controversy,  so  long  as  the  same,  in  all  its  features,  shall 
be  faithfully  adhered  to  and  enforced." 

Then  they  go  on  to  recite  six  different  causes,  for  which  they 
will  resort  to  the  most  extreme  remedies  which  we  had  supposed 
ever  could  be  necessary.  The  case  only  requires  that  I  should  say 
that  the  party  to  which  I  belonged  did  not  then,  nor  at  any  pre 
vious  time,  propose  to  go  out  of  the  Union,  but  to  have  a  South 
ern  convention  for  consultation  as  to  future  contingencies,  threat 
ened  and  anticipated.  It  was  at  last  narrowed  down  to  the  ques 
tion,  whether  we  should  meet  South  Carolina  and  consult  with  her. 
Honoring  that  gallant  State  for  the  magnanimity  she  had  mani 
fested  in  the  first  efforts  for  the  creation  of  the  Government,  in  the 
preliminaries  to  the  struggle  for  independence,  when  she,  a  favored 
colony,  feeling  no  oppression,  nursed  by  the  mother  country, 
cherished  in  every  method,  yet  agreed  with  Massachusetts,  then 
oppressed,  to  assert  the  great  principle  of  community  independ 
ence,  and  to  carry  it  to  the  extent  of  war — honoring  her  for  her 
unvarying  defense  of  the  Constitution  throughout  her  whole 
course — believing  that  she  was  true  to  her  faith,  and  would  re- 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  139 

deem  all  her  pledges — feeling  that  a  friendly  hand  might  restrain, 
while,  if  left  to  herself,  her  pride  might  precipitate  her  on  the  trial 
of  separation,  I  did  desire  to  meet  South  Carolina  in  convention, 
though  nobody  but  ourselves  should  be  there  to  join  her. 

But,  to  close  the  matter,  this  convention,  in  its  seventh  resolu 
tion,  after  stating  all  those  questions  on  which  it  would  resist, 
declared : 

"  That,  as  the  people  of  Mississippi,  in  the  opinion  of  this  con 
vention,  desire  all  further  agitation  of  the  slavery  question  to 
cease,  and  have  acted  upon  and  decided  the  foregoing  questions, 
thereby  making  it  the  duty  of  this  convention  to  pass  no  act  in  the 
perview  and  spirit  of  the  law  under  which  it  is  called,  this  conven 
tion  deems  it  unnecessary  to  refer  to  the  people,  for  approval  or 
disapproval,  at  the  ballot-box,  its  action  in  the  premises." 

So  that  when  the  Senator  appealed  to  this  as  evidence  of  what 
the  people  of  Mississippi  had  done,  he  was  ignorant  of  the  fact 
that  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Mississippi  did  not  agree  with 
him  ;  that  their  resolutions  did  not  sustain  the  view  which  he  took, 
and  that  the  people  of  Mississippi  never  acted  on  them.  If,  then, 
there  had  been  good  taste  in  the  intervention  of  this  local  ques 
tion,  there  was  certainly  very  bad  judgment  in  hazarding  his  state 
ments  on  a  subject  of  which  he  was  so  little  informed. 

The  Senator  here,  as  in  relation  to  our  friends  at  Charleston, 
takes  kind  care  of  us  —  supposes  we  do  not  know  what  we  are 
about,  but  that  he,  with  his  superior  discrimination,  sees  what  must 
necessarily  result  from  what  we  are  doing ;  he  says  that,  at  Charles 
ton,  they — innocent  people — did  not  intend  to  destroy  the  Govern 
ment  ;  but  he  warns  them  that,  if  they  do  what  they  propose,  they 
will  destroy  it ;  and  so  he  says  we  of  Mississippi,  not  desiring  to 
break  up  the  Union,  nevertheless  pursued  a  course  which  would 
have  had  that  result  if  it  had  not  been  checked.  Where  does  he 
get  all  this  information?  I  have  been  in  every  State  of  the  Union 
except  two — three  now,  since  Oregon  has  been  admitted — but  I 


140  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

have  never  seen  a  man  who  had  as  much  personal  knowledge.  It 
is  equally  surprising  that  his  facts  should  be  so  contrary  to  the 
record. 

We  believed  then,  as  I  believe  now,  that  this  Union,  as  a  com 
pact  entered  into  between  the  States,  was  to  be  preserved  by  good 
faith,  and  by  a  close  observance  of  the  terms  on  which  we  were 
united.  We  believed  then,  as  I  believe  now,  that  the  party  which 
rested  upon  the  basis  of  truth  ;  promulgated  its  opinions,  and  had 
them  tested  in  the  alembic  of  public  opinion,  adopted  the  only 
path  of  safety.  I  can  not  respect  such  a  doctrine  as  that  which 
says,  "You  may  construe  the  Constitution  your  way,  and  I  will 
construe  it  mine  ;  we  will  waive  the  merit  of  these  two  construc 
tions,  and  harmonize  together  until  the  courts  decide  the  question 
between  us."  A  man  is  bound  to  have  an  opinion  upon  any  political 
subject  upon  which  he  is  called  to  act;  it  is  skulking  his  respon 
sibility  for  a  citizen  to  say,  "Let  us  express  no  opinion;  I  will 
agree  that  you  may  have  yours,  and  I  will  have  mine;  we  will  co 
operate  politically  together ;  we  will  beat  the  opposition,  divide  the 
spoils,  and  leave  it  to  the  court  to  decide  the  question  between  us." 

I  do  not  believe  that  this  is  the  path  of  safety ;  I  am  sure  it  is 
not  the  way  of  honor.  I  believe  it  devolves  on  us,  who  are  prin 
cipally  sufferers  from  the  danger  to  which  this  policy  has  exposed 
us,  to  affirm  the  truth  boldly,  and  let  the  people  decide  after  the 
promulgation  of  our  opinions.  Our  Government,  resting  as  it  does 
upon  public  opinion  and  popular  consent,  was  not  formed  to  deceive 
the  people,  nor  does  it  regard  the  men  in  office  as  a  governing  class. 
We,  the  functionaries,  should  derive  our  opinions  from  the  people. 
To  know  what  their  opinion  is,  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  pro 
nounce,  in  unmistakable  language,  what  we  ourselves  mean. 

My  position  is,  that  there  is  no  portion  of  our  country  where 
the  people  are  not  sufficiently  intelligent  to  discriminate  between 
right  and  wrong,  and  no  portion  where  the  sense  of  justice  does 
not  predominate.  I,  therefore,  have  been  always  willing  to  unfurl 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  141 

our  flag  to  its  innermost  fold — to  nail  it  to  the  mast,  with  all  our 
principles  plainly  inscribed  upon  it.  Believing  that  we  ask  nothing 
but  what  the  Constitution  was  intended  to  confer — nothing  but  that 
which,  as  equals,  we  are  entitled  to  receive — I  am  willing  that  our 
case  should  be  plainly  stated  to  those  who  have  to  decide  it,  and 
await,  for  good  or  for  evil,  their  verdict. 

For  two  days,  the  Senator  spoke  nominally  upon  the  resolutions, 
and  upon  the  territorial  question ;  but,  like  the  witness  in  the 
French  comedy,  who,  when  called  upon  to  testify,  commenced 
before  the  creation,  and  was  stopped  by  the  judge,  who  told  him  to 
come  down,  for  a  beginning,  to  the  deluge,  he  commenced  so  far 
back,  and  narrated  so  minutely,  that  he  never  got  chronologically 
down  to  the  point  before  us. 

What  is  the  question  on  which  the  Democracy  are  divided? 
Are  we  called  upon  to  settle  what  every  body  said  from  1847  down 
to  this  date?  Have  the  Democracy  divided  on  that?  Have  they 
divided  on  the  resolutions  of  the  States  in  1840,  or  1844,  or  1848? 
Have  the  Democracy  undertaken  to  review  the  position  taken  in 
1854,  that  there  should  be  a  latitude  of  construction  upon  a  par 
ticular  point  of  constitutional  law  while  they  did  await  the  de 
cision  of  the  Supreme  Court  ?  No,  sir  j  the  question  is  changed 
from  before  to  after  the  event ;  the  call  is  on  every  man  to  come 
forward  now,  after  the  Supreme  Court  has  given  all  it  could  render 
upon  a  political  subject,  and  state  that  his  creed  is  adherence  to 
the  rule  thus  expounded  in  accordance  with  previous  agreement. 

The  Senator  tells  us  that  he  will  abide  by  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court ;  but  it  was  fairly  to  be  inferred,  from  what  he 
said,  that,  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  he  held  that  they  had  only  de 
cided  that  a  negro  could  not  sue  in  a  Federal  Court.  "Was  this 
the  entertainment  to  which  we  were  invited?  Was  the  proclaimed 
boon  of  allowing  the  question  to  go  to  judicial  decision,  no  more 
than  that,  one  after  another,  each  law  might  be  tested,  and  that, 
one  after  another,  each  case,  under  every  law,  might  be  tried,  and 


142  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

that  after  centuries  should  roll  away,  we  might  hope  for  the  period 
when,  every  case  exhausted,  the  decision  of  our  constitutional  right 
and  of  the  federal  duty  would  be  complete?  Or  was  it  that  we 
were  to  get  rid  of  the  controversy  which  had  divided  the  country 
for  thirty  years ;  that  we  were  to  reach  a  conclusion  beyond  which 
we  could  see  the  region  of  peace;  that  tranquillity  was  to  be  ob 
tained  by  getting  a  decision  on  a  constitutional  question  which  had 
been  discussed  until  it  was  seen  that,  legislatively,  it  could  not  or 
would  not  be  decided?  If,  then,  the  Supreme  Court  has  judicially 
announced  that  Congress  can  not  prohibit  the  introduction  of  slave 
property  into  a  Territory,  and  that  no  one  deriving  authority  from 
Congress  can  do  so,  and  the  Senator  from  Illinois  holds  that  the 
inhabitants  derive  their  power  from  the  organic  act  of  Congress, 
what  restrains  his  acknowledgment  of  our  right  to  go  into  the  Ter 
ritories,  and  his  recognition  of  the  case  being  closed  by  the  opin 
ion  of  the  court  ?  I  can  understand  how  one  who  has  followed  to 
its  logical  consequences  the  original  doctrine  of  squatter  sover 
eignty  might  still  stand  out,  and  say  this  inherent  right  can  not  be 
taken  away  by  judicial  decision ;  but  is  not  one  who  claims  to 
derive  the  power  of  the  territorial  legislation  from  a  law  of  Con 
gress,  and  who  finds  the  opinion  of  the  court  conclusive  as  to 
Congress,  and  to  all  deriving  their  authority  from  it,  estopped 
from  any  further  argument? 

Much  of  what  the  Senator  said  about  the  condition  of  public 
affairs  can  only  be  regarded  as  the  presentation  of  his  own  case, 
and  repuires  no  notice  from  me.  His  witticism  upon  the  honor 
able  Senator,  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 
[Mr.  Bayard],  who  is  now  absent,  because  of  the  size  of  the  State 
which  he  represents,  reminds  one  that  it  was  mentioned  as  an  evi 
dence  of  the  stupidity  of  a  Gertnan,  that  he  questioned  the  great 
ness  of  Napoleon  because  he  was  born  in  the  little  island  of  Corsica. 
I  know  not  what  views  the  Senator  entertained  when  he  measured 
the  capacity  of  the  Senator  from  Delaware  by  the  size  of  that 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  143 

State,  or  the  dignity  of  his  action  at  Charleston  by  the  number  of 
his  constituents.  If  there  be  any  political  feature  which  stands 
more  prominently  out  than  another  in  the  Union,  it  is  the  equality 
of  the  States.  Our  stars  have  no  variant  size ;  they  shine  with  no 
unequal  brilliancy.  A  Senator  from  Delaware  holds  a  position 
entitled  to  the  same  respect,  as  such,  as  the  Senator  from  any 
other  State  of  the  Union.  More  than  that,  the  character,  the 
conduct,  the  information,  the  capacity  of  that  Senator  might  claim 
respect,  if  he  was  not  entitled  to  it  from  his  position. 

Twice  on  this  occasion,  and  more  than  the  same  number  of  times 
heretofore,  has  the  Senator  referred  to  the  great  benefit  derived 
from  that  provision  which  grants  a  trial  in  the  local  court,  an 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Territory,  and  an  appeal  from 
thence  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  on  every  ques 
tion  involving  title  to  slaves.  I  wish  to  say  that  whatever  merit 
attaches  to  that  belongs  to  a  Senator  to  whom  the  advocates  of 
negro  slavery  have  not  often  been  in  the  habit  of  acknowledging 
their  obligations — the  Senator  from  New  Hampshire  [Mr.  Hale], 
who  introduced  it  in  1850  as  an  amendment  to  the  New  Mexico 
Bill.  We  adopted  it  as  a  fair  proposition,  equally  acceptable  upon 
one  side  and  the  other.  On  its  adoption,  no  one  voted  against  it. 
That  proposition  was  incorporated  in  the  Kansas  Bill,  but  unless 
we  acknowledge  obligations  to  the  Senator  from  New  Hampshire, 
how  shall  they  be  accorded  for  that  to  the  Senator  from  Illinois? 

I  am  asked  whether  the  resolutions  of  the  Senate  can  have  the 
force  of  law.  Of  course  not.  The  Senate,  however,  is  an  inde 
pendent  member  of  the  Government,  and  from  its  organization 
should  be  peculiarly  watchful  of  State  rights.  Before  the  meeting 
of  the  Charleston  Convention,  it  was  untruly  stated  that  these 
resolutions  were  concocted  to  affect  the  action  of  the  Charleston 
Convention.  Now  we  are  asked  if  they  are  to  affect  the  Baltimore 
Convention.  They  were  not  designed  for  the  one ;  they  are  not 
pressed  in  view  of  the  other.  They  were  introduced  to  obtain  an 


144  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

expression  of  the  opinion  of  the  Senate,  a  proceeding  quite  fre 
quent  in  the  history  of  this  body.  It  was  believed  that  they  would 
have  a  beneficial  effect,  and  that  they  were  stated  in  terms  which 
would  show  the  public  the  error  of  supposing  that  there  was  a 
purpose  on  the  part  of  the  Democracy,  or  of  the  South,  to  enact 
what  was  called  a  slave  code  for  the  Territories  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  believed  that  the  assertion  of  sound  principles  at 
this  time  would  direct  public  opinion,  and  might  be  fruitful  of 
such  reuniting,  harmonizing  results  as  we  all  desire,  and  which 
the  public  need.  Whether  it  is  to  have  this  effect  or  not;  whether 
at  last  we  are  to  be  shorn  of  our  national  strength  by  personal  or 
sectional  strife,  depends  upon  the  conduct  of  those  who  have  it  in 
their  power  to  control  the  result.  The  Democratic  party,  in  its 
history,  presents  a  high  example  of  nationality ;  its  power  and  its 
usefulness  has  been  its  co-extension  with  the  Union.  The  Demo 
crats  of  the  Northern  States  who  vote  for  these  resolutions,  but 
affirm  that  which  we  have  so  often  announced  with  pride,  that 
there  was  a  political  opinion  which  pervaded  the  whole  country ; 
there  was  a  party  capable  to  save  the  Union,  because  it  be 
longed  to  all  the  States.  If  the  two  Democratic  Senators  who 
alone  have  declared  their  opposition  should  so  vote,  to  that  extent 
the  effect  would  be  impaired,  and  they  will  stand  in  that  isolation 
to  which  the  Senator  points  as  a  consequence  so  dreadful  to  the 
Southern  men  at  Charleston. 

[Here  Mr.  Davis  gave  way  for  a  motion  to  adjourn,  and  on  the  17th 
resumed.] 

MR.  DAVIS.  At  the  close  of  the  session  of  yesterday,  I  was 
speaking  of  the  hope  entertained  that  the  Democratic  party  would 
yet  be  united  j  that  the  party  which  had  so  long  wielded  the  des 
tinies  of  the  country,  for  its  honor,  for  its  glory,  and  its  progress, 
was  not  about'to  be  checked  midway  in  its  career — to  be  buried  in 
a  premature  grave;  but  that  it  was  to  go  on,  with  concentrated 


REPLY  TO  SEXATOB  DOUGLAS.  145 

energy,  toward  the  great  ends  for  which  it  has  striven  since  1800, 
by  a  long  pull,  and  a  strong  pull,  and  a  pull  altogether,  to  bring 
the  ship  of  State  into  that  quiet  harbor  where 

"Vessels  safe,  without  their  hawsers,  ride." 

This  was  a  hope,  however,  not  founded  on  any  supposition  that  we 
were  to  escape  from  the  issues  which  are  presented — a  hope  not 
based  on  the  proposition  that  every  man  should  have  his  own  con 
struction  of  our  creed,  and  that  we  should  unite  together  merely 
for  success;  but  that  the  party,  as  heretofore,  in  each  succeeding 
quadrennial  convention,  would  add  to  the  resolutions  of  the  pre 
ceding  one  such  declarations  as  passing  events  indicated,  and  the 
exigencies  of  the  country  demanded. 

In  the  last  four  years  a  division  has  arisen  in  the  Democratic 
party,  upon  the  construction  of  one  of  the  articles  of  its  creed. 
It  behooves  us,  in  that  state  of  the  case,  to  decide  what  the  true 
construction  is ;  for,  if  the  party  be  not  a  union  of  men  upon  prin 
ciple,  the  sooner  it  is  dissolved  the  better;  and  if  it  be  such  a 
union,  why  shall  not  those  principles  be  defined,  so  as  to  remove 
doubt  or  cavil,  and  be  applied  in  every  emergency  to  meet  the 
demands  of  each  succeeding  case?  Thus  only  can  we  avoid 
division  in  council  and  confusion  in  action. 

The  Senator  from  Illinois,  who  preceded  me,  announced  that  he 
had  performed  a  pleasing  duty  in  defending  the  Democratic  party. 
That  party  might  well  cry  out,  Save  me  from  my  defender.  It 
was  a  defense  of  the  party  by  the  arraignment  of  its  prominent 
members.  It  was  the  preservation  of  the  body  by  the  destruction 
of  its  head — for  the  President  of  the  United  States  is,  for  the  time 
being,  the  head  of  the  party  that  placed  him  in  position ;  and  the 
head  of  the  party  thus  in  position  can  not  be  destroyed  without 
the  disintegration  of  the  members  and  the  destruction  of  the  body 
itself.  I  suppose  the  Senator,  however,  was  at  his  favorite  amuse 
ment  of  "shooting  at  the  lump."  The  "lump"  heretofore  has 
10 


146  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

been  those  Democratic  Senators  who  dissented  from  him :  this  time 
he  involved  Democrats  all  over  the  country.  Not  even  the  presiding 
officer,  whose  position  seals  his  lips,  could  escape  him.  And  here 
let  me  say  that  I  found  nothing  in  the  extract  read  from  that  gen 
tleman's  addres^,  which,  construed  as  was  no  doubt  intended,  does 
not  meet  my  approval ;  but  if  tried  by  the  modern  lexicon  of  the 
Senator,  it  might  be  rendered  a  contradiction  to  his  avowed  opin 
ions,  and  by  the  same  mode  of  expounding,  non-intervention,  would 
be  a  sin  of  which  the  whole  Democracy  might  be  convicted,  under 
the  indictment  of  squatter  sovereignty.  The  language  quoted  from 
the  address  of  the  Vice-President  is  to  be  construed  as  understood 
at  the  time,  at  the  place,  and  by  men  such  as  the  one  who  used  it. 
With  that  force  which  usually  enters  into  his  addresses — with 
even  more  than  his  usual  eloquence — the  Senator  referred  to  the 
scene  which  awaited  him  upon  his  return  to  Chicago,  when,  as 
represented,  he  met  an  infuriated  mob,  who  assailed  him  for  having 
maintained  the  measures  of  1850 — those  compromises  which,  in  the 
Northern  section,  it  was  urged  had  been  passed  in  the  interest  of 
the  South.  But,  pray,  what  one  of  those  measures  was  it  which 
excited  the  mob  so  described?  Only  one,  I  believe,  was  put  in 
issue  at  the  North — the  fugitive  slave  law ;  that  one  he  did  not 
vote  for.  But  it  was  the  part  of  manliness  to  say  that,  though 
absent  and  not  voting  for  it,  he  approved  of  it.  Such,  I  believe, 
was  his  commendable  course  on  that  occasion.  I  give  him,  there 
fore,  all  due  credit  for  not  escaping  from  a  responsibility  to  which 
they  might  not  have  held  him.  Are  we  to  give  perpetual  thanks 
to  any  one  because  he  did  not  yield  to  so  senseless  a  clamor,  but 
conceded  to  us  that  small  measure  of  constitutional  right — because 
he  has  complied  with  a  requirement  so  plain  that  my  regret  is  that 
it  ever  required  congressional  intervention  to  enforce  it?  It  be 
longed  to  the  honor  of  the  States  to  execute  that  clause  of  the 
Constitution.  They  should  have  executed  it  without  congressional 
intervention ;  congressional  action  should  only  have  been  useful  to 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  147 

give  that  uniformity  of  proceeding  which  State  action  could  not 
have  secured. 

Concurring  in  the  depicted  evil  of  the  destruction  of  the  Dem 
ocratic  organization,  it  must  be  admitted  that  such  consequence 
is  the  inevitable  result  of  a  radical  difference  of  principle.  The 
Senator  laments  the  disease,  but  instead  of  healing,  aggravates  it. 
While  pleading  the  evils  of  the  disruption  of  the  party,  it  is  quite 
apparent  that,  in  his  mind,  there  is  another  still  greater  calamity; 
for,  through  all  his  arraignment  of  others,  all  his  self-laudation, 
all  his  complaints  of  persecution,  like  an  air  through  its  varia 
tions,  appears  and  re-appears  the  action  of  the  Charleston  Conven 
tion.  That  seemed  to  be  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  his  solic 
itude.  The  oft-told  tale  of  his  removal  from  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Committee  on  Territories  had  to  be  renewed  and  connected  with 
that  convention,  and  even  assumed  as  the  basis  on  which  his  strength 
was  founded  in  that  convention.  I  think  the  Senator  did  himself 
injustice.  I  think  his  long  career  and  distinguished  labors,  his  ad 
mitted  capacity  for  good  hereafter,  constitute  a  better  reason  for  the 
support  which  he  received,  than  the  fact  that  his  associates  in  the 
Senate  had  not  chosen  to  put  him  in  a  particular  position  in  the 
organization  of  this  body.  It  is  enough  that  that  fact  did  not 
divert  support  from  him ;  and  I  am  aware  of  none  of  his  associates 
here  who  have  forced  it  upon  public  attention  with  a  view  to  affect 
him. 

He  claims  that  an  arraignment  made  against  his  Democracy  has 
been  answered  by  the  action  of  a  majority  of  the  Convention  at 
Charleston ;  and  then  proceeds  to  inform  the  minority  men  that  he 
would  scorn  to  be  the  candidate  of  a  party  unless  he  received  a 
majority  of  its  votes.  There  was  no  use  in  making  that  declara 
tion  ;  it  requires  not  only  a  majority,  but,  under  our  ruling,  a  vote 
of  two-thirds,  for  a  nomination.  It  was  unnecessary  for  any  body 
to  feel  scorn  toward  that  which  he  could  not  receive.  Other  un 
fortunate  wights  might  mourn  the  event ;  it  belonged  to  the  Sen- 


148  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ator  from  Illinois  to  scorn  it.  The  remark  of  Mr.  Lowndes,  which 
has  been  so  often  quoted,  and  which,  beautiful  in  itself,  has  ac 
quired  additional  value  by  time,  that  the  Presidency  was  an  office 
neither  to  be  sought  nor  declined,  has  no  application,  therefore, 
to  the  Senator,  for,  under  certain  contingencies,  he  says  he  would 
decline  it.  It  does  not  devolve  on  me  to  decide  whether  he  has 
sought  it  or  not. 

But,  sir,  what  is  the  danger  which  now  besets  the  Democratic 
party?  Is  it,  as  has  been  asserted,  the  doctrine  of  intervention  by 
Congress,  and  is  that  doctrine  new?  Is  the  idea  that  protection, 
by  Congress,  to  all  rights  of  person  or  property,  wherever  it  has 
jursdiction,  so  dangerous  that,  in  the  language  employed  by  the 
Senator,  it  would  sweep  the  Democratic  party  from  the  face  of  the 
earth?  For  what  was  our  Government  instituted?  Why  did  the 
States  confer  upon  the  Federal  Government  the  great  functions 
which  it  possesses  ?  For  protection — mainly  for  protection  beyond 
the  municipal  power  of  the  States.  I  shall  have  occasion,  in  the 
progress  of  my  remarks,  to  cite  some  authority,  and  to  trace  this  from 
a  very  early  period.  I  will  first,  however,  notice  an  assault  which 
the  Senator  has  thought  proper  to  make  upon  certain  States,  one  of 
which  is,  in  part,  represented  by  myself.  He  says  they  are  seced- 
ers,  bolters,  because  they  withdrew  from  a  party  convention  when 
it  failed  to  announce  their  principles.  There  can  be  no  tie  to  bind 
me  to  a  party  beyond  my  will.  I  will  admit  no  bond  that  holds 
me  to  a  party  a  day  longer  than  I  agree  to  its  principles.  When 
men  meet  together  to  confer,  and  ascertain  whether  or  not  they  do 
agree,  and  find  that  they  differ — radically,  essentially,  irreconcil 
ably  differ — what  belongs  to  an  honorable  position  except  to  part? 
They  can  not  consistently  act  together  any  longer.  It  devolves 
upon  them  frankly  to  announce  the  difference,  and  each  to  pursue 
his  separate  course. 

The  letter  of  Mr.  Yancey — acknowledged  to  be  a  private  letter, 
an  unguarded  letter,  but  which,  somehow  or  other,  got  into  the 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  149 

press — was  read  to  sustain  this  general  accusation  against  what  are 
called  the  Cotton  States.  I  do  not  pretend  to  judge  how  far  the 
Senator  has  the  right  here  to  read  a  private  letter,  which,  without 
the  authority  of  the  writer,  has  gone  into  the  public  press.  It  is 
one  of  those  questions  which  every  man's  sense  of  propriety  must, 
in  his  own  case,  decide.  Whether  or  not  the  use  of  that  letter  was 
justifiable,  how  is  it  to  be  assumed  that  the  Southern  States  are 
bound  by  any  opinion  there  enunciated  ?  How  to  be  asserted  that 
we,  the  residents  in  those  States,  have  pinned  our  faith  to  the 
sleeve  of  any  man,  and  that  we  will  follow  his  behest,  no  matter 
whither  he  may  go  ?  But  was  this  the  only  source  of  information, 
or  was  the  impression  otherwise  sustained  ?  Did  Mr.  Yancey,  in 
his  speech  delivered  at  Charleston,  justify  the  conclusions  which 
the  Senator  draws  from  this  letter?  Did  he  admit  them  to  be 
correct  ?  There  he  might  have  found  the  latest  evidence,  and  the 
best  authority.  Speaking  to  that  point,  Mr.  Yancey  said : 

"  It  has  been  charged,  in  order  to  demoralize  whatever  influence 
we  might  be  entitled  to,  either  from  our  personal  or  political  char 
acteristics,  or  as  representatives  of  the  State  of  Alabama,  that  we 
are  disruptionists,  disunionists  per  se;  that  we  desire  to  break  up 
the  party  in  the  State  of  Alabama — to  break  up  the  party  of  the 
Union,  and  to  dissolve  the  Union  itself.  Each  and  all  of  these 
allegations,  come  from  what  quarter  they  may,  I  pronounce  to  be 
false.  There  is  no  disunionist,  that  I  know  of,  in  the  delegation 
from  the  State  of  Alabama.  There  is  no  disruptionist  that  I  know 
of;  and  if  there  are  factionists  in  our  delegation,  they  could  not 
have  got  in  there,  with  the  knowledge  upon  the  part  of  our  State 
Convention  that  they  were  of  so  unenviable  a  character.  We  come 
here  with  two  great  purposes :  first,  to  save  the  constitutional 
rights  of  the  South,  if  it  lay  in  our  power  to  do  so.  We  desire  to 
save  the  South  by  the  best  means  that  present  themselves  to  us ; 
and  the  State  of  Alabama  believes  that  the  best  means  now  in  ex 
istence  is  the  organization  of  the  Democratic  party,  if  we  shall  be 
able  to  persuade  it  to  adopt  the  constitutional  basis  upon  which 
we  think  the  South  alone  can  be  saved." 


150  LIFE  OF   JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

He  further  says: 

"  We  have  come  here,  then,  with  the  twofold  purpose  of  saving 
the  country  and  saving  the  Democracy ;  and  if  the  Democracy  will 
not  lend  itself  to  that  high,  holy,  and  elevated  purpose ;  if  it  can 
not  elevate  itself  above  the  mere  question  of  how  perfect  shall  be 
its  mere  personal  organization,  and  how  wide-spread  shall  be  its 
mere  voting  success,  then  we  say  to  you,  gentlemen,  mournfully 
and  regretfully,  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  of  Alabama,  and, 
I  believe,  of  the  whole  South,  you  have  failed  in  your  mission,  and 
it  will  be  our  duty  to  go  forth,  and  make  an  appeal  to  the  loyalty 
of  the  country  to  stand  by  that  Constitution  which  party  organiza 
tions  have  deliberately  rejected."  [Applause.] 

Mr.  Yancey  answers  for  himself.  It  was  needless  to  go  back  to 
old  letters.  Here  were  his  remarks  delivered  before  the  conven 
tion,  speaking  to  the  point  in  issue,  and  answering  both  as  to  his 
purposes  and  as  to  the  motives  of  those  with  whom  he  conferred 
and  acted. 

The  Senator  next  cited  the  resolutions  of  the  State  of  Alabama ; 
and  here  he  seemed  to  rest  the  main  point  in  his  argument.  The 
Senator  said  that  Alabama,  in  1856,  had  demanded  of  the  Demo 
cratic  convention,  non-intervention,  and  that,  in  1860,  she  had 
retired  from  the  convention  because  it  insisted  upon  non-interven 
tion.  He  read  one  of  the  resolutions  of  the  Alabama  Convention 
of  1856  ;  but  the  one  which  bore  upon  the  point  was  not  read. 
The  one  which  was  conclusive  as  to  the  position  of  Alabama  then, 
and  its  relation  to  her  position  now,  was  exactly  the  one  that  was 
omitted — I  read  from  the  resolutions  of  this  year — was  as  follows : 

"Resolved,  further,  That  we  re-affirm  so  much  of  the  first  resolu 
tion  of  the  platform  adopted  in  the  convention  by  the  Democracy 
of  this  State,  on  the  8th  of  January,  1856,  as  relates  to  the  sub 
ject  of  slavery,  to-wit." 

It  then  goes  on  to  quote  from  that  resolution  of  1856,  as  follows: 
"  The  unqualified  right  of  the  people  of  the  slaveholding  States 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  151 

to  the  protection  of  their  property  in  the  States,  in  the  Territo 
ries,  and  in  the  wilderness,  in  which  territorial  governments  are 
as  yet  unorganized." 

That  was  the  resolution  of  1856 ;  and  like  it  was  one  of  Febru 
ary,  1848: 

"That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  General  Government  by  all  proper 
legislation,  to  secure  an  entry  into  those  Territories  to  all  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  together  with  their  property,  of  every 
description;  and  that  the  same  shall  be  protected  by  the  United 
States,  while  the  Territories  are  under  its  authority." 

So  stands  the  record  of  that  State  which  is  now  held  responsible 
for  retiring,  and  is  alleged  to  have  withdrawn  because  she  received 
now  what,  in  former  times,  she  had  demanded  as.  the  full  measure 
of  her  rights.  Did  she  receive  it  ?  The  argument  could  only  be 
made  by  concealing  the  fact  that  her  resolutions  of  1848  and  1856 
asserted  the  right  to  protection,  and  claimed  it  from  the  General 
Government.  "What,  then,  is  the  necessary  inference?  That,  in 
the  Cincinnati  platform,  they  believed  they  obtained  that  which 
they  asserted,  or  that  which  necessarily  involved  it.  So  much  for 
the  point  of  faith;  so  much  for  the  point  of  consistency  in  the 
assertion  of  right.  But  if  it  were  otherwise  ;  if  they  had  neglected 
to  assert  a  right ;  would  that  destroy  it?  If  they  had  failed  at 
some  time  to  claim  this  protection,  are  they  to  be  estopped,  in  all 
time  to  come,  from  claiming  it?  Constitutional  right  is  eternal — 
not  to  be  sacrificed  by  any  body  of  men.  A  single  man  may  re 
vive  it  at'  any  period  of  the  existence  of  the  Constitution.  So  the 
argument  would  be  worthless,  if  the  facts  were  as  stated.  That 
they  are  not  so  stated,  is  shown  by  the  record. 

Here  allow  me  to  say,  in  all  sincerity,  that  I  dislike  thus  to 
speak  about  conventions ;  it  does  not  belong  to  the  duties  of  the 
Senate ;  we  did  not  assemble  here  to  make  a  President,  except  in 
the  single  contingency  of  a  failure  by  the  people  and  by  the  House 


152  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

of  Representatives  to  elect.  When  that  contingency  arrives,  the 
question  will  be  before  us.  I  am  sorry  that  it  should  have  been 
prematurely  introduced.  But  since  the  action  of  the  recent  con 
vention  at  Charleston  is  presented  as  the  basis  of  argument,  it  may 
be  as  well  to  refer  to  it,  and  see  what  it  is.  The  majority  report, 
presented  by  seventeen  States  of  the  Union,  and  those  the  States 
most  reliable  to  give  Democratic  votes — the  States  counted  so  cer 
tain  to  give  Democratic  votes  that  they  have  been  regarded  as  a 
fixed  basis,  a  nucleus  to  which  others  were  to  be  attracted — these 
seventeen  States  reported  to  the  convention  a  series  of  resolutions, 
one  of  which  asserted  the  right  to  protection.  A  minority  of 
States  reported  another  series,  excluding  the  avowal  of  the  right — 
not  exactly  denying  it,  but  not  avowing  it — and  a  second  minor 
ity  report  was  submitted,  being  the  Cincinnati  platform,  pure  and 
simple.  It  is  true  that  a  majority  of  delegates  adopted  the  minor 
ity  report,  but  not  a  majority  of  States,  nor  does  it  appear,  by  an 
analysis  of  the  votes,  and  the  best  evidence  I  have  been  able  to 
obtain,  that  it  was  by  a  majority  of  delegates,  if  each  had  been  left 
to  his  own  choice;  but  that,  by  one  of  those  ingenious  arrange 
ments — one  of  those  incidents  which,  among  jurists,  is  described 
as  the  favor  the  vigilant  receives  from  the  law — it  so  happened 
that,  in  certain  States,  the  delegates  were  instructed  to  vote  as  a 
unit;  in  other  States  they  were  not;  so  that,  wherever  they  were 
instructed  to  vote  as  a  unit,  the  vote  must  so  be  cast,  and  wherever 
they  were  not,  they  might  disintegrate.  Thus  minorities  were 
bound  in  one  instance,  and  released  in  another ;  and,  by  a  compari 
son  made  by  those  who  had  an  opportunity  to  know,  i£  appears 
that  the  minority  report  could  not  have  got  a  majority  of  the  del 
egates,  if  each  delegate  had  been  permitted  to  cast  his  own  vote 
in  the  Convention.  Neither  could  it  have  obtained,  as  appears  by 
the  action  of  the  committee,  in  a  majority  of  the  States,  if  they 
had  been  spoken  as  such.  So  that  this  vaunt  as  to  the  effect  of 
the  adoption  of  the  platform  by  a  majority,  seems  to  have  very 


REPLY  TO  SENATOK  DOUGLAS.  153 

little  of  substance  in  it.     Again,  I  find  that,  after  this  adoption  of 
a  platform,  a  delegate  from  Tennessee  offered  a  resolution: 

"  That  all  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  have  an  equal  right 
to  settle,  with  their  property,  in  the  Territories  of  the  United 
States ;  and  that,  under  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  which  we  recognize  as  a  correct  exposition  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  neither  their  rights  of  person 
or  property  can  be  destroyed  or  impaired  by  congressional  or  ter 
ritorial  legislation." 

It  does  not  appear  that  a  vote  was  taken  on  it.  There  is  a  cur 
rent  belief  that  it  would  have  been  adopted.  If  it  had  been,  it 
would  have  been  an  acknowledgment  by  the  Democracy,  in  con 
vention  assembled,  that  the  question  had  been  settled  by  the  de 
cisions  of  the  Supreme  Court.  But  in  the  progress  of  the  con 
vention,  when  they  came  to  balloting,  it  appears,  by  an  analysis  of 
the  vote  for  candidates,  that  the  Senator  from  Illinois  received 
from  seventeen  undoubted  Democratic  States  of  the  Union,  casting 
one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  electoral  votes,  but  eleven  votes. 
It  is  not  such  a  great  triumph,  then,  in  the  Democratic  view,  as  is 
claimed.  It  does  not  suffice  to  add  up  the  number  of  votes  where 
they  do  not  avail.  It  is  not  fair  to  bring  the  votes  of  Vermont, 
where  I  believe  nobody  expects  we  shall  be  successful,  and  count 
them  for  a  particular  candidate.  The  electoral  votes — and  these 
alone*  tell  upon  the  result;  and  it  appears  that  in  those  States 
which  have  been  counted  certain  to  cast  their  electoral  votes  for 
the  candidate  who  might  have  been  nominated  at  that  convention, 
the  Senator  received  but  eleven.  This  is  but  meagre  claim  to 
bind  us  to  his  car  as  the  successful  champion  of  the  majority. 
This  is  but  small  basis  for  the  boast  that  his  hopes  were  gratified, 
that  he  would  not  receive  the  nomination  unless  sustained  by  a 
majority  of  the  party,  and  that  his  opinions  had  received  the  in 
dorsement  of  the  Democracy. 

My  devotion  to  the  party  is  life -long.     If  the  assertion  be  al- 


154  LIFE  OP   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

lowable,  it  may  be  said  that  I  inherited  my  political  principles. 
I  derive  them  from  a  revolutionary  father — one  of  the  earnest 
friends  of  Mr.  Jefferson ;  who,  after  the  revolution  which  achieved 
our  independence,  bore  his  full  part  in  the  civil  revolution  of 
1800,  which  emancipated  us  from  federal  usurpation  and  consoli 
dation.  I  therefore  have  all  that  devotion  to  party  which  belongs 
to  habitual  reverence  and  confidence.  But,  sir,  that  devotion  to 
party  rests  on  the  assumption  that  it  is  to  maintain  sound  prin 
ciples  ;  that  it  is  to  strive  hereafter,  as  heretofore,  to  carry  out 
the  great  cardinal  creed  in  which  the  Democratic  party  was 
founded.  When  the  resolutions  of  1798  and  1799  are  discarded; 
when  we  fly  from  the  extreme  of  monarchy  to  land  in  the  dan 
ger  to  republics,  anarchy,  and  the  Democratic  party  says  its  arm 
is  paralyzed — can  not  be  raised  to  maintain  constitutional  rights, 
my  devotion  to  its  organization  is  at  an  end.  It  fails  thencefor 
ward  in  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  established ;  and  if  there 
be  a  constitutional  party  in  the  land  which,  in  the  language  of 
Mr.  Jefferson,  would  find  in  the  vigor  of  the  Federal  Government 
the  best  hope  for  our  liberty  and  security,  to  that  party  I  should 
attach  myself  whenever  that  sad  contingency  arose. 

The  resolutions  of  1798  and  1799,  though  directed  against 
usurpation,  were  equally  directed  against  the  dangers  of  anarchy. 
Their  principles  are  alike  applicable  to  both.  Their  cardinal 
creed  was  a  Federal  Government,  according  to  the  grants  con 
ferred  upon  it,  and  these  righteously  administered.  It  is  not  fair 
to  the  men  who  taught  us  the  lessons  of  Democracy  that  they 
should  be  held  responsible  for  a  theory  which  leaves  the  Federal 
Government,  as  one  who  has  abdicated  all  authority,  to  stand  at 
the  mercy  of  local  usurpations.  Least  of  ajl  does  their  teaching 
maintain  that  this  Government  has  no  power  over  the  Territories ; 
that  this  Government  has  no  obligation  to  protect  the  rights  of  per 
son  and  property  in  the  Territories ;  for,  among  the  first  acts  under  the 
Constitution,  was  one  which  both  asserted  and  exercised  the  power. 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  155 

After  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  in  1789,  an  act  was 
passed,  to  which  reference  is  frequently  made  as  being  a  confirm 
ation  of  the  ordinance  of  1787 ;  and  this  has  been  repeated  so 
often  that  it  has  received  general  belief.  There  was  a  constitu 
tional  provision  which  required  all  obligations  and  engagements 
under  the  confederation  to  hold  good  under  the  Constitution.  If 
there  was  an  obligation  or  an  engagement  growing  out  of  the  or 
dinance  of  1787,  out  of  the  deed  of  cession  by  Virginia,  it  was 
transmitted  to  the  Government  established  under  the  Constitution; 
but  that  Congress  under  the  Constitution  gave  it  no  vitality — that 
they  added  no  force  to  it,  is  apparent  from  the  fact  which  is  so 
often  relied  upon  as  authority.  It  was  in  view  of  this  fact,  in  full 
remembrance  of  this  and  of  other  facts  connected  with  it,  that 
Mr.  Madison  said,  in  relation  to  passing  regulations  for  the  Ter 
ritories,  that  "  Congress  did  not  regard  the  interdiction  of  slavery 
among  the  needful  regulations  contemplated  by  the  Constitution, 
since,  in  none  of  the  territorial  governments  created  by  them,  was 
such  an  interdict  found."  I  am  aware  that  Justice  McLean  has 
viewed  this  as  an  historical  error  of  Mr.  Madison.  I  shall  not 
assume  to  decide  between  such  high  authorities.  The  act  is  as 
follows : 

"An  Act  to  provide  for  the  government  of  the  Territory  north-west  of  the  Ohio 

River. 

"WHEREAS,  In  order  that  the  ordinance  of  the  United  States  in 
Congress  assembled,  for  the  government  of  the  territory  north-west 
of  the  river  Ohio,  may  continue  to  have  full  effect,  it  is  requisite 
that  certain  provisions  should  be  made  so  as  to  adapt  the  same 
to  the  present  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

"SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Represen 
tatives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That, 
in  all  cases  in  which,  by  the  said  ordinance,  any  information  is  to 
be  given,  or  communication  made,  by  the  governor  of  the  said 
Territory  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled,  or  to  any 
of  their  officers,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  said  governor  to  give 


156  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

such  information,  and  to  make  such  communication,  to  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  President  shall  nominate,  and, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  shall  appoint 
all  officers  which,  by  the  said  ordinance,  were  to  have  been  ap 
pointed  by  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled;  and  all 
officers  so  appointed  shall  be  commissioned  by  him;  and  in  all 
cases  where  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled  might,  by 
the  said  ordinance,  make  any  commission,  or  remove  from  any 
office,  the  President  is  hereby  declared  to  have  the  same  powers 
to  revocation  and  removal. 

"  SEC.  2.  And  be  it  further  enacted,  That  in  the  case  of  the  death, 
removal,  resignation,  or  necessary  absence  of  the  governor  of  the 
said  Territory,  the  secretary  thereof  shall  be,  and  he  is  hereby 
authorized  and  required  to  execute  all  the  powers  and  perform  all 
the  duties  of  the  governor  during  the  vacancy  occasioned  by  the 
removal,  resignation,  or  necessary  absence  of  the  said  governor. 

"Approved  August  7,  1789." 

All  that  is  to  be  found  in  this  act  which  favors  the  supposition 
and  frequent  assertion  that,  under  the  Constitution,  the  ordinance 
of  1787  was  ratified  and  confirmed  is  to  be  found  in  the  preamble, 
and  that  preamble  so  vaguely  alludes  to  it  that  the  idea  is  refuted 
by  reference  to  an  act  which  followed  soon  afterwards — the  act  of 
1793 — from  which  I  will  read  a  single  section: 

"  SEC.  3.  And  be  it  further  enacted^  That  when  a  person  held 
to  labor  in  any  of  the  United  States,  or  in  either  of  the  Territo 
ries  on  the  north-west  or  south  of  the  river  Ohio,  under  the  laws 
thereof,  shall  escape  into  any  other  of  the  said  States  or  Territo 
ries,  the  person  to  whom  such  service  or  labor  may  be  due,  his 
agent,  or  attorney,  is  hereby  empowered  to  seize  or  arrest  such 
fugitive  from  labor,"  etc. 

Is  it  not  apparent  that,  when  the  Congress  legislated  in  1793, 
they  recognized  the  existence  of  slavery  and  protected  that  kind 
of  property  in  the  territory  north-west  of  the  river  Ohio,  and  is  it 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  157 

not  conclusive  that  they  did  not  intend,  by  the  act  of  1789,  to 
confirm,  ratify,  and  give  effect  to  the  ordinance  of  1787,  which 
would  have  excluded  it? 

This  doctrine  of  protection,  then,  is  not  new.  It  goes  back  to 
the  foundation  of  the  Government.  It  is  traceable  down  through 
all  the  early  controversies;  and  they  arose  at  least  as  early  as  1790. 
It  is  found  in  the  messages  of  Mr.  Jefferson  and  Mr.  Madison,  and 
in  the  legislation  of  Congress;  and  also  in  the  messages  of  the 
elder  Adams.  There  was  not  one  of  the  first  four  Presidents  of 
the  United  States  who  did  not  recognize  this  obligation  of  protec 
tion,  who  did  not  assert  this  power  on  the  part  of  the  Federal 
Government ;  and  not  one  of  them  ever  attempted  to  pervert  it  to 
a  power  to  destroy.  If  division  in  the  Democratic  party  is  to  arise 
now,  because  of  this  doctrine,  it  is  not  from  the  change  by  those 
who  assert  it,  but  of  those  who  deny  it.  It  is  not  from  the  intro 
duction  of  a  new  feature  in  the  theory  of  our  Government,  but 
from  the  denial  of  that  which  was  recognized  in  its  very  begin 
ning. 

As  I  understood  the  main  argument  of  the  Senator,  it  was  based 
upon  the  general  postulate  that  the  Democratic  Convention  of  1848 
recognized  a  new  doctrine,  a  doctrine  which  inhibited  the  General 
Government  from  interfering  in  any  way,  either  for  the  protection 
of  property  or  otherwise,  with  the  local  affairs  of  a  Territory ;  he 
held  the  party  responsible  for  all  the  opinions  entertained  by  the 
candidate  in  1848,  because  the  party  had  nominated  him,  and  he 
quoted  the  record  to  show  what  States,  by  voting  for  him,  had 
committed  themselves  to  the  doctrine  of  the  "Nicholson  letter." 
He  even  quoted  South  Carolina,  represented  by  that  man  who  be 
came  famous  for  a  single  act,  and,  as  South  Carolinians  said,  with 
out  authority  at  home  to  sustain  it.  But  this  was  cited  as  pledg 
ing  the  faith  of  South  Carolina  to  the  doctrine  of  the  "Nicholson 
letter ;"  and,  worse  than  all,  the  Senator  did  this,  though  he  knew 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  "Nicholson  letter  "  was  the  subject  of  con- 


158  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

troversy  for  years  subsequently ;  that,  what  was  the  true  construc 
tion  of  that  letter,  entered  into  the  canvass  in  the  Southern  States ; 
that  the  construction  which  Mr.  Cass  himself  placed  upon  it  at  a 
subsequent  period  was  there  denied;  and  the  Senator  might  have 
remembered,  if  he  had  chosen  to  recollect  so  unimportant  a  thing, 
that  I  once  had  to  explain  to  him,  ten  years  ago,  the  fact  that  I 
repudiated  the  doctrine  of  that  letter  at  the  time  it  was  published, 
and  that  the  Democracy  of  Mississippi  had  well-nigh  crucified  me 
for  the  construction  which  I  placed  upon  it ;  there  were  men  mean 
"enough  to  suspect  that  the  construction  I  gave  to  the  Nicholson 
letter  was  prompted  by  the  confidence  and  affection  I  felt  for  Gen 
eral  Taylor.  At  a  subsequent  period,  however,  Mr.  Cass  thor 
oughly  reviewed  it.  He  uttered,  for  him,  very  harsh  language 
against  all  who  had  doubted  the  true  construction  of  his  letter, 
and  he  construed  it  just  as  I  had  done  during  the  canvass  of 
1848.  It  remains  only  to  add  that  I  supported  Mr.  Cass,  not  be 
cause  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Nicholson  letter,  but  in  despite  of  it; 
because  I  believed  a  Democratic  President,  with  a  Democratic  cab 
inet  and  Democratic  counselors  in  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  and 
he  as  honest  a  man  as  I  believed  Mr.  Cass  to  be,  would  be  a  safer 
reliance  than  his  opponent,  who  personally  possessed  my  confi 
dence  as  much  as  any  man  living,  but  who  was  of  and  must  draw 
his  advisers  from  a  party,  the  tenets  of  which  I  believed  to  be 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  country  as  they  were  to  all  my 
political  convictions. 

I  little  thought  at  that  time  that  my  advocacy  of  Mr.  Cass,  upon 
such  grounds  as  these,  or  his  support  by  the  State  of  which  I  am 
a  citizen,  would  at  any  future  day  be  quoted  as  an  indorsement  of 
the  opinions  contained  in  the  Nicholson  letter,  as  those  opinions 
were  afterwards  defined.  But  it  is  not  only  upon  this  letter,  but 
equally  upon  the  resolutions  of  the  convention  as  constructive  of 
that  letter,  that  he  rested  his  argument.  I  will  here  say  to  the 
Senator  that  if,  at  any  time,  I  do  him  the  least  injustice,  speaking 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  159 

as  I  do  from  such  notes  as  I  could  take  while  he  progressed,  I 
will  thank  him  to  correct  me. 

But  this  letter  entered  into  the  canvass ;  there  was  a  doubt  about 
its  construction ;  there  were  men  who  asserted  that  they  had  posi 
tive  authority  for  saying  that  it  meant  that  the  people  of  a  Terri 
tory  could  only  exclude  slavery  when  the  Territory  should  form  a 
constitution  and  be  admitted  as  a  State.  This  doubt  continued  to 
hang  over  the  construction,  and  it  was  that  doubt  alone  which 
secured  Mr.  Cass  the  vote  of  Mississippi.  If  the  true  construction 
had  been  certainly  known  he  would  have  had  no  chance  to  get  it. 
Our  majority  went  down  from  thousands  to  hundreds,  as  it  was. 
In  Alabama  the  decrease  was  greater.  It  was  not  that  the  doc 
trine  was  countenanced,  but  the  doubt  as  to  the  true  meaning 
of  the  letter,  and  the  constantly  reiterated  assertion  that  it  only 
meant  the  Territories  when  they  should  be  admitted  as  States, 
enabled  him  to  carry  those  States. 

But  if  I  mistook  the  Senator  there,  I  think  probably  I  did 
not  on  another  point :  that  he  claimed  the  support  of  certain 
Southern  men  for  Mr.  Richardson  as  Speaker  of  the  House  to 
be  by  them  an  acknowledgment  of  the  doctrine  of  squatter  sov 
ereignty. 

I  suppose  those  Southern  men  who  voted  for  Mr.  Richardson 
voted  for  him  as  I  did  for  Mr.  Cass,  in  despite  of  his  opinions  on 
that  question,  because  they  preferred  Mr.  Richardson  to  Mr. 
Banks,  even  with  squatter  sovereignty.  They  considered  that  the 
latter  was  carrying  an  amount  of  heresies  which  greatly  exceeded 
the  value  of  squatter  sovereignty.  It  was  a  choice  of  evils — not 
an  indorsement  of  his  opinions.  Neither  did  they  this  year  in 
dorse  the  opinions  on  that  point  of  Mr.  McClernand  when  they 
voted  for  him.  According  to  the  Senator's  argument  I  could  show 
him  that  Illinois  was  committed  to  the  doctrine  of  federal  protec 
tion  to  property  in  the  Territories  and  the  remedy  of  secession  as 
a  State  right;  committed  irrevocably,  unmistakably,  with  no  right 


160  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

to  plead  any  ignorance  of  the  political  creed  of  the  individual,  or 
the  meaning  of  his  words. 

In  1852 — I  refer  to  it  with  pride — Illinois  did  me  the  honor  to 
vote  consistently  for  me  for  the  Vice-Presidency,  up  to  the  time 
of  adjournment;  though  in  1850,  and  in  1851,  I  had  done  all 
these  acts  which  have  been  spoken  of,  and  the  Senator  has  admit 
ted  my  consistency,  in  opinions  which  were  avowed  with  at  least 
such  perspicuity  as  left  nobody  in  doubt  as  to  my  opinion.  Did 
Illinois  then  adopt  my  theory  of  protection  in  the  Territories,  or 
of  the  right  of  State  secession?  No,  sir.  I  hold  them  to  no  such 
consequences.  Some  of  the  old  inhabitants  of  Illinois  may  have 
remembered  me  when  their  northern  frontier  was  a  wilderness, 
when  they  and  I  had  kind  relations  in  the  face  of  hostile  Indians. 
Some  of  them  may  have  remembered  me,  and,  I  believe,  kindly,  as 
associated  with  them,  at  a  later  period,  on  the  fields  of  Mexico. 
The  Senator  himself,  I  know,  remembered  kindly  his  association 
with  me  in  the  halls  of  Congress.  It  was  these  bonds  which  gave 
me  the  confidence  of  the  State  of  Illinois.  I  never  misconstrued 
it.  I  never  pretended  to  put  them  in  the  attitude  of  adopting  all 
my  opinions.  Never  required  it,  never  desired  it,  save  as  in  so  far 
as  wishing  all  men  would  agree  with  me,  confidently  believing  my 
position  to  be  true.  At  a  later  period,  and  when  these  questions 
were  more  important  in  the  public  mind,  when  public  attention 
has  been  more  directed  to  them,  when  public  opinion  has  been 
more  matured,  at  the  very  time  when  the  Senator  claims  that  his 
doctrine  culminated,  the  State  of  Illinois  voted  for  a  gentleman 
for  Vice-President  at  Cincinnati  who  held  the  same  opinions  with 
myself,  or,  if  there  was  a  difference,  held  them  to  a  greater  ex 
treme — I  mean  General  Quitman. 

MR.  DOUGLAS.     We  made  no  test  on  any  one. 

MR.  DAVIS.  Then,  how  did  the  South  become  responsible  for 
the  doctrine  of  General  Cass,  by  consenting  to  his  nomination  in 
1848,  and  supporting  his  election?  But  at  a  later  period,  down 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  161 

to  the  present  session,  what  is  the  position  in  which  the  Senator 
places  his  friends — those  sterling  Democrats,  uncompromising  Anti- 
Know-Nothings;  men  who  give  no  quarter  to  the  American  party, 
and  yet  who  voted  this  year  for  Mr.  Smith,  of  North  Carolina,  to 
be  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  Is  the  Senator  an 
swered?  Does  he  not  see  that  there  is  no  justice  in  assuming  a 
vote  for  an  individual  to  be  the  entire  adoption  of  his  opinions  ? 

He  cited,  in  this  connection,  a  resolution  of  1848,  as  having  been 
framed  to  cover  the  doctrines  of  the  Nicholson  letter ;  and  he 
claimed  thus  to  have  shown  that  the  convention  not  only  under 
stood  it,  but  adopted  it,  and  made  it  the  party  creed,  and  that  we 
were  bound  to  it  from  that  period  forward.  He  even  had  that  reso 
lution  of  1848  read,  in  order  that  there  should  be,  at  no  future 
time,  any  question  as  to  the  principle  which  the  party  then  avowed ; 
that  it  should  be  fixed  as  a  starting  point  in  all  the  future  progress 
of  Democracy.  I  was  surprised  at  the  importance  the  Senator  at 
tached  to  that  resolution  of  1848,  because  it  was  not  new;  it  was 
not  framed  to  meet  the  opinions  of  the  Nicholson  letter,  but  came 
down  from  a  period  as  remote  as  1840;  was  copied  into  the  plat 
form  of  1844,  and  again  into  that  of  1848,  being  the  expression 
which  the  condition  of  the  country  in  1840  had  induced — a  dec 
laration  of  opinion  growing  out  of  the  agitation  in  the  two  houses 
of  Congress  at  that  day,  and  the  fearful  strides  which  antislavery 
was  making,  and  which  Mr.  Calhoun  had  labored  to  check  by  the 
declaration  of  constitutional  truths,  as  set  forth  in  his  Senate  reso 
lutions  of  1837-'8. 

That  there  may  be  no  mistake  on  this  point,  and  particularly  as 
the  Senator  attached  special  importance  to  it,  I  will  turn  to  the 
platform  of  1840,  and  read  from  it,  so  that  it  shall  be  found  to  be — 

MR.  DOUGLAS.     It  is  conceded. 

MR.  DAVIS.  The  Senator  concedes  the  fact,  that  the  resolution 
of  1848  was  a  copy  of  that  of  1840,  and  with  the  concession  falls 
his  argument.  The  platforms  of  1840  and  1844  were  re-affirmed 
11 


162  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

in  1848;  and,  consequently,  the  resolution  of  '48  being  identical 
with  that  of  '40,  was  not  a  construction  of  the  letter  written  in 
1847. 

True  to  its  instincts  and  to  its  practices,  the  Democratic  party, 
from  time  to  time,  continued  to  add  to  their  "platform"  whatever 
was  needful  for  action  by  the  Government  in  the  condition  of  the 
country.  Thus,  in  1844,  they  re-asserted  the  platform  of  1840; 
and  they  added  thereto,  because  of  a  question  then  pending,  that — 

"  The  re-annexation  of  Texas,  at  the  earliest  practicable  period, 
is  a  great  American  measure,  which  the  convention  recommend  to 
the  cordial  support  of  the  Democracy  of  the  Union." 

In  1848  they  re-adopted  the  resolutions  of  1844;  and  were  not 
a  little  laughed  at  for  keeping  up  the  question  of  Texas  after  it 
had  been  annexed.  In  1852  a  new  question  had  arisen;  the  meas 
ures  of  1850  had  presented,  with  great  force  to  the  public  mind, 
the  necessity  for  some  expression  of  opinion  upon  the  disturbing 
questions  which  the  measures  of  1850  had  been  designed  to  quiet. 
Therefore,  in  1852,  the  party,  true  to  its  obligation  to  announce  its 
principles,  and  to  meet  issues  as  they  arise,  said : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  foregoing  proposition  (referring  to  the  res 
olution  of  1848)  covers,  and  was  intended  to  embrace,  the  whole 
subject  of  slavery  agitation  in  Congress ;  and,  therefore,  the  Dem 
ocratic  party  in  the  Union,  standing  on  this  national  platform,  will 
abide  by  and  adhere  to  a  faithful  execution  of  the  act  known  as 
the  compromise  measure,  settled  by  the  last  Congress,  the  act  for 
reclaiming  fugitives  from  labor  included ;  which  act,  being  de 
signed  to  carry  out  an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  can 
not,  with  fidelity  thereto,  be  repealed,  or  so  changed  as  to  destroy 
or  impair  its  efficacy. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Democratic  party  will  restrain  all  attempts 
at  renewing,  in  Congress  or  out  of  it,  the  agitation  of  the  slave 
question,  under  whatever  shape  or  color  the  attempt  may  be  made.' 

This  was  the  addition  made  in  1852,  and  it  was  made  because 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  163 

of  the  agitation  which  then  prevailed  through  the  country  against 
the  fugitive  slave  act,  and  it  was  because  the  fugitive  slave  act, 
and  that  alone,  was  assailed,  that  the  Democratic  convention  met 
the  issue  on  that  measure  specifically,  and  for  the  same  reason  it 
received  the  approbation  of  the  Southern  States.  Had  this  been 
considered  as  the  indorsement  of  the  slave  trade  bill  for  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia,  it  would  not  have  received  their  approval.  The 
agitation  was  in  relation  to  recovering  fugitive  slaves,  and  the 
Democratic  party  boldly  and  truly  met  the  living  issue,  and  de 
clared  its  position  upon  it. 

In  1856  other  questions  had  arisen.  It  was  necessary  to  meet 
them.  The  convention  did  meet  them,  and  met  them  in  a  manner 
which  was  satisfactory,  because  it  was  believed  to  be  full.  I  will 
not  weary  the  Senate  by  reading  the  resolutions  of  1856 ;  they  are 
familiar  to  every  body.  I  only  quote  a  portion  of  them  : 

"The  American  Democracy  recognize  and  adopt  the  principles 
contained  in  the  organic  laws  establishing  the  Territories  of  Kan 
sas  and  Nebraska  as  embodying  the  only  sound  and  safe  solution 
of  the  '  slavery  question '  upon  which  the  great  national  idea  of  the 
people  of  this  whole  country  can  repose  in  its  determined  conserv 
atism  of  the  Union — non-interference  by  Congress  with  slavery  in 
State  and  Territory,  or  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 

"  That,  by  the  uniform  application  of  this  Democratic  principle 
to  the  organization  of  Territories,  and  to  the  admission  of  new 
States,  with  or  without  domestic  slavery,  as  they  may  elect,  the 
equal  rights  of  all  States  will  be  preserved  intact,  the  original 
compacts  of  the  Constitution  maintained  inviolate,  and  the  perpe 
tuity  and  expansion  of  this  Union  insured  to  its  utmost  capacity 
of  embracing,  in  peace  and  harmony,  every  future  American  State 
that  may  be  constituted  or  annexed  with  a  republican  form  of  gov 
ernment." 

Pray,  what  can  this  mean?  Squatter  sovereignty?  Incapacity 
of  the  Federal  Government  to  enact  any  law  for  the  protection  of 
slave  property  anywhere?  Could  that  be  in  the  face  of  a  struggle 


164  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

that  we  were  constantly  carrying  on  against  the  opponents  of  the 
fugitive  slave  law?  Could  that  be,  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  a 
majority  had  trodden  down  our  constitutional  rights  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia,  by  legislating  in  relation  to  that  particular  char 
acter  of  property,  and  that  they  had  failed  to  redeem  a  promise 
they  had  sacredly  made  to  pass  a  law  for  the  protection  of  slave 
property,  so  as  to  punish  any  one  who  should  seduce,  or  entice,  or 
abduct  it  from  an  owner  in  this  District  ? 

With  all  these  things  fresh  in  mind,  what  did  they  mean?  They 
meant  that  Congress  should  not  decide  the  question,  whether  that 
institution  should  exist  within  a  Territory  or  not.  They  did  not 
mean  to  withdraw  from  the  inhabitants  of  the  District  of  Columbia 
that  protection  to  which  they  were  entitled,  and  which  is  almost 
annually  given  by  legislation ;  and  yet  States  and  Territories  and 
the  District  of  Columbia  are  all  grouped  together,  as  the  points 
•upon  which  this  idea  rests,  and  to  which  it  is  directed.  It  meant 
that  Congress  was  not  to  legislate  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
property  anywhere;  not  to  attempt  to  decide  what  should  be  the 
institutions  maintained  anywhere ;  but  surely  not  to  disclaim  the 
right  to  protect  property,  whether  on  sea  or  on  land,  wherever  the 
Federal  Government  had  jurisdiction  and  power.  But  some  stress 
has  been  laid  upon  the  resolution,  which  says  that  this  principle 
should  be  applied  to 

"The  organization  of  the  Territories,  and  to  the  admission  of 
new  States,  with  or  without  domestic  slavery,  as  they  may  elect." 

What  does  "may  elect"  mean?  Does  it  refer  to  organization 
of  the  Territory?  Who  may  elect?  Congress  organizes  the  Ter 
ritories.  Did  it  mean  that  the  Territories  were  to  elect?  It  does 
not  say  so.  What  does  it  say? 

"That  by  the  uniform  application  of  this  Democratic  principle 
to  the  organization  of  Territories,  and  to  the  admission  of  new 
States,  with  or  without  domestic  slavery,  as  they  may  elect." 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  165 

And  here  it  met  a  question  which  had  disturbed  the  peace  of 
the  country,  and  well-nigh  destroyed  the  Union — the  right  of  a 
State  holding  slaves  to  be  admitted  into  the  Union.  It  was  de 
clared  here  that  the  State  so  admitted  should  elect  whether  it 
would  or  would  not  have  slaves.  There  is  nothing  in  that  which 
logically  applies  to  the  organization  of  a  Territory.  But  if  this  be 
in  doubt,  let  us  coine  to  the  last  resolution,  which  says : 

"  We  recognize  the  right  of  the  people  of  all  the  Territories,  in 
cluding  Kansas  and  Nebraska,  acting  through  the  legally  and  fairly- 
expressed  will  of  a  majority  of  actual  residents — " 

Does  it  stop  there  ?     No — 

"  and  whenever  the  number  of  their  inhabitants  justifies  it,  to 
form  a  constitution,  with  or  without  domestic  slavery,  and  be  ad 
mitted  into  the  Union  upon  terms  of  perfect  equality  with  the 
other  States." 

If  there  had  been  any  doubt  before  as  to  what  "  may  elect "  re 
ferred  to,  this  resolution  certainly  removed  it.  It  is  clear  they 
meant,  that  when  a  Territory  had  a  sufficient  number  of  inhabit 
ants,  and  came  to  form  a  constitution,  then  it  might  decide  the 
question  as  it  pleased.  From  that  doctrine,  I  know  no  Democrat 
who  now  dissents. 

I  have  thus,  because  of  the  assertion  that  this  was  a  new  idea 
attempted  to  be  interjected  into  the  Democratic  creed,  gone  over 
some  portion  of  its  history.  Important  by  its  connection  with  the 
existing  agitation,  and  last  in  the  series,  is  an  act  with  the  usher 
ing  in  of  which  the  Senator  is  more  familiar  than  myself,  and  on 
which  he  made  remarks,  to  which,  it  is  probable,  some  of  those 
who  acted  with  him,  will  reply.  I  wish  merely  to  say,  in  relation 
to  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act,  that  there  are  expressions  in  it  which 
seem  to  me  not  of  doubtful  meaning,  such  as,  "  in  all  cases  in 
volving  title  to  slaves,  or  involving  the  question  of  personal  free 
dom,"  there  should  be  a  trial  before  the  courts,  and  without  refer- 


166  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ence  to  the  amount  involved,  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  Territory,  and  from  thence  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  If  there  was  no  right  of  property  there;  if  we  had  no 
right  to  recognize  it  there ;  if  some  sovereign  was  to  determine 
whether  it  existed  or  not,  why  did  we  say  that  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  the  last  resort,  should  decide  the  question? 
If  it  was  an  admitted  tfring,  by  that  bill,  that  the  Territorial  Leg 
islature  should  decide  it,  why  did  we  provide  for  taking  the  case 
to  the  Supreme  Court  ?  If  it  had  been  believed  then,  as  it  is  as 
serted  now,  that  a  Territory  possessed  all  the  power  of  a  State; 
that  the  inhabitants  of  a  Territory  could  meet  in  convention  and 
decide  the  question  as  the  people  of  a  State  might  do,  there  was 
nothing  to  be  carried  to  the  Supreme  Court.  You  can  not  appeal 
from  the  decision  of  a  constitutional  convention  of  a  State  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  to  decide  whether  slave  prop 
erty  shall  be  prohibited  or  admitted  within  the  limits  of  a  State ; 
and  if  they  rest  on  the  same  footing,  what  is  the  meaning  of  that 
clause  of  the  bill  ? 

But  this  organic  law  further  provides,  just  as  the  resolution  of 
the  convention  had  done,  that  when  a  legal  majority  of  the  resi 
dents  of  either  Territory  formed  a  constitution,  then,  at  their  will, 
they  might  recognize  or  exclude  slavery,  and  come  into  the  Union 
as  co-equal  States.  This  fixes  the  period,  defines  the  time  at 
which  the  territorial  inhabitants  may  perform  this  act,  and  clearly 
forbids  the  idea  that  it  was  intended,  by  those  who  enacted  the  law, 
to  acknowledge  that  power  to  be  existent  in  the  inhabitants  of  a 
Territory  during  their  territorial  condition.  If  I  am  mistaken  in 
this;  if  there  was  a  contemporaneous  construction  of  it  differing 
from  this,  the  Senators  who  sit  around  me  and  who  were  then  mem 
bers  of  the  body,  will  not  fail  to  remember  it. 

The  Senator  asserts  that,  in  relation  to  this  point,  those  who 
acted  with  him  have  changed,  and  claims  for  himself  to  have  been 
consistent.  If  this  be  so,  it  proves  nothing  as  to  the  present,  and 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  167 

only  individual  opinions  as  to  the  past.  I  do  not  regard  consis 
tency  as  a  very  high  virtue ;  neither,  it  appears,  does  he ;  for  he 
told  us  that  if  it  could  be  shown  to  him  that  he  was  in  error  on 
any  point,  he  would  change  his  opinion.  How  could  that  be? 
Who  would  undertake  to  show  the  Senator  that  he  was  in  error? 
Who  would  undertake  to  measure  the  altitude  of  the  Colossus  who 
bestrides  the  world,  and  announces  for,  and  of,  and  by  himself, 
"We,  the  Democracy,"  as  though,  in  his  person,  all  that  remained 
of  the  party  was  now  concentrated  !  Other  men  are  permitted  to 
change,  because  other  men  may  be  mistaken ;  and  if  they  are 
honest,  when  convicted  of  their  error,  they  must  change,  but  how 
can  one  expect  to  convince  the  Senator,  who,  where  all  is  change, 
stands  changeless  still  ? 

In  the  course  of  his  reply  to  me — if  indeed  it  may  be  called 
such ;  it  seemed  to  be  rather  a  review  of  every  thing  except  what 
I  had  said — he  set  me  the  bad  example  of  going  into  the  canvass 
in  my  own  State.  It  is  the  first,  I  trust  it  will  be  the  last  time,  I 
shall  follow  his  example ;  and  now  only  to  the  extent  of  the  occa 
sion,  where  criticism  was  invited  by  unusual  publicity.  In  the 
canvass  which  the  Senator  had  with  his  opponent,  Mr.  Lincoln, 
and  the  debates  of  which  have  been  published  in  a  book,  we  find 
much  which,  if  it  be  consistent  with  his  course  as  I  had  known  it, 
only  proves  to  me  how  little  able  I  was  to  understand  his  meaning 
in  former  times. 

The  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  having  agreed  the  right  for  which  I 
contend  to  be  the  subject  of  judicial  decision;  it  having  specially 
provided  the  mode  and  facilitated  the  process  by  which  that  right 
should  be  brought  to  the  courts  and  finally  decided ;  not  allowing 
any  check  to  be  interposed  because  of  amount,  that  bill  having 
continued  the  provision  which  had  been  introduced  into  the  New 
Mexico  Bill,  how  arc  we  to  understand  the  Senator's  declarations, 
that,  let  the  Supreme  Court  decide  as  they  may,  the  inhabitants  of 
a  Territory  may  lawfully  admit  or  exclude  slavery  as  they  please? 


168  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

What  a  hollow  promise  was  given  to  us  in  the  provision  referring 
this  vexed  question  to  judicial  decision,  in  order  that  we  might 
reach  a  point  on  which  we  might  peacefully  rest,  if  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Territories  for  which  Congress  had  legislated  could  still  de 
cide  the  question  and  set  aside  any  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
and  do  this  lawfully.  I  ask,  was  it  not  to  give  us  a  stone,  when 
he  promised  us  bread ;  to  incorporate  a  provision  in  the  organic 
act  securing  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  courts,  if,  as  now  stated, 
those  courts  were  known  to  be  powerless  to  grant  a  remedy? 

Here  there  is  a  very  broad  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the 
power  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  Territory,  or  of  any  local  community, 
lawfully  to  do  a  thing,  and  forcibly  to  do  it.  If  the  Senator  had 
said,  that  whatever  might  be  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
whatever  might  be  the  laws  of  Congress,  whatever  might  be  the 
laws  of  the  Territories,  in  the  face  of  an  infuriated  mob,  such  as 
he  described  on  another  occasion,  it  would  be  impossible  for  a  man 
to  hold  a  slave  against  their  will,  he  would  but  have  avowed  the 
truism  that  in  our  country  the  law  waits  upon  public  opinion.  But 
he  says  that  they  can  do  it  lawfully.  If  his  position  had  been 
such  as  I  have  just  stated,  it  would  have  struck  me  as  the  opinion 
I  had  always  supposed  him  to  entertain.  More  than  that,  it  would 
have  struck  me  as  the  opinion  which  no  one  could  gainsay ;  which, 
at  any  time,  I  would  have  been  ready  to  admit.  Nothing  is  more 
clear  than  that  no  law  could  prevail  in  our  country,  where  force,  as 
a  governmental  mean,  is  almost  unknown,  against  a  pervading  sen 
timent  in  the  community.  Every  body  admits  that;  and  it  was  in 
that  view  of  the  case  that  this  question  has  been  so  often  declared 
to  be  a  mere  abstraction.  It  is  an  abstraction  so  far  as  any  one 
would  expect  in  security  to  hold  against  the  fixed  purpose  and  all- 
pervading  will  of  the  community,  whether  territorial  or  other,  a 
species  of  property,  ambulatory,  liable,  because  it  has  mind  enough 
to  go,  to  be  enticed  away  whenever  freed  from  physical  restraint, 
and  which  would  be  nearly  valueless  if  so  restrained.  It  may  be 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  169 

an  abstraction  as  a  practical  question  of  pecuniary  advantage,  but 
it  is  not  the  less  dear  to  those  who  assert  the  constitutional  right. 
It  would  constitute  a  very  good  reason  why  no  one  should  ever  say 
there  was  an  attempt  to  force  slavery  on  an  unwilling  people,  but 
no  reason  why  the  right  should  not  be  recognized  by  the  Federal 
Government  as  one  belonging  to  the  equal  privileges  and  immu 
nities  of  every  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

But  the  main  point  of  the  Senator's  argument — and  it  deserved 
to  be  so,  because  it  is  the  main  question  now  in  the  public  mind — 
was,  what  is  the  meaning  of  non-intervention?  He  defined  it  to 
be  synonymous  with  squatter  sovereignty,  or  with  popular  sov 
ereignty 

The  Senator  and  myself  do  not  seem  to  be  getting  any  nearer 
together;  because  the  very  thing  which  he  describes  constitutes 
the  only  case  in  which  I  would  admit  the  necessity,  and,  conse 
quently,  the  propriety  of  the  people  acting  without  authority.  If 
men  were  cast  upon  a  desert  island,  the  sovereignty  of  which  was 
unknown,  over  which  no  jurisdiction  was  exercised,  they  would 
find  themselves  necessitated  to  establish  rules  which  should  sub 
sist  between  themselves ;  and  so  the  people  of  California,  when  the 
Congress  failed  to  give  them  a  government ;  when  it  refused  to 
enact  a  territorial  law ;  when,  paralyzed  by  the  power  of  contend 
ing  factions,  it  left  the  immigrants  to  work  their  own  unhappy 
way ;  they  had  a  right — a  right  growing  out  of  the  necessity  of 
the  case — to  make  rules  for  the  government  of  their  local  affairs. 
But  this  was  not  sovereignty.  It  was  the  exercise,  between  man 
and  man,  of  a  social  function  necessary  to  preserve  peace  in  the 
absence  of  any  controlling  power — essential  to  conserve  the  rela 
tions  of  person  and  property.  The  sovereignty,  if  it  existed  in 
any  organization  or  government  of  the  world,  remained  there  still ; 
and  whenever  that  sovereignty  extended  itself  over  them,  whether 
shipwrecked  mariners,  or  adventurous  Americans — whether  cast  off 
by  the  sea,  or  whether  finding  their  weary  way  across  the  desert 


170  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

plains  which  lie  west  of  the  Mississippi — whenever  the  hand  of 
the  Government  holding  sovereign  jurisdiction  was  laid  upon  them, 
they  became  subject;  their  sovereign  control  of  their  own  affairs 
ceased.  In  our  case,  the  directing  hand  of  the  Government  is  laid 
upon  them  at  the  moment  of  the  enactment  of  an  organic  law 
Therefore,  the  very  point  at  which  the  Senator  begins  his  sov 
ereignty,  is  the  point  at  which  the  necessity,  and,  in  my  view, 
the  claim  ceases. 

But  suppose  that  a  territorial  legislature,  acting  under  an  or 
ganic  law,  not  defining  their  municipal  powers  further  than  has 
been  general  in  such  laws,  should  pass  a  law  to  exclude  slave 
property,  would  the  Senator  vote  to  repeal  it? 

MR.  DOUGLAS.  I  will  answer.  I  would  not,  because  the  Dem 
ocratic  party  is  pledged  to  non-intervention ;  because,  furthermore, 
whether  such  an  act  is  constitutional  or  not  is  a  judicial  question. 
If  it  is  unconstitutional,  the  court  will  so  decide,  and  it  will  be 
null  and  void  without  repeal.  If  it  is  constitutional,  the  people 
have  a  right  to  pass  it.  If  unconstitutional,  it  is  void,  and  the 
court  will  ascertain  the  fact ;  and  we  pledged  our  honors  to  abide 
the  decision 

MR.  DAVIS.  If  it  will  not  embarrass  the  Senator,  I  would  ask 
him  if,  as  Chief  Executive  of  the  United  States,  he  would  sign  a 
bill  to  protect  slave  property  in  State,  Territory,  or  District  of 
Columbia — an  act  of  Congress? 

MR.  DOUGLAS.  It  will  be  time  enough  for  me,  or  any  other 
man,  to  say  what  bills  he  will  sign,  when  he  is  in  a  position  to 
exercise  the  power. 

MR.  DAVIS.  The  Senator  has  a  right  to  make  me  that  answer. 
I  was  only  leading  on  to  a  fair  understanding  of  the  Senator  and 
myself  about  non-intervention 

I  think  it  now  appears  that,  in  the  minds  of  the  gentlemen, 
non-intervention  is  a  shadowy,  unsubstantial  doctrine,  which  has 
its  application  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  It 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  171 

ceased  to  apply  when  it  was  necessary  to  annul  an  act  in  Kansas 
in  relation  to  the  political  rights  of  the  inhabitants.  It  had  no 
application  when  it  was  necessary  to  declare  that  the  old  French 
laws  should  not  be  revived  in  the  Territory  of  Kansas  after  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise ;  but  it  rose  an  insurmountable 
barrier  when  we  proposed  to  sweep  away  the  Mexican  decrees, 
usages,  or  laws,  and  leave  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States  unfettered  in  their  operation  in  the  Territory  acquired  from 
Mexico.  It  thus  seems  to  have  a  constantly  varying  application, 
and,  as  I  have  not  yet  reached  a  good  definition,  one  which  quite 
satisfies  me,  I  must  take  it  as  I  find  it  in  the  Senator's  speech,  in 
which  he  says  Alabama  asserted  the  doctrine  of  non-intervention 
in  1856.  The  Alabama  resolutions  of  1856  asserted  the  right  to 
protection,  and  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Government  to  give  it.  So, 
if  he  stands  upon  the  resolutions  of  Alabama  in  1856,  non-inter 
vention  is  very  good  doctrine,  and  exactly  agrees  with  what  I  be 
lieve — no  assumption,  by  the  Federal  Government,  of  any  powers 
over  the  municipal  territorial  governments  which  is  not  necessary; 
that  the  hand  of  Federal  power  shall  be  laid  as  lightly  as  possi 
ble  upon  any  territorial  community ;  that  its  laws  shall  be  limited 
to  the  necessities  of  each  case ;  that  it  shall  leave  the  inhabitants 
as  unfettered  in  the  determination  of  their  local  legislation  as  the 
rights  of  the  people  of  the  States  will  permit,  and  the  duty  of  the  Gen 
eral  Government  will  allow.  But  when  non-intervention  is  pressed 
to  the  point  of  depriving  the  arm  of  the  Federal  Government  of 
its  one  great  function  of  protection,  then  it  is  the  doctrine  which 
we  denounce — which  we  call  squatter  sovereignty;  the  renuncia 
tion  by  Congress,  and  the  turning  over  to  the  inhabitants  a  sov 
ereignty  which,  rightfully,  it  does  not  belong  to  the  one  to  grant 
or  the  other  to  claim,  and,  further  and  worse,  thus  to  divest  the 
Federal  Government  of  a  duty  which  the  Constitution  requires  it 
to  perform. 

To  show  that  this  view  is  not  new — that  it  does  not  rest  singly 


172  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

on  the  resolutions  of  Alabama,  I  will  refer  to  a  subject,  the  action 
upon  which  has  already  been  quoted  in  this  debate — the  Oregon 
Bill.  During  the  discussion  of  the  Oregon  Bill,  I  offered  in  the 
Senate,  June  23,  1848,  an  amendment  which  I  will  read : 

"Provided,  That  nothing  contained  in  this  act  shall  be  so  con 
strued  as  to  authorize  the  prohibition  of  domestic  slavery  in  said 
Territory,  whilst  it  remains  in  the  condition  of  a  Territory  of  the 
United  States." 

Upon  this,  I  will  cite  the  authority  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  in  his  speech 
on  the  Oregon  Bill,  June  27,  1848: 

"  The  twelfth  section  of  this  bill  is  intended  to  assert  and  main 
tain  this  demand  of  the  non-slaveholding  States,  while  it  remains  a 
Territory,  not  openly  or  directly,  but  indirectly,  by  extending  the 
provisions  of  the  bill  for  the  establishment  of  the  Iowa  Territory 
to  this,  and  by  ratifying  the  acts  of  the  informal  and  self-consti 
tuted  government  of  Oregon,  which,  among  others,  contains  one 
prohibiting  the  introduction  of  slavery.  It  thus,  in  reality,  adopts 
what  is  called  the  Wilmot  proviso,  not  only  for  Oregon,  but,  as  the 
Bill  now  stands,  for  New  Mexico  and  California.  The  amendment, 
on  the  contrary,  moved  by  the  Senator  from  Mississippi,  near  me 
[Mr.  Davis],  is  intended  to  assert  and  maintain  the  position  of  the 
slave-holding  States.  It  leaves  the  Territory  free  and  open  to  all 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  would  overrule,  if  adopted, 
the  act  of  the  self-constituted  Territory  of  Oregon,  and  the  twelfth 
section,  as  far  as  it  relates  to  the  subject  under  consideration.  We 
have  thus  fairly  presented  the  grounds  taken  by  the  non-slave- 
liolding  and  the  slave-holding  States,  or  as  I  shall  call  them,  for 
the  sake  of  brevity,  the  Northern  and  Southern  States,  in  their 
whole  extent,  for  discussion." — Appendix  to  Congressional  Globe, 
Thirtieth  Congress,  first  Session,  p.  868. 

I  will  quote  also  one  of  the  speeches  which  he  made  near  the 
close  of  his  life,  at  a  time  when  he  was  so  far  wasted  by  disease 
that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  ask  the  Senator  from  Virginia, 
who  sits  before  me  [Mr.  Mason],  to  read  the  speech  which  his 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  173 

tameless  spirit  impelled  him  to  compose,  but  which  he  was  phys 
ically  unable  to  deliver;  and  once  again  he  came  to  the  Senate 
chamber,  when  standing  yet  more  nearly  on  the  confines  of  death ; 
he  rose,  his  heart  failing  in  its  functions,  his  voice  faltered,  but  his 
will  was  so  strong  that  he  could  not  realize  that  the  icy  hand  was 
upon  him,  and  he  erroneously  thought  he  was  oppressed  by  the 
weight  of  his  overcoat.  True  to  his  devotion  to  the  principles  he 
had  always  advocated,  clinging,  to  the  last  hour  of  his  life,  to  the 
duty  to  maintain  the  rights  of  his  constituents,  still  he  was  here, 
and  his  honored,  though  feeble,  voice  was  raised  for  the  mainten 
ance  of  the  great  principle  to  which  his  life  had  been  devoted. 
From  the  speech  I  read  as  follows : 

"The  plan  of  the  administration  can  not  save  the  Union,  because 
it  can  have  no  effect  whatever  towards  satisfying  the  States  com 
posing  the  Southern  section  of  the  Union,  that  they  can,  consist 
ently  with  safety  and  honor,  remain  in  the  Union.  It  is,  in  fact, 
but  a  modification  of  the  Wilmot  proviso.  It  proposes  to  effect 
the  same  object — to  exclude  the  South  from  all  territory  acquired 
by  the  Mexican  treaty.  It  is  well  known  that  the  South  is  united 
against  the  Wilmot  proviso,  and  has  committed  itself,  by-  solemn 
resolutions,  to  resist  should  it  be  adopted.  Its  opposition  is  not  to 
the  name,  but  that  which  it  proposes  to  effect.  That,  the  Southern 
States  hold  to  be  unconstitutional,  unjust,  inconsistent  with  their 
equality  as  members  of  the  common  Union,  and  calculated  to 
destroy  irretrievably  the  equilibrium  between  the  two  sections. 
These  objections  equally  apply  to  what,  for  brevity,  I  will  call  the 
executive  proviso.  There  is  no  difference  between  it  and  the  Wil 
mot,  except  in  the  mode  of  effecting  the  object;  and  in  that  respect, 
I  must  say  that  the  latter  is  much  the  least  objectionable.  It  goes 
to  its  object  openly,  boldly,  and  distinctly.  It  claims  for  Congress 
unlimited  power  over  the  Territories,  and  proposes  to  assert  it  over 
the  territories  acquired  from  Mexico  by  a  positive  prohibition  of 
slavery.  Not  so  the  executive  proviso.  It  takes  an  indirect 
course,  and,  in  order  to  elude  the  Wilmot  proviso,  and  thereby 
avoid  encountering  the  united  and  determined  resistance  of  the 
South,  it  denies,  by  implication,  the  authority  of  Congress  to 


174  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

legislate  for  the  Territories,  and  claims  the  right  as  belonging 
exclusively  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Territories.  But  to  effect 
the  object  of  excluding  the  South,  it  takes  care,  in  the  meantime, 
to  let  in  immigrants  freely  from  the  Northern  States,  and  all  other 
quarters,  except  from  the  South,  which  it  takes  special  care  to 
exclude  by  holding  up  to  them  the  danger  of  having  their  slaves 
liberated  under  the  Mexican  laws.  The  necessary  consequence  is 
to  exclude  the  South  from  the  Territories,  just  as  effectually  as 
would  the  Wilmot  proviso.  The  only  difference,  in  this  respect, 
is,  that  what  one  proposes  to  effect  directly  and  openly,  the  other 
proposes  to  effect  indirectly  and  covertly. 

"But  the  executive  proviso  is  more  objectionable  than  the  Wil 
mot  in  another  and  more  important  particular.  The  latter,  to 
effect  its  object,  inflicts  a  dangerous  wound  upon  the  Constitution, 
by  depriving  the  Southern  States,  as  joint  partners  and  owners 
of  the  Territories,  of  their  rights  in  them ;  but  it  inflicts  no 
greater  wound  than  is  absolutely  necessary  to  effect  its  object. 
The  former,  on  the  contrary,  while  it  inflicts  the  same  wound, 
inflicts  others  equally  great,  and,  if  possible,  greater,  as  I  shall 
next  proceed  to  explain. 

"In  claiming  the  right  for  the  inhabitants,  instead  of  Con 
gress,  to  legislate  for  the  Territories,  the  executive  proviso  assumes 
that  the  sovereignty  over  the  Territories  is  vested  in  the  former, 
or,  to  express  it  in  the  language  used  in  a  resolution  offered  by 
one  of  the  Senators  from  Texas  [General  Houston,  now  absent], 
they  'have  the  same  inherent  right  of  self-government  as  the 
people  in  the  States.'  The  assumption  is  utterly  unfounded,  un 
constitutional,  without  example,  and  contrary  to  the  entire  prac 
tice  of  the  Government,  from  its  commencement  to  the  present 
time,  as  I  shall  proceed  to  show." — Calhouns  Works,  vol.  4,  p.  562. 

MR.  DAVIS.  I  find  that  I  must  abridge,  by  abstaining  from  the 
reading  of  extracts.  When  this  question  arose  in  1820,  Nathaniel 
Macon,  by  many  considered  the  wisest  man  of  his  day,  held  the 
proposed  interference  to  be  unauthorized  and  innovative.  In  ar 
guing  against  the  Missouri  Compromise,  as  it  was  called — the 
attempt  by  Congress  to  prescribe  where  slaves  might  or  might  not 
be  held — the  exercise,  by  the  Federal  Government  north  of  a  cer- 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  175 

tain  point,  of  usurped  power  by  an  act  of  inhibition,  Mr.  Macon 
said  our  true  policy  was  that  which  had  thus  far  guided  the  coun 
try  in  safety :  the  policy  of  non-intervention.  By  non-intervention 
he  meant  the  absence  of  hostile  legislation,  not  the  absence  of  gov 
ernmental  protection.  Our  doctrine  on  this  point  is  not  new,  but 
that  of  our  opponents  is  so. 

The  Senator  from  Illinois  assumes  that  the  congressional  acts 
of  1850  meant  no  legislation  in  relation  to  slave  property;  while, 
in  the  face  of  that  declaration,  stand  the  laws  enacted  in  that  year, 
and  the  promise  of  another,  which  has  not  been  enacted — laws 
directed  to  the  question  of  slavery  and  slave  property ;  one  even 
declaring,  in  certain  contingencies,  as  a  penalty  on  the  owner,  the 
emancipation  of  his  slave  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  If  no  action 
upon  the  question  was  the  prevailing  opinion,  what  does  the  legis 
lation  mean?  Was  it  non-action  in  the  District  of  Columbia? 
Be  it  remembered,  the  resolution  of  the  Cincinnati  platform  says, 
"Non-interference,  by  Congress,  with  slavery  in  State  and  Terii- 
tory,  or  in  the  District  of  Columbia."  They  are  all  upon  the  same 
footing. 

Again,  he  said  that  the  Badger  amendment  was  a  declaration  of 
no  protection  to  slave  property.  The  Badger  amendment  declares 
that  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  shall  not  revive  the 
laws  or  usages  which  preexisted  that  compromise ;  and  the  history 
of  the  times,  so  far  as  I  understand  it,  is,  that  it  intended  to  assure 
those  gentlemen  who  feared  that  the  laws  of  France  would  be 
revived  in  the  Territories  of  Kansas  and  Nebraska,  by  the  repeal 
of  the  act  of  1820,  and  that  they  would  be  held  responsible  for 
having,  by  congressional  act,  established  slavery.  The  Southern 
men  did  not  desire  Congress  to  establish  slavery.  It  has  been  our 
uniform  declaration  that  we  denied  the  power  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  either  to  establish  or  prohibit  it ;  that  we  claimed  for  it 
protection  as  property  recognized  by  the  Constitution,  and  we 
claimed  the  right  for  it,  as  property,  to  go,  and  to  receive  federal 


176  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

protection  wherever  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  is  ex 
clusive.  We  claim  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  in 
recognizing  this  property,  making  it  the  basis  of  representation, 
put  it,  not  upon  the  footing  which  it  holds  between  foreign  na 
tions,  but  upon  the  basis  of  the  compact  or  union  of  the  States; 
that,  under  the  delegated  grant  to  regulate  commerce  between  the 
States,  it  did  not  belong  to  a  State;  therefore,  without  breach  of 
contract,  they  can  not,  by  any  regulation,  prohibit  transit,  and  the 
compact  provided  that  they  should  not  change  the  character  of 
master  and  slave  in  the  case  of  a  fugitive.  Could  Congress  sur 
render,  for  the  States  and  their  citizens,  the  claim  and  protection 
for  those  or  other  constitutional  rights,  against  invasion  by  a 
State?  If  not,  surely  it  can  not  be  done  in  the  case  of  a  Terri 
tory,  a  possession  of  the  States.  The  word  "protecting,"  in  that 
amendment,  referred  to  laws  which  preexisted — laws  which  it  was 
not  designed,  by  the  Democrats,  to  revive  when  they  declared  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise;  and,  therefore,  I  think,  did 
not  affect  the  question  of  constitutional  right  and  of  federal  power 
and  duty. 

In  all  these  territorial  bills  we  have  the  language  "subject  to 
the  Constitution  ;"  that  is  to  say,  that  the  inhabitants  are  to  man 
age  their  local  affairs  in  their  own  way,  subject  to  the  Constitu 
tion  ;  which,  I  suppose,  might  be  rendered  thus :  "  In  their  own 
way,  provided  their  own  way  shall  be  somebody  else's  way;"  for 
"  subject  to  the  Constitution  "  means,  in  accordance  with  an  instru 
ment  with  which  the  territorial  inhabitants  had  nothing  to  do; 
with  the  construction  of  which  they  were  not  concerned ;  in  the 
adoption  of  which  they  had  no  part,  and  in  relation  to  which  it 
has  sometimes  been  questioned  whether  they  had  any  responsi 
bility.  My  own  views,  as  the  Senator  is  aware  from  previous  dis 
cussions,  (and  it  is  needless  to  repeat,)  are  that  the  Constitution 
is  co-extensive  with  the  United  States;  that  the  designation  in 
cludes  the  Territories,  that  they  are  necessarily  subject  to  the  Con- 


EEPLY  TO  SEXATOH  DOUGLAS.  177 

stitution.  But  if  they  be  subject  to  the  Constitution,  and  subject 
to  the  organic  act,  that  is  the  language  used ;  that  organic  act  be 
ing  the  law  of  Congress,  that  Constitution  being  the  compact  of 
the  States — the  territorial  inhabitants  having  no  lot  or  part  in  one 
or  the  other,  save  as  they  are  imposed  upon  them — where  is  their 
claim  to  sovereignty  ?  Where  is  their  right  to  do  as  they  please  ? 
The  States  have  a  compact,  and  the  agent  of  the  States  gives  to 
the  Territories  a  species  of  constitution  in  the  organic  act,  which 
endures  and  binds  them  until  they  throw  off  what  the  Senator  on 
another  occasion  termed  the  minority  condition,  and  assume  the 
majority  condition  as  a  State.  The  remark  to  which  I  refer  was 
on  the  bill  to  admit  Iowa  and  Florida  into  the  Union.  The  Sen 
ator  then  said: 

"  The  father  may  bind  the  son  during  his  minority,  but  the  mo 
ment  that  he  (the  son)  attains  his  majority,  his  fetters  are  severed, 
and  he  is  free  to  regulate  his  own  conduct.  So,  sir,  with  the  Ter 
ritories  ;  they  are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  and  control  of  Con 
gress  during  infancy,  their  minority;  but  when  they  attain  their 
majority,  and  obtain  admission  into  the  Union,  they  are  free  from 
all  restraints  and  restrictions,  except  such  as  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  imposes  upon  each  and  all  of  the  States." 

This  was  the  doctrine  of  territorial  sovereignty — perhaps  that 
is  the  phrase — at  that  period.  At  a  later  period,  in  March,  1856, 
the  Senator  said : 

"  The  sovereignty  of  a  Territory  remains  in  abeyance,  suspended 
in  the  United  States  in  trust  for  the  people,  until  they  shall  be  ad 
mitted  into  the  Union  as  a  State.  In  the  meantime,  they  are 
admitted  to  enjoy  and  exercise  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  self- 
government,  in  subordination  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  obedience  to  the  organic  law  passed  by  Congress  in 
pursuance  of  that  instrument." 

If  it  be  admitted — and  I  believe  there  is  no  issue  between  the 
Senator  and  myself  on  that  point — that  the  Congress  of  the  United 
12 


178  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

States  have  no  right  to  pass  a  law  excluding  slaves  from  a  Terri 
tory,  or  determining  in  the  Territory  the  relation  of  master  and 
slave,  of  parent  and  child,  of  guardian  and  ward  ;  that  they  have 
no  right  anywhere  to  decide  what  is  property,  but  are  only  bound 
to  protect  such  rights  as  preexisted  the  formation  of  the  Union — 
to  perform  such  functions  as  are  intrusted  to  them  as  the  agent 
of  the  States — then  how  can  Congress,  thus  fettered,  confer  upon 
a  corporation  of  its  creation — upon  a  territorial  legislature,  by 
an  organic  act,  a  power  to  determine  what  shall  be  property  within 
the  limits  of  such  Territory  ? 

But,  again,  if  it  were  admitted  that  the  territorial  inhabitants 
did  possess  this  sovereignty  :  that  they  had  the  right  to  do  as  they 
pleased  on  all  subjects,  then  would  arise  the  question,  if  they 
were  authorized,  through  their  representatives,  thus  to  act,  whence 
came  the  opposition  to  what  was  called  the  Lecompton  Constitu 
tion  ?  How  did  Congress,  under  this  state  of  facts,  get  the  right 
to  inquire  whether  those  representatives  in  that  case  really  ex 
pressed  the  will  of  the  people.  Still  more ;  how  did  Congress  get 
the  right  to  decide  that  those  representatives  must  submit  their 
action  to  a  popular  vote  in  a  manner  not  prescribed  by  the  people 
of  the  Territory,  however  eminently  it  may  have  been  advisable, 
convenient,  and  proper  in  the  judgment  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  ?  What  revisory  function  had  we,  if  they,  through 
their  representatives,  had  full  power  to  act  on  all  such  subjects 
whatsoever  ? 

I  have  necessarily,  in  answering  the  Senator,  gone  somewhat 
into  the  argumentum  ad  hominem.  Though  it  is  not  entirely  ex 
hausted,  I  think  enough  has  been  said  to  show  the  Senate  in 
what  the  difference  between  us  consists.  If  it  be  necessary  fur 
ther  to  illustrate  it,  I  might  ask  how  did  he  propose  to  annul  the 
organic  act  for  Utah,  if  the  recognition  by  the  Congress  of  a  suffi 
cient  number  of  inhabitants  to  justify  the  organization  of  a  terri 
torial  government  transferred  the  sovereignty  to  the  inhabitants 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  179 

of  the  Territory?  If  sovereignty  passed  by  the  recognition  of  the 
fact,  how  did  he  propose,  by  congressional  act,  to  annul  the  terri 
torial  existence  of  Utah  ? 

It  is  this  confusion  of  ideas,  it  is  this  confounding  of  terms, 
this  changing  of  language,  this  applying  of  new  meanings  to 
words,  out  of  which,  I  think,  a  large  portion  of  the  dispute  arises. 
For  instance,  it  is  claimed  that  President  Pierce,  in  using  the 
phrase  "existing  and  incipient  States,"  meant  to  include  all  Ter 
ritories,  and  thus  that  he  had  bound  me  to  a  doctrine  which  pre 
cluded  my  strictures  on  what  I  termed  squatter  sovereignty.  This 
all  arises  from  the  misuse  of  language.  An  incipient  State,  ac 
cording  to  my  idea,  is  the  territorial  condition  at  the  moment  it 
changes  into  that  of  a  State.  It  is  when  the  people  assemble  in 
convention  to  form  a  constitution  as  a  State,  that  they  are  in  the 
condition  of  an  incipient  State.  Various  names  were  applied  to 
the  Territories  at  an  earlier  period.  Sometimes  they  were  called 
"  new  States,"  because  they  were  expected  to  be  States ;  sometimes 
they  were  called  "States  in  embryo."  and  it  requires  a  determina 
tion  of  the  language  that  is  employed  before  it  is  possible  to  arrive 
at  any  conclusion  as  to  the  differences  of  understanding  between 
gentlemen.  Therefore,  it  was,  and,  I  think,  very  properly,  (but 
not,  as  the  Senator  supposed,  to  catechise  him,)  that  I  asked  him 
what  he  meant  by  non-intervention,  before  I  commenced  these 
remarks. 

In  the  same  line  of  errors  was  the  confusion  which  resulted  in 
his  assuming  that  the  evils  I  described  as  growing  out  of  his  doc 
trine  on  the  plains  of  Kansas,  were  a  denunciation,  on  my  part, 
of  the  bill  called  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill.  At  the  time  that  bill 
passed,  I  did  not  foresee  all  the  evils  which  have  resulted  from  the 
doctrine  based  upon  it,  but  which  I  do  not  think  the  bill  sustains. 
I  am  not  willing  now  to  turn  on  those  who  were  in  a  position 
which  compelled  them  to  act,  made  them  responsible,  and  to  divest 
myself  of  any  responsibility  which  Belongs  to  any  opinion  I  enter- 


180  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tained.  I  will  not  seek  to  judge  after  the  fact  and  hold  the 
measure  up  against  those  who  had  to  judge  before.  Therefore  I 
will  frankly  avow  that  I  should  have  sustained  that  bill  if  I  had 
been  in  the  Senate ;  but  I  did  not  foresee  or  apprehend  such  evils 
as  immediately  grew  up  on  the  plains  of  Kansas.  I  looked  then, 
as  our  fathers  had  looked  before,  to  the  settlement  of  the  question 
of  what  institutions  should  exist  there,  as  one  to  be  determined  by 
soil  and  climate,  and  by  the  pleasure  of  those  who  should  volun 
tarily  go  into  the  country.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  case.  The 
form  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  invited  to  a  controversy — not 
foreseen.  I  was  not  charging  the  Senator  with  any  responsibility 
for  it,  but  the  variation  of  its  terms  invited  contending  parties  to 
meet  on  the  plains  of  Kansas,  and  had  well-nigh  eventuated  in 
civil  war.  The  great  respect  which  even  the  most  lawless  of  those 
adventurers  in  Kansas  had  for  the  name  and  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  served,  by  the  timely  interposition  of  the  Federal  force  and 
laws,  to  restrain  the  excited  masses  and  prevented  violence  from 
assuming  larger  proportions  than  combats  between  squads  of  ad 
venturers. 

This  brings  me  in  the  line  of  rejoinder,  to  the  meaning  of  the 
phrase,  "  the  people  of  a  Territory,  like  those  of  a  State,  should 
decide  for  themselves,"  etc.,  the  language  quoted  against  the  Pres 
ident  in  the  remarks  of  the  Senator.  This,  it  was  announced,  was 
squatter  sovereignty  in  its  broadest  sense;  and  it  was  added,  that 
the  present  Executive  was  elected  to  the  high  office  he  holds  on 
that  construction  of  the  platform.  Now,  I  do  not  know  how  it  is 
that  the  Senator  has  the  power  to  decide  why  the  people  voted 
for  a  candidate.  I  rather  suppose,  among  the  many  millions  who 
did  vote,  there  must  have  been  a  variety  of  reasons,  and  that  it  is 
not  in  the  power  of  any  one  man  to  declare  what  determined  the 
result.  But  waiving  that,  is  it  squatter  sovereignty  in  its  broadest 
sense  ?  Is  it  a  declaration  that  the  inhabitants  of  a  Territory  can 
exercise  all  the  powers  of  a  Sjate?  It  says  that,  "like  the  peo- 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  181 

pie  of  a  State,"  they  may  decide  for  themselves.  Then  how  do 
the  people  of  a  State  decide  the  question  of  what  shall  be  prop 
erty  within  the  State?  Every  one  knows  that  it  is  by  calling  a 
convention,  and  that  the  people,  represented  in  convention,  and 
forming  a  constitution  their  fundamental  law,  do  this.  Every  one 
knows  that,  under  the  constitutions  and  bills  of  rights  which  pre 
vail  in  the  republican  States  of  this  Union,  no  legislature  is  in 
vested  with  that  power.  If  this  be  the  mode  which  is  prescribed 
in  the  States — the  modes  which  the  States  must  pursue — I  ask 
you,  in  the  name  of  common  sense,  can  the  language  of  the  Pres 
ident  be  construed  to  mean  that  a  territorial  legislature  may  do 
what  it  is  admitted  the  legislature  of  a  State  can  not ;  or  that  the 
inhabitants  of  a  Territory  can  assemble  a  convention,  and  form  a 
fundamental  law  overriding  the  organic  act,  to  which  the  Senator 
has  already  acknowledged  they  stand  subject  uitil  they  be  admit 
ted  as  a  State? 

We  of  the  South,  I  know,  are  arraigned,  and  many  believe  justly, 
for  starting  a  new  question  which  distracts  the  Democratic  party. 
I  have  endeavored,  therefore,  to  show  that  it  is  not  new.  I  have 
also  asserted,  what  I  think  is  clear,  that  if  it  were  new,  but  yet  a 
constitutional  right,  it  is  not  only  our  province,  but  our  duty  to 
assert  it — to  assert  it  whenever  or  wherever  that  right  is  contro 
verted.  It  is  asserted  now  with  more  force  than  at  a  former 
period,  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  is  now  denied,  to  an  extent 
which  has  never  been  known  before.  We  do  not  seek,  in  the  cant 
language  of  the  day,  to  force  slavery  on  an  unwilling  people.  We 
know  full  well  there  is  no  power  to  do  it;  and  our  limited  obser 
vation  has  not  yet  made  us  acquainted  with  the  man  who  was 
likely  to  have  a  slave  forced  upon  him,  or  who  could  get  one  with 
out  paying  a  very  high  price  for  him.  He  must  first  have  the  will, 
and,  secondly,  he  must  put  money  in  his  purse  to  enable  him  to  get 
one.  They  are  too  valuable  among  those  by  whom  they  are  now 
owned,  to  be  forced  upon  any  body.  Not  admitting  the  correctue^ 


182  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

of  the  doctrine  which  the  Senator  promulgated  in  his  magazine 
article  in  relation  to  a  local  character  of  slave  property,  I  recog 
nize  the  laws  of  nature,  and  that  immigration  will  follow  in  the  lines 
where  any  species  of  labor  may  be  most  profitably  employed ;  all, 
therefore,  we  have  asked — fulfillment  of  the  original  compact  of  our 
fathers — was  that  there  should  be  no  discrimination ;  that  all  prop 
erty  should  be  equally  protected ;  that  we  should  be  permitted  to 
go  into  every  portion  of  the  United  States  save  where  some  sov 
ereign  power  has  said  slaves  shall  not  be  held,  and  to  take  with 
us  our  slave  property  in  like  manner  as  we  would  take  any  other ; 
no  more  than  that.  For  that,  our  Government  has  contended  on 
the  high  seas  against  foreign  powers.  That  has  entered  into  our 
negotiations,  and  has  been  recognized  by  every  government  against 
whom  a  claim  has  been  asserted.  Where  our  property  was  cap 
tured  on  the  land  during  the  period  of  an  invasion,  Great  Britain, 
by  treaty,  restored  it,  or  paid  for  it.  Wherever  it  has  suffered  loss 
on  the  high  seas,  down  to  a  very  recent  period,  we  have  received 
indemnity;  and  where  we  have  not,  it  was  only  because  the  power 
and  duty  of  the  Federal  Government  was  sacrificed  to  this  miser 
able  strife  in  relation  to  property,  with  the  existence  of  which, 
those  making  the  interference  had  no  municipal  connection,  or 
moral  responsibility. 

I  do  not  admit  that  sovereignty  necessarily  exists  in  the  Fed 
eral  Government  or  in  a  fcrritorial  government.  I  deny  the  Sen 
ator's  proposition,  whidH  is  broadly  laid  down,  of  the  necessity 
which  must  exist  for  it  in  the  one  place  or  the  other.  I  hold 
that  sovereignty  exists  only  in  a  State,  or  in  the  United  States  in 
their  associated  capacity,  to  whom  sovereignty  may  be  transferred, 
but  that  their  agent  is  incapable  of  receiving  it,  and,  still  more, 
of  transferring  it  to  territorial  inhabitants. 

I  was  sorry  for  some  of  the  remarks  which  he  thought  it  neces 
sary  to  make,  as  to  the  position  of  the  South  on  this  question, 
and  for  his  assertion  that  the  resolutions  of  the  convention  of 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  183 

1848  put  the  pro-slavery  men  and  the  Abolitionists  on  the  same 
ground.  I  think  it  was  altogether  unjust.  I  did  not  think  it 
quite  belonged  to  him  to  make  it.  I  was  aware  that  his  opponent, 
in  that  canvass  to  which  I  referred,  had  made  a  prophecy  that  he 
Was,  sooner  or  later,  to  land  in  the  ranks  of  the  Republicans. 
Even  if  I  had  believed  it,  I  would  not  have  chosen — and  it  is  due 
to  candor  to  say  I  do  not  believe 

MR.  DAVIS.  Well,  it  is  unimportant.  I  feel  myself  constrained, 
because  I  promised  to  do  it,  to  refer  to  some  portion  of  the  joint 
record  of  the  Senator  and  myself  in  1850,  or,  as  I  have  consumed 
so  much  time,  I  would  avoid  it.  In  that  same  magazine  article, 
to  which  I  have  referred,  the  Senator  took  occasion  to  refer  to 
some  part  which  I  had  taken  in  the  legislation  of  1850  ;  and  I 
must  say  he  presented  me  unfairly.  He  put  me  in  the  attitude 
of  one  who  was  seeking  to  discriminate,  and  left  himself  in  the 
position  of  one  who  was  willing  to  give  equal  protection  to  all 
kinds  of  property.  In  that  magazine  article  the  Senator  repre 
sents  Mr.  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  as  having  endeavored  to  discrim 
inate  in  favor  of  slave  property,  and  Mr.  Chase,  of  Ohio,  as  hav 
ing  made  a  like  attempt  against  it;  and  he  leaves  himself,  by  his 
argument,  in  the  attitude  of  one  who  concurred  with  Mr.  Clay  in 
opposition  to  both  propositions. 

I  offered  an  amendment  to  the  compromise  bill  of  1850,  which 
was  to  strike  out  the  words  "  in  respect  to,"  and  insert  "  and  in 
troduce  or  exclude,"  and  after  the  word  "slavery"  to  insert  the 
following : 

"  Provided,  That  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed 
to  prevent  said  territorial  legislature  passing  such  laws  as  may  be 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  property  of  any  kind 
which  may  have  been  or  may  be  hereafter,  conformably  to  the  Con 
stitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  held  in,  or  introduced  into, 
said  Territory." 

Mr.  Chase's  amendment  is  in  these  words : 


184  LIFE    OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  Provided  further,  That  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  con 
strued  as  authorizing  or  permitting  the  introduction  of  slavery,  or 
the  holding  of  persons  as  property  within  said  Territory." 

Whilst  the  quotation  in  the  magazine  article  left  me  in  the  po 
sition  already  stated,  the  debates  which  had  occurred  between  us 
necessarily  informed  the  Senator  that  it  was  not  my  position,  for  I 
brought  him  in  that  debate  to  acknowledge  it. 

On  that  occasion,  I  argued  for  my  amendment  as  an  obligation 
of  the  Government  to  remove  obstructions ;  to  give  the  fair  opera 
tion  to  constitutional  right;  and  so  far  from  the  Senator  having 
stood  with  Mr.  Clay  against  all  these  propositions,  the  fact  appears, 
on  page  1134  of  the  Globe,  that,  upon  the  vote  on  Chase's  amend 
ment,  Douglas  voted  for  it,  and  Davis  and  Clay  voted  against  it; 
that  upon  the  vote  on  Davis'  amendment,  Clay  and  Davis  voted 
for  it,  and  Douglas  voted  against  it. 

MR.  DOUGLAS.  The  Senator  should  add,  that  that  vote  was 
given  under  the  very  instructions  to  which  he  referred  the  other 
day,  and  which  are  well  known  to  the  Senate,  and  are  on  the  table. 

MR.  DAVIS.  I  was  aware  that  the  Senator  had  voted  for  Mr. 
Seward's  amendment,  the  "Wilmot  proviso,"  under  these  instruc 
tions,  but  I  receive  his  explanation.  Mr.  Berrien  offered  an  amend 
ment  to  change  the  provision,  which  said  there  should  be  no  legis 
lation  in  respect  to  slavery,  so  as  to  make  it  read,  "  there  shall  be 
no  legislation  establishing  or  prohibiting  African  slavery."  Mr. 
Clay  voted  for  that ;  so  did  Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Douglas  voted  against 
it.  Mr.  Hale  offered  an  amendment  to  Mr.  Berrien's  amendment, 
to  add  the  word  "allowing."  Here  Mr.  Douglas  voted  for  Mr. 
Hale's  amendment,  and  against  Davis  and  Clay.  Then  a  propo 
sition  was  made  to  continue  the  Mexican  laws  against  slavery  until 
repealed  by  Congress.  I  think  I  proved — at  least  I  did  to  my  own 
satisfaction — that  there  was  no  such  Mexican  law;  that  it  was  a  de 
cree,  and  that  the  legislation  which  occurred  under  it  had  never 
been  executed.  But  that  proposition  by  Mr.  Baldwin,  which  was 


REPLY  TO  SENATOK  DOUGLAS.  185 

to  contiuue  the  Mexican  laws  in  force,  was  brought  to  a  vote,  and 
again  Mr.  Douglas  voted  for  it,  and  Mr.  Davis  and  Mr.  Clay  voted 
against  it.  When  another  proposition  was  brought  forward  to 
amend  by  "  removing  the  obstructions  of  Mexican  laws  and  usages 
to  any  right  of  person  or  property  by  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Territories  aforesaid,"  I  do  not  find  the  Senator's 
name  among  those  who  voted,  though,  by  reference  to  the  Appen 
dix,  I  learned  he  was  present  immediately  afterwards,  by  his  speak 
ing  to  another  amendment. 

Thus  we  find  the  Senator  differing  from  me  on  this  question,  as 
was  stated;  but  we  do  not  find  him  concurring  with  Mr.  Clay,  as 
was  stated;  and  we  do  not  find  the  proposition  which  I  introduced, 
and  which  was  mentioned  in  the  magazine  article,  receiving  the 
joint  opposition  of  himself  and  Mr.  Clay;  and  yet  his  remarks  in 
the  Senate  the  other  day  went  upon  the  same  theory,  that  Mr. 
Clay  and  himself  had  been  cooperating.  Now,  the  fact  of  the  case 
is,  that  they  agreed  in  supporting  the  final  passage  of  the  bill,  and 
I  was  against  it.  I  was  one  of  the  few  Southern  men  who  resisted, 
in  all  its  stages,  what  was  called  the  compromise,  or  omnibus  bill. 
I  have  consumed  the  time  of  the  Senate  by  this  reference,  made  as 
brief  as  I  could,  on  account  of  the  remarks  the  Senator  had  made. 

Coupled  with  this  arraignment  of  myself,  at  a  time  when  he  says 
he  had  leisure  to  discuss  the  question  with  the  Attorney-General, 
but  when  there  was  nothing  in  my  position  certainly  to  provoke 
the  revision  of  my  course  in  Congress,  is  his  like  review  of  it  in 
the  Senate.  As  I  understood  his  remarks,  for  I  did  not  find  them 
in  the  Congressional  Globe  the  next  morning,  he  vaunted  his  own 
consistency  and  admitted  mine,  but  claimed  his  to  be  inside  and 
mine  outside  of  the  Democratic  organization.  Is  it  so?  Will  our 
votes  on  test  questions  sustain  it?  The  list  of  yeas  and  nays  would, 
on  the  points  referred  to,  exhibit  quite  the  reverse.  And  it  strikes 
me  that,  on  the  recent  demonstrations  we  have  had,  when  the  Dem 
ocratic  administration  was,  as  it  were,  put  on  its  trial  in  relation  to 


186  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

its  policy  in  Kansas,  the  Senator's  associations,  rather  than  mine, 
were  outside  of  the  Democratic  organization.  How  is  it,  on  the 
pending  question — the  declaration  of  great  principles  of  political 
creed — the  Senator's  position  is  outside  of  the  Senate's  Democracy, 
and  mine  in  it,  so  that  I  do  not  see  with  what  justice  he  attempts 
that  discrimination  between  him  and  me  ?  That  the  difference  ex 
ists,  that  it  involves  a  division  greater  or  less  in  Democratic  ranks, 
is  a  personal  regret,  and  I  think  a  public  misfortune.  It  gives 
me,  therefore,  no  pleasure  to  dwell  upon  it,  and  it  is  now  dismissed. 

Mr.  President,  after  having  for  forty  years  been  engaged  in 
bitter  controversy  over  a  question  relating  to  common  property 
of  the  States,  we  have  reached  the  point  where  the  issue  is  pre 
sented  in  a  form  in  which  it  becomes  us  to  meet  it  according  to 
existing  facts ;  where  it  has  ceased  to  be  a  question  to  be  decided 
on  the  footing  of  authority,  and  by  reference  to  history.  We  have 
decided  that  too  long  had  this  question  been  disturbing  the  peace 
and  endangering  the  Union,  and  it  was  resolved  to  provide  for  its 
settlement  by  treating  it  as  a  judicial  question.  Now,  will  it  be 
said,  after  Congress  provided  for  the  adjustment  of  this  question 
by  the  courts,  and  after  the  courts  had  a  case  brought  before  them, 
and  expressed  an  opinion  covering  the  controversy,  that  no  addi 
tional  latitude  is  to  be  given  to  the  application  of  the  decision  of 
the  court,  though  Congress  had  referred  it  specially  to  them;  that 
it  is  to  be  treated  simply  and  technically  as  a  question  of  mewn  et 
tuum,  such  as  might  have  arisen  if  there  had  been  no  such  legis 
lation  by  Congress?  Surely  it  does  not  become  those  who  have 
pointed  us  to  that  provision  as  the  peace-offering,  as  the  means  for 
final  adjustment,  now  to  say  that  it  meant  nothing  more  than  that 
the  courts  would  go  on  hereafter,  as  heretofore,  to  try  questions  of 
property. 

The  courts  have  decided  the  question  so  far  as  they  could  decide 
any  political  question.  A  case  arose  in  relation  to  property  in  a 
slave  held  within  a  Territory  where  a  law  of  Congress  declared 


REPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  187 

tlia  such  property  should  not  be  held.  The  whole  case  was  before 
them ;  every  thing,  except  the  mere  technical  point  that  the  law 
was  not  enacted"  by  a  territorial  legislature.  Why,  then,  if  we 
are  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  any  future 
case,  do  they  maintain  this  controversy  on  the  mere  technical  point 
which  now  divides,  disturbs,  distracts,  destroys  the  efficiency  and 
the  power  of  the  Democratic  party  ?  To  the  Senator,  I  know,  as  a 
question  of  property,  it  is  a  matter  of  no  consequence.  I  should 
do  him  injustice  if  I  left  any  one  to  infer  that  I  treated  his  argu 
ment  as  one  made  by  a  man  prejudiced  against  the  character  of 
property  involved  in  the  question.  That  is  not  his  position ;  but 
I  assert  that  he  is  pursuing  an  ignis  fatuus — not  a  light  caught 
from  the  Constitution — but  a  vapor  which  has  arisen  from  the  cor 
rupting  cess -pools  of  sectional  strife,  of  faction,  and  individual 
rivalry.  Measured  by  any  standard  of  common  sense,  its  magni 
tude  would  be  too  small  to  disturb  the  adjustment  of  the  balance 
of  our  country.  There  can  be  no  appeal  to  humanity  made  upon 
this  basis.  Least  of  all  could  it  be  made  to  one  who,  like  the  Sen 
ator  and  myself,  has  seen  this  species  of  property  in  its  sparse  con 
dition  on  the  north-western  frontier,  and  seen  it  go  out  without 
disturbing  the  tranquillity  of  the  community,  as  it  had  previously 
existed  without  injury  to  any  one,  if  not  to  the  benefit  of  the  in 
dividual  who  held  it.  He  has  no  apprehension,  he  can  have  none, 
that  it  is  to  retard  the  political  prosperity  of  the  future  States — 
now  the  Territories.  He  can  have  no  apprehension  that  in  that 
country,  to  which  they  never  would  be  carried  except  for  domestic 
purposes,  they  could  ever  so  accumulate  as  to  constitute  a  great  po 
litical  element.  He  knows,  and  every  man  who  has  had  experience 
and  judgment  must  admit,  that  the  few  who  may  be  so  carried  there 
have  nothing  to  fear  but  the  climate,  and  that  living  in  that  close 
connection  which  belongs  to  one  or  half  a  dozen  of  them  in  a  fam 
ily,  the  kindest  relations  which  it  is  possible  to  exist  between  mas 
ter  and  dependent,  exist  between  these  domestics  and  their  owners. 


188  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

There  is  a  relation  belonging  to  this  species  of  property,  unlike 
that  of  the  apprentice  or  the  hired  man,  which  awakens  whatever 
there  is  of  kindness  or  of  nobility  of  soul  in  the  heart  of  him  who 
owns  it;  this  can  only  be  alienated,  obscured,  or  destroyed  by  col 
lecting  this  species  of  property  into  such  masses  that  the  owner  is 
not  personally  acquainted  with  the  individuals  who  compose  it.  In 
the  relation,  however,  which  can  exist  in  the  north-western  Terri 
tories,  the  mere  domestic  connection  of  one,  two,  or,  at  most,  half 
a  dozen  servants  in  a  family,  associating  with  the  children  as  they 
grow  up,  attending  upon  age  as  it  declines,  there  can  be  nothing 
against  which  either  philanthropy  or  humanity  can  make  an  appeal. 
Not  even  the  emancipationist  could  raise  his  voice,  for  this  is  the 
high  road  and  the  open  gate  to  the  condition  in  which  the  masters 
would,  from  interest,  in  a  few  years,  desire  the  emancipation  of 
every  one  who  may  thus  be  taken  to  the  north-western  frontier. 

Mr.  President,  I  briefly  and  reluctantly  referred,  because  the 
subject  had  been  introduced,  to  the  attitude  of  Mississippi  on  a 
former  occasion.  I  will  now  as  briefly  say,  that  in  1851,  and  in 
1860,  Mississippi  was,  and  is,  ready  to  make  every  concession 
which  it  becomes  her  to  make  to  «the  welfare  and  the  safety  of  the 
Union.  If,  on  a  former  occasion,  she  hoped  too  much  from  frater 
nity,  the  responsibility  for  her  disappointment  rests  upon  those  who 
fail  to  fulfill  her  expectations.  She  still  clings  to  the  Government 
as  our  fathers  formed  it.  She  is  ready  to-day  and  to-morrow,  as  in 
her  past,  and  though  brief,  yet  brilliant  history,  to  maintain  that 
Government  in  all  its  power,  and  to  vindicate  its  honor  with  all  the 
means  she  possesses.  I  say  brilliant  history;  for  it  was  in  the  very 
morning  of  her  existence  that  her  sons,  on  the  plains  of  New  Or 
leans,  were  announced,  in  general  orders  to  have  been  the  admiration 
of  one  army  and  the  wonder  of  the  other.  That  we  had  a  division 
in  relation  to  the  measures  enacted  in  1850,  is  true;  that  the 
Southern  rights  men  became  the  minority  in  the  election  which  re 
sulted,  is  true ;  but  no  figure  of  speech  could  warrant  the  Senator 


EEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  189 

in  speaking  of  them  as  subdued ;  as  coming  to  him  or  any  body 
else  for  quarter.  I  deemed  it  offensive  when  it  was  uttered,  and 
the  scorn  with  which  I  repelled  it  at  the  instant,  time  has  only 
softened  to  contempt.  Our  flag  was  never  borne  from  the  field. 
We  had  carried  it  in  the  face  of  defeat,  with  a  knowledge  that  de 
feat  awaited  it ;  but  scarcely  had  the  smoke  of  the  battle  passed 
away  which  proclaimed  another  victor,  before  the  general  voice  ad 
mitted  that  the  field  again  was  ours ;  I  have  not  seen  a  sagacious, 
reflecting  man,  who  was  cognizant  of  the  events  as  they  transpired 
at  the  time,  who  does  not  say  that,  within  two  weeks  after  the 
election,  our  party  was  in  a  majority;  and  the  next  election  which 
occurred  showed  that  we  possessed  the  State  beyond  controversy. 
How  we  have  wielded  that  power  it  is  not  for  me  to  say.  I  trust 
others  may  see  forbearance  in  our  conduct — that,  with  a  determi 
nation  to  insist  upon  our  constitutional  rights,  then  and  now,  there 
is  an  unwavering  desire  to  maintain  the  Government,  and  to  up 
hold  the  Democratic  party. 

We  believe  now,  as  we  have  asserted  on  former  occasions,  that 
the  best  hope  for  the  perpetuity  of  our  institutions  depends  upon 
the  cooperation,  the  harmony,  the  zealous  action  of  the  Democratic 
party.  We  cling  to  that  party  from  conviction,  that  its  principles 
and  its  aims  are  those  of  truth  and  the  country,  as  we  cling  to 
the  Union  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  purposes  for  which  it  was 
formed.  Whenever  we  shall  be  taught  that  the  Democratic  party 
is  recreant  to  its  principles;  whenever  we  shall  learn  that  it  can 
not  be  relied  upon  to  maintain  the  great  measures  which  consti 
tute  its  vitality,  I,  for  one,  shall  be  ready  to  leave  it.  And  so, 
when  we  declare  our  tenacious  adherence  to  the  Union,  it  is  the 
Union  of  the  Constitution.  If  the  compact  between  the  States  is 
to  be  trampled  into  the  dust ;  if  anarchy  is  to  be  substituted  for 
the  usurpation  and  consolidation  which  threatened  the  Government 
at  an  earlier  period ;  if  the  Union  is  to  become  powerless  for  the 
purposes  for  which  it  was  established,  and  we  are  vainly  to  appeal 


190  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

to  it  for  protection,  then,  sir,  conscious  of  the  rectitude  of  our 
course,  the  justice  of  our  cause,  self-reliant,  yet  humbly,  confid 
ingly  trusting  in  the  arm  that  guided  and  protected  our  fathers, 
we  look  beyond  the  confines  of  the  Union  for  the  maintenance  of 
our  rights.  A  habitual  reverence  and  cherished  affection  for  the 
Government  will  bind  us  to  it  longer  than  our  interests  would 
suggest  or  require ;  but  he  is  a  poor  student  of  the  world's  history 
who  does  not  understand  that  communities  at  last  must  yield  to 
the  dictates  of  their  interests.  That  the  affection,  the  mutual  de 
sire  for  the  mutual  good,  which  existed  among  our  fathers,  may  be 
weakened  in  succeeding  generations  by  the  denial  of  right,  and 
hostile  demonstration,  until  the  equality  guaranteed,  but  not 
secured  within  the  Union,  may  be  sought  for  without  it,  must  be 
evident  to  even  a  careless  observer  of  our  race.  It  is  time  to  be 
up  and  doing.  There  is  yet  time  to  remove  the  causes  of  dissen 
sion  and  alienation  which  are  now  distracting,  and  have  for  years 
past  divided  the  country. 

If  the  Senator  correctly  described  me  as  having,  at  a  former 
period,  against  my  own  preferences  and  opinions,  acquiesced  in  the 
decision  of  my  party ;  if  when  I  had  youth,  when  physical  vigor 
gave  promise  of  many  days,  and  the  future  was  painted  in  the 
colors  of  hope,  I  could  thus  surrender  my  own  convictions,  my 
own  prejudices,  and  cooperate  with  my  political  friends,  according 
to  their  views,  as  to  the  best  method  of  promoting  the  public  good ; 
now,  when  the  years  of  my  future  can  not  be  many,  and  experi 
ence  has  sobered  the  hopeful  tints  of  youth's  gilding;  when,  ap 
proaching  the  evening  of  life,  the  shadows  are  reversed,  and  the 
mind  turns  retrospectively,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  I  would 
abandon  lightly,  or  idly  put  on  trial,  the  party  to  which  I  have 
steadily  adhered.  It  is  rather  to  be  assumed  that  conservatism, 
which  belongs  to  the  timidity  or  caution  of  increasing  years,  would 
lead  me  to  cling  to — to  be  supported  by,  rather  than  to  cast  off,  the 
organization  with  which  I  have  been  so  long  connected.  If  I  am 


BEPLY  TO  SENATOR  DOUGLAS.  191 

driven  to  consider  the  necessity  of  separating  myself  from  those 
old  and  dear  relations,  of  discarding  the  accustomed  support,  under 
circumstances  such  as  I  have  described,  might  not  my  friends  who 
differ  from  ine  pause  and  inquire  whether  there  is  not  something 
involved  in  it  which  calls  for  their  careful  revision? 

I  desire  no  divided  flag  for  the  Democratic  party,  seek  not  to 
depreciate  the  power  of  the  Senator,  or  take  from  him  any  thing 
of  that  confidence  he  feels  in  the  large  army  which  follows  his 
standard.  I  prefer  that  his  banner  should  lie  in  its  silken  folds 
to  feed  the  moth ;  but  if  it  unrestrainedly  rustles,  impatient  to  be 
unfurled,  we  who  have  not  invited  the  conflict,  shrink  not  from 
the  trial ;  we  will  plant  our  flag  on  every  hill  and  plain  •  it  shall 
overlook  the  Atlantic  and  welcome  the  sun  as  he  rises  from  its 
dancing  waters ;  it  shall  wave  its  adieu  as  he  sinks  to  repose  in 
the  quiet  Pacific. 

Our  principles  are  national ;  they  belong  to  every  State  of  the 
Union ;  and  though  elections  may  be  lost  by  their  assertion,  they 
constitute  the  only  foundation  on  which  we  can  maintain  power, 
on  which  we  can  again  rise  to  the  dignity  the  Democracy  once 
possessed.  Does  not  the  Senator  from  Illinois  see  in  the  sectional 
character  of  the  vote  he  received,  that  his  opinions  are  not  accept 
able  to  every  portion  of  the  country  ?  Is  not  the  fact  that  the 
resolutions  adopted  by  seventeen  States,  on  which  the  greatest  re 
liance  must  be  placed  for  Democratic  support,  are  in  opposition 
to  the  dogma  to  which  he  still  clings,  a  warning  that  if  he  persists 
and  succeeds  in  forcing  his  theory  upon  the  Democratic  party,  its 
days  are  numbered  ?  We  ask  only  for  the  Constitution.  We  ask 
of  the  Democracy  only  from  time  to  time  to  declare,  as  current 
exigencies  may  indicate,  what  the  Constitution  was  intended  to 
secure  and  provide.  Our  flag  bears  no  new  device.  Upon  its  folds 
our  principles  are  written  in  living  light;  all  proclaiming  the  con 
stitutional  Union,  justice,  equality,  and  fraternity  of  our  ocean- 
bound  domain,  for  a  limitless  future. 


192  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

ELECTION  OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN — HISTORICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  EVENT — 
THE  OBJECTS  AIMED  AT  BY  HISTORY  AND  BIOGRAPHY  IDENTICAL  IN  THE  DIS 
CUSSION  OF  EVENTS  OF  THE  LATE  WAR — NORTHERN  EVASION  OF  THE  REAL 
QUESTION THE  SOUTH  DID  NOT  ATTEMPT  REVOLUTION SECESSION  A  JUSTI 
FIABLE  RIGHT  EXERCISED  BY  SOVEREIGN  STATES BRIEF  REVIEW  OF  THE 

QUESTION — WHAT     THE    FEDERALIST     SAYS CHIEF-JUSTICE    MARSHALL MR. 

MADISON COERCION  NOT   JUSTIFIED  AT  THE  NORTH    PREVIOUS    TO    THE    LATE 

WAR REMARKS  OF  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS OF  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN — OF  HORACE 

GREELEY — SUCCESSFUL  PERVERSION  OF  TRUTH  BY  THE  NORTH PROVOCATIONS 

TO  SECESSION  BY  THE  SOUTH — AGGRESSIONS  BY  THE  NORTH — ITS  PUNIC 
FAITH — LOSS  OF  THE  BALANCE  OF  POWER — PATIENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH — 
REMARKS  OF  HON.  C.  C.  CLAY — WHAT  THE  ELECTION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN 
MEANT — HIS  ADMINISTRATIVE  POLICY — REVELATIONS  OF  THE  OBJECTS  OF 
THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY — WENDELL  PHILLIPS — NO  SECURITY  FOR  THE 
SOUTH  IN  THE  UNION — MEETING  OF  CONGRESS — MR.  DAVIS'  ASSURANCE 
TO  PRESIDENT  BUCHANAN — CONCILIATORY  COURSE  OF  MR.  DAVIS — HIS  CON 
SISTENT  DEVOTION  TO  THE  UNION,  AND  EFFORTS  TO  SAVE  IT — FORESEES 
WAR  AS  THE  RESULT  OF  SECESSION,  AND  URGES  THE  EXHAUSTION  OF  EVERY 

EXPEDIENT    TO    AVERT    IT THE     CRITTENDEN    AMENDMENT — HOPES    OF    ITS 

ADOPTION — DAVIS  WILLING  TO  ACCEPT  IT  IN  SPITE  OF  ITS  INJUSTICE  TO 
THE  SOUTH — REPUBLICAN  SENATORS  DECLINE  ALL  CONCILIATORY  MEASURES 
THE  CLARKE  AMENDMENT WHERE  RESTS  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  OF  DIS 
UNION? — STATEMENTS  OF  MESSRS.  DOUGLAS  AND  COX — SECESSION  OF  THE 

COTTON    STATES A    LETTER    FROM   JEFFERSON    DAVIS   TO    R.   B.   RHETT,  JR. 

MR.    DAVIS'   FAREWELL  TO  THE  SENATE — HIS  REASONS  FOR  WITHDRAWING 

RETURNS  TO  MISSISSIPPI — MAJOR-GENERAL  OF  STATE  FORCES — ORGANIZATION 
OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT — MR.  DAVIS  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  STATES. 


A 


S  had  been  foreseen,  and,  indeed,  as  was  the  inevitable 
sequence  of  the  disruption  of  the  Democratic  party,  Abra- 


ELECTION   OF   ABE  AH  AM   LINCOLN.  193 

ham  Lincoln,  the  candidate  of  the  Republican  party,  was,  in 
November,  1860,  elected  President  of  the  United  States.  This 
was  the  supreme  and  sufficient  incitement  to  the  adoption  of 
the  dreaded  resort  of  disunion.  As  the  occasion  which  finally 
brought  the  South  to  the  attitude  of  resistance,  the  event  ac 
quires  vast  historical  importance. 

When  it  is  conceded  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  elected  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  forms  of  the  Constitution,  having  received 
a  majority  of  electoral  votes;  that  the  mere  ceremony  of  elec 
tion  was  attended  by  no  unusual  circumstances,  we  concede 
every  possible  ground  upon  which  can  be  based  an  argument 
denying  its  ample  justification  of  the  course  pursued  by  the 
South.  Such  an  argument,  however,  leads  to  a  wholly  unten 
able  conclusion,  and  may  be  easily  exposed  in  its  hypocritical 
evasion  of  the  real  question.  We  are  here  required  to  note 
the  distinction  between  cause  and  occasion.  As  the  final  con 
summation  of  tendencies,  long  indicating  the  result  of  dis 
union,  this  event  has  an  appropriate  place  in  the  recapitulation 
of  those  influences,  and  can  be  rightly  estimated  only  in  con 
nection  with  their  operation. 

Trite  observations  upon  the  influence  of  passion  and  preju 
dice,  over  contemporary  judgment,  are  not  necessary  to  a  due 
conception  of  the  obstacles  which,  for  the  present,  exclude 
candor  from  the  discussion  of  the  late  movement  for  South 
ern  independence.  In  the  face  of  the  disastrous  overthrow 
of  that  movement,  the  wrecked  hopes  and  fortunes  of  those 
who  participated  in  it,  discussion  is  chiefly  serviceable,  as  it 
throws  additional  light  upon  the  development  of  those  eternal 
principles  in  whose  ceaseless  struggles  men  are  only  temporary 
agents. 

History  and  biography  are  here  most  intimately  blended; 
13 


LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

beginning  from  the  same  stand-point,  they  encounter  common 
difficulties,  and  aim  to  explore  the  same  general  grounds  of 
observation.  So  far  as  a  verdict — from  whatever  tribunal, 
whether  rendered  at  the  bar  of  justice  or  in  the  award  of  pop 
ular  opinion,  when  the  embers  of  recent  strife  are  still  fiercely 
glowing — can  affect  the  dispassionate  judgment  of  History, 
the  Southern  people  can  not  be  separated,  either  in  fact  or 
in  sentiment,  from  Jefferson  Davis.  He  was  the  illustrious 
compatriot  of  six  millions  of  freemen,  who  struck  for  nation 
ality  and  independence,  and  lost — as  did  Greece  and  Poland 
before  them;  or  he  and  they  were  alike  insurgents,  equally 
guilty  of  the  crime  of  treason. 

"With  an  adroitness  which  does  credit  to  the  characteristic 
charlatanism  of  the  North,  an  infinite  variety  of  special  ques 
tions  and  side  issues  have  been  interwoven  with  the  narrative 
of  the  late  war,  for  the  obvious  purpose  of  confounding  the 
judgment  of  mankind  regarding  the  great  question  which 
really  constitutes  the  gravamen  of  the  controversy.  Conspic 
uous  among  these  efforts,  from  both  audacity  and  plausibility, 
are  appeals  to  the  sympathies  of  the  world,  in  consideration  of 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  which  it  is  well  known  was  merely  an 
incident,  and  not  the  avowed  design  of  the  war. 

Persistent  in  its  introduction  of  the  moral  question  of  slav 
ery,  the  North  seeks  to  shield  itself  from  the  reproach  justly 
visited  upon  its  perpetration  of  an  atrocious  political  crime,  by 
an  insolent  intrusion  of  a  false  claim  to  the  championship  of 
humanity.  Whatever  may  be  the  decision  of  Time  upon  the 
merits  of  slavery,  it  is  in  vain  for  the  North  to  seek  escape 
from  its  responsibility  for  an  institution,  protected  and  sus 
tained  by  a  government  which  was  the  joint  creation  of  South 
ern  and  Northern  hands. 


SECESSION    NOT   HE  VOLUTION.  195 

The  attempted  dissolution  of  the  Union  by  the  South  was 
a  movement  involving  moral  and  political  considerations,  not 
unlike  those  incidental  to  revolutions  in  general,  yet  presenting 
certain  peculiar  characteristics,  traceable  to  the  inherent  and 
distinctive  features  of  the  American  political  system.  These 
latter  considerations  constitute  a  vital  part  of  its  justification. 
The  South  did  not  appeal  only  to  the  inalienable  right  of  rev 
olution,  which  is  the  natural  guarantee  of  resistance  to  wrong 
and  oppression.  Nor  did  the  States,  severally,  as  they  as 
sumed  to  sever  their  connection  with  the  Union,  announce  a 
purpose  of  constitutional  revolution,  or  adopt  a  course  invit 
ing  or  justifying  violence.  Mr.  Davis  and  those  who  cooper 
ated  with  him,  neither  by  the  acts  of  secession,  nor  the  sub 
sequent  confederation  of  the  States  under  a  new  government, 
could  have  committed  treason  against  Mr.  Lincoln,  since  they 
were  not  his  subjects.  Nor  yet  were  they  traitors  to  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States,  since  the  States  of  which  they 
were  citizens  had  rescinded  the  grant  of  powers  voluntarily 
made  by  them  to  that  Government,  and  begun  to  exercise 
them  in  conjunction  with  other  powers  which  they  had  with 
held  by  express  reservation. 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  movement,  contemplating  such 
important  political  changes,  more  entirely  unattended  by  dis 
plays  of  violence,  passion,  and  disorder.  A  simple  assertion, 
with  due  solemnity,  by  each  State,  of  its  sovereignty — a  herit 
age  which  it  had  never  surrendered,  but  which  had  been  re 
spected  by  innumerable  forms  of  recognition  in  the  history 
of  the  Union — and  the  exercise  of  those  attributes  of  sover 
eignty,  which  are  too  palpable  to  require  that  they  shall  be 
indicated,  was  the  peaceable  method  resorted  to  of  terminating 
a  political  alliance  which  had  become  injurious  to  the  highest 


196  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

interests  of  one  of  the  parties.  Could  there  have  been  a  more 
becoming  and  dignified  exercise  of  the  vaunted  right  of  self- 
government?  It  is  that  right  to  which  America  is. so  con 
spicuously  committed,  and  which  has  been  such  an  inexhausti 
ble  theme  for  the  tawdry  rhetoric  of  Northern  eloquence. 

Even  in  the  insolence  of  its  triumph,  the  North  feels  the 
necessity  of  at  least  a  decent  pretext  for  its  destruction  of  the 
cardinal  feature  in  the  American  system  of  government — the 
sovereignty  of  the  States.  With  habitual  want  of  candor, 
Northern  writers  pretend  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  does  not  affirm  the  sovereignty  of  the  States,  and  that, 
therefore,  secession  was  treason  against  that  Constitution  to 
which  they  had  subscribed;  in  other  words,  the  created  does 
not  give  authority  to  the  creator — i.  e.,  the  Constitution,  which 
the  States  created,  does  not  accredit  sovereignty  to  the  States, 
and,  therefore,  the  States  are  not  sovereign.  It  is  not  pre 
tended  that  the  States  were  not,  each  of  them,  originally  inde 
pendent  powers,  since  they  were  so  recognized  by  Great  Britain, 
in  the  plainest  terms,  at  the  termination  of  the  first  revolution. 
Nor  is  it  asserted  that  the  union  of  the  States,  under  the  title 
of  United  States,  was  the  occasion  of  any  surrender  of  their 
individual  sovereignty,  as  it  was  then  declared  that  "each 
State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom,  and  independence."  A 
conclusive  demonstration  of  the  retention  of  sovereignty  by  the 
States  is  seen  in  the  entire  failure  of  the  Constitution,  either 
by  direct  assertion  or  by  implication,  to  claim  its  surrender 
to  the  Union. 

If  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  be  conceded,  the  South 
stands  justified  as  having  exercised  an  unquestionable  right. 
It  was  never  formally  denied,  even  at  the  North,  until  Mr. 
Webster,  in  his  debate  with  Mr.  Calhoun,  affirmed  the  doo- 


A   CHALLENGE    NOT   ACCEPTED.  197 

trine  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Union,  to  which  conclusion  the 
Northern  masses  sprung  with  alacrity,  as  an  available  justifi 
cation  for  compelling  the  submission  of  the  South  to  the  out 
rages  which  they  had  already  commenced. 

Volumes  of  testimony  have  been  adduced,  proving  the  the 
ory  of  State  sovereignty  to  have  been  the  overwhelmingly 
predominant  belief  among  the  statesmen  most  prominent  in 
the  establishment  of  the  Union,  and  in  shaping  the  policy  of 
the  Government  in  its  earlier  history.  Argument  proved  an 
unavailing  offset  to  the  stern  decrees  of  the  sword,  and  is 
quite  unnecessary  so  long  as  the  unanswerable  logic  of  Cal- 
houn,  Davis,  and  a  score  of  Southern  statesmen  remains  upon 
the  national  records — a  perpetual  challenge,  as  yet  unaccepted, 
to  the  boasted  intellect  of  the  North,  and  a  significant  warn 
ing  of  the  final  adjudication  of  the  centuries.  We  shall  in 
trude  no  argument  of  our  own  in  support  of  State  sovereignty, 
upon  which  rests  the  vindication  of  the  South  and  her  leaders. 
Before  us  are  the  apposite  and  conclusive  assumptions  of  men 
who  have  been  the  revered  sources  of  political  inspiration 
among  Americans. 

The  Federalist,  that  most  powerful  vindication  of  the  Con 
stitution,  and  earnest  plea  for  its  adoption  by  the  States, 
assumes  that  it  was  a  "compact,"  to  which  "the  States,  as 
distinct  and  independent  sovereigns,"  were  the  parties.  Yet 
this  doctrine,  the  basis  upon  which  rests  the  august  handi 
work  of  Madison  and  Hamilton,  the  "  architects  of  the  Con 
stitution,"  when  applied  by  Davis  and  his  compatriots,  becomes 
treason!  Such  is  the  extremity  to  which  despotism,  in  its 
wretched  plea  of  expediency,  is  driven;  and  the  candid,  en 
lightened  American  of  to-day  realizes,  in  his  country,  a  laud 
in  which  "truth  is  treason,  and  history  is  rebellion." 


198  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

» Chief-Justice  Marshall,  the  great  judicial  luminary  of  Amer 
ica,  and  an  authority  not  usually  summoned  to  the  support  of 
doctrines  hostile  to  the  assumptions  of  Federal  power,  gave 
most  emphatic  testimony  to  the  propriety  of  the  States'  Eights 
view  of  the  relations  of  State  and  Federal  authority.  In  the 
Virginia  Convention  which  ratified  the  Constitution,  he  said : 
"The  State  governments  did  not  derive  their  powers  from 
the  General  Government.  But  each  government  derived  its 
powers  from  the  people,  and  each  was  to  act  according  to  the 
powers  given  it.  Would  any  gentleman  deny  this?  He  de 
manded,  if  powers  not  given  were  retained  by  implication? 
Could  any  man  say,  no  ?  Could  any  man  say  that  this  power 
was  not  retained  by  the  States,  since  it  was  not  given  away  ? " 
The  view  so  earnestly  urged  by  Marshall,  was  not  only  avowed 
generally,  but  Virginia,  Massachusetts,  and  Pennsylvania  in 
sisted  upon  a  written  declaration,  in  the  Constitution,  of  the 
principle  that  certain  attributes  of  sovereignty,  which  they  did 
not  delegate  to  the  Union,  were  retained  by  the  States. 

Mr.  Madison,  whose  great  abilities  were  taxed  to  the  utmost 
to  secure  the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  by  Virginia,  vig 
orously  and  earnestly  defended  it  against  the  allegation  that 
it  created  a  consolidated  government.  With  the  utmost  diffi 
culty,  he  secured  a  majority  of  ten  votes,  in  the  Virginia  Con 
vention,  in  favor  of  the  Constitution,  which  his  rival,  Patrick 
Henry,  denounced  as  destructive  of  State  sovereignty. 

Defining  the  expression,  "We,  the  people,"  Mr.  Madison 
said :  "  The  parties  to  it  were  the  people,  but  not  the  people 
as  composing  one  great  society,  but  the  people  as  composing 
'thirteen  sovereignties.'"  To  quote  Mr.  Madison  again:  "If 
it  were  a  consolidated  government,  the  assent  of  a  majority  of 
the  people  would  be  sufficient  to  establish  it.  But  it  was  to 


OPINIONS   OF   THE    FATHERS.  199 

be  binding  on  the  people  of  a  State  only  by  their  own  separate 
consent."  Under  the  influence  of  these  arguments,  and  others 
of  the  same  import  from  Mr.  Madison,  whom  she  thought, 
from  his  close  relations  to  the  Constitution,  high  authority 
upon  all  questions  pertaining  to  its  character,  Virginia  finally 
acceded  to  the  Union.  It  is  especially  noteworthy,  however, 
that  Virginia,  when  becoming  a  party  to  the  Constitution, 
expressly  affirmed,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  the  right  to 
"resume"  her  grants  of  power  to  the  Federal  Government. 

In  deference  to  the  accumulated  evidence  upon  this  subject, 
came  the  unqualified  statement,  from  eminent  Northern  au 
thority,*  that,  "  This  right  [of  secession]  must  be  considered 
an  ingredient  in  the  original  composition  of  the  General  Gov 
ernment,  which,  though  not  expressed,  was  mutually  under 
stood." 

But  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  prescriptive  and  in 
herent  right  of  sovereignty,  exercised  by  the  South  in  with 
drawing  from  the  Union,  as  deducible  from  the  peculiar 
nature  of  the  American  system,  and  as  expounded  by  the 
founders  of  that  system,  there  can  be  no  question  as  to  its 
entire  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  American  polity.  Au 
thority  is  abundant  in  support  of  the  assertion  that,  not  even 
in  the  North,  previous  to  the  inception  of  the  present  revolu- 

*  William  Rawle,  of  Philadelphia,  an  able  lawyer  and  constitutional 
expounder.  Mr.  Buchanan,  in  his  history  of  his  own  administration, 
thus  mentions  him :  "  The  right  of  secession  found  advocates  afterwards 
in  men  of  distinguished  abilities  and  unquestioned  patriotism.  In  1825, 
it  was  maintained  by  Mr.  William  Rawle,  of  Philadelphia,  an  eminent 

and  universally-respected   lawyer His  biographer  says 

that,  'in  1791,  he  was  appointed  District  Attorney  of  the  United  States,' 
and  'the  situation  of  Attorney  General  was  more  than  once  tendered  to 
him  by  Washington,  but  as  often  declined,'  for  domestic  reasons." 


200  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tion,  was  the  idea  of  a  constrained  connection  with  the  Union 
entertained.  From  every  source  of  Northern  opinion  has  come 
indignant  repudiation  of  a  coerced  association  of  communities, 
originally  united  by  a  common  pledge  of  fealty  to  the  right  of 
self-government. 

Upon  this  subject  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams  spoke  in  lan 
guage  of  characteristic  fervor:  "The  indissoluble  link  of 
union  between  the  people  of  the  several  States  of  this  confed 
erated  nation  is,  after  all,  not  in  the  right,  but  in  the  heart. 
If  the  day  should  ever  come  (may  heaven  avert  it !)  when  the 
affections  of  the  people  of  these  States  shall  be  alienated  from 
each  other — when  the  fraternal  spirit  shall  give  way  to  cold 
indifference,  or  collision  of  interest  shall  fester  into  hatred,  the 
bands  of  political  association  will  not  long  hold  together  par 
ties  no  longer  attracted  by  the  magnetism  of  conciliated  inter 
ests  and  kindly  sympathies;  and  far  better  will  it  be  for  the 
people  of  the  disunited  States  to  part  in  friendship  from  each 
other  than  to  be  held  together  by  constraint." 

Even  Mr.  Lincoln,  whose  statesmanship  is  not  likely  to  be 
commemorated  for  its  profundity  or  scholarship,  fully  com 
prehended  the  exaggerated  reverence  of  the  American  mind 
for  the  "sacred  right  of  self-government."  Now  that  his 
homely  phrases  are  dignified  by  the  Northern  masses  with  the 
sanctity  of  the  utterances  of  Deity,  assuredly  there  should  be 
no  apprehension  that  his  opinions  may  not  be  deemed  con 
clusive.  In  1848,  Mr.  Lincoln  said:  "Any  people  whatever 
have  the  right  to  abolish  the  existing  government,  and  form 
a  new  one  that  suits  them  better.  This  is  a  most  valuable,  a 
most  sacred  right." 

A  brave  affirmation  was  this  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Declara 
tion  of  Independence,  that  "Governments  derive  their  just 


OPINIONS    OF   NORTHERN    MEN.  201 

powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed ;"  and  one  which 
would  have  commanded  the  united  applause  of  the  North, 
then  and  ROW,  had  the  application  concerned  Hungary,  Po 
land,  Greece,  or  Mexico.  But,  with  reference  to  the  South, 
there  was  a  most  important  modification  of  this  admirable 
principle  of  equity  and  humanity.  When  asked,  "Why  not 
let  the  South  go?"  Abraham  Lincoln,  the  President,  in  1861, 
said :  "  Let  the  South  go  !  Where,  then,  shall  we  get  our  rev 
enue  ? "  And  the  united  North  reechoed :  "Let  the  South  go ! 
Where,  then,  shall  we  look  for  the  bounties  and  monopolies  which 
have  so  enriched  us  at  the  expense  of  those  improvident,  unsus 
pecting  Southerners  ?  Where  shall  we  find  again  such  patient 
victims  of  spoliation  ?  " 

Mr.  Horace  Greeley  frequently  and  emphatically,  previous 
to  the  war,  affirmed  the  right  of  changing  its  political  associ 
ation  asserted  by  the  South.  Three  days  after  the  election 
of  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  November,  1860,  his  paper,  the  New  York 
Tribune,  said :  "  If  the  Cotton  States  shall  become  satisfied 
that  they  can  do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it,  we  insist 

on  letting  them  go  in  peace We  must  ever 

resist  the  right  of  any  State  to  remain  in  the  Union,  and  nul 
lify  or  defy  the  laws  thereof.  To  withdraw  from  the  Union  is 
quite  another  matter  ;  and  whenever  any  considerable  section  of 
our  Union  ^hall  deliberately  resolve  to  go  out,  we  shall  resist  all 
coercive  measures  designed  to  keep  it  in.  We  hope  never  to  live 
in  a  Republic  whereof  one  section  is  pinned  to  another  by 
bayonets."  On  the  17th  of  December,  1860,  the  Tribune  said: 
"  If  it  [the  Declaration  of  Independence]  justifies  the  secession 
of  three  millions  of  colonists  in  1776,  we  do  not  see  why  it  would 
not  justify  the  secession  of  five  millions  of  Southerners  from  the 
Federal  Union  in  1861." 


202  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Such  are  a  few  illustrations,  to  which  might  be  added  innu 
merable  quotations,  of  the  same  import,  from  the  most  promi 
nent  sources  of  Northern  opinion.  Never  has  there  been  a 
question  so  capable  of  positive  solution  and  easy  comprehen 
sion,  when  subjected  to  the  test  of  candid  investigation,  and 
never  so  successful  a  purpose  to  exclude  the  illumination  of 
facts  by  persistent  and  ingenious  misrepresentation.  The 
North  has  reason  for  its  extravagant  exultation  at  the  skill 
and  audacity  with  which  the  brazen  front  of  hypocrisy,  for  a 
time,  at  least,  has  successfully  sustained,  in  the  name  of  hu 
manity  and  liberty,  the  most  monstrous  imposition  and  trans 
parent  counterfeit  of  virtue  ever  designed  upon  an  intelligent  age. 

To  the  triumphant  historical  vindication  of  the  South,  there 
remains  only  the  essential  condition  of  a  clear  and  truthful 
statement  of  the  provocations  which  impelled  her  to  adopt 
that  long-deferred  remedy,  which  is  the  last  refuge  of  a  people 
whose  liberties  are  imperiled.  Secession,  however  strong  in 
its  prescriptive  or  implied  justification  as  a  principle,  was  not 
to  be  undertaken  from  caprice,  or  trivial  causes  of  dissatis 
faction. 

Abuses,  numerous,  serious,  and  consecutive,  were  required 
before  disunion  became  either  desirable  or  acceptable  to  the 
South.  The  native  conservatism  of  the  Southern  character 
renders  it  peculiarly  averse  to  agitation ;  to  this  were  added 
social  features,  the  safety  of  which  would  be  greatly  imper 
iled  by  civil  war,  and  thus  a  train  of  influences  tended  to 
make  Southern  soil,  of  all  others,  the  least  favorable  to  the 
growth  of  revolutionary  principles. 

In  the  development  of  this  volume,  we  have  glanced  at  the 
progress  of  those  sectional  differences,  at  various  periods  pre 
cipitated  by  the  insolent  aggressions  of  Abolitionism,  which 


NORTHERN  AGGRESSION.  203 

steadily  depreciated  the  value  of  the  Union  in  Southern  esti 
mation.  Continued  aggressions  by  her  enemies;  their  Punic 
faith,  illustrated  in  a  series  of  violated  pledges,  and  habitual 
disregard  of  the  conditions  of  the  covenant  which  bound  South 
and  North  together;  petty  outrages,  taunts  and  insults,  ema 
nating  from  every  possible  source  of  public  expression  at  the 
North,  for  many  years  had  banished  fraternal  feeling  and 
precluded  those  interchanges  of  comity  between  the  sections 
which  were  the  indispensable  requisites  to  national  harmony. 
It  is  undeniable,  that  for  years  previous  to  secession,  the  sen 
timental  attachment  to  the  Union,  which  was  the  distinctive 
characteristic  of  Southern  patriotism — unlike  the  coarse,  utili 
tarian  estimate  of  the  Union  as  a  source  of  pecuniary  profit, 
which  constituted  its  value  to  the  North — had  been  greatly 
impaired.  Since  1850,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  during  the 
preceding  decade,  the  most  sagacious  statesmen  of  the  South 
contemplated  disunion  as  an  event  almost  inevitable,  unless 
averted  by  a  contingency  of  very  improbable  occurrence. 
There  must  be  an  awakening  by  the  North  to  a  more  just 
appreciation  of  its  constitutional  and  patriotic  obligations,  or 
an  unmanly  submission  by  the  South,  to  a  condition  of  de 
grading  inferiority,  in  a  government  to  whose  construction, 
prosperity,  and  distinction,  she  had  contributed  more  than  a 
proportionate  share  of  influence. 

Chief  among  the  considerations  which  admonished  the  South 
of  the  perils  which  environed  her  situation  in  the  Union,  was 
the  total  destruction  of  that  sectional  balance,  which  had  been 
wisely  adjusted  by  its  founders,  as  the  safeguard  of  the  weaker 
against  the  stronger  influence.  Having  in  mind  the  wise  say 
ing  of  Aristotle,  that  "  the  weak  always  desire  what  is  equal 
and  just,  but  the  powerful  pay  no  regard  to  it,"  the  states- 


204  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

men  of  1787  designedly  shaped  •  the  chart  of  government 
with  a  view  to  the  preservation  of  equality.  The  struggle 
between  the  weaker  element,  naturally  contending  in  behalf 
of  the  equilibrium,  and  the  stronger  striving  for  its  overthrow, 
was,  at  an  early  period,  distinctly  foreshadowed.  With  char 
acteristic  prevision,  Alexander  Hamilton,  probably  the  fore 
most  statesman  of  his  day,  foretold  the  nature  of  this  contest 
over  the  principle  of  equality.  Said  that  sagacious  publicist : 
"  The  truth  is,  it  is  a  contest  for  power,  not  for  liberty.7' 

This  contest,  indeed,  so  long  waged,  was,  many  years  since, 
decided  overwhelmingly  against  the  South.  In  1850,  the 
Northern  majority  in  the  House  of  Kepresentatives,  the  pop 
ular  branch  of  the  government,  had  increased  from  a  majority, 
in  1790,  of  five  votes,  to  fifty-four.  Years  before,  the  legis 
lation  of  Congress  assumed  that  sectional  bias,  which  was  un- 
deviatingly  adhered  to  for  the  purpose,  and  with  ample  suc 
cess,  of  the  material  depression  of  the  South.  Under  the 
baleful  influences  of  hostile  legislation,  of  tariffs  aimed  directly 
at  her  commercial  prosperity,  of  bounties  for  fostering  multi 
farious  Northern  interests,  her  position  in  the  Union  was  help 
less  and  deplorable  in  the  extreme.  Yet,  like  a  rock-bound 
Prometheus,  with  the  insidious  elements  of  destruction  gnaw 
ing  at  her  vitals,  the  South  suffered  herself  to  be  chained  by  an 
influence  of  sentiment,  of  association,  and  reminiscence  to  the 
Union,  fully  conscious  of  the  growing  rapacity  of  her  despoiler 
and  of  her  own  hopeless  decline.  Her  infatuation  was  indeed 
marvelous,  in  trusting  to  the  dawning  of  justice  and  gener 
osity  in  a  fierce,  vindictive,  and  remorseless  sectional  majority. 

The  alarming  portents  of  ultimately  complete  material  pros 
tration,  to  be  consummated  by  these  perversions  of  the  pur 
poses  of  the  Union,  were  terribly  significant,  in  view  of  the 


A   CLEAR   STATEMENT    OF    THE   CONTROVERSY.  205 

venom  which  actuated  the  enemies  of  the  South.  The  sec 
tional  balance  was  hopelessly  gone;  Southern  material  pros 
perity  destroyed  by  sectional  legislation;  not  a  check,  originally 
provided  by  the  Constitution  for  the  protection  of  the  weaker 
section,  but  had  been  virtually  obliterated;  Northern  perfidy 
illustrated  in  the  violation  of  every  compact  which,  in  opera 
tion,  proved  favorable  to  the  South,  while  the  latter  was  held 
to  a  rigid  fidelity  in  all  agreements  favorable  to  her  enemies; 
the  nullification,  by  the  legislatures  of  half  the  Northern 
States,  of  Federal  laws  for  the  protection  of  Southern  property, 
are  a  few  of  those  grievances  which  presented  to  the  South 
the  hard  and  inexorable  alternative  of  resistance,  or  abject 
submission  to  endless  insult  and  outrage. 

A  Southern  Senator,*  announcing  the  secession  of  his  State, 
and  his  own  consequent  withdrawal  from  the  Senate,  stated 
the  question  in  a  form,  which  even  then  had  the  authority  of 
history. 

"Not  a  decade,  nor  scarce  a  lustrum,  has  elapsed  (since  Ala 
bama  became  a  State)  that  has  not  been  strongly  marked  by 
proofs  of  the  growth  and  power  of  that  antislavery  spirit  of  the 
Northern  people,  which  seeks  the  overthrow  of  that  domestic  in 
stitution  of  the  South,  which  is  not  only  the  chief  source  of  her 
prosperity,  but  the  very  basis  of  her  social  order  and  State  polity. 
It  is  to-day  the  master-spirit  of  the  Northern  States,  and  had 
before  the  secession  of  Alabama,  of  Mississippi,  of  Florida,  or  of 
South  Carolina,  severed  most  of  the  bonds  of  the  Union.  It  de 
nied  us  Christian  communion,  because  it  could  not  endure  what 
it  calls  the  moral  leprosy  of  slave-holding ;  it  refused  us  permis 
sion  to  sojourn,  or  even  to  pass  through  the  North  with  our 
property;  it  claimed  freedom  for  the  slave,  if  brought  by  his 

*  Hon.  C.  C.  Clay,  of  Alabama. 


206  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

master  into  a  Northern  State;  it  violated  the  Constitution,  and 
treaties,  and  laws  of  Congress,  because  designed  to  protect  that 
property ;  it  refused  us  any  share  of  lands  acquired  mainly  by  our 
diplomacy,  and  blood,  and  treasure;  it  refused  our  property  any 
shelter  or  security  beneath  the  flag  of  a  common  government ;  it 
robbed  us  of  our  property,  and  refused  to  restore  it ;  it  refused 
to  deliver  criminals  against  our  laws,  who  fled  to  the  North  with 
our  property  or  our  blood  upon  their  hands;  it  threatened  us  by 
solemn  legislative  acts,  with  ignominious  punishment,  if  we  pur 
sued  our  property  into  a  Northern  State;  it  murdered  Southern 
men  when  seeking  the  recovery  of  their  property  on  Northern 
soil ;  it  invaded  the  borders  of  Southern  States,  poisoned  their 
wells,  burnt  their  dwellings,  and  murdered  their  people  ;  it  de 
nounced  us  by  deliberate  resolves  of  popular  meetings,  of  party 
conventions,  and  of  religious,  and  even  legislative  assemblies,  as 
habitual  violators  of  the  laws  of  God  and  the  rights  of  humanity ; 
it  exerted  all  the  moral  and  physical  agencies  that  human  ingenu 
ity  can  devise,  or  diabolical  malice  can  employ,  to  heap  odium 
and  infamy  upon  us,  and  to  make  us  a  by-word  of  hissing  and 
of  scorn  throughout  the  civilized  world." 

There  was  no  room  for  uncertainty  as  to  the  significance  of 
the  election  of  Abraham  Lincoln  to  the  Presidency,  in  1860, 
by  a  party  exclusively  sectional  in  organization,  and  upon  a 
platform,  which  virtually  declared  the  Union,  as  then  consti 
tuted,  in  opposition  to  justice,  humanity,  and  civilization. 

The  real  danger  to  the  South,  involved  in  this  election, 
was  that  it  was  a  sectional  triumph — a  victory  of  North 
over  South,  in  a  contest  where  the  South  risked  every  thing, 
the  North  nothing.  From  time  immemorial  sincere  patriots 
of  both  sections  had  deprecated  the  formation  of  sectional  par 
ties,  organized  upon  geographical  interests,  or  upon  ideas  con 
fined  to  limited  portions  of  the  Union.  Washington,  in  his 


•    SIGNIFICANCE   OF   LINCOLN'S   ELECTION.  207 

farewell  injunction,  admonished  his  countrymen  of  the  de 
plorable  results  which  must  follow  the  presentation  of  such 
issues. 

The  Chicago  platform  was  more  than  a  menace  to  the 
South ;  it  was  a  defiance  of  law,  a  declaration  of  war  upon  the 
Constitution.  The  election  of  Lincoln  was  both  a  legal  and 
moral  severance  of  the  bonds  of  Union.  While  he  received 
the  united  vote  of  the  North,  save  New  Jersey,  he  did  not 
receive  one  electoral  vote  from  the  South.  His  shaping  of  his 
administration  was  consistent  with  the  character  of  the  party 
which  elected  him.  All  his  constitutional  advisers  were  North 
ern  men  or  Southern  Abolitionists ;  social  outlaws  in  their  own 
section,  in  consequence  of  their  notorious  personal  depravity, 
and  infidelity  to  their  immediate  fellow-citizens.  Of  like  char 
acter  were  the  subordinate  appointments  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  in  Southern  communities. 

Nor  was  there  reason  to  doubt  the  policy  of  the  Govern 
ment  under  its  new  management.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been  suf 
ficiently  communicative  of  his  own  bitter  hostility  to  Southern 
institutions.  In  fact,  with  much  show  of  justice,  his  admirers 
claimed  for  him  the  original  suggestion  of  the  idea  of  an  "  irre 
pressible  conflict,"  afterwards  so  elaborately  pronounced  by 
William  H.  Seward.  Public  announcements,  from  prominent 
speakers  of  the  successful  party,  amply  revealed  the  feast  to 
which  the  South  was  invited.  Wendell  Phillips,  the  most 
able,  eloquent,  and  sagacious  of  the  original  Abolitionists,  thus 
pointedly  defined  the  situation:  "No  man  has  a  right  to  be 
surprised  at  this  state  of  things.  It  is  just  what  we  have  at 
tempted  to  bring  about.  It  is  the  first  sectional  party  ever 
organized  in  this  country.  It  does  not  know  its  own  face,  and 
calls  itself  national;  but  it  is  not  national — it  is  sectional. 


208  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  Republican  party  is  a  party  of  the  North  pledged  against 
the  South." 

Such  was  the  complexion  to  which  political  affairs  were 
brought  by  the  election  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  There  remained 
hardly  a  hope,  even  for  future  security  or  domestic  tranquillity 
to  the  South,  except  in  withdrawal  from  an  association,  in  which 
she  had  become  an  inferior  and  an  outcast — an  object  of  op 
pression,  outrage,  and  contumely.  From  a  relentless  Abolition 
majority  she  could  expect  no  favors ;  and  the  Northern  Democ 
racy,  so  long  her  ally,  for  common  purposes  of  party,  had 
cowered  before  the  storm  of  fanaticism,  and  repudiated  the 
first  demand  made  upon  its  fidelity  to  principle. 

Congress  assembled  on  the  first  Monday  of  December,  1860, 
a  few  weeks  subsequent  to  the  Presidential  election.  Never 
had  that  body  met  under  circumstances  of  such  gravity.  Uni 
versal  foreboding  of  peril  to  the  nation  was  mingled  with  hope 
of  such  action,  as  would  avert  the  impending  calamities  of  dis 
union  and  civil  war.  There  were  few  indications,  at  the  open 
ing  of  the  session,  of  conciliatory  sentiments ;  from  the  repre 
sentatives  of  both  sections  came  open  defiance,  and  Northern 
members  of  both  houses  were  more  than  ever  bold  in  the  utter 
ance  of  insult  and  menace.  Before  the  opening  of  the  session, 
President  Buchanan  received  from  Mr.  Davis  the  most  satis 
factory  assurances  of  his  cooperation  with  the  administration 
in  a  pacific  policy,  having  for  its  object  the  settlement  of  the 
national  difficulties  upon  terms  promotive  of  the  peace  of  the 
country,  and  assuring  the  security  of  the  South.*  To  such  a 

*  It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  Mr.  Davis  approved  Mr.  Buchanan's  pol 
icy  in  the  winter  of  1861.  The  message  of  the  President  disappointed  the 
South,  and  was  offensive  to  many  of  his  most  attached  supporters,  in  con 
sequence  of  its  denial  of  the  right  of  secession.  Denying  the  right  of 


PATRIOTIC   COURSE   OF   MR.  DAVIS.  209 

settlement  the  efforts  of  Mr.  Davis  were  addressed  so  long  as 
there  was  the  slightest  ground  for  the  indulgence  of  hope. 

This  session  of  Congress,  the  last  which  was  held  previous 
to  the  commencement  of  civil  Avar,  is  chiefly  interesting  as  the 
historical  record  of  those  patriotic  efforts  which  were  made  to 
save  the  Union,  and  as  furnishing  incontestable  proof  of  the 
guilt  of  those  who,  by  their  persistent  refusal  of  all  concilia 
tory  propositions,  are  justly  responsible  for  the  calamities  which 
were  to  befall  the  country.  Happily  for  the  reputation  of  Mr. 
Davis,  the  proof  is  authentic  and  conclusive  in  his  favor  upon 
these  important  questions.  There  is  no  portion  of  his  career 
in  which  statesmanship,  patriotism,  and  a  noble  appreciation 
of  the  claims  of  humanity  shine  forth  more  conspicuously.  So 
overwhelming  is  the  evidence  that,  in  these  last  days  of  the 
Union,  he  was  false  to  none  of  these  high  considerations,  that 
the  most  mendacious  assailants  of  himself  and  the  cause  he 
lately  represented  have  not  yet  ventured  to  call  it  in  question. 

A  disposition  is  frequently  evinced  to  plead  for  him  immu 
nity  from  the  responsibility  of  his  position,  as  the  leader  of  the 
Confederate  movement,  upon  the  score  of  his  consistent  Union 
ism,  manifested  in  the  prevailing  conservatism  of  his  course  as 
a  politician.  He  needs  no  such  palliation.  His  devotion  to 
the  Union  of  the  American  fathers  was  as  unquestionable  as 
was  that  of  Washington.  His  patriotism  was  illustrated  by 
every  mode  of  exemplification  in  the  service  of  country.  To 
secession,  Mr.  Buchanan  yet  denied,  also,  the  power  of  coercing  the  States, 
but  subsequently  lent  himself  to  the  latter  policy.  Mr.  Davis  freely  tes 
tified  his  disappointment  at  certain  positions  taken  in  the  Message,  and 
criticised  them  with  emphasis,  but  great  courtesy.  Mr.  Buchanan  indi 
cates  the  special  message  of  January,  1861,  as  the  occasion  of  the  termi 
nation  of  all  friendly  relations  between  himself  and  those  whom  he  terms 
the  "  secession  Senators." 
14 


210  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

substantiate  his  attachment  to  that  association  of  States,  de 
signed  by  the  fathers,  sublime  in  its  objects  of  mutual  fidelity, 
generous  sympathies,  justice,  and  equality,  no  elaborate  state 
ment  is  required,  nor  could  formal  vindication  strengthen  its 
defenses.*  He  never  arrayed  himself  against  such  a  Union, 
but,  abhorring  that  perverted  instrument  of  sectional  aggres 
sion,  which  the  Government  had  become,  he  did  accompany 
and  lead  his  fellow-citizens  in  their  exercise  of  the  highest 
privilege  of  freemen. 

He  was  always  prepared  to  follow  the  principles  of  States' 
Rights  to  their  logical  consequences,  and  was  yet  consistent  in 
his  attachment  to  the  Union.  Thus  he  was  a  firm  believer  in 
the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  States,  and  of  the  enjoyment, 
by  the  States,  of  all  the  attributes  of  sovereignty,  including, 
necessarily,  the  right  of  secession.  He  had  never  urged  the 
expediency  of  secession,  though,  upon  repeated  occasions,  he 
had  foreshadowed  its  probable  necessity  in  the  future,  as  the 
only  remedy  remaining  to  the  South  in  certain  contingencies. 
In  the  Senate,  in  1850,  he  thus  alluded  to  the  possibility  of  a 
successful  organization  of  a  sectional  party:  "The  danger  is 
one  of  our  own  times,  and  it  is  that  sectional  division  of  the 
people  which  has  created  the  necessity  of  looking  to  the  ques 
tion  of  the  balance  of  power,  and  which  carries  with  it,  when 
disturbed,  the  danger  of  disunion." 

In  1859,  again,  he  proclaimed,  in  unequivocal  terms,  his 
course  in  the  event  of  the  success  of  a  party  indorsing  the 
Rochester  pronunciamento  of  Mr.  Seward.  Yet  his  course, 

*  It  is  a  notable  fact  that,  years  ago,  the  strong  and  avowed  attachment 
of  Mr.  Davis  for  the  Union,  was  habitually  sneered  at  by  some  Southern 
men,  who  are  now  seeking  to  gratify  their  lust  for  place  by  "crooking 
the  pregnant  hinges  of  the  knee,"  to  those  who  persecute  him  and  his 
countrymen. 


SEEKS   TO  AVERT    WAR.  211 

subsequent  to  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  was  directed  entirely 
in  the  interest  of  moderation.  Having  little  hope  of  conces 
sion  from  the  enemies  of  the  South,  in  the  moment  of  their 
overwhelming  victory,  he  yet  anxiously,  earnestly  entered  that 
last  struggle  for  the  Constitution,  before  it  passed  into  the 
keeping  of  iconoclasts,  who  were  pledged  to  its  destruction. 

His  zeal  in  behalf  of  pacification  was  actuated  by  consider 
ations  of  humanity,  no  less  ennobling  than  his  impulse  of 
disinterested  patriotism.  Regarding  a  long  and  bloody  war 
as  the  certain  result  of  dissolution,  he  anxiously  sought  to 
avert  that  calamitous  result,  and  stood  pledged  to  the  accept 
ance  of  any  basis  of  settlement  which  should  guarantee  the 
safety  and  honor  of  the  South.  At  no  time,  however,  did  he 
advocate  submission.  His  language  in  the  Senate  is  explicit. 
Speaking  of  the  secession  of  Mississippi,  he  said :  "  I,  how 
ever,  may  be  permitted  to  say,  that  I  do  think  she  has  justi 
fiable  cause,  and  I  approve  of  her  act.  I  conferred  with  her 
people  before  that  act  was  taken,  counseled  them  then  that,  if 
the  state  of  things  which  they  apprehended  should  exist  when 
the  convention  met,  they  should  take  the  action  which  they 
have  now  adopted." 

During  the  session,  numerous  efforts  at  compromise  were 
made,  in  every  instance  emanating  from  Southern  Represent 
atives  or  Northern  Democrats,  the  dominant  party  of  the 
North  declining  all  tenders  of  pacification,  and  offering  no 
terms  of  conciliation  in  return.  It  is  unnecessary  to  trace  the 
progress  of  these  abortive  efforts,  which,  in  the  main,  received 
the  support  of  feeble  minorities,  and  had,  from  their  inception, 
no  prospect  of  adoption. 

There  was  one  proposition,  and  probably  only  one,  which 
embodied  a  competent  basis  of  settlement,  and  was  entitled  to 


212  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

favor.  This  was  called  the  "  Crittenden  Compromise,"  and 
originated  with  the  venerable  Kentucky  Senator,  by  whose 
name  it  is  designated.  For  a  time  it  seemed  that  the  demon 
strations  of  popular  sentiment  in  its  favor,  especially  the  well- 
ascertained  readiness  of  a  large  majority  of  the  Southern  people 
to  accept  it,  and  its  exceedingly  practical  nature,  as  a  final 
settlement  of  the  slavery  question,  would  eventually  secure  its 
adoption  by  Congress.  The  result  was  a  disappointment  of 
this  patriotic  expectation,  and  a  conclusive  demonstration  of 
the  purpose  of  the  Kepublican  party  to  consent  to  no  settle 
ment  which  the  South  could  accept. 

An  examination  of  the  Crittenden  proposition  will  reveal  a 
most  striking  illustration  of  the  ever-present  spirit  of  accom 
modation,  in  matters  affecting  the  safety  of  the  Union,  which, 
even  in  its  last  hours,  was  characteristic  of  the  leaders  and 
people  of  the  South,  and  of  the  narrow,  selfish,  and  exacting 
sectionalism  of  the  North.  In  reality,  it  was  little  short  of  a 
surrender,  in  its  ample  concessions,  to  the  encroachments  of 
Abolitionism. 

The  resolutions  introduced  by  Mr.  Crittenden,  in  the  Sen 
ate,  on  the  18th  of  December,  1860,  contemplated  amendments 
to  the  Constitution  having  the  following  objects :  The  prohib 
ition  of  slavery  in  all  Territories  north  of  the  old  Missouri 
Compromise  line,  and  providing  protection  for  it  south  of  that 
line;  a  denial  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  or  in  ports,  arsenels,  dock-yards,  or 
wherever  else  the  Federal  Government  exercised  jurisdiction ; 
remuneration  to  owners  of  escaped  slaves  by  communities  in 
which  the  Federal  laws,  providing  rendition  of  slaves,  might 
be  violently  obstructed.  Such  were  the  material  features  of 
the  "Crittenden  Compromise." 


THE   CIUTTENIXEN    COMPROMISE.  213 

It  will  be  seen  at  a  glance  how  absurd  was  the  misnomer 
of  "  compromise "  applied  to  so  one-sided  a  settlement.  The 
South  was  required,  by  its  provisions,  to  abandon  the  sacred 
right  of  protection  to  her  property,  guaranteed  by  the  Consti 
tution  and  unequivocally  re-affirmed  by  the  highest  judicial 
tribunal  in  the  land.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  the  Dred  Scott 
case,  had  already  decided  the  right  to  take  slaves  into  all  the 
Territories,  while  the  Crittenden  proposition  prohibited  it  en 
tirely  in  the  major  portion  of  the  common  Territory,  and 
merely  tolerated  it  in  the  residue.  The  Constitution,  as  ex 
pounded  by  the  Supreme  Court,  guaranteed  the  right  of  intro 
duction  and  protection  of  slavery  in  all  the  Territories,  in 
whatever  latitude,  as  the  common  property  of  the  States.  The 
Crittenden  amendment  proposed  to  confine  this  right  to  Ter 
ritory  south  of  36°  30',  prohibiting,  in  the  meanwhile,  slavery 
forever  north  of  that  line,  and  in  regions  where  its  legal  exist 
ence  had  been  emphatically  affirmed  by  that  august  tribunal, 
the  Supreme  Court.  If  adopted,  it  would  have  yielded  every 
thing  to  Abolition  rapacity,  save  a  mere  abstraction.  Of  all 
the  vast  territory  yet  remaining  to  be  hereafter  divided  into 
States,  only  in  New  Mexico  did  it  propose  even  to  tolerate 
slavery,  and  in  that  locality  the  laws  of  nature  precluded  its 
permanent  establishment. 

A  few  days  after  its  introdution  in  the  Senate,  the  Critten 
den  amendment  was  proposed  by  its  author  to  a  special  com 
mittee  of  thirteen,  created  on  motion  of  Senator  Powell,  of 
Kentucky,  for  the  consideration  of  all  questions  pertaining  to 
the  pending  national  difficulties.  This  committee  was  com 
posed  of  the  most  eminent  and  influential  Senators,  embracing 
five  leading  Republicans,  five  Southern  Senators,  and  Messrs. 
Bright,  Bigler,  and  Douglas,  on  behalf  of  the  Northern  De- 


214  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

mocracy.  Mr.  Davis,  originally  appointed,  at  first  declined  to 
serve,  but  finally  consented,  in  compliance  with  the  urgent 
requests  of  other  Senators.  At  the  first  meeting  of  the  com 
mittee,  21st  December,  it  was  "  resolved  that  no  proposition 
shall  be  reported  as  adopted,  unless  sustained  by  a  majority 
of  each  of  the  classes  of  the  committee ;  Senators  of  the  Repub 
lican  party  to  constitute  one  class,  and  Senators  of  the  other 
parties  to  constitute  the  other  class." 

This  resolution  was  necessary,  in  consequence  of  the  obvious 
futility  of  any  settlement  which  did  not  meet  the  approval  of 
a  majority  of  the  Eepublican  Senators.  In  this  Committee 
the  Crittenden  proposition  was  defeated.  Not  one  of  the  Re 
publican  Senators  voted  for  it,  and  Messrs.  Davis  and  Toombs 
likewise  voted  against  it  when  it  was  ascertained  that  it  would 
not  receive  the  sanction  of  a  majority  of  the  Republican  Sen 
ators. 

Despite  its  unfairness  as  a  measure  of  settlement,  and  its 
great  injustice  to  tne  South,  Mr.  Davis  would  have  accepted 
it,  as  would  a  large  majority  of  Southern  Senators,  as  a  final 
ity,  if  the  Republican  Senators  had  tendered  it.  This,  how 
ever,  the  latter  were  determined  not  to  do,  nor  did  a  single 
Republican  Senator,  at  any  time  during  the  session,  express 
even  a  desire  that  any  action,  conciliatory  to  the  South,  should 
be  adopted.*  Insolent,  dictatorial,  and  defiant,  they  pro 
claimed  their  purpose,  at  all  hazards,  to  assert  the  authority 
of  the  Government,  and  their  acts  clearly  indicated  their  stern 

*  Mr.  Crittenden,  whose  supreme  devotion  to  the  Union,  can  not  be 
called  in  question,  since  he  continued  to  cling  to  the  shadow  long  after 
the  substance  had  departed,  and  in  the  midst  of  actual  war  continued  to 
hope  for  a  final  pacific  settlement,  was  greatly  incensed  at  the  unpatriotic 
course  of  the  Republican  Senators.  His  gray  hairs,  his  eloquence,  his 


THE    CLARKE    AMENDMENT.  215 

purpose  to  refuse  every  proposition  contemplating  concession 
or  compromise.  In  substitution  of  the  Crittenden  adjustment, 
they  voted  solidly  for  the  amendment  of  Senator  Clarke,  of 
New  Hampshire,  which  denied  the  necessity  of  amendments 
to  the  Constitution,  which  ought  to  be  obeyed  rather  than 
amended,  and  declared  that  the  remedy  for  present  difficulties 
was  to  be  sought  in  a  stern  enforcement  of  the  laws,  rather 
than  in  assurances  to  peculiar  ideas  and  guarantees  to  peculiar 
interests.  This  palpable  defiance,  and  emphatic  avowal  of  a 
purpose  to  concede  nothing  to  Southern  demands,  was  in 
dorsed  by  the  action  of  Eepublican  caucusses  of  both  houses 
of  Congress,  by  resolutions  of  State  Legislatures,  and  by 
tenders  of  men  and  means  to  compel  the  submission  of  the 
South.  The  entire  Republican  party  were  clearly  committed 
to  the  purpose,  avowed  by  Mr.  Salmon  P.  Chase,  in  a  letter 
from  the  Peace  Congress,  to  Portsmouth,  Ohio,  to  "use  the 
power  while  they  had  it,  and  prevent  a  settlement."* 

On  the  31st  December,  1860,  the  Committee  of  Thirteen 
reported  to  the  Senate  their  inability  to  "  agree  upon  any 
general  plan  of  adjustment,"  and  thus,  with  the  arrival  of  the 
new  year,  had  vanished  the  last  hope  of  preserving  the  peace 
of  the  country.  The  failure  of  the  Crittenden  proposition  was 
decisive  of  the  question  of  pacification  ;  no  other  plan  of  ad 
justment,  that  was  presented,  having  either  its  merits  or  its 
practical  features. 

Southern  resistance  came  none  too  soon  for  Northern  power, 

unquestioned  Unionism,  were  all  unavailing.  He  was  frequently  hotly 
denunciatory,  of  what,  equally  with  Mr.  Davis,  he  regarded  a  purpose 
to  prevent  any  adjustment  which  could  have  a  pacifying  effect  upon  the 
country. 

*  Statement  of  Hon.  S.  S.  Cox. 


216  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSOX   DAVIS. 

hate,  and  lust,  but  far  too  late  for  the  precious  goal  of  inde 
pendence.  Delay  had  been  fatal,  and  the  golden  opportunity 
long  since  lost.  But  there  was  still  time  to  emulate  the 
glorious  examples  of  the  past.  With  marvelous  calmness  and 
dauntless  intrepidity,  a  heroic  race  prepared  an  exhibition  of 
noble  devotion  and  willing  sacrifice,  the  contemplation  of 
which  revives  the  memories  of  Thermopylae. 

Comparatively  of  little  moment,  now,  is  the  question, 
whether  the  acceptance  of  this  basis  of  adjustment  by  the 
South  would  have  been  consistent  with  discretion.  In  the 
end  the  result,  in  all  likelihood,  would  have  been  the  same. 
Had  a  settlement  been  reached  in  1861,  Southern  liberties 
must  eventually  have  perished,  through  the  influences  of  cor 
ruption  and  the  demoralization  engendered  by  continued  sub 
mission  to  wrong,  no  less  effectually  than  by  their  overthrow 
in  that  gallant  struggle  of  arms,  which  terminated  with  such 
fatal  results.  But  there  still  remains  the  question  of  respon 
sibility  for  those  horrors  of  civil  strife,  which  the  failure  of 
the  Crittenden  amendment  soon  precipitated  upon  the  country. 
Those  crimson  spots  which  stain  the  subsequent  history  of  the 
Republic,  are  traceable  to  no  parricidal  hand  raised  by  the 
South.  'No  historical  question  has  received  more  satisfactory 
decision  than  this;  and  the  South  is  acquitted  even  by  the 
testimony  of  her  enemies.  It  is  unnecessary  to  give  the  evi 
dence  of  Southern  men,  when  there  is  such  ample  testimony 
from  those  who  deprecated  and  condemned  the  subsequent 
course  of  the  South. 

Senator  Douglas,  on  the  3d  January,  1861,  only  three  days 
after  the  report  of  the  Committee  of  Thirteen  had  been  sub 
mitted,  and  within  hearing  of  its  members,  thus  expressed 
himself  in  the  course  of  an  address  to  the  Senate : 


STATEMENT   OF   SENATOR   DOUGLAS.  217 

"If  you  of  the  Republican  side  are  not  willing  to  accept  this 
[a  proposition  of  his  own]  nor  the  proposition  of  the  Senator  from 
Kentucky  [Mr.  Crittenden,]  pray  tell  us  what  are  you  willing  to 
do?  I  address  the  inquiry  to  the  Republicans  alone,  for  the 
reason,  that  in  the  Committee  of  Thirteen,  a  few  days  ago,  every 
member  from  the  South,  including  those  from  the  Cotton  States 
[Messrs.  Toombs  and  Davis,]  expressed  their  readiness  to  accept 
the  proposition  of  my  venerable  friend  from  Kentucky  [Mr.  Crit 
tenden]  as  a  final  settlement  of  the  controversy,  if  tendered  and 
sustained  by  the  Republican  members.  Hence,  the  sole  responsi 
bility  of  our  disagreement,  and  the  only  difficulty  in  the  way  of  an 
amicable  adjustment,  is  with  the  Republican  party." 

Again,  on  the  2d  March,  1861,  Mr.  Douglas  re- affirmed 
this  important  statement.  Said  he: 

"The  Senator  has  said  that  if  the  Crittenden  proposition  could 
have  been  passed  early  in  the  session,  it  would  have  saved  all  the 
States  except  South  Carolina.  I  firmly  believe  it  would.  While 
the  Crittenden  proposition  was  not  in  accordance  with  my  cherished 
views,  I  avowed  my  readiness  and  eagerness  to  accept  it,  in  order 
to  save  the  Union,  if  we  could  unite  upon  it.  No  man  has  labored 
harder  than  I  have  to  get  it  passed.  I  can  confirm  the  Senator's 
declaration  that  Senator  Davis  himself,  when  on  the  Committee  of 
Thirteen,  was  ready  at  all  times  to  compromise  on  the  Crittenden 
proposition.  I  will  go  further,  and  say  that  Mr.  Toombs  was  also 
ready  to  do  so." 

Hon.  S.  S.  Cox,  for  several  years  an  able  and  eloquent 
member  of  Congress  from  Ohio,  has  made  a  most  interesting 
statement  upon  this  subject: 

The  vote  on  the  Crittenden  proposition  was  well  defined,  but  is 
not  so  well  understood.  From  the  frequency  of  inquiries  since  the 
war  as  to  this  latter  vote,  the  people  were  eager  to  know  upon 


218  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

whom  to  fix  the  responsibility  of  its  failure.  It  may  as  well  be 
stated  that  all  other  propositions,  whether  of  the  Peace  Convention 
or  the  Border  State  project,  or  the  measures  of  the  committees, 
were  comparatively  of  no  moment;  for  the  Crittenden  proposition 
was  the  only  one  which  could  have  arrested  the  struggle.  It  would 
have  received  a  larger  vote  than  any  other.  It  would  have  had 
more  effect  in  moderating  Southern  excitement.  Even  Davis, 
Toombs,  and  others  of  the  Gulf  States,  would  have  accepted  it.  I 
have  talked  with  Mr.  Crittenden  frequently  on  this  point.  Not 
only  has  he  confirmed  the  public  declarations  of  Douglas  and  Pugh, 
and  the  speech  of  Toombs  himself,  to  this  effect,  but  he  said  it  was 
so  understood  in  committee.  At  one  time,  while  the  committee 
was  in  session,  he  said:  "Mr.  Toombs,  will  this  compromise,  as  a 
remedy  for  all  wrongs  and  apprehensions,  be  acceptable  to  you?" 
Mr.  Toombs,  with  some  profanity,  replied:  "Not  by  a  good  deal; 

but  my  State  will  accept  it,  and  I  will  follow  my  State  to ." 

And  he  did. 

I  will  not  open  the  question  whether  it  was  wise  then  to  offer 
accommodations.  It  may  not  be  profitable  now  to  ask  whether  the 
millions  of  young  men  whose  bodies  are  maimed,  or  whose  bones 
are  decaying  under  the  sod  of  the  South,  and  the  heavy  load  of 
public  debt  under  which  we  sweat  and  toil,  have  their  compensation 
in  black  liberty.  Nor  will  I  discuss  whether  the  blacks  have  been 
bettered  by  their  precipitate  freedom,  passing,  as  so  many  have, 
from  slavery,  through  starvation  and  suffering,  to  death.  There  is 
no  comfort  in  the  reflection  that  the  negroes  will  be  exterminated 
with  the  extermination  of  slavery.  The  real  point  is,  could  not 
this  Union  have  been  made  permanent  by  timely  settlement,  instead 
of  cemented  by  fraternal  blood  and  military  rule?  By  an  equitable 
partition  of  the  territory  this  was  possible.  We  had  then  1,200,000 
square  miles.  The  Crittenden  proposition  would  have  given  the 
North  900,000  of  these  square  miles,  and  applied  the  Chicago  doc 
trines  to  that  quantity.  It  would  have  left  the  remaining  fourth 


STATEMENT  OF  ME.   COX.  219 

substantially  to  be  carved  out  as  free  or  slave  States,  at  the  option 
of  the  people  when  the  States  were  admitted.  This  proposition 
the  radicals  denounced.  It  has  been  stated,  to  rid  the  Republicans 
of  the  odium  of  not  averting  the  war  when  that  was  possible,  that 
the  Northern  members  tendered  to  the  Southern  the  Crittenden 
compromise,  which  the  South  rejected.  This  is  untrue.  It  was 
tendered  by  Southern  Senators  and  Northern  Democrats  to  the 
Republicans.  It  was  voted  upon  but  once  in  the  House,  when  it 
received  eighty  votes  against  one  hundred  and  thirteen.  These 
eighty  votes  were  exclusively  Democrats  and  Southern  Americans, 
like  Gilmer,  Vance,  and  others.  Mr.  Briggs,  of  New  York,  was 
the  only  one  not  a  Democrat  who  voted  for  it.  He  had  been  an 
old  Whig,  and  never  a  Republican.  The  Republican  roll,  begin 
ning  with  Adams  and  ending  with  Woodruff,  was  a  unit  against 
it.  Intermingled  with  them  was  one  Southern  extremist  (General 
Hindman)  who  desired  no  settlement.  There  were  many  Southern 
men  who  did  not  vote,  believing  that  unless  the  Republicans,  who 
were  just  acceding  to  power,  favored  it,  its  adoption  would  be  a 
delusion. 

The  plan  adopted  by  the  Republican  Senators  to  defeat  it  was 
by  amendment  and  postponement.  On  the  14th  and  15th  of  Janu 
ary  they  cast  all  their  votes  against  its  being  taken  up ;  and  on  the 
16th,  when  it  came  up,  Mr.  Clark,  of  New  Hampshire,  moved  to 
strike  it  out,  and  insert  something  which  he  knew  would  neither 
be  successful  nor  acceptable.  The  vote  on  Clark's  amendment 
was  25  to  23;  every  "aye"  being  a  Republican,  and  every  "no," 
except  Kennedy  and  Crittenden  (Americans),  being  Democrats. 

When  this  result  was  announced  universal  gloom  prevailed. 
The  people  favored  this  compromise.  Petitions  by  thousands  of 
citizens  were  showered  upon  Congress  for  its  passage.  Had  it 
received  a  majority  only,  they  would  have  rallied  and  sustained 
those  who  desired  peace  and  union.  One  more  earnest  appeal  was 
made  to  the  Republicans.  General  Cameron  answered  it  by  moving 


220  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

a  reconsideration.  His  motion  came  up  on  the  18th,  when  he  voted 
against  his  own  motion.  It  was  carried,  however,  over  the  votes 
of  the  Republicans,  although  Wigfall  voted  with  them.  When  it 
was  again  up  on  the  second  of  March,  1861,  the  Southern  States 
were  nearly  all  gone.  Even  then  it  was  lost  by  one  vote  only. 
But  on  that  occasion  all  the  Democrats  were  for,  and  all  the  Re 
publicans  against  it.  The  truth  is,  there  was  nothing  but  sneers 
and  skepticism  from  the  Republicans  at  any  settlement.  They 
broke  down  every  proposition.  They  took  the  elements  of  con 
ciliation  out  of  the  Peace  Convention  before  it  assembled.  Sena 
tors  Harlan  and  Chandler  were  especially  active  in  preparing  that 
convention  for  a  failure.  If  every  Southern  man  and  every 
Northern  Democrat  had  voted  for  this  proposition,  it  would  have 
required  some  nine  Republicans  for  the  requisite  two -thirds. 
Where  were  they?  Dreaming  with  Mr.  Seward  of  a  sixty  days' 
struggle,  or  arranging  for  the  division  of  the  patronage  of  adminis 
tration.  The  only  Southern  Senators  who  seemed  against  any 
settlement  were  Iverson  and  Wigfall ;  that  no  man  will  challenge 
if  he  will  refer  to  the  Globe  (1st  part,  Thirty-fifth  Congress,  page 
270)  for  the  testimony  of  Douglas  and  Pugh,  and  to  Mr.  Bigler's 
Bucks  County  speech,  September  17,  1863.  The  latter  knew  it  to 
be  true  when  he  said  that — 

"  When  the  struggle  was  at  its  height  in  Georgia,  between  Robert 
Toombs  for  secession,  and  A.  H.  Stephens  against  it,  had  those 
men  in  the  Committee  of  Thirteen,  who  are  now  so  blameless  in 
their  own  estimation,  given  us  their  votes,  or  even  three  of  them, 
Stephens  would  have  defeated  Toombs,  and  secession  would  have 
been  prostrated.  I  heard  Mr.  Toombs  say  to  Mr.  Douglas  that 
the  result  in  Georgia  was  staked  on  the  action  of  the  Committee 
of  Thirteen.  If  it  accepted  the  Crittenden  proposition,  Stephens 
would  defeat  him;  if  not,  he  would  carry  the  State  out  by  40,000 
majority.  The  three  votes  from  the  Republican  side  would  have 
carried  it  at  any  time;  but  union  and  peace  in  the  balance  against 
the  Chicago  platform  were  sure  to  be  found  wanting." 


SOUTH   CAROLINA   SECEDES.  221 

If  other  testimony  were  wanting,  I  would  ask  a  suspension  of 
judgment  until  those  facts,  better  known  to  Southern  men,  trans 
pire.  The  intercourse  about  to  be  reestablished  between  the 
sections  will  cumulate  the  proof.  It  will  also  bring  to  the  light 
many  facts  showing  that,  while  President  Buchanan  was  working 
for  the  Peace  Conference,  while  Virginia  had  been  gained  to  our 
side  with  her  ablest  men,  there  were  even  then  in  the  Cabinet  those 
who  not  only  encouraged  revolt,  but  foiled  by  letter  and  speech 
the  efforts  of  the  Unionists  at  Washington  and  Richmond.  These 
letters  and  acts  are  referred  to  in  the  recent  speech  of  General 
Blair.  They  will  be,  and  should  be  brought  into  the  sunshine,  if 
only  to  vindicate  the  true  Union  men  of  that  dark  hour,  and  to 
condemn  those  who  have  since  made  so  much  pretension  with  so 
much  zealotry,  coupled  with  unexampled  cruelty  and  tyranny. 

In  the  light  of  subsequent  events  that  policy  was  developed. 
It  was  the  destruction  of  slavery  at  the  peril  of  war  and  disunion ; 
or,  as  Senator  Douglas  expressed  it,  "  a  disruption  of  the  Union, 
believing  it  would  draw  after  it,  as  an  inevitable  consequence,  civil 
war,  servile  insurrections,  and  finally  the  utter  extermination  of 
slavery  in  all  the  Southern  States." 

While  these  fruitless  efforts  at  compromise  were  in  progress 
at  Washington,  public  sentiment  in  the  South,  especially  in 
the  Cotton  States,  was  rapidly  reaching  a  point  of  exasperation, 
which  refused  to  brook  longer  delay  in  the  vain  hope  of  justice 
from  the  exultant  and  unyielding  North.  In  several  of  the 
States,  so  excited  was  popular  feeling,  that  within  a  few  weeks 
what  was  originally  merely  a  purpose  of  resistance,  intensified 
into  a  determination  of  absolute  national  independence  and 
permanent  separation.  South  Carolina,  on  the  20th  December, 
1860,  adopted  her  ordinance  of  secession,  and  thus  bravely 
gave  the  example,  which  other  States  speedily  followed. 

The  work  of  secession,  so  thoroughly  started  by  the  opening 


222  LIFE   OP   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

of  the  new  year,  was  not  accomplished  without  a  severe 
struggle  in  several  of  the  Cotton  States,  in  which  contest, 
those  who  advocated  unconditional  separation  were  greatly 
assisted  by  the  defiant  position  of 'the  Republican  party.  The 
more  sagacious  Southern  leaders  foresaw  the  inevitable  failure 
of  the  movement  of  separation,  unless  it  should  be  sustained 
by  an  extensive  cooperation  among  the  Southern  States.  To 
secure  the  united  action  of  the  Cotton  States,  at  least,  was 
essential  to  give  the  movement  strength  and  dignity.  Mr. 
Davis,  who  advocated  secession  only  in  the  event  of  the  failure 
to  obtain  reasonable  guarantees,  and  had  never  proposed  to 
abandon  the  Union  without  an  effort  to  save  it,  was  a  most 
earnest  and  influential  advocate  of  the  policy  of  cooperation. 
Of  great  historical  importance  is  the  fact,  that  the  counsels  of 
himself  and  those  who  acted  with  him,  were  adopted  in  pref 
erence  to  a  more  hasty  policy,  which,  however  ample  the 
provocation  to  immediate  action,  would  have  deprived  the 
South  of  the  potent  justification  of  having  forborne  until 
"  endurance  ceased  to  be  a  virtue." 

In  a  letter  written  a  few  days  after  the  election  of  Mr. 
Lincoln,  he  thus  expressed  his  views : 

WARREN  COUNTY,  Miss.,  Nov.  10,  1860. 

Hon.  R.  B.  RHETT,  JR. — Dear  Sir:  I  had  the  honor  to  receive, 
last  night,  yours  of  the  27th  ult.,  and  hasten  to  reply  to  the  in 
quiries  propounded.  Reports  of  the  election  leave  little  doubt 
that  the  event  you  anticipated  has  occurred,  that  electors  have 
been  chosen,  securing  the  election  of  Lincoln,  and  I  will  answer 
on  that  supposition. 

My  home  is  so  isolated  that  I  have  had  no  intercourse  with 
those  who  might  have  aided  me  in  forming  an  opinion  as  to  the 
effect  produced  on  the  mind  of  our  people  by  the  result  of  the 


LETTER   TO    R.   B.  RHETT.  223 

recent   election,   and  the   impressions   which   I  communicate   are 
founded  upon  antecedent  expressions. 

1.  I  doubt  not  that  the  Governor  of  Mississippi  has  convoked 
the  Legislature  to  assemble  within  the  present  month,  to  decide 
upon  the  course  which  the  State  should  adopt  in  the  present  emer 
gency.     Whether  the  Legislature  will  direct  the  call  of  a  conven 
tion  of  the  State,  or  appoint  delegates  to   a  convention  of  such 
Southern  States  as   may  be  willing  to   consult  together   for  the 
adoption  of  a  Southern  plan  of  action,  is  doubtful. 

2.  If  a  convention  of  the  State  were  assembled,  the  proposition 
to  secede  from  the  Union,  independently  of  support  from  neigh 
boring  States,  would  probably  fail. 

3.  If  South  Carolina  should  first  secede,  and  she  alone  should 
take  such  action,  the  position  of  Mississippi  would  not  probably 
be  changed  by  that  fact.     A  powerful   obstacle   to   the  separate 
action  of  Mississippi  is  the  want  of  a  port;    from  which  follows 
the  consequence  that  her  trade,  being  still  conducted  through  the 
ports  of  the  Union,  her  revenue  would  be  diverted  from  her  own 
support  to  that  of  a  foreign   government;    and  being  geographi 
cally  unconnected  with  South  Carolina,  an  alliance  with  her  would 
not  vary  that  state  of  the  case.     [>Sk'c.] 

4.  The  propriety  of  separate  secession  by  South  Carolina  de 
pends  so  much  upon  collateral  questions  that  I  find  it  difficult  to 
respond  to  your  last  inquiry,  for   the  want  of  knowledge  which 
would  enable  me  to  estimate  the  value  of  the  elements  involved 
in  the  issue,  though  exterior  to  your  State.     Georgia  is  necessary 
to  connect  you  with  Alabama,  and  thus  to  make  effectual  the  co 
operation  of  Mississippi.     If  Georgia  would  be  lost  by  immediate 
action,  but  could  be  gained  by  delay,  it  seems  clear  to  me  that 
you  should  wait.     If  the  secession  of  South  Carolina   should  be 
followed  by  an  attempt  to  coerce  her  back  into  the  Union,  that  act 
of  usurpation,  folly,  and  wickedness  would  enlist  every  true  South 
ern  man  for  her  defense.     If  it  were  attempted  to  blockade  her 


224  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ports  and  destroy  her  trade,  a  like  result  would  be  produced,  and 
the  commercial  world  would  probably  be  added  to  her  allies.  It 
is  probable  that  neither  of  those  measures  would  be  adopted  by 
any  administration,  but  that  Federal  ships  would  be  sent  to  col 
lect  the  duties  on  imports  outside  of  the  bar ;  that  the  commer 
cial  nations  would  feel  little  interest  in  that;  and  the  Southern 
States  would  have  little  power  to  counteract  it. 

The  planting  States  have  a  common  interest  of  such  magnitude, 
that  their  union,  sooner  or  later,  for  the  protection  of  that  interest, 
is  certain.  United  they  will  have  ample  power  for  their  own  pro 
tection,  and  their  exports  will  make  for  them  allies  of  all  com 
mercial  and  manufacturing  powers. 

The  new  States  have  a  heterogeneous  population,  and  will  be 
slower  and  less  unanimous  than  those  in  which  there  is  less  of 
the  Northern  element  in  the  body  politic,  but  interest  controls 
the  policy  of  States,  and  finally  all  the  planting  communities  must 
reach  the  same  conclusion.  My  opinion  is,  therefore,  as  it  has  been, 
in  favor  of  seeking  to  bring  those  States  into  cooperation  before  ask 
ing  for  a  popular  decision  upon  a  new  policy  and  relation  to  the 
nations  of  the  earth.  If  South  Carolina  should  resolve  to  secede 
before  that  cooperation  can  be  obtained,  to  go  out  leaving  Georgia,' 
and  Alabama,  and  Louisiana  in  the  Union,  and  without  any  reason 
to  suppose  they  will  follow  her,  there  appears  to  me  to  be  no 
advantage  in  waiting  until  the  Government  has  passed  into  hostile 
hands,  and  men  have  become  familiarized  to  that  injurious  and 
offensive  perversion  of  the  General  Government  from  the  ends  for 
which  it  was  established.  I  have  written  with  the  freedom  and 
carelessness  of  private  correspondence,  and  regret  that  I  could 
not  give  more  precise  information. 

Very  respectfully,  yours,  etc., 

JEFFERSON  DAYIS. 

Mr.  Davis  remained  in  the  Senate,  a  friend  of  peace,  and, 


FAREWELL   TO   THE   SENATE.  225 

until  the  last  moment,  laboring  for  adjustment,  when  he 
received  the  summons  of  Mississippi,  forbidding  the  longer 
exercise  of  the  trust  which  she  had  given  to  his  keeping. 
Mississippi  seceded  on  the  9th  of  January,  1861.  Mr.  Davis, 
receiving  formal  announcement  of  the  event,  withdrew  on  the 
21st,  after  pronouncing  an  impressive  valedictory  to  the  Sen 
ate.  Its  dignified,  courteous,  and  statesman-like  character  has 
challenged  the  unqualified  eulogy  of  the  enlightened  world. 

SPEECH    OF   HON.    JEFFERSON    DAVIS,    ON  WITHDRAWING 
FROM  THE   U.  S.  SENATE.  JAN.  21,  1861. 

MR.  DAVIS.  I  rise,  Mr.  President,  for  the  purpose  of  announc 
ing  to  the  Senate  that  I  have  satisfactory  evidence  that  the  State 
of  Mississippi,  by  a  solemn  ordinance  of  her  people,  in  convention 
assembled,  has  declared  her  separation  from  the  United  States. 
Under  these  circumstances,  of  course,  my  functions  are  terminated 
here.  It  has  seemed  to  me  proper,  however,  that  I  should  appear 
in  the  Senate  to  announce  that  fact  to  my  associates,  and  I  will  say 
but  very  little  more.  The  occasion  does  not  invite  me  to  go  into 
argument;  and  my  physical  condition  would  not  permit  me  to  do 
so,  if  otherwise ;  and  yet  it  seems  to  become  me  to  say  something 
on  the  part  of  a  State  I  bere  represent,  on  an  occasion  so  solemn 
as  this. 

It  is  known  to  Senators  who  have  served  with  me  bere,  tbat  I 
have,  for  many  years,  advocated,  as  an  essential  attribute  of  State 
sovereignty,  tbe  rigbt  of  a  State  to  secede  from  tbe  Union.  There 
fore,  if  I  had  not  believed  tbere  was  justifiable  cause ;  if  I  bad 
thought  tbat  Mississippi  was  acting  without  sufficient  provocation, 
or  without  an  existing  necessity,  I  should  still,  under  my  tbeory 
of  the  Government,  because  of  my  allegiance  to  the  State  of  which 
I  am  a  citizen,  have  been  bound  by  her  action.  I,  however,  may 
be  permitted  to  say  that  I  do  think  she  has  justifiable  cause,  and  I 
15 


226  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

approve  of  her  act.  I  conferred  with  her  people  before  that  act 
was  taken,  counseled  them  then  that  if  the  state  of  things  which 
they  apprehended  should  exist  when  the  convention  met,  they 
should  take  the  action  which  they  have  now  adopted. 

I  hope  none  who  hear  me  will  confound  this  expression  of  mine 
with  the  advocacy  of  the  right  of  a  State  to  remain  in  the  Union, 
and  to  disregard  its  constitutional  obligations  by  the  nullification 
of  the  law.  Such  is  not  my  theory.  Nullification  and  secession, 
so  often  confounded,  are,  indeed,  antagonistic  principles.  Nullifi 
cation  is  a  remedy  which  it  is  sought  to  apply  within  the  Union, 
and  against  the  agent  of  the  States.  It  is  only  to  be  justified 
when  the  agent  has  violated  his  constitutional  obligations,  and  a 
State,  assuming  to  judge  for  itself,  denies  the  right  of  the  agent 
thus  to  act,  and  appeals  to  the  other  States  of  the  Union  for  a 
decision ;  but  when  the  States  themselves,  and  when  the  people 
of  the  States,  have  so  acted  as  to  convince  us  that  they  will  not 
regard  our  constitutional  rights,  then,  and  then  for  the  first  time, 
arises  the  doctrine  of  secession  in  its  practical  application. 

A  great  man,  who  now  reposes  with  his  fathers,  and  who  has 
often  been  arraigned  for  a  want  of  fealty  to  the  Union,  advocated 
the  doctrine  of  nullification  because  it  preserved  the  Union.  It 
was  because  of  his  deep-seated  attachment  to  the  Union — his  de 
termination  to  find  some  remedy  for  existing  ills  short  of  a  sever 
ance  of  the  ties  which  bound  South  Carolina  to  the  other  States, 
that  Mr.  Calhoun  advocated  the  doctrine  of  nullification,  which  he 
proclaimed  to  be  peaceful — to  be  within  the  limits  of  State  power, 
not  to  disturb  the  Union,  but  only  to  be  a  means  of  bringing  the 
agent  before  the  tribunal  of  the  States  for  their  judgment. 

Secession  belongs  to  a  different  class  of  remedies.  It  is  to  be 
justified  upon  the  basis  that  the  States  are  sovereign.  There  was 
a  time  when  none  denied  it.  I  hope  the  time  may  come  again, 
when  a  better  comprehension,  of  the  theory  of  our  Government, 
and  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  people  of  the  States,  will  prevent 


FAREWELL  TO   THE   SENATE.  227 

any  one  from  denying  that  each  State  is  a  sovereign,  and  thus  may 
reclaim  the  grants  which  it  has  made  to  any  agent  whomsoever. 

I,  therefore,  say  I  concur  in  the  action  of  the  people  of  Missis 
sippi,  believing  it  to  be  necessary  and  proper,  and  should '  have 
been  bound  by  their  action  if  my  belief  had  been  otherwise ;  and 
this  brings  me  to  the  important  point  which  I  wish,  on  this  last 
occasion,  to  present  to  the  Senate.  It  is  by  this  confounding  of 
nullification  and  secession,  that  the  name  of  a  great  man,  whose 
ashes  now  mingle  with  his  mother  earth,  has  been  evoked  to  jus 
tify  coercion  against  a  seceded  State.  The  phrase,  "to  execute  the 
laws,"  was  an  expression  which  General  Jackson  applied  to  the 
case  of  a  State  refusing  to  obey  the  laws  while  yet  a  member  of 
the  Union.  That  is  not  the  case  which  is  now  presented.  The 
laws  are  to  be  executed  over  the  United  States,  and  upon  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  They  have  no  relation  to  any  for 
eign  country.  It  is  a  perversion  of  terms — at  least  it  is  a  great 
misapprehension  of  the  case — which  cites  that  expression  for  ap 
plication  to  a  State  which  has  withdrawn  from  the  Union.  You 
may  make  war  on  a  foreign  State.  If  it  be  the  purpose  of  gen 
tlemen,  they  may  make  war  against  a  State  which  has  withdrawn 
from  the  Union ;  but  there  are  no  laws  of  the  United  States  to  be 
executed  within  the  limits  of  a  seceded  State.  A  State,  finding 
herself  in  the  condition  in  which  Mississippi  has  judged  she  is — 
in  which  her  safety  requires  that  she  should  provide  for  the  main 
tenance  of  her  rights  out  of  the  Union — surrenders  all  the  bene 
fits  (and  they  are  known  to  be  many),  deprives  herself  of  the 
advantages  (and  they  are  known  to  be  great),  severs  all  the  ties 
of  affection  (and  they  are  close  and  enduring),  which  have  bound 
her  to  the  Union ;  and  thus  divesting  herself  of  every  benefit — 
taking  upon  herself  every  burden — she  claims  to  be  exempt  from 
any  power  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  United  States  within  her 
limits. 

I  well  remember  an  occasion  when  Massachusetts  was  arraigned 


228  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

before  the  bar  of  the  Senate,  and  when  the  doctrine  of  coercion 
was  rife,  and  to  be  applied  against  her,  because  of  the  rescue  of  a 
fugitive  slave  in  Boston.  My  opinion  then  was  the  same  that  it 
is  now.  Not  in  a  spirit  of  egotism,  but  to  show  that  I  am  not 
influenced,  in  my  opinion,  because  the  case  is  my  own,  I  refer  to 
that  time  and  that  occasion,  as  containing  the  opinion  which  I 
then  entertained,  and  on  which  my  present  conduct  is  based.  I 
then  said  that  if  Massachusetts,  following  her  through  a  stated 
line  of  conduct,  choose  to  take  the  last  step  which  separates  her 
from  the  Union,  it  is  her  right  to  go,  and  I  will  neither  vote  one 
dollar  nor  one  man  to  coerce  her  back;  but  will  say  to  her,  God 
speed,  in  memory  of  the  kind  associations  which  once  existed  be 
tween  her  and  the  other  States. 

It  has  been  a  conviction  of  pressing  necessity — it  has  been  a 
belief  that  we  are  to  be  deprived,  in  the  Union,  of  the  rights  which 
our  fathers  bequeathed  to  us — which  has  brought  Mississippi  into 
her  present  decision.  She  has  heard  proclaimed  the  theory  that 
all  men  are  created  free  and  equal,  and  this  made  the  basis  of  an 
attack  upon  her  social  institutions;  and  the  sacred  Declaration  of 
Independence  has  been  invoked  to  maintain  the  position  of  the 
equality  of  the  races.  The  Declaration  of  Independence  is  to  be 
construed  by  the  circumstances  and  purposes  for  which  it  was  made. 
The  communities  were  declaring  their  independence ;  the  people  of 
those  communities  were  asserting  that  no  man  was  born,  to  use  the 
language  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  booted  and  spurred,  to  ride  over  the 
rest  of  mankind ;  that  men  were  created  equal — meaning  the  men 
of  the  political  community ;  that  there  was  no  divine  right  to  rule ; 
that  no  man  inherited  the  right  to  govern ;  that  there  were  no 
classes  by  which  power  and  place  descended  to  families ;  but  that 
all  stations  were  equally  within  the  grasp  of  each  member  of  the 
body  politic.  These  were  the  great  principles  they  announced ; 
these  were  the  purposes  for  which  they  made  their  declaration  ; 
these  were  the  ends  to  which  their  enunciation  was  directed.  They 


FAEEWELL   TO   THE   SENATE.  229 

have  no  reference  to  the  slave;  else,  how  happened  it,  that,  among 
the  items  of  arraignment  against  George  III,  was,  that  he  endeav 
ored  to  do  just  what  the  North  has  been  endeavoring  of  late  to  do, 
to  stir  up  insurrection  among  our  slaves.  Had  the  Declaration 
announced  that  the  negroes  were  free  and  equal,  how  was  the 
prince  to  be  arraigned  for  raising  up  insurrection  among  them? 
And  how  was  this  to  be  enumerated  among  the  high  crimes  which 
caused  the  colonies  to  sever  their  connection  with  the  mother 
country?  When  our  Constitution  was  formed,  the  same  idea  was 
rendered  more  palpable ;  for  there  we  find  provision  made  for  that 
very  class  of  persons  as  property ;  they  were  not  put  upon  the  foot 
ing  of  equality  with  white  men — not  even  upon  that  of  paupers 
and  convicts;  but,  so  far  as  representation  was  concerned,  were 
discriminated  against  as  a  lower  caste,  only  to  be  represented  in 
the  numerical  proportion  of  three-fifths. 

Then,  Senators,  we  recur  to  the  compact  which  binds  us  to 
gether ;  we  recur  to  the  principles  upon  which  our  Government 
was  founded ;  and  when  you  deny  them,  and  when  you  deny  to  us 
the  right  to  withdraw  from  a  government,  which,  thus  perverted, 
threatens  to  be  destructive  of  our  rights,  we  but  tread  in  the  path 
of  our  fathers  when  we  proclaim  our  independence,  and  take  the 
hazard.  This  is  done,  not  in  hostility  to  others — not  to  injure  any 
section  of  the  country — not  even  for  our  own  pecuniary  benefit; 
but  from  the  high  and  solemn  motive  of  defending  and  protecting 
the  rights  we  inherited,  and  which  it  is  our  duty  to  transmit  un 
shorn  to  our  children. 

I  find  in  myself,  perhaps,  a  type  of  the  general  feeling  of  my 
constituents  toward  yours.  I  am  sure  I  feel  no  hostility  toward 
you.  Senators  from  the  North.  I  am  sure  there  is  not  one  of  you, 
whatever  sharp  discussion  there  may  have  been  between  us,  to  whom 
I  can  not  now  say,  in  the  presence  of  my  God,  I  wish  you  well ; 
and  such,  I  am  sure,  is  the  feeling  of  the  people  whom  I  repre 
sent  toward  those  whom  you  represent.  I,  therefore,  feel  that  I 


230  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSOX   DAVIS. 

but  express  their  desire,  when  I  say  I  hope,  and  they  hope,  for 
peaceable  relations  with  you,  though  we  must  part.  They  may  be 
mutually  beneficial  to  us  in  the  future,  as  they  have  been  in  the 
past,  if  you  so  will  it.  The  reverse  may  bring  disaster  on  every 
portion  of  the  country ;  and  if  you  will  have  it  thus,  we  will  in 
voke  the  God  of  our  fathers,  who  delivered  them  from  the  power 
of  the  lion,  to  protect  us  from  the  ravages  of  the  bear;  and  thus, 
putting  our  trust  in  God,  and  in  our  firm  hearts  and  strong  arms, 
we  will  vindicate  the  right  as  best  we  may. 

In  the  course  of  my  service  here,  associated,  at  different  times, 
with  a  great  variety  of  Senators,  I  see  now  around  me  some  with 
whom  I  have  served  long;  there  have  been  points  of  collision,  but 
whatever  of  offense  there  has  been  to  me,  I  leave  here — I  carry 
with  me  no  hostile  remembrance.  Whatever  offense  I  have  given, 
which  has  not  been  redressed,  or  for  which  satisfaction  has  not 
been  demanded,  I  have,  Senators,  in  this  hour  of  our  parting,  to 
offer  you  my  apology  for  any  pain  which,  in  the  heat  of  discussion, 
I  have  inflicted.  I  go  hence  unincumbered  of  the  remembrance 
of  any  injury  received,  and  having  discharged  the  duty  of  making 
the  only  reparation  in  my  power  for  any  injury  offered. 

Mr.  President  and  Senators,  having  made  the  announcement 
which  the  occasion  seemed  to  me  to  require,  it  only  remains  for 
me  to  bid  you  a  final  adieu. 

A  frequent  accusation  alleged  against  Mr.  Davis  and  other 
Southern  Senators  who  adopted  his  course  of  a  formal  with 
drawal  from  the  Senate,  is  that  they  thus  gave  the  Republican 
party  control  of  the  Senate,  and  voluntarily  surrendered  its 
power  to  the  hostile  administration  soon  to  be  inaugurated. 
It  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  this  statement  that  the  mere  admis 
sion  that  the  administration  was  hostile  to  Southern  interests,  and 
menacing  to  Southern  safety  and  honor,  or  even  that  the  South 


HIS   WITHDEAWAL   JUSTIFIED.  231 

had  good  reason  for  so  believing,  is  to  fix  the  responsibility  of 
disunion  elsewhere  than  upon  the  Southern  leaders. 

To  have  retained  his  seat  under  such  circumstances  would 
have  been  altogether  inconsistent  with  Mr.  Davis7  conception 
of  the  nature  of  the  position.  He  was  committed,  by  public 
announcement,  to  a  very  different  view  of  the  obligations  of 
the  representative  of  a  State  in  the  Federal  Congress.  Hold 
ing  it  to  be  a  point  of  honor  not  to  occupy  such  a  relation, 
with  the  object  of  hostility  to  the  Government,  years  ago  he 
announced,  in  connection  with  an  allusion  to  a  calumnious 
insinuation,  that  he  would  answer  in  monosyllables  the  man 
who  would  charge  him  with  being  a  disunionist. 

Entertaining  his  view  of  the  character  of  the  American 
political  system,  of  which  the  foundation  was  the  doctrine  of  a 
paramount  allegiance  of  the  citizen  to  his  State,  when  Missis 
sippi  withdrew  from  the  Union,  he  had  no  other  alternative  than 
to  vacate  the  position  which  he  held  by  her  commission,  and  which 
was,  at  once,  the  sign  of  the  equality  and  sovereignty  of  the 
States,  and  of  the  adherence  of  each  to  the  league  by  which  she 
was  united  to  the  others.  To  represent  a  State  adhering  to  the 
Union,  and  use  the  position  to  make  war  upon  the  Govern 
ment,  or  to  retain  a  seat  in  Congress  when  the  State  had,  by 
its  sovereign  fiat,  revoked  its  grants,  and  withdrawn  from  the 
league,  were  offenses  belonging  to  the  last  stage  of  decadence 
in  political  morality  and  personal  honor. 

Retiring  from  the  Senate,  Mr.  Davis  returned,  within  a  few 
days  thereafter,  to  his  residence  in  Mississippi.  The  State  was 
not  unmindful  of  the  necessity  of  preparations  for  a  war  which, 
though  not  deemed  inevitable,  was  yet  extremely  probable. 
Mr.  Davis  was  honored  by  an  appointment  to  the  command  of 
the  militia  of  the  State,  with  the  rank  of  Major-General.  His 


232  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

retirement  upon  his  plantation  thus  promised  to  be  of  short 
duration,  but  before  he  could  assume  the  responsibilities  which 
Mississippi,  in  this  reiteration  of  her  confidence,  had  conferred, 
the  voice,  of  millions  invoked  his  guidance  Of  their  destinies  in 
the  hazardous  experiment  of  independent  national  existence. 

Secession,  in  its  rapid  progress,  confirmed  the  threadbare 
theory  of  the  progressive  tendency  of  revolutionary  move 
ments.  Acquiring  impetus  as  it  advanced,  before  the  first 
of  February,  1861,  six  States  had  declared  themselves  no 
longer  members  of  the  Union.*  Representatives  from  these 
States  met,  in  convention,  at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  on  4th 
^  February,  1861,  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  provisional  gov 
ernment.  On  the  8th  February,  this  body  adopted  a  constitu 
tion,  and  proclaimed  an  addition  to  the  family  of  nations,  under 
the  title  of  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

The  next  day  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  an 
nounced  its  choice  of  the  two  highest  constitutional  officers  of 
the  new  Government : 

President,  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  of  Mississippi. 
Vice-President,  ALEXANDER  H.  STEPHENS',  of  Georgia. 

*  Acts  of  secession  were  adopted  by  the  various  States  as  follows : 
South  Carolina,  December  20,  1860. 
Florida,  January  7,  1861. 
Mississippi,  January  9,  1861. 
Alabama,  January  11,  1861. 
Georgia,  January  20,  1861. 
Louisiana,  January  26,  1861. 
Texas,  February  1,  1861. 


CONFEDEKACY   ESTABLISHED.  233 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE  CONFEDERACY  ESTABLISHED  AND  IN  OPERATION — CALMNESS  AND  MODERA 
TION  OF  THE  SOUTH — THE  MONTGOMERY  CONSTITUTION — THE  IMPROVEMENTS 
UPON  THE  FEDERAL  INSTRUMENT— POPULAR  DELIGHT  AT  THE  SELECTION  OF 
MR.  DAVIS  AS  PRESIDENT — MOTIVES  OF  HIS  ACCEPTANCE — HIS  PREFERENCE 

FOR  THE  ARMY DAVIS  THE  SYMBOL  OF  SOUTHERN  CHARACTER  AND  HOPES 

ON  HIS  WAY  TO  MONTGOMERY — A  CONTRAST — INAUGURATION  AND  INAUGURAL 

ADDRESS — THE    CONFEDERATE    CABINET TOOMBS WALKER MEMMINGER 

BENJAMIN MALLORY REAGAN HISTORICAL  POSITION    OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS 

THE    TWO    POWERS EXTREME    DEMOCRACY    OF    THE    NORTH— NOBLE    IDEAL 

OF    REPUBLICANISM    CHERISHED    BY     THE     SOUTH-^DAVIS'     REPRESENTATIVE 

QUALITIES  AND  DISTINGUISHED  SERVICES THE  HISTORIC  REPRESENTATIVE  OF 

THE  CONFEDERATE  CAUSE EARLY  HISTORY  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  AT  MONT 
GOMERY CONFIDENCE  IN  PRESIDENT  DAVIS  UNLIMITED PRESIDENT  DAVIS' 

ADMINISTRATIVE  CAPACITY HIS  MILITARY  ADMINISTRATION THE  CONFED 
ERATE  ARMY — WEST  POINT— NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  SURRENDER  OF  FORTS  SUM- 

TER  AND  PICKENS ME.   BUCHANAN'S  PITIABLE   POLICY THE   ISSUE  OF  PEACE 

OR   WAR — PERFIDIOUS   COURSE    OF   THE    LINCOLN   ADMINISTRATION — MR.    SE- 

WARD'S  DALLIANCE  WITH  THE  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSIONERS — HIS  DECEP 
TIONS — THE  EXPEDITION  TO  PROVISION  THE  GARRISON  OF  SUMTER — REDUC' 
TION  OF  THE  FORT — WAR — GUILT  OF  THE  NORTH — ITS  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR 
THE  WAR. 

rTlHUS,  without  the  disorder  of  anarchy,  and  without  the 
-*-  violence  of  armed  conflict,  a  new  and  imposing  structure 
of  state  was  speedily  erected  from  the  separated  fragments. 
The  event  was  indeed  unparalleled,  and,  to  the  mind  of  the 
world,  unused  to  the  novel  spectacle  of  the  dismemberment  of 
an  empire,  except  as  the  consummation  of  years  of  bloodshed, 
its  philosophy  was  difficult  of  comprehension. 


234  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  sixth  of  November,  1860,  was  the  ominous  day  upon 
which  the  revolution,  so  long  threatened,  and  so  often  deferred 
by  Southern  concession  and  sacrifice,  was  inaugurated.  Upon 
that  day,  with  the  election  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  was  opened  a 
new  volume  in  American  history.  Upon  that  day,  the  Amer 
ican  Union,  "formed  to  establish  justice,"  resting  upon  the 
principle  of  equality  as  its  foundation-stone,  passed  under  the 
control  of  an  arrogant  majority,  pledged  to  its  perversion,  to 
the  oppression  of  nearly  one-half  its  members.  From  the  pro 
fession  of  fraternity,  and  the  outward  pretense  of  comity,  it 
passed  under  the  domination  of  principles  whose  origin  was 
discord  and  whose  logical  result  was  dissolution. 

The  answer  of  those  who  were  threatened  most  seriously  by 
this  subversion  of  the  Government  of  their  fathers,  though 
well  considered,  neither  debated  with  passion,  nor  concluded 
with  rashness,  was  worthy  of  men — the  descendants  of  the 
authors  of  American  Independence,  and  educated  in  that  po 
litical  school  which  teaches  the  assertion  of  the  rights  of  the 
few  against  the  power  of  the  many.  A  manly  resistance,  such 
as  only  threatened  degradation  inspires  in  the  bosoms  of  free 
men,  which  the  insolence  of  faction  had  long  defied  and  a 
conscious  physical  superiority  had  haughtily  derided,  was,  at 
length,  thoroughly  aroused.  "Within  a  few  months,  the  revo 
lutionary  movement,  begun  in  November,  and  pressed,  by  its 
authors,  to  its  inevitable  consequences,  had  reached  the  im 
portant  result  of  a  withdrawal  of  nearly  one-fourth  of  the  States 
constituting  the  American  Union. 

The  new  government,  in  the  incidents  attending  its  con 
struction  and  setting  in  operation,  fully  vindicated  the  earnest 
and  conscientious  convictions  of  the  people  who  had  called  it 
into  existence.  The  absence  of  tumult  and  of  all  passionate 


MODERATION   OF  THE  SOUTH.  235 

display,  at  Montgomery,  was  in  marked  contrast  with  the  in 
decent  exultation  witnessed  at  Washington  from  the  adher 
ents  of  the  incoming  administration.  The  calmness,  moder 
ation,  and  evident  earnestness  of  purpose  which  prevailed  at 
the  South,  and  was  thus  manifested  by  those  who  were  in 
trusted  with  the  framing  of  the  new  government,  impressed 
the  world  to  an  extent  that  prepared  it  to  entertain  a  sympa 
thy  for  the  Southern  cause  not  to  have  been  expected  from 
the  prevalent,  though  erroneous,  impressions  of  foreigners  re 
specting  the  merits  of  the  sectional  quarrel  in  America. 

That  secession  was  not  a  revolutionary  movement,  but 
merely  the  necessary  defense  of  a  people  threatened  with  ma 
terial  ruin  and  political  degradation,  by  a  revolution  which 
had  already  been  consummated,  was  amply  demonstrated  by  its 
immediate  consequences.  The  Confederate  leaders,  at  Mont 
gomery,  exhibited  an  almost  religious  veneration  for  the  spirit, 
forms,  and  associations  of  the  government  which  they  had 
abandoned.  The  strict  adherence  of  the  Montgomery  Con 
stitution  to  the  features  of  the  Federal  instrument,  indicates 
the  absurdity  of  the  impression  that  it  was  a  proclamation  of 
revolution ;  and  the  circumstances  of  its  adoption  are  totally 
inconsistent  with  a  correct  conception  of  the  conduct  of  an  in 
surgent  body. 

,  It  was  a  signal  improvement  upon  the  original  American 
Constitution,  and  the  few  alterations  made  were  commended 
by  enlightened  and  conservative  intellects  every-where,  as 
necessary  changes  in  the  perfection  of  the  American  polity. 
The  object  sought,  and  successfully  consummated,  was  to  em 
body  every  valuable  principle  of  the  old  Constitution  with  cer 
tain  remedial  provisions  for  the  correction  of  obvious  evils, 
which  experience  had  fully  indicated.  Among  these  changes, 


236  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

which  were  universally  recognized  as  of  the  utmost  value, 
were  provisions  making  the  Presidential  term  six  years,  in 
stead  of  four,  as  under  the  old  system,  and  precluding  reelec 
tion;  permitting  cabinet  ministers  to  participate  in  the  de 
bates  of  Congress,  and  the  virtual  abolition  of  the  pernicious 
system  of  removing  all  officials,  of  whatever  degree,  upon  each 
advent  of  a  new  administration.  The  Confederate  Constitu 
tion  positively  prohibited  the  African  slave-trade,  which  the 
v  Federal  Constitution  had  failed  to  do.  A  striking  provision, 
and  one  never  before  avowed  in  any  similar  instrument,  was 
the  prohibition  of  duties  for  the  purpose  of  protection.  There 
was,  indeed,  nothing  whatever  in  the  Montgomery  instrument 
which  a  candid  and  enlightened  public  sentiment,  even  at  the 
North,  might  not  have  fully  approved,  excepting  the  ample 
and  avowed  protection  to  property  in  slaves.  This,  it  was 
claimed,  was  not  an  alteration  of  the  old  Constitution,  but 
merely  a  formal  interpretation  of  its  obvious  purpose. 

In  no  respect  was  the  action  of  the  new  Confederacy  deemed 
more  fortunate  than  in  the  selection  of  its  leader.  That,  in  the 
choice  of  Mr.  Davis  as  President,  the  Congress  only  responded 
to  the  preconceived  choice  of  the  Southern  people,  was  attested 
by  the  spontaneous  acclamation  with  which  the  announcement 
was  received.  Even  those  who  had  been  in  doubt  as  to  the 
proper  personage  to  endow  with  the  powers  and  responsibili 
ties  of  a  position,  at  once  the  most  onerous,  and,  looking  to 
the  contingencies  of  the  early  future,  a  long  and  sanguinary 
war,  with  the  chances  of  a  disastrous  termination,  the  most 
precarious  of  modern  times,  yielded  hearty  recognition  of  the 
wise  selection  of  the  Congress. 

The  responsibilities  and  difficulties  of  the  trust,  did  not 
suggest  to  Mr.  Davis  hesitation  as  to  its  acceptance.  If  this, 


PRE-EMINENT   FITNESS   OF   DAVIS.  237 

the  highest  distinction  which  public  appreciation  had  yet  ten 
dered  him  should  prove  a  forlorn  hope,  his  sense  of  duty  would 
no  more  permit  hesitation  than  in  the  assumption  of  more 
cheaply-earned  honors.  Entertaining  no  purpose  of  inglorious 
ease,  amid  the  trials  and  perils,  which,  with  a  prevision,  rare, 
indeed,  at  that  period,  he  already  anticipated,  his  own  prefer- 
rence  was  for  a  different  station  of  public  service.  Months  sub 
sequently  he  indicated  the  post  of  danger  as  the  post  of  duty  to 
which  he  had  aspired  in  that  gigantic  struggle  through  which 
his  country  must  pass  to  the  assurance  of  independence.  "  I 
then  imagined,"  said  he,  "  that  it  might  be  my  fortune  again  to 
lead  Mississippians  in  the  field,  and  to  be  with  them  where  dan 
ger  was  to  be  braved  and  glory  won.  I  thought  to  find  that 
place  which  I  believed  to  be  suited  to  my  capacity — that  of 
an  officer  in  the  service  of  the  State  of  Mississippi."  * 

Of  the  public  conviction  as  to  his  preeminent  fitness,  there 
could  not  be  a  question.  His  character,  his  abilities,  his 
military  education  and  experience,  had  long  been  recognized 
throughout  the  Union,  and  his  exalted  reputation  was  a  source 
of  just  pride  to  the  South.  No  Southern  statesman  presented 
so  admirable  a  combination  of  purity,  dignity,  firmness,  devo 
tion,  and  skill — qualities  for  which  there  is  an  inexorable  de 
mand  in  revolutionary  periods.  William  Tell,  with  his  cross 
bow  and  apple,  to  the  rustic  simplicity  of  the  Swiss,  was  the 
very  embodiment  of  the  genius  of  liberty.  Far  beyond  any 
influence  of  fiction  was  the  magic  potency  of  the  red  shirt  and 
felt  hat  of  Garibaldi  to  imaginative  Italy ;  and  Washington,  as 
Lamartine  said,  with  his  sword  and  the  law,  was  the  symbol 
standing  erect  at  the  cradle  of  American  liberty.  Equally  with 

*  Extract  from  President  Davis'  address  before  the  Mississippi  Legis 
lature,  December,  1862. 


238  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESOX   DAVIS. 

the  greatest  of  these  prototypes  was  Jefferson  Davis,  the  symbol 
of  the  noble  aspirations  of  the  proud,  impulsive,  chivalrous  race 
which  confided  to  him  the  conduct  of  its  destinies  through  the 
wilderness  of  revolution  to  the  goal  of  independence  and  na 
tionality  beyond.  He  did  not  seek  the  position;  had  not 
been  conspicuous  in  flaming  exhortations  to  popular  assemblies ; 
'  had  not  employed  any  of  the  arts  of  the  demagogue — of  flattery 
or  cajolery  of  the  masses  into  a  false  and  extravagant  estimate 
of  his  qualities ;  but  before  the  world  were  his  character,  fame, 
and  services,  in  unadorned  simplicity,  painted  only  in  the  severe 
colors  of  truth.  It  was  the  tribute  to  virtue,  most  to  be  valued 
when  unsought ;  the  award  of  honor,  only  appropriate  when 
merited  and  becomingly  worn. 

Mr.  Davis'  assumption  of  his  trust  was  characterized  by  a 
dignity,  absence  of  ostentation,  and  profound  appreciation  of 
its  delicate  nature,  in  the  highest  degree  imposing.  From  it 
was  augured  such  a  worthy  administration  of  public  affairs  as 
would  secure  for  the  Confederacy,  if  permitted  the  blessings  of 
peace,  an  enviable  position  among  the  nations  of  the  earth. 
But  his  first  announcement  of  its  policy  indicated  his  appre 
ciation  of  the  danger  of  war,  in  which  its  utmost  exertions 
would  be  required  to  vindicate  the  independence  which  the 
States  had  declared.  To  the  heroic  maintenance  of  that  posi 
tion  he  committed  himself  by  the  most  emphatic  avowals;  and 
in  whatever  contingency,  whether  of  peace  or  war,  his  purpose 
was  one  of  deathless  resistence  to  any  denial  of  the  right  of 
self-government,  which  his  fellow-citizens  had  exercised. 

Informed  of  his  election,  Mr.  Davis  immediately  left  his 
home  for  the  seat  of  government.  Along  the  route  to  Mont 
gomery  he  was  greeted,  by  the  people,  with  every  possible 
demonstration  of  patriotic  enthusiasm  and  personal  regard. 


ARRIVES   AT   MONTGOMERY.  239 

In  response  to  these  demonstrations,  he  at  several  points  ad 
dressed  the  people  in  terms  of  characteristic  eloquence,  dignity 
and  moderation. 

Proud,  indeed,  must  ever  be,  to  the  Southern  people,  the 
\  contrast  of  the  noble  bearing  of  their  chosen  ruler  with  the 
display  of  vulgarity  attending  the  journey  of  Mr.  Lincoln  from 
Springfield  to  Washington.  These  two  men — the  one  with  the 
calm  dignity  of  the  statesman  and  the  polished  bearing  of  the 
gentleman;  the  other  with  coarse  jests  and  buffoonery,  upon 
the  eve  of  the  most  important  event  in  their  individual  history, 
and  pregnant  with  significance  to  millions — were  no  bad  indices 
1  of  the  civilization  of  their  respective  sections. 

Arriving  in  Montgomery,  Mr.  Davis  was  inaugurated  on 
the  18th  February,  with  a  simplicity  of  ceremony,  an  absence 
of  personal  inflation,  and  a  degree  of  popular  enthusiasm, 
which  well  befitted  the  formal  assertion  of  true  republican 
liberty,  equally  protected  against  the  license  of  mobs  and  the 
usurpations  of  tyrants.  The  ceremonies  of  inauguration  were 
little  more  than  the  taking  of  the  oath  of  office  and  the  deliv 
ery  of  the  inaugural  address.  The  inaugural  of  President 
Davis  is  unquestionably  of  the  highest  order  of  state  papers. 
As  a  model  of  composition,  it  is  rarely  equaled ;  and  its 
statement  of  the  position  of  the  South,  the  grievances  which 
had  led  to  the  assumption  of  that  position,  her  hopes,  aspira 
tions,  and  purposes,  has  never  been  surpassed  in  power  and 
perspicuity,  by  any  similar  document. 


240  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS,  DELIVERED  AT 
THE  CAPITOL,  MONDAY,  FEB.  18,  1861. 

Gentlemen  of  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America ; 
Friends  and  Fellow- Citizens : 

Called  to  the  difficult  and  responsible  station  of  Chief  Executive 
of  the  Provisional  Government  which  you  have  instituted,  I  ap 
proach  the  discharge  of  the  duties  assigned  to  me  with  an  humble 
distrust  of  my  abilities,  but  with  a  sustaining  confidence  in  the 
wisdom  of  those  who  are  to  guide  and  aid  me  in  the  administration 
of  public  affairs,  and  an  abiding  faith  in  the  virtue  and  patriotism 
of  the  people. 

Looking  forward  to  the  speedy  establishment  of  a  permanent 
government  to  take  the  place  of  this,  and  which,  by  its  greater 
moral  and  physical  power,  will  be  better  able  to  combat  with  the 
many  difficulties  which  arise  from  the  conflicting  interests  of  .sep 
arate  nations,  I  enter  upon  the  duties  of  the  office,  to  which  I  have 
been  chosen,  with  the  hope  that  the  beginning  of  our  career,  as  a 
Confederacy,  may  not  be  obstructed  by  hostile  opposition  to  our 
enjoyment  of  the  separate  existence  and  independence  which  we 
have  asserted,  and,  with  the  blessing  of  Providence,  intend  to 
maintain.  Our  present  condition,  achieved  in  a  manner  unprece 
dented  in  the  history  of  nations,  illustrates  the  American  idea  that 
governments  rest  upon  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  it  is 
the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  abolish  governments  whenever  they 
become  destructive  of  the  ends  for  which  they  were  established. 

The  declared  purpose  of  the  compact  of  union  from  which  we 
have  withdrawn,  was  "to  establish  justice,  insure  domestic  tran 
quillity,  provide  for  the  common  defense,  promote  the  general 
welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  pos 
terity;"  and  when,  in  the  judgment  of  the  sovereign  States  now 
composing  this  Confederacy,  it  had  been  perverted  from  the  pur- 


INAUGURAL   ADDRESS.  241 

poses  for  which  it  was  ordained,  and  had  ceased  to  answer  the  ends 
for  which  it  was  established,  a  peaceful  appeal  to  the  ballot-box, 
declared,  that  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the  government 
created  by  that  compact  should  cease  to  exist.  In  this  they 
merely  asserted  a  right  which  the  Declaration  of  Independence  of 
1776  had  denned  to  be  inalienable.  Of  the  time  and  occasion  for 
its  exercise,  they,  as  sovereigns,  were  the  final  judges,  each  for 
itself.  The  impartial  and  enlightened  verdict  of  mankind  will 
vindicate  the  rectitude  of  our  conduct,  and  He,  who  knows  the 
hearts  of  men,  will  judge  of  the  sincerity  with  which  we  labored 
to  preserve  the  government  of  our  fathers  in  its  spirit.  The  right 
solemnly  proclaimed  at  the  birth  of  the  States,  aud  which  has  been 
affirmed  and  re-affirmed  in  the  bills  of  rights  of  States  subsequently 
admitted  into  the  Union  of  1789,  undeniably  recognizes  in  the 
people  the  power  to  resume  the  authority  delegated  for  the  pur 
poses  of  government.  Thus  the  sovereign  States,  here  represented, 
proceeded  to  form  this  Confederacy,  and  it  is  by  abuse  of  language 
that  their  act  has  been  denominated  a  revolution.  They  formed  a 
new  alliance,  but  within  each  State  its  government  has  remained, 
and  the  rights  of  person  and  property  have  not  been  disturbed. 
The  agent,  through  whom  they  communicated  with  foreign  nations, 
is  changed;  but  this  does  not  necessarily  interrupt  their  interna 
tional  relations. 

Sustained  by  the  consciousness  that  the  transition  from  the  for 
mer  Union  to  the  present  Confederacy,  has  not  proceeded  from  a 
disregard  on  our  part  of  just  obligations,  or  any  failure  to  perform 
any  constitutional  duty;  moved  by  no  interest  or  passion  to  invade 
the  rights  of  others;  anxious  to  cultivate  peace  and  commerce  with 
all  nations,  if  we  may  not  hope  to  avoid  war,  we  may  at  least  ex 
pect  that  posterity  will  acquit  us  of  having  needlessly  engaged  in 
it.  Doubly  justified  by  the  absence  of  wrong  on  our  part,  and  by 
wanton  aggression  on  the  part  of  others,  there  can  be  no  cause  to 
doubt  that  the  courage  and  patriotism  of  the  people  of  the  Confed- 
16 


242  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

erate  States  will  be  found  equal  to  any  measures  of  defense  which 
honor  and  security  may  require. 

An  agricultural  people,  whose  chief  interest  is  the  export  of  a 
commodity  required  in  every  manufacturing  country,  our  true 
policy  is  peace  and  the  freest  trade  which  our  necessities  will  per 
mit.  It  is  alike  our  interest,  and  that  of  all  those  to  whom  we 
would  sell  and  from  whom  we  would  buy,  that  there  should  be  the 
fewest  practicable  restrictions  upon  the  interchange  of  commodities. 
There  can  be  but  little  rivalry  between  ours  and  any  manufacturing 
or  navigating  community,  such  as  the  North-eastern  States  of  the 
American  Union.  It  must  follow,  therefore,  that  a  mutual  interest 
would  invite  good  will  and  kind  offices.  If,  however,  passion  or 
the  lust  of  dominion  should  cloud  the  judgment  or  inflame  the 
ambition  of  those  States,  we  must  prepare  to  meet  the  emergency, 
and  to  maintain,  by  the  final  arbitrament  of  the  sword,  the  position 
which  we  have  assumed  among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  We  havo 
entered  upon  the  career  of  independence,  and  it  must  be  inflexibly 
pursued.  Through  many  years  of  controversy  with  our  late  asso 
ciates,  the  Northern  States,  we  have  vainly  endeavored  to  secure 
tranquillity,  and  to  obtain  respect  for  the  rights  to  which  we  were 
entitled.  As  a  necessity,  not  a  choice,  we  have  resorted  to  the 
remedy  of  separation  j  and  henceforth  our  energies  must  be  directed 
to  the  conduct  of  our  own  affairs,  and  the  perpetuity  of  the  Con 
federacy  which  we  have  formed.  If  a  just  perception  of  mutual 
interest  shall  permit  us  peaceably  to  pursue  our  separate  political 
career,  my  most  earnest  desire  will  have  been  fulfilled;  but  if  this 
be  denied  to  us,  and  the  integrity  of  our  territory  and  jurisdic 
tion  be  assailed,  it  will  but  remain  for  us,  with  firm  resolve,  to 
appeal  to  arms  and  invoke  the  blessings  of  Providence  on  a  just 
cause. 

As  a  consequence  of  our  new  condition,  and  with  a  view  to  meet 
anticipated  wants,  it  will  be  necessary  to  provide  for  the  speedy 
and  efficient  organization  of  branches  of  the  Executive  Depart- 


INAUGURAL   ADDRESS.  243 

merit,  having  special  charge  of  foreign  intercourse,  finance,  military 
affairs,  and  the  postal  service. 

For  purposes  of  defense,  the  Confederate  States  may,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  rely  mainly  upon  the  militia;  but  it  is 
deemed  advisable,  in  the  present  condition  of  affairs,  that  there 
should  be  a  well-instructed  and  disciplined  army,  more  numerous 
than  would  usually  be  required  on  a  peace  establishment.  I  also 
suggest  that,  for  the  protection  of  our  harbors  and  commerce  on 
the  high  seas,  a  navy  adapted  to  those  objects  will  be  required. 
These  necessities  have  doubtless  engaged  the  attention  of  Congress. 

With  a  Constitution  differing  only  from  that  of  our  fathers,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  explanatory  of  their  well-known  intent,  freed  from 
the  sectional  conflicts  which  have  interfered  with  the  pursuit  of 
the  general  welfare,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  expect  that  States, 
from  which  we  have  recently  parted,  may  seek  to  unite  their  for 
tunes  with  ours  under  the  government  which  we  have  instituted. 
For  this  your  Constitution  makes  adequate  provision ;  but  beyond 
this,  if  I  mistake  not  the  judgment  and  will  of  the  people,  a  re 
union  with  the  States  from  which  we  have  separated  is  neither 
practicable  nor  desirable.  To  increase  the  power,  develop  the 
resources,  and  promote  the  happiness  of  the  Confederacy,  it  is 
requisite  that  there  should  be  so  much  of  homogeneity  that  the 
welfare  of  every  portion  shall  be  the  aim  of  the  whole.  Where 
this  does  not  exist,  antagonisms  are  engendered  which  must  and 
should  result  in  separation. 

Actuated  solely  by  the  desire  to  preserve  our  own  rights  and 
promote  our  own  welfare,  the  separation  of  the  Confederate  States 
has  been  marked  by  no  aggression  upon  others,  and  followed  by  no 
domestic  convulsion.  Our  industrial  pursuits  have  received  no 
check;  the  cultivation  of  our  fields  has  progressed  as  heretofore; 
and  even  should  we  be  involved  in  war,  there  would  be  no  consid 
erable  diminution  in  the  production  of  the  staples  which  have 
constituted  our  exports,  and  in  which  the  commercial  world  has 

M\W^-.  v, 

V 

.A        V*i  . 


244  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

an  interest  scarcely  less  tlian  our  own.  This  common  interest  of 
the  producer  and  consumer  can  only  be  interrupted  by  an  exterior 
force,  which  should  obstruct  its  transmission  to  foreign  markets — 
a  course  of  conduct  which  would  be  as  unjust  toward  us  as  it  would 
be  detrimental  to  manufacturing  and  commercial  interests  abroad. 
Should  reason  guide  the  action  of  the  Government  from  which  we 
have  separated,  a  policy  so  detrimental  to  the  civilized  world,  the 
Northern  States  included,  could  not  be  dictated  by  even  the 
strongest  desire  to  inflict  injury  upon  us;  but  if  otherwise,  a  ter 
rible  responsibility  will  rest  upon  it,  and  the  suffering  of  millions 
will  bear  testimony  to  the  folly  and  wickedness  of  our  aggressors. 
In  the  meantime,  there  will  remain  to  us,  besides  the  ordinary 
means  before  suggested,  the  well-known  resources  for  retaliation 
upon  the  commerce  of  an  enemy. 

Experience  in  public  stations,  of  subordinate  grade  to  this  which 
your  kindness  has  conferred,  has  taught  me  that  care,  and  toil, 
and  disappointment,  are  the  price  of  official  elevation.  You  will 
see  many  errors  to  forgive,  many  deficiencies  to  tolerate,  but  you 
shall  not  find  in  me  either  a  want  of  zeal  or  fidelity  to  the  cause 
that  is  to  me  highest  in  hope  and  of  most  enduring  affection. 
Your  generosity  has  bestowed  upon  me  an  undeserved  distinction — 
C^one  which  I  neither  sought  nor  desired.  Upon  the  continuance 
of  that  sentiment,  and  upon  your  wisdom  and  patriotism,  I  rely  to 
direct  and  support  me  in  the  performance  of  the  duty  required  at 
my  hands. 

We  have  changed  the  constituent  parts  but  not  the  system  of 
our  Government.  The  Constitution  formed  by  our  fathers  is  that 
of  these  Confederate  States,  in  their  exposition  of  it;  and,  in  the 
judicial  construction  it  has  received,  we  have  a  light  which  reveals 
its  true  meaning. 

Thus  instructed  as  to  the  just  interpretation  of  the  instrument, 
and  ever  remembering  that  all  offices  are  but  trusts  held  for  the 
people,  and  that  delegated  powers  are  to  be  strictly  construed,  I 


CABINET   APPOINTMENTS.  245 

will  hope,  by  due  diligence  in  the  performance  of  my  duties, 
though  I  may  disappoint  your  expectations,  yet  to  retain,  when 
retiring,  something  of  the  good-will  and  confidence  which  welcomed 
my  entrance  into  office. 

It  is  joyous,  in  the  midst  of  perilous  times,  to  look  around  upon 
a  people  united  in  heart,  where  one  purpose  of  high  resolve  ani 
mates  and  actuates  the  whole — where  the  sacrifices  to  be  made  are 
not  weighed  in  the  balance  against  honor,  and  right,  and  liberty, 
and  equality.  Obstacles  may  retard — they  can  not  long  prevent — 
the  progress  of  a  movement  sanctified  by  its  justice,  and  sustained 
by  a  virtuous  people.  Reverently  let  us  invoke  the  God  of  our 
fathers  to  guide  and  protect  us  in  our  efforts  to  perpetuate  the 
principles  which,  by  his  blessing,  they  were  able  to  vindicate, 
establish,  and  transmit  to  their  posterity,  and  with  a  continuance 
of  His  favor,  ever  gratefully  acknowledged,  we  may  hopefully  look 
forward  to  success,  to  peace,  and  to  prosperity. 

Working  in  great  harmony  between  its  executive  and  legis 
lative  departments,  the  new  government,  within  a  very  few 
weeks,  presented  an  extraordinary  spectacle  of  compact  organ 
ization,  though  in  all  its  parts  it  was  yet  purely  provisional. 
The  Cabinet  announced  by  the  President,  embraced,  for  the 
most  part,  names  well  known  to  the  country  in  connection 
with  important  public  trusts.  It  may  not  be  inappropriate  to 
speak  •  briefly  here  of  those  who  sustained  to  President  Davis 
the  close  relations  of  constitutional  advisers. 

Mr.  Robert  Toombs,  the  Secretary  of  State,  was  indebted 
for  his  appointment  not  less  to  the  position  of  his  State,  the 
first  in  rank  in  the  Confederacy,  than  to  the  public  apprecia 
tion  of  his  abilities.  For  several  years  he  had  represented 
Georgia  in  the  United  States  Senate,  and  in  that  body  his 
reputation  was  very  high  as  a  debater  and  orator.  His  ora- 


246  "LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

tory,  however,  was  a  good  index  of  his  mind  and  disposition, 
strong  and  impassioned,  but  desultory,  vehement  and  bluster 
ing.  Mr.  Toombs  had  contributed  largely  to  prepare  the 
people  of  Georgia  for  .secession,  and  his  fierce  and  persistent 
eloquence  had  greatly  accelerated  the  movement.  His  ca 
pacity  for  agitation  and  destruction  was  indeed  immeasurably 
superior  to  any  qualification  that  he  may  have  had  for  recon 
structing  the  broken  and  scattered  fragments  of  the  govern- 
(  mental  column.  Restless,  arrogant,  and  intolerant — a  born 
destructive  and  inveterate  agitator — Mr.  Toombs  speedily  de 
monstrated  his  deficiency  in  statesmanship.  His  connection 
with  the  Confederate  Cabinet  was  of  brief  duratipn,  and  his 
subsequent  military  service  undistinguished.  The  War  De 
partment — the  second  post  of  distinction  in  the  Cabinet — was 
given  to  Alabama,  the  second  State  of  the  Confederacy,  in  the  per 
son  of  Mr.  Leroy  P.  Walker.  His  connection  with  the  Govern 
ment,  like  that  of  Mr.  Toombs,  was  brief,  and  wholly  unmarked 
by  evidence  of  fitness.  Mr.  Memminger,  of  South  Carolina, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  made  an  exceedingly  unpopular 
officer,  and,  as  the  sequel  demonstrated,  was  incompetent  for 
the  delicate  task  of  financial  management.  The  Attorney- 
General,  Mr.  Benjamin,  of  Louisiana,  an  eminent  lawyer  and 
a  prominent  Senator,  was,  beyond  all  question,  the  ablest  of 
Mr.  Davis'  Cabinet.  He  was  a  man  of  marvelous  intel 
lectual  resources,  an  orator,  a  lawyer,  and  gifted,  to  an  unex 
ampled  degree,  in  the  varied  attributes,  entering  into  the 
savior  faire  of  politics  and  diplomacy.  Mr.  Benjamin  con 
tinued  the  trusted  counselor  of  President  Davis  during  the 
whole  period  of  his  authority.  Mr.  Mallory,  of  Florida,  was 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy — a  gentleman  of  excellent  sense, 
unpretending  manners,  who  probably  conducted  his  depart- 


247 

ment  as  successfully  as  was  possible,  with  the  limited  naval 
resources  of  the  South.  The  Post-office  Department  was 
given  to  Mr.  Reagan,  of  Texas,  noted  for  his  fidelity,  industry, 
and  good  sense. 

The  Cabinet  of  President  Davis  was  destined  to  many  changes 
in  the  progress  of  subsequent  events.  Of  those  originally 
appointed,  Messrs.  Benjamin,  Mallory,  and  Reagan  continued 
their  connection  with  the  Confederate  Government  during  the 
entire  period  of  its  existence.  The  brief  experiment  of  Con 
federate  independence  was  fruitful  in  illustrations  of  the  im 
portant  truth  that  political  distinction  achieved  in  the  ordinary 
struggles  of  parties,  in  times  of  profound  peace,  is  not  the  sure 
guarantee  of  the  possession  of  those  especial  and  peculiar  quali 
fications  which  befit  the  circumstances  of  revolution.  That 
President  Davis,  in  the  selection  of  some  of  his  advisers,  was 
at  fault,  is  to  be  ascribed  rather  to  the  novelty  and  necessities 
of  the  public  situation  than  to  errors  of  his  judgment.  Not 
only  must  public  sentiment  respecting  men  be  to  some  extent 
consulted,  but  the  test  of  experience  must,  necessarily,  after 
all,  determine  the  question  of  fitness,  where  all  were  untried. 

Jefferson  Davis  now  occupied  a  position  in  the  highest 
sense  historical.  It  was  plain  that  his  name  was  destined  to  be 
indelibly  associated  with  a  series  of  incidents  forming  a  most 
thrilling  and  instructive  episode  in  political  history.  As 
the  exponent  of  a  theory  of  constitutional  principles  never 
asserted,  and  unknown  save  through  the  inspiration  of  the 
genius  of  American  Liberty,  and  as  the  head  of  a  Govern 
ment  whose  birth  and  destiny  must  enter  conspicuously  into 
all  future  questions  of  popular  government,  he  stood,  in  a 
double  sense,  the  central  figure  in  a  most  striking  phase  of  the 
drama  of  human  progress.  Splendid  as  had  been  American 


248  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

history  until  that  day,  it  was  now  to  contribute,  still  more 
generously,  to  the  illumination  of  the  great  truths  of  political 
science. 

The  issue  was  again  to  be  joined  between  constitutional 
freedom  and  the  odious  despotism  of  an  enthroned  mob. 
On  the  one  side  were  asserted  the  principles  of  regulated  lib 
erty,  without  which  free  government  can  never  be  stable — 
order,  allegiance,  and  reverence  for  law  and  authority.  On 
the  other,  the  wild  passions  of  an  infuriated  populace,  hurling 
down  the  restraints  of  law,  shattering  constitutions;  and  when 
its  frenzied  lust  had  been  satiated  by  the  destruction  of  every 
accessible  image  of  virtue  and  order,  transferring  supreme 
power  from  its  polluted  grasp  to  the  hands  of  demagogues — 
capable  agents  of  the  depraved  will  which  invests  them  with 
authority. 

Such  was  really  a  faithful  contrast  of  the  two  powers  which 
were  now  inaugurated  in  what  had  been  the  United  States. 
It  was  still  the  old  Greek  question  of  the  "  few  or  the  many," 
the  "  King  Numbers  "  of  the  North  against  the  conservatism 
of  the  South.  The  old  contest  was  to  be  revived,  of  Cleon 
and  Nicias,  in  the  Athenian  Agora,  and  struggling  on  through 
the  political  battle-fields  of  free  governments  in  all  ages. 

It  is  not  an  abuse  of  language  to  characterize  the  North  as 
realizing  the  ultra  theory  of  popular  government.  Its  politi 
cal  fabric  rests  exclusively  upon  the  Utopian  conception  of  an 
intelligence  and  integrity  in  the  masses  which  they  have  never 
been  known  to  possess.  Carrying  out  its  pernicious  construc 
tion  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  that 
"  all  men  are  born  free  and  equal,"  it  professes  to  hold  in 
light  esteem  the  obvious  distinctions  of  race,  property,  and 
color.  Earnestly  devoted  to  the  successful  illustration  of  the 


SOUTHERN   IDEAL   OF   REPUBLICANISM.  249 

experiment  of  Democracy,  it  has  sedulously  directed  its  social 
and  political  development  to  the  overthrow  of  caste,  the  oblit 
eration  of  necessary  social  distinctions,  and  the  practical  asser 
tion  of  the  principle  of  absolute  social,  political,  and  personal 
equality  among  all  men.  The  election  of  Lincoln  was  the 
grand,  decisive  triumph  of  these  tendencies.  He  went  into 
power  as  the  avowed  champion  of  the  interests  of  the  poor 
and  laboring  classes,  which  he  declared  to  be  in  conflict  with 
those  of  the  slave-holding  aristocrats  of  the  South.  Entirely 
undistinguished,  with  no  political  record,  his  popularity  was 
based  upon  his  vulgar  antecedents — no  slight  recommendation 
to  the  populace,  gratified  at  the  prospective  promotion  of  one 
of  its  own  class. 

A  free  society,  politically,  in  which  wealth  and  distinction 
were  debarred  to  none,  the  aristocratic  influences  of  slavery 
were  the  propitious  inducements  in  the  South,  to  the  cultiva 
tion  of  that  personal  dignity  which  marks  the  refinement  of 
rank,  in  contradistinction  to  the  vulgar  pretensions  and  affecta 
tion  of  a  mere  aristocracy  of  money.  The  patrician  society  of 
the  South  sought  the  noblest  type  of  republicanism — regulated 
liberty — beyond  the  influence  of  ignorant  and  fanatical  mobs, 
that  perfect  order  which  reposes  securely  upon  virtue,  intelli 
gence,  and  interested  attachment,  which  all  human  experience 
teaches  are  the  only  reliable  safeguards  of  freedom. 

The  noblest  achievement  of  constitutional  liberty  would 
have  been  the  realization  of  the  Southern  ideal  of  republican 
ism.  The  success  and  beneficence  of  such  a  government  would 
have  been  in  perfect  accord  with  the  philosophy  of  history. 
Every  nation  to  which  has  been  guaranteed  a  free  constitution 
is  indebted  for  its  liberal  features  to  its  educated,  patrician 
classes,  while  all  the  decayed  republics  of  history  owed  their 


250  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

downfall  to  the  corruption  and  excesses  of  an  "unbridled 
Democracy." 

Of  such  a  government,  Jefferson  Davis  was  the  appropriately 
chosen  head.  An  ardent  republican,  in  the  truest  and  noblest 
sense  of  that  abused  term,  a  foe  to  absolutism  and  radicalism 
in  every  shape,  he  was  the  noblest  product  of  a  conservatism 
in  which  the  elements  of  distinction  were  ability,  intelligence, 
refinement,  and  social  position.  When,  added  to  this  repre 
sentative  quality,  are  considered  his  splendid  career  of  public 
service,  and  his  varied  talents,  exemplified  on  almost  every 
field  of  exertion,  it  must  be  conceded  that  no  ruler  was  ever 
more  worthily  invited  to  the  head  of  a  nation,  and  assuredly 
none  ever  was  invited  with  such  unanimity  of  popular  ac 
claim. 

We  have  said  that  Jefferson  Davis  must  ever  appear  to  the 
eye  of  mankind  the  historic  representative  of  the  Confederate 
cause.  The  North  can  not,  assuredly,  reject  this  decision, 
since  it  made  him  the  vicarious  sufferer  for  what  it  affected  to 
consider  the  sins  of  a  nation.  Through  him,  it  actually  ac 
complished  that  from  which  the  great  abilities  of  Edmund 
Burke  recoiled  in  confession  of  impotent  endeavor,  the  indict 
ment  of  an  entire  people.  Those  Southern  men  who  have  rashly 
and  ungenerously  assailed  him  as  responsible  for  the  failure  of 
the  South  to  win  its  independence,  can  not  complain  if  the 
verdict  of  history  shall  be  that  the  genius  of  its  leader  was 
worthy  of  a  noble  cause,  whose  fate  the  laws  of  nature,  not 
the  resources  or  the  impotence  of  one  man,  determined.  The  star 
of  Napoleon  went  down  upon  the  disastrous  field  of  Waterloo, 
and  the  millions  that  he  had  liberated  passed  again  under  the 
domination  of  tyrants  whom  they  despised.  But  would  the 
most  stupid  Bourbon  partisan,  therefore,  call  in  question  the 


EARLY   HISTORY   OF   THE   CONFEDERACY.  251 

mighty  genius  of  Napoleon  ?  It  is  a  glorious  memory  to 
France,  that  her  illustrious  sovereign,  aided  by  the  valor  of 
her  children,  defied  for  twenty  years,  the  arms  of  combined 
Europe,  but  she  has  no  blush  that  those  energies  were  not 
equal  to  an  indefinite  resistance.  That  the  South,  struggling 
against  mortal  odds,  with  her  comparatively  feeble  resources 
constantly  diminishing  with  each  prodigious  effort,  finally  suc 
cumbed  to  an  enemy  inexhaustible  in  strength  and  reinforced 
by  the  world,  is  no  testimony  against  either  the  valor  or  the 
skill  with  which  her  struggle  was  directed.  Like  Washington, 
Davis  was  embarrassed,  in  a  hazardous  cause,  with  defec 
tion,  distrust,  and  discontent.  But,  unlike  Washington,  Davis 
did  not  receive  the  assistance  of  a  powerful  ally  at  the  moment 
when  aid  could  be  most  serviceably  employed. 

Recurring  to  the  early  history  of  the  Confederacy,  during 
the  brief  season  when  Montgomery  was  its  seat  of  government, 
and  especially  to  its  unwritten  details,  there  seems  wanting  no 
auspicious  omen  to  presage  for  it  future  security  and  renown. 
The  cause  and  its  leader  equally  challenged  the  enthused  sym 
pathies  of  a  patriotic  people,  and  all  that  patriotism  was  ready 
to  sacrifice  for  the  one  was  cheerfully  confided  to  the  other. 
Hopefully,  almost  joyously,  the  young  Confederacy  began  its 
short-lived  career.  Those  were  the  halcyon  days  of  that  cheap 
patriotism  and  ferocious  valor  which  delights  to  vaunt  itself 
beyond  the  sound  of  "war's  rude  alarms."  Every  aspect  of 
the  situation  appears  tinged  with  the  couleur  de  rose.  In  fan 
cied  security  of  certain  independence,  achieved  without  the 
harsh  resort  of  arms,  demagogues  boasted  that  they  courted  a 
trial  of  strength  with  the  North,  as  an  opportunity  for  the 
display  of  Southern  prowess.  Men  who  subsequently  were 
noted  for  unscrupulous  assaults  upon  the  Confederate  admin- 


252  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

istration,  and,  since  the  war,  for  their  ready  prostration  before 
the  Northern  juggernaut,  were  then  loud  in  "never  surrender" 
proclamations  of  eternal  separation  from  the  North. 

Such  was  not  an  appropriate  season  for  expressing  grave  and 
painful  doubts  of  the  President's  fitness  for  his  high  trust. 
No  whisper  was  then  heard  of  his  want  of  appreciation  of  his 
situation.  There  was  no  intimation  then  that  he  failed  to 
discern  the  future,  or  refused  to  provide  against  the  perils  that 
menaced  the  Confederacy,  and  were  so  obvious  to  more  saga 
cious  minds.  Sensational  newspaper  correspondents,  professing 
to  base  their  accounts  upon  reliable  hints  from  the  executive 
quarter,  were  profuse  in  their  panegyrics  upon  his  indefatigable 
industry,  his  vigilance,  penetration,  and  marvelous  intuition 
of  Yankee  designs.  They  vied  with  each  other  in  telling  the 
world,  especially  the  North,  of  the  stupendous  preparations 
which  the  Government  was  making  in  anticipation  of  a  pos 
sible  attempt  at  coercion  by  the  Lincoln  government.  It  was 
evident,  from  the  outgivings  of  every  source  of  opinion,  that 
the  Confederates  trusting  much  to  the  merits  of  their  cause  and 
their  own  valor,  yet  largely  depended  for  the  successful  issue 
of  their  assertion  of  independence  upon  the  soldier-statesman, 
who,  charged  with  many  public  duties,  had  never  proven  either 
unwilling  or  incapable  in  any  trust.  The  time  for  censure  was 
not  yet  at  hand.  Incompetent  generals  and  recreant  politicians 
were  not  yet  in  want  of  a  scape-goat  upon  which  to  throw  their 
own  delinquencies.  Harsh  and  censorious  criticism  was  re 
served  for  a  more  opportune  period,  when  the  Confederacy, 
like  a  wearied  gladiator,  whose  spirit  was  invincible,  reeled 
under  the  exhaustion  of  a  dozen  successive  combats,  with  as 
many  fresh  adversaries. 

The  high  administrative  capacity  of  Mr.  Davis  had  received 


ADMINISTRATIVE   QUALITIES.  253 

a  most  fortunate  discipline  in  his  brilliant  conduct  of  the  Fed 
eral  War  Department.  That  service  was  a  vaiuaole  auxiliary 
to  his  efficiency  as  the  executive  head  of  a  new  government, 
whose  safety  was,  from  its  incipiency,  to  depend  upon  the  re 
sources  of  that  rarest  phase  of  genius,  the  combined  capacity 
for  civil  and  military  administration.  The  complex  machinery 
of  government,  even  when  moving  smoothly  in  the  accustomed 
grooves,  imposes  not  only  severe  labor,  but  is  frequently  a 
painful  tax  upon  the  faculties  of  those  most  familiar  with  its 
workings.  When  to  the  labor  of  comprehension  is  added  the 
task  of  construction  and  organization  from  comparative  chaos, 
such  as  prevailed  at  Montgomery,  and  as  prevails  every-where, 
as  the  result  of  political  change,  the  difficulties  are  increased 
tenfold.  Creation  must  then  precede  order.  Organization  is 
to  be  perfected  before  administration  can  be  successfully  at 
tempted.  It  is  this  task  of  organization  which  has  invoked 
some  of  the  most  splendid  displays  of  genius,  and  interposed 
the  obstacles  which  have  occasioned  its  severest  disappoint 
ments.  Universal  testimony  awards  to  Napoleon,  for  his  won 
derful  ingenuity  in  penetrating  social  necessities  and  meeting 
civil  emergencies,  a  merit  not  inferior  to  his  unrivaled  genius 
for  war.  Frederick  the  Great,  in  times  of  peace,  exhibited  a 
vicious  pragmatism  which  rendered  his  civil  rule  contemptible 
when  contrasted  with  his  military  success. 

The  underlying  secret  of  all  successful  administration  is  the 
union  of  the  advantages  flowing  from  unity  of  purpose,  and 
those  resulting  from  division  of  labor — so  necessary  to  exact 
and  intelligent  execution.  President  Davis,  throughout  his 
administration,  sought  the  attainment  of  this  aim.  Confiding 
the  various  departments  to  men  of  at  least  reputed  talents  and 
integrity,  he  yet  exercised  that  constant  supervision  which 


254  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

was  inseparable  from  his  responsibilities,  and  exacted  by  public 
expectation,  and  this  without  arrogance  or  dictation.  Disin 
genuous  criticism  has  alleged  that,  by  an  assumption  of  auto 
cracy,  he  united  in  himself  all  the  powers  and  prerogatives  of 
government,  and  thus  professes  to  hold  him  alone  responsible 
for  the  loss  of  his  country's  liberties.  A  score  of  years,  or 
even  a  decade  hence,  and  he  will  be  exalted  as  the  all-informing 
mind  which  directed,  vitalized,  and  inspired  the  noblest  strug 
gle  of  republicanism  known  to  ancient  or  modern  story. 

At  the  organization  of  the  Confederate  Government,  his 
individual  taste,  capacity  and  experience,  were  fortunately  co 
incident  with  the  necessities  of  the  situation  in  urging  upon 
President  Davis  a  thorough  and  efficient  military  establishment 
upon  a  war  footing.  The  necessity  of  thorough  preparation 
for  war  with  the  United  States  was  never  lost  sight  of  by  him. 
Whatever  his  efforts  to  avert  that  calamity,  its  probabilities 
were  too  menacing  not  to  challenge  unremitting  precautions. 
In  the  War  Department  and  military  legislation  of  the  Con 
federacy  was  felt  the  infusion  of  his  energy  and  system,  and 
were  realized  the  fruits  of  his  labors.  There  can  be  no  more 
splendid  monument  of  his  genius  than  that  superb  specimen 
of  scientific  mechanism,  the  army  of  the  Confederate  States. 
Its  nucleus  was  prepared  in  those  few  weeks'  respite  from 
actual  war,  passed  by  the  Confederate  Government,  at 
Montgomery;  and  the  framework  then  established  was  subse 
quently  enlarged  upon,  until  it  was  developed  into  a  model  of 
military  anatomy — of  complex,  yet  harmonious  organism — 
seldom  rivaled  and  never  surpassed  in  the  history  of  Avar. 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  defective  features  exhibited  in  the 
Confederate  military  organization,  in  the  numerous  and  varied 
campaigns  of  the  war,  those  defects  are  not  to  be  attributed  to 


PREFERS    EDUCATED   SOLDIERS.  255 

the  original  system.  Whatever  may  be  alleged  against  its  lax 
discipline — that  morbid  influence  which  so  fearfully  enervated 
its  efficiency,  neutralized  valor  and  strategy,  and  made  the 
war  a  series  of  magnificent  but  valueless  successes,  the  shadow 
without  the  substance  of  victory — the  fault  was  in  the  execu 
tion,  not  in  the  original  conception.  However  admirably  tem 
pered  the  blade,  that  must  be  a  skillful  hand  which  would 
efficiently  wield  it. 

A  graduate  of  West  Point  and  a  practical  as  well  as 
theoretical  soldier,  President  Davis  naturally  and,  as  the  war 
demonstrated,  wisely  inclined  in  his  military  administration  to 
those  theories  which  regard  war  as  a  science  difficult  and  labo 
rious  of  mastery.  His  marked  and  judicious  partiality  for 
educated  soldiers  was  often  the  ground  of  censorious  comment 
during  the  war,  but  this  will  hardly  be  adjudged  a  fault  now. 
"West  Point"  was  amply  vindicated  by  the  experience  of  both 
armies,  against  the  sneers  of  those  who  affected  such  extreme 
admiration  for  the  "  native  genius  "  of  citizen-soldiers.  With 
a  few  notable  exceptions  in  the  Confederate  army  (and  here  is 
to  be  considered  the  peculiar  genius  for  war  of  the  South), 
and  scarcely  one  worth  mention  in  the  armies  of  the  North, 
the  achievements  of  educated  officers,  and  those  of  officers 
from  civil  life,  are  so  utterly  disproportionate  as  to  forbid 
comparison. 

The  paramount  object  of  all  Confederate  diplomacy  was  to 
secure  a  recognition  of  the  new  Government  by  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  If  war  with  the  United  States 
could  be  averted,  the  Confederacy  was,  for  all  time,  a  fixed 
fact.  At  an  early  period  President  Davis  instituted  efforts  to 
secure  by  negotiation  possession  of  certain  fortifications  and 
other  property  of  the  Federal  Government  located  within  the 


256  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSOX   DAVIS. 

limits  of  the  seceded  States.  Arsenals,  located  in  the  interior,  had, 
in  many  instances,  been  seized  by  the  State  troops  previous  to  the 
formation  of  the  Confederate  Government.  Happily,  those  in 
authority  at  these  places,  appreciating  the  folly  of  resistance  in 
a  situation  utterly  helpless,  had  avoided  a  needless  shedding 
of  blood,  by  a  prompt  compliance  with  the  demands  of  the 
State  authorities. 

When  the  Confederate  Government  went  into  operation, 
there  were  but  two  fortifications  within  the  limits  of  its  juris 
diction  in  the  possession  of  Federal  garrisons:  Fort  Sumter, 
in  Charleston  Harbor,  and  Fort  Pickens,  off  Pensacola,  Florida. 
These  two  positions  were  of  the  utmost  value  to  the  Confed 
eracy,  viewed  as  to  location,  and  their  peaceable  acquisition 
was  of  increased  importance  in  consideration  of  the  obstinate 
defense  of  which  they  were  capable.  The  continued  oc 
cupation  of  these  positions  by  Federal  forces  was,  in  the 
highest  degree,  inconsistent  with  the  dignity  of  the  Con 
federacy  after  it  had  proclaimed  a  distinct  and  independent 
nationality.  Moreover,  in  the  present  temper  of  the  dom 
inant  party  in  the  United  States,  a  large  majority  of  which 
favored  coercion  of  the  South  back  into  the  Union,  Federal 
occupancy  of  these  forts  was  a  menace  to  the  safety  of  the 
Confederacy. 

It  is  easy  to  appreciate  the  delicate  character  of  the  diplo 
macy  now  required  by  the  situation  of  the  Confederacy. 
Without  at  all  acquiescing  in  the  Federal  possession  of  Sum- 
ter  and  Pickens — on  the  contrary,  asserting  the  right  of  the 
Confederacy  to  those  places,  and  avowing  its  willingness  to 
give  adequate  compensation  whenever  they  should  be  surren 
dered — it  was  yet  necessary  to  avoid  affront  to  a  respectable 
minority  at  the  North,  influenced,  apparently,  by  pacific  inten- 


IMBECILITY   OF   ME.  BUCHANAN.  257 

tions.  In  short,  it  became  the  settled  policy  of  the  Confed 
erate  Government  to  postpone  collision  with  the  Federal 
Government  until  the  latest  possible  moment — until  obvious 
considerations  of  public  safety  should  impel  a  resort  to  hostile 
measures. 

President  Buchanan,  whose  term  of  office  expired  March  4, 
1861,  after  numerous  badly  disguised  attempts  at  duplicity 
with  the  Confederate  authorities,  or  more  properly,  with  the 
authorities  of  some  of  the  States  constituting  the  Confederacy, 
and  after  a  contemptibly  weak  and  driveling  policy  of  eva 
sion,  had  left  the  negotiations  between  the  two  Governments 
in  a  most  unsatisfactory  and  confused  condition.  A  brief 
summary  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  conduct  affords  a  most  singular 
exhibition  of  mingled  imbecility,  timidity,  and  disingenuous- 
ness.  His  course,  until  the  meeting  of  Congress,  in  December, 
1860,  was  understood  to  be  in  thorough  accord  with  that  of 
the  States7  Rights  party  of  the  South.  In  that  party  were  his 
most  trusted  advisers,  both  in  and  out  of  the  Cabinet,  and  it 
had  given  to  his  administration  a  consistent  and  cordial  sup 
port.  Like  them,  he  was  pledged  to  the  preservation  of  a 
constitutional  Union,  and  also  to  a  full  recognition  of  the  perils 
which  menaced  the  South,  resulting  from  the  late  sectional 
triumph.  In  his  opening  message  he  condemned  the  exercise 
of  secession  as  unauthorized  and  illegal,  but  denied  emphat 
ically  the  right  of  coercion.  Yet,  in  the  sequel,  he  proved, 
equally  with  the  Republican  party,  an  enemy  to  peaceable  se 
cession. 

When  South  Carolina  was  preparing  for  secession,  Mr. 
Buchanan  entered  into  a  solemn  understanding  with  a  delegation 
of  several  of  her  most  prominent  citizens,  that,  upon  condition 

that  the  people  and  authorities  of  that  State  should  refrain  from 
17 


258  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

hostile  demonstrations,  no  reinforcements  should  be  sent  to  the 
forts  in  Charleston  harbor,  and  that  "their  relative  military 
status  should  remain  as  at  present."  Yet,  when  Major  Ander 
son,  in  positive  violation  of  this  agreement,  removed  his  forces 
from  the  weaker  forts  to  Fort  Sumter,  Mr.  Buchanan  refused 
to  order  him  back.  Having  broken  one  stipulation,  he  now 
determined  to  disregard  the  other,  and,  under  the  pretense  of 
"  provisioning  a  starving  garrison,"  Mr.  Buchanan  attempted 
to  send  troops  to  Sumter.* 

But  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  weak,  offensive,  and 
disgusting,  as  it  was  to  both  North  and  South,  becomes  simply 
pitiable,  when  contrasted  with  the  greater  magnitude  of  the 
perfidy  of  the  Lincoln  government. 

The  two  Presidents,  Davis  and  Lincoln,  were  inaugurated 
within  a  fortnight  of  each  other — the  first  on  the  18th  of 
February,  the  latter  on  the  4th  of  March.  Between  them 
the  question  of  peace  or  war  must,  after  all,  depend — for, 
however  pacific  might  have  been  Mr.  Buchanan's  policy,  it 
would  fail,  should  Lincoln  adopt  a  belligerent  course.  Con 
siderable  hope  was,  at  times,  indulged,  that  the  negotiations 
with  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  Cabinet  would  at  least  be  marked 
with  a  better  display  of  candor  than  had  commemorated  the 
policy  of  his  predecessor.  These  negotiations,  as  fruitless  as 
those  attempted  in  Congress  during  the  preceding  winter,  for 
the  prevention  of  secession,  were  to  involve  a  question  of  even 
more  moment.  The  direct  issue  of  peace  or  war  was  now 
pending.  It  is  confidently  and  successfully  maintained  by  the 
South,  that  in  the  grave  question  of  responsibility  for  actual 
bloodshed,  her  vindication  is  as  clear  and  incontestable  as 

*  By  the  steamer  "Star  of  the  West,"  which  was  driven  back  by  the 
South  Carolina  batteries. 


EFFORTS   TO   PREVENT   WAR.  259 

must  ever  be  her  acquittal  of  the  responsibility  of  disunion. 
"War  with  the  United  States  was  deprecated  by  official  declara 
tion  of  the  Confederate  States  as  "  a  policy  detrimental  to  the 
civilized  world."  Most  impressive  is  the  declaration  of  Presi 
dent  Davis'  inaugural :  "  Sustained  by  the  consciousness  that 
the  transition  from  the  former  Union  to  the  present  Confed 
eracy  has  not  proceeded  from  a  disregard,  on  our  part,  of  just 
obligations,  or  any  failure  to  perform  any  constitutional  duty — 
moved  by  no  interest  or  passion  to  invade  the  rights  of  others — 
anxious  to  cultivate  peace  and  commerce  with  all  nations,  if 
we  may  not  hope  to  avoid  war,  ice  may  at  least  expect  that  pos 
terity  will  acquit  us  of  having  needlessly  engaged  in  it" 

President  Davis  was  at  all  times  most  solicitous  for  peace, 
and  adopted  every  expedient  of  negotiation  that  could  pro 
mote  that  end.  Heartily  responding  to  the  wishes  of  the 
Congress  and  people  of  the  Confederacy,  he  appointed,  in  Feb 
ruary,  an  embassy  to  the  Government  at  Washington.  The 
resolution  of  Congress,  asking  that  the  embassy  should  be 
sent,  explains  its  object  to  be  the  "  negotiating  friendly  relations 
between  that  Government  and  the  Confederate  States  of 
America,  and  for  the  settlement  of  all  questions  of  disagree 
ment  between  the  two  governments  upon  principles  of  right, 
justice,  equity,  and  good  faith." 

Two  of  these  commissioners,  Messrs.  Crawford  and  Forsyth, 
arrived  in  Washington  on  the  5th  of  March,  the  day  succeed 
ing  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration.  Wishing  to  allow  the  Presi 
dent  abundant  opportunity  for  the  discharge  of  the  urgent 
official  duties  necessarily  crowding  upon  him  at  such  a  season, 
the  Confederate  commissioners  did  not  immediately  press 
their  mission  upon  his  attention.  At  first  giving  merely  an 
informal  announcement  of  their  arrival,  they  waited  until  the 


260  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

12th  of  March  before  making  an  official  presentation  of  their 
mission.  On  that  day  they  addressed  a  formal  communica 
tion  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  announcing  their 
authority  to  settle  with  the  Federal  Government  all  claims  of 
public  property  arising  from  the  separation  of  the  States  from 
the  Union,  and  to  negotiate  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Federal 
forces  from  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens. 

Here  begins  a  record  of  perfidy,  the  parallel  of  which  is  not 
to  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Mr.  Seward,  while 
declining  to  recognize  the  Confederate  commissioners  officially, 
yet  frequently  held  confidential  communication  with  them,  by 
which  the  faith  of  the  two  Governments  was  fully  pledged  to 
a  line  of  policy,  by  what  should  certainly  be  the  strongest  form 
of  assurance — the  personal  honor  of  their  representatives.  In 
verbal  interviews,  the  commissioners  wrere  frequently  assured 
of  a  pacific  policy  by  the  Federal  Government,  that  Fort 
Sumter  would  be  evacuated,  that  the  status  at  Fort  Pickens 
should  not  be  changed,  and  that  no  departure  from  these 
pacific  intentions  would  be  made  without  due  notice  to  the 
Confederate  Government. 

The  commissioners,  conformably  to  the  spirit  of  their  Gov 
ernment,  to  avoid,  if  possible,  collision  with  the  United  States, 
made  an  important  concession  in  these  interviews  in  consenting 
to  waive  all  questions  of  form.  It  was  alleged  that  formal 
negotiations  with  them,  in  an  official  capacity,  would  seriously 
jeopardize  the  success  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  manipulation  of  public 
sentiment  at  the  North,  which,  it  was  further  confidentially 
alleged,  he  was  sedulously  educating  to  concurrence  with  his 
own  friendly  purposes  toward  the  Confederates.  By  this  cun 
ning  device  and  the  unscrupulous  employment  of  deception 
and  falsehood  in  his  interviews  with  the  commissioners,  Mr. 


FEDERAL   DUPLICITY.  261 

Seward  accomplished  the  double  purpose  of  successful  imposi 
tion  upon  the  credulity  of  the  commissioners  and  evasion  of 
official  recognition  of  the  Confederate  embassy. 

In  the  meantime,  while  these  negotiations  were  pending,  and 
in  the  midst  of  these  friendly  assurances,  the  Lincoln  adminis 
tration  was  secretly  preparing  hostile  measures,  and,  as  was 
clearly  demonstrated  by  subsequent  revelations,  had  never  se 
riously  entertained  any  of  the  propositions  submitted  by  the 
Confederate  Government.  Resolved  not  to  evacuate  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  the  Federal  Government,  while  amusing  the  Confederate 
commissioners  with  cunning  dalliance,  had  for  weeks  been 
meditating  the  feasibility  of  reenforcing  it.  To  pass  the 
numerous  batteries  erected  by  the  Confederates  in  Charleston 
harbor  was  clearly  a  task  of  the  utmost  difficulty,  if,  indeed, 
possible.  So  complete  was  the  cordon  of  Confederate  batteries 
wrhich  had  been  in  course  of  preparation  for  many  weeks,  that 
the  beleaguered  fortress  was  evidently  doomed  whenever  the 
Confederates  were  provoked  to  fire  upon  it.  The  evacuation 
of  Fort  Sumter  was  clearly  a  military  necessity,  so  pronounced 
by  the  highest  military  authority  in  the  United  States,  and  so 
regarded  by  the  intelligent  public  of  the  North.  Never  had  a 
Government  so  auspicious  an  opportunity  to  save  the  needless 
effusion  of  blood,  and  to  avert  indefinitely,  if  not  finally,  the 
calamity  of  war. 

Such  a  result  was,  however,  farthest  from  the  wishes  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  majority  of  his  Cabinet.  Reinforcement 
of  Fort  Sumter  being  out  of  the  question,  it  became  the  study 
of  the  Federal  authorities  to  devise  a  convenient  and  effective 
pretext  by  which  the  North  could  be  united  in  a  war  of  subju 
gation  against  the  South,  and  for  the  extermination  of  slavery. 
To  this  end  an  expedition  was  ordered  to  Charleston,  for  the 


262  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

purpose  of  supplying  the  garrison  of  Sumter  with  provisions, 
peaceably  or  forcibly,  as  events  might  decide.  As  it  was  well 
known  that  the  Confederate  authorities  would  not  permit  the 
execution  of  the  object  of  this  expedition,  it  was  clearly  a 
measure  of  hostility,  prepared  and  conducted,  too,  under  the 
most  dishonorable  circumstances  of  secrecy  and  falsehood  as  to 
its  destination. 

In  the  meantime  the  Federal  authorities  continued  to  prac 
tice  the  base  policy  of  deception  with  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners.  Upon  one  occasion  Mr.  Seward  declared  that  Fort 
Sumter  would  be  evacuated  before  a  letter,  then  ready  to  be 
mailed,  could  reach  President  Davis  at  Montgomery.  Five  days 
afterward,  General  Beauregard,  commanding  the  Confederate 
forces  in  Charleston  harbor,  telegraphed  the  commissioners  at 
Washington  the  ominous  intelligence  that  the  Federal  com 
mandant  was  actively  strengthening  Fort  Sumter.  The  com 
missioners  were  again  soothed  with  Mr.  Seward's  renewed 
assurances  of  the  positive  intention  of  his  government  to  evacu 
ate  the  fort.  As  late  as  the  7th  of  April  Mr.  Seward  gave  the 
emphatic  assurance :  "  Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept :  wait  and 
see."  This  was  the  date  of  the  sailing  of  the  Federal  fleet  with  a 
strong  military  force  on  board*  The  just  characterization,  by 

*It  was  not  until  the  8th  of  April  that  the  commissioners  obtained  a 
reply  to  their  official  communication  of  March  12th.  From  this  reply,  it 
appeared  that  "during  the  whole  interval  while  the  commissioners  were 
receiving  assurances  calculated  to  inspire  hope  of  the  success  of  their  mis 
sion,  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  President  of  the  United  States  had 
already  determined  to  hold  no  intercourse  with  them  whatever;  to  refuse 
even  to  listen  to  any  proposals  they  had  to  make,  and  had  profited  by  the  ' 
delay  created  by  their  own  assurances,  in  order  to  prepare  secretly  the 
means  for  effective  hostile  operations." — President  Davis  Message,  April 
29th,  1861. 


BOMBARDMENT  OP  FORT  SUMTER.          263 

President  Davis,  of  these  deceptions,  was,  that  "the  crooked 
paths  of  diplomacy  can  scarcely  furnish  an  example  so  wanting 
in  courtesy,  in  candor,  and  directness,  as  was  the  course  of  the 
United  States  Government  toward  our  commissioners  in  Wash 
ington."  * 

The  expedition  was  some  hours  on  its  way,f  when  its  pur 
pose  to  provision  the  fort  was  announced  to  the  Governor  of 
South  Carolina  by  an  agent  of  the  United  States.  This 
announcement  was  telegraphed  to  Montgomery  by  General 
Beauregard,  who  also  asked  for  instructions.  His  government 
replied,  that  if  the  message  was  authentic,  a  demand  should  be 
made  for  the  surrender  of  the  fort  to  the  Confederate  forces ; 
and  in  the  event  of  refusal,  its  reduction  should  be  undertaken. 
On  the  llth  of  April  the  demand  was  made  and  refused. J  In 
obedience  to  the  orders  of  his  government  General  Beauregard 

*  Message  to  Confederate  Congress. 

fThis  expedition,  ostensibly  "for  the  relief  of  a  starving  garrison," 
consisted  of  eleven  vessels,  with  two  hundred  and  eighty-five  guns  and 
twenty-four  hundred  men. 

t  Before  instructing  General  Beauregard  to  fire  upon  the  fort,  President 
Davis  made  another  effort  to  prevent  hostilities,  which  he  thus  explains : 
"Even  then"  (after  Beauregard  had  applied  for  instructions),  "under  all 
the  provocation  incident  to  the  contemptuous  refusal  to  listen  to  our  com 
missioners,  and  the  treacherous  course  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  I  was  sincerely  anxious  to  avoid  the  effusion  of  blood,  and  directed 
a  proposal  to  be  made  to  the  commander  of  Fort  Sumter,  who  had  avowed 
himself  to  be  nearly  out  of  provisions,  that  we  would  abstain  from  direct 
ing  our  fire  at  Fort  Sumter,  if  he  would  promise  not  to  open  fire  on  our 
forces  unless  first  attacked.  This  proposal  was  refused.  The  conclusion 
was,  that  the  design  of  the  United  States  was  to  place  the  besieging  force 
at  Charleston  between  the  simultaneous  fire  of  the  fleet  and  fort.  The 
fort  should,  of  course,  be  at  once  reduced.  This  order  was  executed  by 
General  Beauregard  with  skill  and  success."— Message,  2Vth  Avril,  1861. 


264  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 

opened  fire  upon  Fort  Sumter  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
12th  April.  On  the  13th  the  fort  surrendered. 

The  calculations  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  cabinet,  as  to  the 
result  to  be  produced  by  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  pro 
voked  by  their  deliberate  and  dishonest  design,  were  not  dis 
appointed.  A  furious  and  instantaneous  rush  to  arms  by  the 
North  followed  the  intelligence  of  the  surrender  of  the  fort, 
and  revealed  the  ferocious  lust  with  which  it  had  awaited  the 
signal  to  begin  the  crusade  against  the  liberties  and  property 
of  the  South.  As  no  possible  trait  of  guilt  had  been  wanting 
in  the  means  employed  to  precipitate  hostilities,  so  no  conceiv 
able  feature  of  atrocity  was  to  be  wanting  in  the  conduct  of  a 
war  by  the  North,  produced  by  its  own  avarice,  perfidy,  and 
lust  of  dominion. 

The  brief  recapitulation  which  we  have  given  sufficiently 
exposes  the  pretexts  upon  which  the  North  began  the  war  of 
coercion.  Assuming  that  the  national  dignity  had  been  in 
sulted,  and  the  national  honor  violated,  by  an  attack  upon  the 
flag  of  the  Union,  under  the  impious  profession  of  vindicating 
the  law,  the  North  drew  its  sword  against  the  sovereignty  of 
the  States.  It  had  procured  the  assault  upon  Sumter — that 
essential  step  to  the  desired  frenzy  of  the  masses.  By  a  shal 
low  device,  the  South  had  been  provoked  to  initiate  resistance 
— that  long-sought  pretext  which  should  justify  the  most 
barbaric  invasion  of  modern  times.  Yet,  under  this  flimsy 
imposition,  the  North  cloaks  its  crime,  and  exults  in  its  antic 
ipated  immunity  from  those  execrations  which  have  been  the 
reward  of  similar  examples  of  turpitude.  The  spirit  of  inquiry 
is  not  to  be  thus  deftly  eluded,  nor  the  avenging  sentence  of 
history  so  easily  perverted.  The  question  shall  not  be,  who 
fired  the  first  shot  ?  but,  who  offered  the  first  aggression  f  who 


THE   SOUTH    JUSTIFIED.  265 

first  indicated  the  purpose  of  hostility  ?  We  are  not  required  to 
await  the  bursting  forth  of  the  flames  over  our  heads,  when 
the  fell  intent  of  the  incendiary  is  revealed  to  our  sight.  The 
menace  of  the  murderer  justifies  his  intended  victim  in  eluding 
the  blow  while  the  steel  is  uplifted. 

Jefferson  Davis  signed  the  order  for  the  reduction  of  Fort 
Sumter,  but  he  did  not  thereby  invoke  the  calamities  of  war. 
That  act  was  simply  the  patriot's  defiance  to  the  menace  of 
tyranny.  It  was  the  choice  of  the  freeman  between  resistance 
and  shame. 


266  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

EVENTS  CONSEQUENT  UPON  THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  FORT  SUMTER — MR.  LINCOLN 
BEGINS  THE  WAR  BY  USURPATION — THE  BORDER  STATES — CONTINUED  DU 
PLICITY  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT VIRGINIA  JOINS  THE  COTTON 

STATES AFFAIRS  IN   MARYLAND,    MISSOURI,    AND    KENTUCKY UNPROMISING 

PHASES    OF   THE    SITUATION,    AFFECTING    THE    PROSPECTS    OF    THE    SOUTH 

DIVISIONS  IN  SOUTHERN  SENTIMENT THE  NORTHERN  DEMOCRACY PRESI 
DENT  DAVIS'  ANTICIPATIONS  REALIZED — HIS  RESPONSE  TO  MR.  LINCOLN'S 
PROCLAMATION  OF  WAR — PUBLIC  ENTHUSIASM  IN  THE  SOUTH — PRESIDENT 
DAVIS'  MESSAGE — VIRGINIA  THE  FLANDERS  OF  THE  WAR — REMOVAL  OF  THE 

CONFEDERATE  CAPITAL    TO  RICHMOND POLICY  OF  THAT  STEP    CONSIDERED 

POPULAR  REGARD    FOR   MR.    DAVIS    IN  VIRGINIA — ACTION  OF   THE  VIRGINIAN 

AUTHORITIES NORTH  CAROLINA;    HER    NOBLE  CONDUCT,  AND    EFFICIENT   AID 

TO    THE     CONFEDERACY MILITARY    PREPARATIONS     IN    VIRGINIA GENERAL 

LEE — HIS  SERVICES  IN  THE  EARLY  MONTHS  OF  THE  WAR MINOR  ENGAGE 
MENTS PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  GREAT  STRUGGLE  IN  VIRGINIA AN  IM 
PORTANT  HISTORICAL  QUESTION CHARGES  AGAINST  MR.  DAVIS  CONSIDERED — • 

HIS    STATESMAN-LIKE    PREVISION DID     HE    ANTICIPATE    AND    PROVIDE    FOR 

WAR  ? WHEN  MR.  DAVIS'  RESPONSIBILITY  BEGAN HIS  ENERGETIC  PREPAR 
ATION THE  PREVAILING  SENTIMENT  AT  MONTGOMERY  AS  TO  THE  WAR 

QUOTATIONS  FROM  GENERAL  EARLY  AND  GENERAL  VON  MOLKTE. 

VENTS  quickly  followed  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter, 
foreshadowing  the  violence  and  magnitude  of  the  strife 
about  to  be  joined  between  the  sundered  sections  of  America. 
If  the  North  showed  itself  prompt  and  enthusiastic  to  recog 
nize  the  signal  of  conquest  and  spoliation,  the  South  was 
tenfold  more  resolute  and  confident  in  its  triple  armor  of 
right.  If  the  adroit  appeals  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  adherents,  in 
behalf  of  an  "  insulted  flag,"  and  an  "  outraged  national  dig- 


267 

nity,"  broke  down  the  barriers  of  party,  and  united  the 
Northern  masses  in  an  imagined  crusade  of  patriotism  for  the 
rescue  of  the  Union,  the  occasion  brought  to  the  Confederacy 
accessions  of  strength,  which,  if  they  did  not  ensure  a  success 
ful  defense,  established  the  fact  of  protracted  resistance. 

Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers  promptly  seized  upon  the 
favorable  opportunity  presented  by  the  fanatical  excitement 
prevalent  throughout  the  North.  Within  forty-eight  hours 
after  the  intelligence  of  the  bloodless  encounter  of  Sumter  was 
flashed  over  the  land,  his  proclamation  of  war  against  the 
seceded  States  was  read  by  thousands  of  excited  people.*  A 
flimsy  and  indefensible  perversion  of  an  act,  passed  by  Con 
gress,  in  1795,  which  simply  provided  the  raising  of  armed 
posses  "  in  aid  of  the  civil  authorities,"  was  the  shallow  pre 
text,  under  which  was  masked  the  real  design  of  a  war  which 
was  to  terminate  in  the  destruction  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States.  Beginning  with  this  clear  usurpation  of  the  power 
of  Congress,  which  is  alone  authorized  to  declare  war,  and 
proclaiming  a  purpose  to  "  maintain  the  honor,  the  integrity, 
and  existence  "  of  the  Union,  "  and  the  perpetuity  of  popular 
government,"  the  work  of  conquest  was  begun. 

The  role  undertaken  by  the  Federal  government  was  em 
barrassed  by  many  difficulties.  It  had  not  yet  relinquished 
the  hope  of  retaining  the  Border  States  firm  in  their  adhesion 
to  the  Union.  As  yet  the  action  of  those  States  had  indicated 
no  purpose  of  separation  from  the  North,  unless  in  the  event 
of  direct  interference  by  the  Federal  authorities  with  their 
domestic  concerns,  or  in  the  event  of  a  war  of  subjugation 
against  the  seceded  States.  Popular  feeling  in  all  the  Border 
States  was  unmistakably  resolved  against  the  policy  of  coer- 
*Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation  was  dated  April  15,  1861. 


268  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

cion,  and  in  several  instances  State  Legislatures  had  declared 
a  purpose  to  make  common  cause  with  the  seceded  States, 
whenever  the  Federal  authorities  should  appeal  to  force  against 
them.  It  was  difficult  indeed  for  the  latter  to  reconcile  their 
hostile  purposes  against  the  Confederate  States  with  the  pro 
fessions  of  peaceful  intentions  which  they  so  freely  tendered 
to  the  Border  States.  Well  pleased,  however,  with  the  uniform 
success  of  its  policy  of  duplicity,  the  Federal  administration 
adhered  to  its  "  treacherous  amusement  of  double  and  triple 
negotiations/7  hoping  to  amuse  the  Border  States,  by  pacifying 
assurances,  until  its  schemes  of  coercion  could  be  thoroughly 
prepared.*  But  the  sham  was  too  transparent  to  deceive. 
Friendly  assurances  and  protestations  of  a  desire  to  avoid  the 
eifusion  of  blood  were  not  to  be  accepted  in  the  face  of 
gigantic  martial  preparations. 

An  immediate  consequence  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation 
of  war,  and  invocation  of  an  army  of  seventy-five  thousand 
men,  for  the  subjugation  of  the  Cotton  States,  was  to  throw 
the  mighty  energies  and  heroic  spirit  of  Virginia,  hitherto 
neutral  and  hesitating,  into  hearty  sympathy  with  the  Con 
federacy.  The  sublime  courage  and  devotion  of  this  noble 
State,  manifested  by  the  circumstances  of  her  accession  to  the 
cause  of  her  sister  States,  have  been  the  theme  of  repeated, 
but  not  extravagant  eulogy.  With  a  full  conviction  of  her 
own  peculiar  perils  in  a  war  which  she  had  zealously  striven 
to  prevent;  from  which,  whatever  its  eventualities,  she  had 

*0n  the  day  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter,  Mr.  Lincoln  protested 
to  the  Virginia  commissioners  the  pacific  purposes  of  his  government. 
When  giving  these  assurances  to  Virginia  he  had  heard  of  the  surrender 
of  the  fort,  and  knew  that  for  two  days  Beauregard  had  been  firing  upon 
the  "sacred  flag." 


ACTION   OF   BORDER   STATES.  269 

little  to  hope,  and  with  a  perfect  prevision  of  the  ruin  which 
was  to  ravage  her  bosom,  Virginia  proudly  assumed  the  post 
of  leadership  and  of  peril  in  the  struggle  for  those  immortal 
principles,  of  which  her  soil  was  the  nursery  and  her  illustrious 
sons  the  foremost  champions.  The  historic  prestige  of  Virginia 
was  heightened  by  this  act  of  supreme  devotion,  and  the  value 
of  her  influence  was  speedily  demonstrated  by  the  enthusiastic 
accession  of  other  States  to  the  cause  which  she  had  espoused. 
The  ordinance  of  secession,  adopted  by  the  Virginia  Con 
vention,  was  followed  immediately  by  a  temporary  alliance* 
with  the  Confederate  States,  and  in  a  few  weeks  afterward 
the  Confederacy  embraced,  in  addition  to  its  original  members, 
Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas,  each  of 
which,  by  formal  State  action,  ratified  the  Confederate  con 
stitution. 

The  arbitrary  acts  of  the  Federal  government,  in  Maryland 
and  Missouri,  not  only  vindicated  the  course  of  those  States 
which  had  interpreted  its  policy  as  one  of  subjugation,  but 
greatly  strengthened  the  already  preponderant  Southern  sym 
pathies  of  those  two  commonwealths.  Increasing  by  consecu 
tive  proclamations  his  demands  for  troops,  Mr.  Lincoln  soon 
had  nearly  two  hundred  thousand  men  under  arms.  These 
troops  assembled  under  false  pretenses  at  different  points,  were 
used  for  purposes  of  glaring  despotism;  overawing  the  pro 
nounced  Southern  feeling  of  the  people  by  military  arrests,  by 
licentious  and  violent  demonstrations  of  the  soldiery.  Missouri 
was  soon  in  open  revolt  against  the  Federal  authorities,  and 
in  Maryland  a  general  uprising  was  prevented  by  the  thorough 
precautions  which  had  been  adopted,  rendering  clearly  hopeless 

*  April  24,  1861.  Virginia  joined  the  Confederacy  as  a  member 
May  6,  1861. 


270  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

such  an  undertaking.  The  Legislature  of  Missouri,  unques 
tionably  representing  a  large  majority  of  her  citizens,  event 
ually  adopted  an  ordinance  of  secession  and  ratified  the 
constitution  of  the  Confederate  States.  Kentucky,  vainly 
attempting  a  policy  of  neutrality,  was  divided  in  sentiment 
and  in  strength  between  the  contestants.  A  portion  of  her 
citizens,  residing  within  the  Confederate  lines,  several  months 
after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  declared  the  State  out  of  the 
Union,  and  associated  Kentucky  with  the  Confederacy. 

Such  were  the  immediate  consequences  resulting  from  the 
capture  of  Fort  Sumter.  All  hopes  of  peace  vanished  in  the 
rush  of  events  which  daily  contributed  new  elements  to  the 
incipient  strife,  and  with  constant  reinforcements  of  strength 
and  feeling  to  each  of  the  contending  parties,  there  was  want 
ing  no  omen  of  a  struggle  bloody  and  exhaustive  beyond  all 
previous  example. 

There  were  phases  of  the  situation  not  to  be  lightly  appre 
ciated  by  so  thoughtful  a  statesman  as  President  Davis,  which 
did  not  encourage  that  sanguine  conviction,  so  extravagantly 
indulged  in  by  many  popular  leaders,  of  an  overwhelming  and 
immediate  triumph  of  the  Southern  cause.  The  immense 
disparity  of  physical  resources,  as  was  abundantly  shown  by 
the  lessons  of  history,  could  be  neutralized  by  a  wise  public 
administration,  by  superior  valor,  and  by  that  high  sense  of 
public  virtue,  in  its  original  Roman  sense  of  fortitude,  endur 
ance,  and  willing  sacrifice  in  the  cause  of  country,  which  is  the 
last  and  sure  defense  of  a  nation's  liberties.  Nor  were  those 
important  advantages  of  the  South,  to  the  value  of  which  his 
torical  precedents  have  so  conclusively  testified — a  conscious 
rectitude  of  purpose — a  supreme  conviction  that  theirs  was 
the  better  cause,  and  that,  besides,  it  was  a  war  for  home  and 


ELEMENT   OF   WEAKNESS    IN   THE   SOUTH.  271 

family,  to  be  fought  mainly  upon  their  own  soil — to  be  over 
looked  in  an  intelligent  estimate  of  the  relative  strength  of 
the  belligerents. 

It  was  not  a  failure  to  recognize  these  great  advantages 
which  forbade  wise  and  reflecting  Southern  statesmen  to  indulge 
in  those  grotesque  exhibitions  of  braggadocio,  with  which 
demagogues  amused  excited  crowds  at  railway  stations  and 
upon  street-corners.  There  was  an  element  of  weakness  in  the 
South,  which,  looking  to  the  contingencies  of  the  future,  and 
remembering  the  incertitude  of  war,  might  prove  the  source 
of  serious  danger.  This  was  the  absence  of  that  unity  in  the 
South,  to  which  all  her  statesmen  had  looked  forward,  when 
ever  actual  battle  should  be  joined  between  the  defenders  and 
assailants  of  Southern  liberties.  To  see  a  "  UNITED  SOUTH," 
had  been  for  years  the  dream  of  Calhoun's  noble  intellect. 
Davis,  with  equal  energy  and  ability,  had  striven  for  such 
united  action  by  the  South  as  would  command  peace  and  se 
curity  in  the  Union,  or  independence  beyond  its  limits.  But 
now  the  battle  was  joined,  and  the  dream  was  not  to  be  realized. 

Kentucky  was  hopelessly  divided,  and  though,  from  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  her  people  in  sympathy  with  the 
South,  were  to  come  thousands  of  gallant  soldiers,  the  Confed 
eracy  was  to  be  denied  the  powerful  aid  which  the  brave  heart 
and  mighty  resources  of  united  Kentucky  should  have  thrown 
into  the  scale.  Missouri,  in  consequence  of  her  geographical  po 
sition,  peculiarly  assailable  by  the  North-western  States,  and  by 
divisions  among  her  population,  was  similarly  situated ;  while 
Maryland,  a  gallant  and  patriotic  State,  not  less  than  South 
Carolina  devoted  to  the  independence  of  the  South,  was  se 
curely  shackled  at  the  first  demonstration,  by  her  people,  of 
sympathy  with  their  invaded  countrymen. 


272  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

But  not  only  was  there  a  failure  to  realize  united  action  by 
those  States,  which,  by  geographical  contiguity,  no  less  than  by 
identity  of  political  institutions,  constituted  what  was  desig 
nated  as  THE  SOUTH.  There  was  by  no  means  a  thoroughly 
harmonious  sentiment  among  the  people  of  those  States  which 
had  joined  the  Southern  alliance.  This  was  conspicuously  the 
case  in  Western  Virginia  and  Eastern  Tennessee.*  Though  ap 
parently  insignificant  in  the  midst  of  the  general  enthusiasm 
which  prevailed  in  the  early  months  of  the  war,  these  and 
other  instances  of  local  disaffection  were  to  prove,  at  more  than 
one  critical  period,  fruitful  of  embarrassment.  Intelligence  of 
Confederate  disasters  was  always  the  signal  for  exhibitions  of 
that  covert  disloyalty  which  Confederate  success  compelled  to 
concealment.  Always  ready  to  assist  the  invaders  of  their 
country,  the  so-called  "  Union  men  "  of  the  South  were  valu 
able  auxiliaries  to  the  Federal  armies  as  spies,  and  as  secret 
enemies  to  the  cause  of  the  patriots ;  but  they  were  not  more 
hurtful  and  insidious  in  these  capacities  than  as  the  nucleus 
around  which  crystallized,  under  the  direction  of  disappointed 
demagogues,  the  various  elements  of  discontent  which  were 
subsequently  developed. 

Yet  in  both  sections  was  the  outward  seeming  at  least  of  an 
undivided  war  sentiment.  The  Union  party  of  the  South,  as 
it  had  previously  existed — a  powerful  political  organization, 
embracing  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  Border  States — did 
not  more  immediately  disappear,  as  the  certainty  of  war  was 
developed,  than  did  the  party  of  peace  at  the  North.  The 
Northern  Democracy  did  not,  for  a  moment,  strive  to  breast 
the  popular  current,  but  its  leaders,  the  life-long  allies  of  the 

*  "East  Tennessee"  was  a  perpetual  "fire  in  the  rear"  to  the  Con 
federacy. 


PRESIDENT    DAVIS    RESPONDS.  273 

South,  committed,  by  a  thousand  declarations  to  the  cause  of 
States7  Rights,  eagerly  vied  with  the  Republican  leaders  in 
threats  of  vengeance  against  the  South.  The  Dickinsons, 
Everetts,  Cochranes,  Logans,  and  Butlers — hitherto  the  pro 
fessed  friends  and  advocates  of  the  South — with  that  pliant 
accommodation  to  circumstances,  so  befitting  the  instincts  of 
the  demagogue,  in  their  harangues  to  howling  mobs,  pro 
claimed  themselves  the  advocates  of  a  ruthless  and  indiscrim 
inate  warfare  upon  a  people  who  had  been  driven,  by  intolerable 
wrongs,  into  patriotic  resistance. 

We  have  already  described  the  attitude  and  condition  of  the 
Confederate  Government  at  Montgomery  previous  to  the  at 
tack  upon  Fort  Sumter.  The  honorable  exertions  of  President 
Davis,  cordially  approved  by  Congress  and  the  people,  to 
avoid  a  collision  of  arms,  were  disappointed,  and  events  had 
now  verified  his  life-long  conviction,  that  the  exercise  of  their 
sovereignty,  by  the  States,  would  be  attended  by  a  war  in 
volving  their  existence.  Sustained  by  an  unlimited  popular 
confidence,  with  a  comparatively  perfected  organization,  and 
with  every  possible  preparation  that  the  difficulties  of  its  sit 
uation  would  permit,  the  Government  met,  with  commendable 
composure,  the  shock  of  arms  which  its  chief  had  foreseen  to 
be  inevitable. 

The  proclamation  of  President  Lincoln,  declaring  war  upon 
the  Confederate  States,  was  promptly  responded  to  by  Presi 
dent  Davis,  in  official  announcements,  appropriately  recognizing 
the  condition  of  public  affairs,  and  inviting  energetic  prepara 
tions  for  immediate  hostilities.  He  at  once  called  upon  the 
various  States  for  quotas  of  volunteers  for  the  public  defense. 
By  public  proclamation,  he  invited  applications  for  privateer 
ing  service,  in  which  armed  vessels  might  assist  in  the  public 
18 


274  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

defense  on  the  high  seas,  under  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal 
granted  by  Congress.* 

In  every  instance,  and  by  all  classes  of  citizens,  an  enthusi 
astic  response  was  given  to  the  demands  of  the  Government. 
Individuals  and  corporations  entered  into  a  generous  and 
patriotic  rivalry  in  the  tender  of  aid  to  the  cause.  Wealthy 
citizens  donated  large  sums  of  money  or  supplies,  while  rail 
road  and  transportation  companies  tendered  valuable  assistance 
in  the  conveyance  of  troops  and  stores.  An  enthusiastic  desire 
to  enter  the  public  service  was  manifested  in  every  community. 
Men  decrepit  from  age,  or  infirm  from  disease,  were  impor 
tunate  in  demanding  any  service  suitable  to  their  condition. 
Volunteering  progressed  so  actively  that  a  few  weeks  only  suf 
ficed  to  show  that  the  Confederacy — for  the  present  at  least — 
would  not  want  soldiers.  In  all  the  States  the  responses  to 
the  call  for  volunteers  exceeded  the  quotas. 

Congress  assembled  in  special  session,   in   obedience  to  a 

*  President  Davis  appreciated  the  immense  value  to  the  South  of  priva 
teering.  The  Federal  Government  employed  all  the  naval  force  at  their 
command  to  blockade  the  South,  recalled  the  squadrons  stationed  in  foreign 
waters,  and  made  extensive  purchases  of  vessels  for  purposes  of  war. 
The  South,  of  course,  had  no  navy,  since  there  had  been  no  time  to  pre 
pare  or  purchase  one  within  the  brief  space  between  the  organization  of 
the  Confederate  Government  and  the  beginning  of  hostilities.  Under 
these  circumstances  there  remained  only  the  resort  to  private  armed  ships, 
under  letters  of  marque,  to  assault  the  floating  commerce  of  the  enemy, 
and,  to  some  extent,  neutralize  the  blockade.  Doubting  the  constitutional 
power  of  the  executive  in  the  premises,  he,  with  characteristic  regard  for 
law,  determined  not  to  commission  privateers  until  duly  authorized  by  the 
legislation  of  Congress.  The  authority  to  issue  commissions,  and  letters 
of  marque  and  general  reprisal,  to  privateers,  was  given  by  act  of  Congress, 
passed  6th  of  May. 


PKESIDENT   DAVIS'    MESSAGE.  275 

proclamation  of  the  President,  on  the  29th  of  April.  The 
message  was  an  eminently  characteristic  document,  and  made  a 
profound  impression  both  in  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
Its  calm  and  clear  statements  were  in  marked  contrast  with 
the  wild  elements  of  war  convulsing  the  country.  Europe 
was  not  less  amazed  and  delighted  with  its  dignity  and  force, 
than  Was  the  North  impressed  with  the  earnest  terms  in  which 
the  purpose  of  resistance  was  announced.  He  reviewed  and 
established  the  doctrine  of  secession,  detailed  the  facts  showing 
the  bad  faith  of  the  Northern  government  about  Fort  Surnter, 
and  the  necessity  for  its  capture;  spoke  in  terms  of  keen,  yet 
dignified  satire  of  Lincoln's  proclamation,  which  attempted  to 
treat  seven  sovereign  States  united  in  a  confederacy,  and  hold 
ing  five  millions  of  people  and  a  half  million  of  square  miles 
of  territory,  as  "  combinations/'  which  he  proposed  to  suppress 
by  a  posse  comitatus  of  seventy- five  thousand  men ;  congratu 
lated  the  Congress  on  the  probable  accession  of  other  slave 
States;  informed  them  that  the  State  Department  had  sent 
three  commissioners  to  England,  France,  Russia  and  Belgium, 
to  seek  the  recognition  of  the  Confederate  States;  advised 
legislation  for  the  employment  of  privateers  for  measures  of 
defense,  and  for  perfecting  the  government  organization;  and 
concluded  with  these  impressive  words:  "We  feel  that  our 
cause  is  just  and  holy;  we  protest  solemnly  in  the  face  of 
mankind  that  we  desire  peace  at  any  sacrifice  save  that  of  honor 
and  independence;  we  seek  no  conquest,  no  aggrandizement, 
no  concession  of  any  kind  from  the  States  with  whom  we  were 
lately  confederated.  All  we  seek  is  to  be  let  alone ;  that  those 
who  never  held  power  over  us  shall  not  now  attempt  our  sub 
jugation  by  arms.  This  we  will,  this  we  must  resist  to  the 
direst  extremity.  The  moment  that  this  pretension  is  aban- 


276  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

doned,  the  sword  will  drop  from  our  grasp,  and  we  shall  be 
ready  to  enter  into  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce  that  can 
not  but  be  materially  beneficial.  So  long  as  this  pretension  is 
maintained,  with  firm  reliance  on  that  divine  power  which 
covers  with  its  protection  the  just  cause,  we  will  continue  the 
struggle  for  our  inherent  right  to  freedom,  independence,  and 
self-government." 

The  geographical  position  of  Virginia  clearly  indicated  that 
State  as  the  Flanders  of  the  war.  Within  her  boundaries  was 
necessarily  to  be  located  the  first  line  of  Confederate  defense, 
and  also  to  be  found  more  than  one  favorable  point  d'appui 
for  the  invading  forces.  To  the  aid  of  important  geographical 
and  physical  considerations,  moral  and  political  necessities 
were  superadded,  to  urge  a  prompt  and  vigorous  assistance  to 
Virginia,  in  the  heroic  effort  which  she  was  preparing  for  her 
deliverance.  With  the  eye  of  the  soldier  and  the  appreciation 
of  the  statesman,  President  Davis  urged  the  immediate  removal 
of  the  seat  of  government  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  seat  of 
war.  On  the  20th  of  May  the  seat  of  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  was  transferred  from  Montgomery  to  Richmond,  the 
capital  of  Virginia,  and  within  a  few  days  afterward  Mr.  Davis 
reached  the  latter  city.* 

*A  recent  work  (Richmond  During  the  War)  thus  mentions  the  arrival 
of  Mr.  Davis  in  Richmond : 

"  He  was  received  with  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm.  A  suite  of  hand- 
gome  apartments  had  been  provided  for  him  at  the  Spotswood  Hotel,  until 
arrangements  could  be  made  for  supplying  him  with  more  elegant  and 
suitable  accommodations.  Over  the  hotel,  and  from  the  various  windows 
of  the  guests,  waved  numerous  Confederate  flags,  and  the  rooms  destined 
for  his  use  were  gorgeously  draped  in  the  Confederate  colors.  In  honor 
of  his  arrival,  almost  every  house  in  the  city  was  decorated  with  the  '  Stars 
and  Bars.' 


EICHMOND    THE   CAPITAL.  277 

The  transfer  of  the  Confederate  capital  to  Richmond  was  an 
event  affecting  the  direction,  character,  and  destinies  of  the 
war  to  such  an  extent  as  entitles  it  to  be  considered  one  of  its 
salient  incidents.  As  a  measure  of  policy,  it  has  been  variously 
viewed,  and  has  involved  some  interesting  discussion  of  mili 
tary  and  strategic  considerations.  In  the  progress  of  events 
during  the  war,  its  wisdom  was  generally  recognized,  and  in 
the  calmer  judgment  of  the  present  there  is  scarcely  a  dissent 
ing  voice  to  the  prevailing  opinion  that  it  was  a  master-stroke 
of  political  sagacity  and  military  forecast. 

High  military  authority  has  been  quoted  in  support  of  the 
opinion  opposed  to  locating  the  Confederate  capital  at  Rich 
mond.  Ingeniously  enough  it  was  alleged  that  such  a  step 
involved  fighting  on  the  exterior  of  the  circle  instead  of  the 
centre,  and  that  thus  the  great  advantage  to  the  party  conduct 
ing  operations  upon  an  interior  line  would  be  surrendered. 
It  was  also  tolerably  certain  that  the  North  would  aim,  in  its 
invasion,  at  the  Confederate  capital  as  the  vital  objective  point 
of  its  campaigns ;  and  to  transfer  the  capital  to  a  point  so  far 

"An  elegant  residence  for  the  use  of  Mr.  Davis  was  soon  procured.  It 
was  situated  in  the  western  part  of  the  city,  on  a  hill,  overlooking  a  land 
scape  of  romantic  beauty.  This  establishment  was  luxuriantly  furnished, 
and  there  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Davis  dispensed  the  elegant  hospitalities  for 
which  they  were  ever  distinguished.  Mrs.  Davis  is  a  tall,  commanding 
figure,  with  dark  hair,  eyes  and  complexion,  and  strongly -marked  expres 
sion,  which  lies  chiefly  in  the  mouth.  With  firmly-set  yet  flexible  lips, 
there  is  indicated  much  energy  of  purpose  and  will,  but  beautifully 
softened  by  the  usually  sad  expression  of  her  dark,  earnest  eyes.  Her 
manners  are  kind,  graceful,  easy,  and  affable,  and  her  receptions  were 
characterized  by  the  dignity  and  suavity  which  should  very  properly  dis 
tinguish  the  drawing  room  entertainments  of  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  a 
Republic." 


278  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

north  as  Richmond,  greatly  diminished  the  enemy's  difficulties 
— first,  as  to  space;  and  secondly,  by  shortening  his  line  of 
transportation  and  supply. 

But  these  views  were  the  conclusions  of  a  purely  strategic 
judgment,  overlooking  entirely  moral  and  political  considera 
tions  involved,  nor  are  they  by  any  means  exhaustive  of  the 
argument  as  to  the  military  aspects  of  the  situation.  The 
courageous  and  unselfish  action  of  Virginia  deserved  a  response 
of  similar  spirit  from  the  Confederacy.  Virginia  had  volun 
tarily  become  the  outpost  of  the  South,  and  her  people  needed 
the  presence  among  them  of  that  authority  which  was  to  wield 
her  great  resources,  organize  her  energies,  and  give  counsel  to 
her  courage.  Her  people  invited  the  Government  to  join 
them  and  make  the  battle  for  the  common  deliverance  of  the 
South  around  their  homesteads.  To  accept  this  invitation  was 
a  step  no  less  characteristic  of  President  Davis  than  was  his 
prompt,  decisive  action  in  the  crisis  at  Buena  Vista.  It  had 
the  combined  advantage  of  bold  defiance  and  prudent  calcula 
tion.  This  bold  courting  of  the  issue  by  the  infant  power, 
at  the  very  outset  of  hostilities,  was  the  foundation  of  that 
brilliant  prestige  which  marked  its  earlier  history.  To  an  ad 
versary  intoxicated  with  an  overweening  sense  of  numerical 
superiority,  and  a  brutal  reliance  upon  his  superior  strength, 
this  defiant  planting  of  the  standard  in  front  of  his  first  line 
was  a  significant  warning  of  the  difficulties  of  the  task  which 
he  had  undertaken. 

President  Davis  has  never  seen  reason  to  regret  the  trans 
fer  of  the  Government  to  Eichmond.  It  bound  Virginia,  by 
indissoluble  ties  to  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy,  and  was 
the  beginning  of  an  affection  for  himself,  among  her  citizens, 
which  it  was  their  pride  to  exhibit  in  the  face  of  calamities 


EVENTS   IN   VIRGINIA.  279 

common  to  him  and  to  themselves.  Not  even  in  his  own 
gallant  State  of  Mississippi  are  the  genius,  virtues,  and  fame 
of  Jefferson  Davis  cherished  with  a  more  tender  association 
than  in  Virginia. 

A  brief  resume  of  events  will  now  assist  to  a  clear  under 
standing  of  the  situation  of  affairs  when  President  Davis 
reached  Richmond  in  the  latter  part  of  May.  Virginia,  a 
week  previously,  had,  by  formal  vote  of  her  people,  ratified 
the  ordinance  of  secession  adopted  by  her  convention.  When 
the  convention  passed  the  ordinance  of  secession  on  the  17th 
of  April,  the  State  authorities,  with  commendable  discretion, 
prepared  to  make  important  seizures  of  arms,  stores,  etc.,  the 
property  of  the  Federal  Government  within  the  limits  of  the 
State.  Governor  Letcher — well  known  for  his  steadfast  de 
votion  to  the  Union,  and  for  his  honorable  zeal  to  preserve 
it — in  this  trying  crisis  of  the  State,  was  nobly  faithful  to  his 
Virginian  instincts,  and  mindful  of  the  honorable  part  which 
devolved  upon  Virginia's  Governor. 

The  capture  of  two  places  of  special  importance  was  sought 
by  expeditions  arranged  with  secrecy  and  ingenuity,  but  re 
sulting,  in  both  instances,  in  only  partial  success.  These 
places  were  Gosport  Navy-yard — famous  for  its  dry-dock, 
shops,  ammunition,  arms,  timber,  rope-walks,  and  other  ap 
purtenances  of  an  extensive  naval  establishment — and  Har 
per's  Ferry,  on  the  Potomac,  with  its  extensive  armory  and 
arsenal,  large  collection  of  arms,  and  valuable  machinery.  At 
the  latter  place,  the  Federal  commander,  by  an  unworthy  sub 
terfuge,  obtained  a  delay  in  the  attack  which  the  Virginians 
were  about  to  make,  and  took  advantage  of  a  parley,  to  at 
tempt  the  destruction,  by  fire,  of  the  buildings  and  machinery. 
Much  valuable  property  was  destroyed,  but  the  State  secured 


280  L.TFE    OF    JKF.FK11.SON    J>AVKS. 

machinery,  which  was  afterward  turned  to  most  important 
account,  and  many  excellent  arms  for  her  rapidly  gathering 
volunteers.  The  attempted  destruction,  by  the  Federals,  at 
Gosport,  was  imperfectly  executed.  Among  the  prizes  cap 
tured  here  was  the  steam  frigate  Merrimac,  nearly  finished, 
but  greatly  damaged  by  fire.  Within  a  very  few  months  this 
vessel  was  destined  to  a  performance,  conspicuous  for  all  time 
in  the  annals  of  naval  warfare. 

The  authorities  of  North  Carolina — a  State  which  had  clung 
with  unsurpassed  fidelity  to  the  Federal  Union — acted  with  a 
vigor  which  well  befitted  a  community  conspicuous,  in  the 
first  American  revolution,  for  the  fidelity  of  its  patriotism. 
Slow  to  reach  her  conclusions,  North  Carolina  was  fully  up  to 
the  demands  of  the  occasion,  in  her  preparation  for  a  struggle, 
during  which  her  revolutionary  fame  was  to  be  excelled  by  a 
second  dedication  of  her  blood  and  energies  to  the  cause  of 
liberty.  On  the  21st  of  May,  North  Carolina,  by  unanimous 
vote  of  her  convention,  adopted  an  ordinance  of  secession. 
Her  brave  Governor  (Ellis)  whose  services  were  too  soon  lost 
to  his  State  and  country,  had  previously  caused  the  seizure  of 
Forts  Macon  and  Caswell,  and  the  arsenal  at  Fayetteville, 
with  nearly  sixty  thousand  arms,  of  which  half  were  of  the 
most  approved  construction. 

On  the  19th  of  April  occurred  a  collision  between  citizens 
of  Baltimore  and  Massachusetts  soldiers,  en  route  to  the  Fed 
eral  capital,  followed  by  such  a  stringent  policy  as  made 
clearly  hopeless  the  open  cooperation  of  Maryland,  unless  by 
successful  invasion  of  the  Confederate  forces. 

Missouri,  under  the  guidance  of  Jackson,  Price,  and  other 
able  and  resolute  leaders,  was  preparing  a  heroic  resistance, 
but  under  difficulties  greater  than  were  experienced  in  any 


GENERAL    LEE.  281 

other  Southern  State,  against  the  domination  established  upon 
her  soil. 

When  President  Davis  reached  Richmond  he  found  Vir 
ginia  in  an  advanced  state  of  preparation.  Thirty  thousand 
troops  were  in  camps  of  instruction,  or  upon  duty  at  Norfolk, 
upon  the  peninsula  of  James  and  York  Rivers,  and  at  differ 
ent  points  upon  the  northern  boundary  of  the  State.  In  su 
preme  command  was  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  the  friend  and 
former  classmate  of  the  President  at  West  Point ;  and,  under 
him,  Colonel  John  B.  Magruder,  also  his  associate  at  West 
Point,  and  other  officers  of  promise  and  ability,  seeking  ser 
vice  in  defense  of  their  native  State  and  the  South.  As  the 
several  States  acceded  to  the  Confederacy,  their  troops,  arms, 
stores,  etc.,  were  turned  over  to  the  Confederate  authorities, 
and  officers  were  assigned  rank  in  the  Confederate  service  by 
a  rule,  regulated  by  the  rank  which  they  had  held  in  the  Fed 
eral  army. 

In  accordance  with  this  rule,  General  Lee  was  third  on  the 
list  of  full  generals  appointed  by  President  Davis — General 
Cooper  being  first,  and  General  Albert  Sydney  Johnston  being 
second.  General  Lee  had  been  first  commissioned,  after  the 
tender  of  his  resignation  in  the  Federal  service,  a  Major- 
General  of  Virginia  forces.  Until  he  was  commissioned  full 
general,  by  President  Davis,  in  June,  1861,  he  continued 
to  act  as  the  general  commanding  the  Virginia  forces,  and  was 
invested  also  with  the  direction  of  the  Confederate  troops 
which  were  arriving  daily  from  the  States  south.  His  author 
ity  was  as  follows : 

"MONTGOMERY,  May  10,  1861. 

"To  Major-General  R.  E.  Lee:  To  prevent  confusion,  you 
will  assume  control  of  the  forces  of  the  Confederate  States  in 


282  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Virginia,  and  assign  them  to  such  duties  as  you  may  in 
dicate,  until  further  orders;  for  which  this  will  be  your 
authority. 

"  L.  P.  WALKER,  Secretary  of  War." 

It  would  be  impossible  to  overestimate  the  services  of  Gen 
eral  Lee  in  the  preparation  of  the  Virginia  troops  for  the 
field,  and  in  preparing  the  general  defense  of  the  State  by  the 
location  and  dis  osition  of  the  Confederate  forces  as  they  ar 
rived  in  Virginia.  His  distinguished  services  afterwards  are 
hardly  better  evidence  of  his  genius  as  a  soldier,  than  the 
results  of  his  arduous  labors  at  this  trying  period,  and  in  a 
position  of  comparative  obscurity.  President  Davis  fully  in 
dicated  his  confidence  in  the  counsels  of  Lee  by  his  constant 
retention  of  him  at  his  side.  The  South  has  probably  not  yet 
appreciated  the  extent  to  which  the  genius  of  Lee,  in  coopera 
tion  with  that  of  Davis,  aided  in  those  earlier  achieve 
ments  of  the  war,  which  secured  the  immediate  preservation 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  earned  so  flattering  a  reputation  for 
others. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  Confederate  authority  in 
Virginia,  reinforcements  from  other  States  were  constantly 
added  to  her  own  levies,  and  by  the  middle  of  June,  more 
than  fifty  thousand  men  were  in  arms  for  her  defense.  As 
yet,  collisions  between  the  opposing  forces  had  been  rare,  and 
totally  indecisive.  A  force  of  raw  volunteers,  unorganized 
and  imperfectly  armed,  was  surprised  in  Western  Virginia,  by 
a  movement  of  considerable  vigor  on  the  part  of  the  Federal 
commander,  and  the  patriots,  under  Colonel  Porterfield,  com 
pelled  to  retreat.  At  Great  Bethel,  near  Fortress  Monroe,  a 
few  hundred  Virginians  and  North  Carolinians,  under  Colonel 


MAGRUDER'S  VICTORY.  283 

Magruder,  handsomely  repulsed  a  large  column  of  Federal 
troops,  attempting  to  advance  up  the  peninsula.  In  the  then 
uneducated  popular  idea  of  military  operations,  the  fight  at 
Bethel  was  magnified  to  an  extent  greatly  beyond  its  real 
importance.  It  had,  nevertheless,  a  timely  significance,  in  its 
evidence  of  the  spirit  of  the  Confederate  soldiery.  President 
Davis  was  pleased  to  recognize  this  fact  in  a  congratulatory 
letter  to  Governor  Ellis,  commending  the  conduct  of  the  North 
Carolinians  who  were  engaged  in  the  fight. 

These  minor  affairs  were  preliminary  incidents  to  the 
thrilling  events,  upon  a  more  extended  scale  of  operations,  and 
upon  a  more  important  theatre,  which  were  to  make  mem 
orable  the  approaching  midsummer.  Pending  the  preparations, 
active  and  extensive  on  both  sides,  for  the  coming  grand 
encounter,  there  was  a  marked  pause  in  military  operations, 
attended  by  an  agreeable  subsidence  of  the  feverish  excitement 
of  which  war  is  so  productive.  The  struggle  for  the  mastery 
in  Virginia,  which  it  was  plain  would  decide  the  present  fate 
of  the  Southern  movement,  was  destined  also  to  decide,  in  a 
large  measure,  the  extent  and  duration  of  the  war.  Viewed 
in  its  historical  significance,  it  becomes  chiefly  important  as  a 
stage  of  the  revolution  indicating  a  new  departure,  and  an 
altered  direction  of  events.  Preparation  was  now  to  be  dis 
placed  by  action.  Skirmishes  were  to  be  followed  by  heavy 
engagements,  and  the  high  prestige  of  the  South  was  now  to 
be  subjected  to  its  first  test,  in  that  long  series  of  cruel  en 
counters,  between  valor  and  endurance  on  one  side,  and  mere 
weight  of  numbers  on  the  other. 

Preliminary  to  the  narrative  of  these  important  events,  ap 
propriately  arises  one  phase  of  that  historical  question  which 
involves  the  statesmanship,  the  forecast,  and  the  general  fitness 


284  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

of  Jefferson  Davis  in  the  position  which  he  now  occupied, 
and  under  the  circumstances  by  which  he  was  surrounded. 

It  would  be  a  superfluous  and  unprofitable  task  to  consider 
in  detail  the  numerous  allegations,  trivial  and  serious,  made 
against  President  Davis  by  his  assailants,  in  support  of  their 
professed  belief  in  his  responsibility  for  the  failure  of  the 
Confederate  cause.  When  facts  are  perverted,  history  dis 
torted,  and  prejudice,  rather  than  truth,  is  the  governing  in 
fluence,  such  allegations  will  be  sufficiently  numerous,  even 
though  they  be  not  well  sustained.  Nor  yet  is  it  maintained 
that  President  Davis  committed  no  errors  in  the  long  and 
trying  term  of  his  administration.  It  is  very  certain  that  no 
such  defense,  asserting  his  infallibility,  would  be  approved 
by  him.  But  the  real  historical  significance  of  the  ques 
tion  of  Mr.  Davis7  capacity  for  his  office  may  be  reduced 
to  very  simple  dimensions.  Conceding  him  to  be  mor 
tal,  we  concede  that  he  is  fallible.  Then  the  question  arises, 
"Were  his  errors  sufficiently  numerous  and  serious,  unaided  by 
other  and  greater  causes,  to  have  occasioned  the  failure  of  the 
South  in  the  late  war  ?  Again,  conceding  still  more  liberally 
to  his  assailants,  were  those  errors  the  chief  causes  of  a  failure, 
which  might  have  been  avoided,  despite  all  other  adverse  in 
fluences,  disadvantages,  and  obstacles,  if  a  different  adminis 
trative  policy  had  prevailed  ? 

The  subject  now  has  no  value,  save  in  its  historical  sense, 
and  in  that  sense  its  value  must  be  determined  from  the  stand 
point  just  indicated.  At  least  it  is  in  that  aspect  that  we 
propose  to  consider  it,  whenever  its  discussion  shall  be  appro 
priate  in  these  pages.  The  consideration  will  be  modified  by 
many  collateral  questions  which  must  incidentally  arise.  It 
may  be  necessary  to  ask  if  no  other  Southern  leader,  entrusted 


•' 


AN   IMPORTANT   QUESTION.  285 


with  great  responsibilities,  and  enjoying  uninterrupted  popular 
favor,  during  and  since  the  war,  committed  mistakes  quite  as 
serious  and  frequent  as  did  the  President,  in  proportion  to  the 
multiplicity  of  his  cares  ?  It  may  be  appropriate,  too,  to  con 
sider  the  influence  that  these  mistakes  of  others  exerted  upon 
those  final  disasters  for  which  he  alone  is  held  responsible. 
These  questions  we  propose  to  consider,  each  in  its  appropriate 
place,  and  with  becoming  candor.  If  we  shall  not  meet  the 
arguments  and  allegations  employed  against  Mr.  Davis  with 
a  spirit  more  ingenuous  than  has  seemed  to  actuate  his  assail 
ants,  our  success  must  be  poor,  indeed. 

Those  who  profess  to  consider  President  Davis  wanting  in 
the  necessary  qualifications  for  his  position,  dwell  with  especial 
emphasis  upon  what  they  are  pleased  to  characterize  his  fail 
ure  in  the  early  months  of  the  war,  to  foresee  its  character, 
duration  and  magnitude,  and  the  consequent  imperfect  prepara 
tion  of  the  Confederate  Government.  It  is  asserted  that  he 
was  utterly  blind  to  all  the  indications  of  a  long  and  obstinate 
struggle,  urged  upon  his  attention  by  a  more  sagacious  states 
manship  than  his  own  ;  that  he  was  persistent  and  arrogant 
in  his  prophecies  of  a  struggle,  short,  brilliant,  and  over 
whelming  in  favor  of  the  South,  even  after  the  war  had  com 
menced;  and  that  before  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  he  was 
no  less  positive  in  his  convictions  that  there  would  be  no  war; 
that  he  was,  in  short,  stupidly  unreasoning  and  inactive,  deaf 
alike  to  entreaties,  arguments,  and  facts. 

If,  indeed,  it  could  be  established  that  during  the  era  of 
secession  (the  interval  between  November,  1860,  and  April, 
1861),  Mr.  Davis  had  cherished  expectations  of  peaceable  sepa 
ration,  and  that  during  that  portion  of  his  presidential  term 
embraced  before  the  assault  upon  Sumter,  relying  upon  this 


286  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

prospect  of  peace,  he  had  failed  to  prepare  for  war,  then,  in 
deed,  would  his  responsibility  be  great ;  but  it  would  be  shared 
by  every  contemporary  statesman  of  the  South,  almost,  if  not 
quite,  without  an  exception.  History  may  palliate  the  amaz 
ing  infatuation  of  the  Southern  masses  at  this  period,  but 
surely  its  verdict  must  be  a  contemptuous  condemnation  of 
that  vaunted  statesmanship  which  scouted  war  as  the  result  of 
secession,  as  an  impossibility,  and  its  anticipation  as  the  pro 
duct  of  timidity.  But  President  Davis  is  not  driven  to  the 
extremity  of  seeking  so  poor  a  refuge  as  the  common  and 
universal  blindness  and  weakness  of  that  critical  period.  Re 
cognizing  the  justice  of  that  test  which  demands  of  the  true 
statesman  a  prescience  beyond  the  average  vision,  it  is  believed 
that  his  defense  may  be  made  easy  and  triumphant. 

Candid  investigation  will  demonstrate  the  fact  that  Davis, 
among  Southern  statesmen,  was  an  almost  solitary  exception 
in  his  rejection  of  the  dominant  sentiment  of  the  times.  The 
remarkable  consistency  of  his  public  life  is  in  no  respect  better 
sustained  than  in  his  oft-repeated  apprehensions  of  eventual 
war  between  the  sections.  His  dread  of  disunion  arose  from 
his  dread  of  civil  war,  and  the  latter  he  always  urged  to  be 
the  necessary  consequence  of  the  former.  Striving  to  save  the 
Union  upon  a  just  and  constitutional  basis,  he  yet  habitually 
admonished  the  South  of  the  inevitable  result  of  disunion,  and 
coupled  his  admonitions  with  earnest  exhortations  of  thorough 
preparation  for  the  most  serious  emergency  in  its  history. 
His  speeches,  addresses,  and  letters,  furnish  irrefutable  testi 
mony  of  his  apprehension  of  civil  war  as  an  inevitable  con 
comitant  of  disunion.  Not  one  line,  or  one  sentence,  written  or 
uttered  by  him  in  the  entire  period  of  his  public  career,  can  be  so 
construed  as  to  indicate  a  different  conviction.  Believing  that 


THE   FACTS   OF   THE   CASE.  287 

he  foresaw  the  impending  conflict,  he  strove  with  indefatigable 
energy  and  incomparable  ability,  in  company  with  Calhoun, 
in  1850,  to  place  the  South  in  a  position  which  would  then 
have  rescued  her  liberties.  If  the  warning  voice  of  the  South, 
proclaiming  the  inexorable  decree  of  disunion,  unless  her  con 
stitutional  rights  were  fully  and  forever  secured,  had  then  been 
disregarded,  at  least  her  resistance  must  have  been  more  effect 
ual  than  it  could  become  by  postponement.  In  innumerable 
passages  of  rare  eloquence,  he  has  left  an  imperishable  record 
of  patriotic  devotion  to  a  constitutional  union,  and  touching 
proofs  of  the  emotion  with  which  he  contemplated  the  evils 
which  were  to  follow  its  destruction.  The  words  of  his  fare 
well  address  to  the  Senate,  ("  putting  our  trust  in  God,  and  in 
our  firm  hearts  and  strong  arms,  we  will  vindicate  the  right 
as  best  we  may")  do  not  more  clearly  indicate  the  calm  de 
termination  with  which  he  would  meet  the  peril,  than  his 
appreciation  of  its  serious  nature. 

When  it  is  alleged  that  the  inadequate  preparation  of  the 
South,  during  the  period  which  we  have  characterized  as  the 
era  of  secession,  enters  as  a  most  important  feature  in  the 
explanation  of  her  failure,  a  proposition  is  boldly  asserted, 
which  is,  at  least,  debatable;  but  its  discussion  does  not 
devolve  upon  us.*  Mr.  Davis  is  assuredly  not  to  be  held 

*  We  intentionally  waive  the  discussion  of  this  question  as  to  the  extent 
of  the  preparation  made  by  the  States,  severally,  for  actual  war.  It  is  not 
incumbent  upon  us  here  to  examine  the  action  of  the  individual  States. 
We  do  not  desire  to  be  understood,  however,  as  assenting  to  the  proposi 
tion  that  all  the  States  were  inadequately  prepared.  It  is  a  singular 
commentary  upon  the  wisdom  and  sagacity  of  the  leaders  of  secession  in 
its  earlier  stages  (by  the  various  States),  that  Virginia  and  North  Caro 
lina  were  each  better  able  to  arm  their  troops  than  were  some  of  the 
Cotton  States.  The  latter  may  have  made  as  much  preparation  as  waa 


288  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

justly  accountable  for  what  the  various  States  failed  to  do  while 
he  was  at  his  post  of  duty  in  the  Senate,  and  in  no  manner 
controlling  their  action.  No  responsibility  can  attach  to  him 
teyond  the  action  of  the  Confederate  Government,  save  in  the 
case  of  his  own  State,  and  whatever  preparation  Mississippi 
made  was  at  his  instance.  By  what  law  of  justice  or  logic 
can  Mr.  Davis  be  made  accountable  for  the  inadequate  prepa 
ration  of  Georgia,  (assuming  that  Georgia  was  unprepared,  or 
had  omitted  any  preparation  that  was  possible  under  the  cir 
cumstances),  which  then  had  the  full  benefit  of  the  counsels  of 
reputed  statesmen  like  Messrs.  Toombs,  Stephens,  and  Brown? 
or  of  South  Carolina,  under  the  counsels  of  Messrs.  Bhett  and 
Orr,  and  the  Charleston  Mercury  ?  Of  Alabama,  led  by  the  bril 
liant  genius  of  Mr.  Yancey  ?  Yet,  upon  the  aggregate  resources 
and  means  of  defense  of  these  and  the  other  States  must  depend 
the  safety  of  the  Confederacy.  While  Mr.  Davis  was  yet  in 
Washington,  striving  against  hope  to  avert  the  dreaded  issue, 
many  of  the  States,  under  the  guidance  of  their  leading  men, 
were  passing  ordinances  of  secession.  Assuredly,  then,  he  is 
not  to  be  censured  for  any  .lack  of  preparation  at  this  period. 
Yet  no  very  close  examination  of  the  record  is  necessary  to 
establish  the  fact,  that  those  who  have  since  been  most  forward 
in  denying  the  prevision  of  statesmanship  to  Davis,  were  then, 
by  their  own  showing,  precipitating  their  several  States  into 

possible  under  the  circumstances.  When  Mr.  Davis  reached  Mississippi, 
after  his  withdrawal  from  the  Senate,  the  Legislature  had  appropriated 
$150,000  for  military  purposes.  As  Major-General  commanding  the  forces 
of  the  State,  he  was  consulted  as  to  additional  appropriations.  He  imme 
diately  recommended  an  appropriation  of  three  millions  of  dollars.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  such  a  recommendation,  at  that  period,  was  deemed 
little  less  than  extravagant  folly. 


MR.    DAVIS'    RESPONSIBILITY.  289 

secession,  totally  unprepared  for  a  war,  the  very  possibility  of 
which  they  derided. 

The  responsibility  of  Mr.  Davis  can  date  only  from  his  in 
auguration  as  President  of  the  Confederate  States,  on  February 
18,  1861.  Between  that  date  and  the  actual  breaking  out  of 
war  was  ah  interval  of  less  than  two  months.  Within  this 
period  the  results  accomplished  were  certainly  all  that  could 
have  been  anticipated,  and  all  that  ever  were  accomplished  by 
any  government  yet  in  its  infancy,  within  the  same  space  of 
time.  The  organization  of  the  Government  had  been  perfected, 
efforts  made  to  secure  intercourse  with  foreign  nations,  and  the 
civil  administration  completed  in  all  important  features.  With 
the  aid  of  that  master  genius  for  organization,  General  Samuel 
Cooper,  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General  of  the  Confederate 
army,  the  basis  of  a  military  organization,  upon  which  the 
most  splendid  armies  of  modern  history  were  speedily  created, 
was  prepared ;  troops  were  called  into  the  field ;  and  the  Con 
federacy,  in  proportion  to  its  means,  was  actually  placed,  in  two 
months,  upon  a  war  footing,  not  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy 
at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

The  unprejudiced  Northern  or  European  reader,  whose  ad 
miration  has  been  freely  expressed  for  the  valor  and  endurance 
of  the  South,  and  for  the  skillful  use  of  its  comparatively 
limited  resources,  may  well  be  amazed  at  the  censures  of  Mr. 
Davis,  from  Southern  sources. 

But  what  was  his  error  after  assumption  of  the  Presidency  ? 
More  important  still,  what  is  the  evidence  ?  So  far  as  we  have 
been  able  to  gather  the  evidence,  it  consists  in  the  fact  that 
President  Davis  did  not  urge  the  indiscriminate  purchase  of 
arms  in  Europe,  or  wherever  else  they  might  have  been  obr 
tained.  The  intelligent  foreign  reader  can  only  be  amazed 
19 


290  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

that,  upon  this  single  fact — for  it  is  the  only  fact  alleged — rests 
the  charge  that  President  Davis  did  not  make  adequate  prep 
aration  for  war.  The  answer  is  very  simple,  and  indisputable. 
First,  the  Confederate  Government,  from  the  date  of  its  organ 
ization,  endeavored  constantly  to  purchase  serviceable  arms 
wherever  they  could  be  obtained.  Second,  the  Confederate 
Government  had  given  extensive  orders  to  Northern  manu 
factories  (because  they  were  nearest)  at  Chickopee  and  elsewhere, 
some  of  which  were  filled  and  the  arms  received,  while,  in 
other  cases,  they  were  seized  by  the  Federal  authorities  after 
the  commencement  of  hostilities  while  en  route  South.  Third, 
there  were  very  few  serviceable  arms  to  be  purchased  in  Eu 
rope  ;  and  in  support  of  this  assertion  we  have  only  to  recall 
the  enormous  swindles  practised  on  the  Federal  Government 
in  its  purchase  of  arms  in  Europe  at  this  period.  Arms  were 
offered,  in  some  instances,  to  the  Government,  and  rejected, 
because  President  Davis,  while  Secretary  of  War,  had  become 
acquainted  with  their  worthlessness  ;  and  thus,  while  certain 
speculations  were  disappointed,  the  means  of  the  Government 
were  not  squandered.  An  examination  of  the  records  will 
demonstrate  the  fact  that  the  Confederate  Ordnance  Bureau, 
under  Colonel  Gorgas,  was  conducted  with  signal  judgment 
and  ability.  From  the  beginning  to  the  end,  it  was  managed 
with  a  success  which  entitles  it  to  be  considered  probably  the 
most  ably  conducted  bureau  of  the  Government. 

But  not  only  do  the  recorded  events  of  the  period  vindicate 
Mr.  Davis  from  the  accusations  of  a  tardy  and  delinquent  pol 
icy  in  providing  for  the  threatened  emergency  of  war ;  they 
are  fully  conclusive  as  to  the  energetic  provision  made  when 
hostilities  were  opened.  Nothing  can  be  more  emphatic  in 
its  enunciation  of  a  bold,  vigorous  policy  than  President  Da- 


VIGOROUS   POLICY   OF   PRESIDENT   DAVIS.  291 

vis'  message  to  the  Confederate  Congress,  assembled  by  special 
convocation,  on  the  29th  of  April  :*  "  There  are  now  in  the 
field  at  Charleston,  Pensacola,  Forts  Morgan,  Jackson,  St. 
Philip,  and  Pulaski,  nineteen  thousand  men,  and  sixteen 
thousand  are  now  en  route  for  Virginia.  It  is  proposed  to 
organize  and  hold  in  readiness  for  instant  action,  in  mew  of 
the  present  exigencies  of  the  country,  an  army  of  one  hundred 
thousand  men"  Surely  we  must  look  elsewhere  than  to  such 
an  announcement  as  this,  for  evidence  in  support  of  this  pre 
tended  absence  of  foresight,  and  inappreciation  of  the  extent 
and  character  of  the  approaching  struggle.  This,  be  it  re 
membered,  was  in  Davis7  first  response  to  the  Federal  declara 
tion  of  war,  only  two  weeks  after  the  fall  of  Sumter,  and  when 
President  Lincoln  had,  as  yet,  called  for  but  seventy-five 
thousand  men.  This  was  the  spirit  in  which  President  Davis 
began  the  contest,  and  the  results  which  immediately  followed, 
in  months  of  brilliant  and  consecutive  triumphs,  demonstrated 
the  ample  provision  made  for  the  emergency  .f 

In  marked  contrast  with  this  vigorous  policy  were  the  silly 
vaporings  of  demagogues,  prating  of  Southern  invincibility 
against  a  world  in  arms,  protesting  that  the  North,  under  no 
circumstances,  could  be  induced  to  fight,  and  scouting  a  longer 

*  It  should  be  observed  that  Mr.  Lincoln  did  not  call  upon  the  Federal 
Congress  to  assemble  until  July  4th,  two  months  after  the  meeting  of  the 
Confederate  Congress. 

f  In  this  connection,  we  quote  from  a  remarkably  faithful  and  careful 
chronicle  of  events  during  a  portion  of  the  war :  "  On  the  morning  of 

the  29th  of  May,  President  Davis  arrived  in  Richmond 

He  found  the  military  preparations  in  a  state  requiring  instant  energy, 
and,  within  a  few  hours  after  his  arrival,  he  telegraphed  and  wrote  mes 
sages  to  every  State  in  the  South,  urging  that  troops  should  be  sent  for 
ward  with  increased  speed." — Howisoris  History  of  the  War. 


292  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

duration  of  a  war  with  "  Yankees,"  than  six  months  at  the 
farthest.  That ,  such  was  the  dominant  conviction  at  Mont 
gomery,  no  contemporary  authority  will  deny.  An  eminent 
Virginian,  a  commissioner  from  his  own  State  to  the  Confed 
erate  Congress,  was  amazed  to  hear  laughed  at  as  an  excellent 
joke,  his  congratulations  to  that  body,  upon  the  wise  de 
termination  to  locate  the  seat  of  government  at  Richmond,  in 
close  proximity  to  the  seat  of  war.  The  grave  legislators  at 
Montgomery,  at  least,  had  not  yet  comprehended  that  there 
was  to  be  war. 

But  perhaps  we  are  in  fault,  in  thus  offering  the  evidence 
of  uncontradicted  facts  and  obvious  conclusions,  where  only 
vague  inferences  and  unsupported  allegations  are  urged  'to  the 
contrary.  There  are  graver  questions  yet  to  be  encountered, 
far  better  justifying  difference  of  opinion,  and  affording  better 
ground  for  discussion  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Southern  fail 
ure.  Censure  of  those  who  have  had  the  conduct  of  a  ruined 
cause  is ,  as  inevitable  as  the  criticism  which  ever  waits  upon 
history;  but  it  is  not,  therefore,  always  just.  A  great 
soldier,*  who  has  but  recently  contributed  a  chapter  to  his 
tory,  thrilling  in  interest  and  inestimable  in  importance,  when 
congratulated  since  upon  his  brilliant  triumphs,  touchingly 
replied  :  "  How  would  it  have  been  if  success — this  unexam 
pled  success — had  not  crowned  our  undertaking?  Would  not 
this  undeserved  exaltation  have  been  so  much  unreasonable 
criticism  and  undeserved  blame  ?  " 

To  a  certain  class  of  Southern  critics,  we  commend  the 
magnanimous  sentiment  of  an  illustrious  fellow-countryman,f 

*  General  Von  Molkte,  who  planned  the  Prussian  campaign  in  Bo 
hemia. 

f  General  Jubal  A.  Early. 


GENEEAL    EARLY'S    OPINION.  293 

now  mourning,  in  exile,  the  afflictions  of  his  country:  "As 
for  myself,  I  have  not  undertaken  to  speculate  as  to  the  causes 
of  our  failure,  as  I  have  seen  abundant  reason  for  it  in  the 
tremendous  odds  brought  against  us.  Having  had  some 
means  of  judging,  I  will,  however,  say  that,  in  my  opinion, 
both  President  Davis  and  General  Lee,  in  their  respective 
spheres,  did  all  for  the  success  of  our  cause  which  it  was  pos 
sible  for  mortal  men  to  do ;  and  it  is  a  great  privilege  and 
comfort  for  me  so  to  believe,  and  to  have  been  able  to  bring 
with  me,  into  exile,  a  profound  love  and  veneration  for  those 
great  men." 


294  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    X. 

SHARACTERISTICS    OF    THE    WAR  IN    1861 — THE    TWO   GOVERNMENTS    MORE    DI 
RECTLY    CONNECTED    WITH     RESULTS    IN    THE    FIELD    THAN    AT    SUBSEQUENT 

PERIODS MR.     DAVIS'     CONNECTION    WITH     THE     MILITARY     POLICY    OF    THE 

CONFEDERACY THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  ADOPTS,   IN  THE  MAIN,   THE 

DEFENSIVE  POLICY  OF  THE  VIRGINIAN  AUTHORITIES FEDERAL  PREPARATIONS 

GENERAL  SCOTT DEFENSIVE  PLANS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES DISTRIBUTION 

OF   THEIR    FORCES THE    CONFEDERATE    CAMPAIGN    OF    1861    JUSTIFIED DIS 
TRIBUTION  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FORCES PROGRESS  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN — GENERALS 

PATTERSON    AND    JOHNSTON JUNCTION    OF    BEAUREGARD    AND    JOHNSTON 

MANASSAS PRESIDENT    DAVIS    ON    THE    BATTLE-FIELD — HIS    DISPATCH HIS 

RETURN  TO    RICHMOND A  SPEECH  NEVER  PUBLISHED  BEFORE REFLECTIONS 

UPON    THE    RESULTS    OF    MANASSAS — MR.    DAVIS   NOT    RESPONSIBLE    FOR    THB 

ABSENCE    OF    PURSUIT — STONEWALL    JACKSON* S    VIEWS DAVIS    IN   FAVOR    OF 

PURSUIT    OF    THE    FEDERALS MISREPRESENTATIONS MILITARY   MOVEMENTS 

IN    VARIOUS    QUARTERS — THE     "TRENT    AFFAIR1' — RESULTS    OF    THE    FIRST 
YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. 

WHATEVER  crudities  may  appear  in  the  general  plans 
of  warfare,  adopted  by  the  American  belligerents  in 
1861,  when  tested  by  the  maxims  which  have  obtained  in 
other  wars,  waged  upon  different  theatres  of  action,  and  for 
different  purposes,  at  least  there  was  not  wanting  a  palpable 
and  definitive  shape.  "With  remarkable  rapidity  and  precision, 
the  military  situation  was  adjusted  to  the  attainment  of  certain 
general  objects,  which  continued,  during  the  successive  stages 
of  the  war,  to  be  pursued,  with  varying  fortune,  by  the  re 
spective  contestants. 

The  incipient  campaign  of  the  war  was  peculiarly  regulated 


DAVIS7  CONNECTION  WITH  MILITARY  OPERATIONS.      295 

and  determined  by  the  paramount  aims  which  had  impelled 
the  respective  parties  to  arms.  Of  necessity,  the  campaign,  on 
the  part  of  the  North,  must  be  offensive,  while  the  South,  in 
a  defensive  attitude,  must  prepare  to  parry  the  blows  of  her 
assailant.  The  pretext  of  the  Xorth  was  to  assert  the  "  na 
tional  authority  "  over  what  it  was  pleased  to  term  "  rebellious  " 
territory.  The  animus  of  the  South  was  to  repel  an  invasion 
which  menaced  her  liberties  and  firesides.  Whatever  advan 
tages  may  have  belonged  to  the  position  of  the  South  were  not 
overlooked  by  those  who  were  charged  with  her  defense;  and 
it  may  safely  be  claimed,  in  view  of  the  immediate  and  over 
whelming  result  in  her  favor,  that  whatever  compensation,  for 
obvious  disadvantages,  she  had  anticipated  from  the  resources 
of  skillful  leadership,  was  fairly  rendered. 

The  two  Governments,  at  Washington  and  at  Richmond, 
were  then  more  directly  chargeable  with  the  actual  results  in 
the  field  than  at  subsequent  periods.  The  army  had  then 
become  less  independent  of  the  Government.  Its  organic 
structure  was  undeveloped,  and  it  had  not  yet  become  identi 
fied  with  those  commanders  whose  history  was  hereafter  to  be 
so  interwoven  with  its  own.  In  a  general  sense,  it  may  be 
remarked,  that  the  connection  of  President  Davis  with  all  the 
campaigns  of  the  Confederate  army,  was  that  which  the  country 
designed  it  should  be,  when,  in  consequence  of  his  military 
aptitude  and  experience,  it  placed  him  in  charge  of  the  public 
administration.  Moreover,  it  was  consistent  with  that  inevi 
table  responsibility  which  attached  to  the  office  of  chief  execu 
tive.  Ignorant  and  intemperate  partisans  have  labored  to 
prove  his  responsibility  for  those  casualties  of  war,  which  are 
utterly  beyond  human  calculations,  and  to  trace  to  his  influence 
disasters  of  the  battle-field,  with  which  he  could  by  no  possi- 


296  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSOX   DAVIS. 

bility  have  been  connected.  As  is  usual  in  such  cases,  these 
criticisms  are  made  with  a  total  forgetfulness  of  the  uninten 
tional  tribute,  which  is  accorded  to  Mr.  Davis,  in  ascribing  to 
him  the  chief  responsibility  for  .a  military  administration,  which 
the  world  declares  to  have  had  few  parallels  in  its  history. 

When  President  Davis  reached  Richmond,  from  Montgom 
ery,  the  military  situation  had  already  assumed  a  well-defined 
shape.  The  plans  of  defense,  adopted  by  the  Virginian  au 
thorities,  mainly  under  the  direction  of  General  Lee,  and  car 
ried  into  partial  execution  before  the  alliance  with  the  Confed 
eracy  had  been  formally  consummated,  were  adhered  to  by  the 
Confederate  Government.  President  Davis,  as  we  have  seen, 
fully  impressed  with  the  demands  of  the  exigency,  immediately 
upon  his  arrival,  addressed  himself,  with  characteristic  vigor 
and  promptitude,  to  such  measures  as  would  secure  a  successful 
campaign.  In  the  meantime,  the  preparations  of  the  Federal 
Government  were  equally  vigorous,  and  by  no  means  indefinite 
in  their  aims. 

Whatever  may  be  the  comparative  merits,  when  placed  in 
antithetical  juxtaposition,  of  the  plans  of  campaign  adopted  by 
the  two  Governments  in  1861,  or  whatever  may  be  alleged  of 
the  blunders  and  mishaps  of  the  Federal  scheme  of  warfare, 
there  could  be  no  question  of  the  full  comprehension  of  the 
necessities  of  the  situation  by  the  veteran  commander  of  the 
Federal  armies.  We  are  not  called  upon  here  to  give  an 
opinion  of  General  Scott  in  his  personal  or  political  relations, 
but  that  combination  of  sagacious  military  minds,  upon  which 
devolved  the  defense  of  Southern  liberties,  was  not  likely  to 
commit  the  error  of  a  disparaging  estimate  of  his  abilities. 

General  Scott,  far  in  advance  of  the  prevailing  opinion  at 
the  North,  dreamed  of  no  holiday  enterprise.  He  well  knew 


DEFENSIVE  ATTITUDE  OF  THE  CONFEDEKACY.         297 

that  Southern  valor,  directed  by  leaders  whose  names  were 
identified  with  the  proudest  prestige  of  America,  and  enlisted 
in  the  defense  of  principles  which  were  the  dearest  convictions 
and  traditions  of  the  Southern  heart,  was  not  to  be  crushed  in 
a  "  three-months7 "  wrestle  of  arms.  Accordingly,  his  prepara 
tions  were  for  war  in  its  broadest  and  most  terrible  sense;  a 
war  between  powerful  nationalities;  a  war  in  which,  though 
sustained  by  inexhaustible  resources  and  popular  enthusiasm, 
he  had  yet  to  contend  with  a  race  essentially  military  in  its 
instincts,  earnest  in  conviction,  led  by  men  whose  capacities  he 
had  amply  tested,  and  aided  by  defensive  position,  vast  extent 
of  territory,  and  by  those  numerous  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
conquest,  which  must  have  been  apparent  to  the  eye  of  an 
experienced  soldier. 

The  attitude  of  the  Confederate  Government  was  necessarily 
defensive.  History  would  be  searched  in  vain  for  examples 
justifying  an  invasion  by  a  people  entirely  agricultural  in 
habits  and  resources,  weak  in  numbers,  and  with  a  govern 
ment  not  yet  organized  three  months,  of  a  powerful  manufac 
turing  and  commercial  nation,  of  dense  population,  and  great 
wealth  and  resources.  Without  supplies,  equipment  and  trans 
portation,  and  without  the  time  or  opportunity  to  obtain  them, 
successful  invasion  of  the  North,  however  attractive  to  the 
popular  imagination,  was  clearly  impossible.  Viewed  from 
the  more  educated  stand-point,  furnished  by  the  later  develop 
ments  of  the  war,  the  crude  ideas,  from  which  arose  the  popu 
lar  aspiration  of  at  once  "  carrying  the  war  into  Africa,"  are 
ludicrous  in  the  extreme.  Indeed,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  defensive,  subjected  to  such  modifications  as  the  casual 
ties  of  war  render  proper  and  necessary  in  all  plans,  whether 
offensive  or  defensive,  was  at  all  times  the  true  policy  of  the 


298  LIFE   OP   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

South.  Certain  it  is,  that,  upon  two  occasions,  essaying  the 
offensive  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  and  under 
their  greatest  commander,  the  Confederates  were  overtaken  by 
disaster.  There  can  be  no  just  criterion,  furnished  by  Euro 
pean  wars,  by  which  to  test  the  Confederate  military  policy  in 
the  main.  Parallels  between  the  American  civil  war  and  those 
waged  by  Frederick  the  Great  and  Napoleon  are  inadmissable. 
Not  only  were  circumstances  entirely  dissimilar,  but  able  mili 
tary  critics  have  indicated  physical  peculiarities,  forbidding  the 
unexceptional  application  to  American  warfare,  of  maxims 
which,  elsewhere,  are  undisputed. 

Nevertheless,  war  as  a  science  must  be  worse  than  useless, 
unless  its  underlying  principles  have  universal  application. 
Nor  is  it  maintained  that  there  were  no  circumstances  which 
would  have  justified  a  departure  from  the  usually  defensive 
policy  of  the  Confederates.  Upon  two  occasions  the  main 
army  of  the  South,  having  successfully  encountered  upon  its 
own  soil  the  most  prodigious  efforts  of  the  enemy's  strength, 
sought  to  follow  him  in  the  moment  of  his  recoil.  The  Con 
federate  invasion  of  1862,  culminating  at  Antietam,  and  that 
of  1863,  culminating  at  Gettysburg,  were  undertaken  with  the 
purpose  of  destroying,  upon  his  own  soil,  an  enemy  already 
defeated.  Each  of  these  endeavors  was  based  upon  sound 
principles;  and  there  is  no  little  palliation  for  the  disaster,  in 
either  case,  in  reflecting  how  great  would  have  been  the  results 
of  success.  Much  of  the  philosophy  of  the  war  in  Virginia  is 
to  be  explained  by  the  fact  of  the  thoroughly  aggressive  char 
acter,  as  soldiers,  of  President  Davis  and  General  Lee.  These 
two  directing  minds,  by  whose  combined  genius  and  will,  the 
fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  were  so  long  upheld,  in  full  and 
cordial  cooperation  during  the  entire  war,  were  in  nothing 


DISTRIBUTION   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   FORCES.          299 

more  harmonious,  than  in  the  desire  for  an  aggressive  cam 
paign,  whenever  it  could  be  undertaken  with  a  reasonable 
promise  of  success.  Hence,  the  history  of  the  army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  develops,  throughout,  that  military  policy  which 
is  known  as  the  "defensive  with  offensive  returns." 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  between  Virginia  and 
the  Confederate  States,  which  placed  all  "military  opera 
tions,  offensive  and  defensive,  in  Virginia,"  under  the  control 
of  the  Confederate  President,  troops  from  the  other  South 
ern  States  had  been  thrown  northward  with  astonishing 
rapidity.  As  rapidly  as  they  arrived,  regiments  were  sent  to 
the  various  localities  where  it  had  been  thought  expedient  to 
establish  a  defensive  force.  These  posts  were  distributed  with 
a  view  to  their  strategic  bearing  upon  particular  sections  of 
territory,  which  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  defend,  and  also 
with  reference  to  their  strategic  connection  with  each  other, 
and  with  the  chain  of  combinations  making  the  general  plan 
of  defense. 

In  the  early  summer,  the  distribution  of  the  Southern  forces 
in  Virginia  was  as  follows :  At  Manassas  Junction,  thirty-five 
miles  south-west  from  Washington,  and  the  point  of  intersec 
tion  of  the  lines  of  railroad  running  southward  to  Richmond, 
and  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  was  a  force,  to  the  command 
of  which  General  Beauregard  was  transferred  from  the  charge 
of  the  defenses  of  Charleston.  Manassas  Junction  was  ob 
viously  a  strategic  point  of  the  first  importance,  as  the  centre 
of  the  railroad  system  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  as  a  base  of 
operations  threatening  Washington,  and  immediately  across 
the  path  of  any  overland  expedition  against  Richmond.  The 
favorable  estimate  of  General  Beauregard's  abilities  enter 
tained  by  the  President,  added  to  the  popularity  which  fol- 


300  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

lowed  his  services  at  Charleston,  occasioned  his  assignment  to 
what  was  obviously  to  be  the  most  important  theatre  of 
operations. 

Auxiliary  to  the  command  of  Beauregard,  but  operating 
independently  of  that  officer,  was  a  force  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
on  the  Potomac,  commanded  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
an  officer  of  reputed  skill,  who  had  earned  honorable  distinc 
tion  in  Mexico,  and  enjoyed  high  rank  and  reputation  in  the 
Federal  service.  This  force  had  a  mission  second  in  value 
only  to  that  of  the  army  at  Manassas.  It  was  charged  with 
the  defense  of  the  rich  and  populous  Shenandoah  Valley,  teem 
ing  with  supplies,  and  inhabited  by  a  hardy  and  patriotic 
population.  Its  position  was  intermediate  between  the  forces 
operating  in  Western  Virginia,  and  those  in  front  of  Wash 
ington,  and  threatening  to  the  enemy's  line  of  communication 
westward  via  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad. 

In  Western  Virginia  were  the  commands  of  Generals  Wise 
and  Garnett,  respectively,  in  the  Kanawha  Valley,  and  upon 
the  main  line  of  communication  between  the  sections  east  and 
west  of  the  Alleghany  mountains.  The  forces  of  Wise  and 
Garnett  were  designed  for  the  double  purpose  of  defending  the 
sections  of  territory  in  which  they  were  respectively  located, 
and  for  the  aid  and  encouragement  of  the  patriotic  portion  of 
the  population,  then  under  the  joint  domination  of  the  Union 
men  and  Federal  soldiers. 

Under  Magruder,  promoted  for  his  victory  at  Bethel,  was  a 
comparatively  small  force,  holding  the  peninsula  of  James 
and  York  Rivers,  the  direct  route  to  Richmond  from  the 
coast ;  and  at  Norfolk  were  several  thousand  men,  under  com 
mand  of  General  Huger. 

No  very  acute  analysis  is  required  to  penetrate  the  motives 


OBJECTS   OF   THESE    DISPOSITIONS.  301 

of  this  distribution  of  forces  in  the  face  of  the  plain  necessities  of 
the  situation.  Yet  a  vast  amount  of  conceit  has  been  expended 
in  glittering  verbiage,  aiming  to  exhibit  the  early  partiality 
of  President  Davis  for  the  weak  policy  of  dispersion,  and  that 
aversion  to  the  "concentration"  of  troops,  for  overwhelming 
victories,  to  be  followed  by  decisive  results,'  which,  it  is  al 
leged,  adhered  to  his  military  policy  to  the  last.  To  this  cant 
about  "  concentration,"  a  sufficient  answer  relative  to  this  dispo 
sition  of  troops  is,  that  it  has  the  sanction  of  Lee's  great  name, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  complete  success  that  followed  it.  There 
was  no  phase  of  the  situation,  either  then  or  for  months  after 
ward,  which  could  have  justified  for  any  result,  then  attainable 
by  "  concentration,"  the  surrendering  to  the  enemy  of  vast  sec 
tions  of  country,  which,  then  and  subsequently,  fed  the  army 
and  supplied  thousands  of  soldiers.  Popular  confidence,  so 
indispensable  to  a  government  under  such  circumstances,  was 
not  to  be  won  by  such  a  policy,  at  the  very  incipiency  of  the 
contest.  Were  the  patriots  of  Western  Virginia,  thousands 
of  whom  made  heroic  sacrifices,  to  be  abandoned  without  an 
effort  for  their  rescue  ?  Magruder  and  Huger,  too,  had  duties 
of  no  insignificant  character  to  perform.  Fortress  Monroe, 
commanding  the  tributaries  of  the  Chesapeake — the  avenues 
leading  to  the  very  heart  of  Virginia,  to  the  doors  of  Rich 
mond,  and  the  rear  of  the  armies  upon  the  northern  borders — 
presented,  during  the  entire  war,  an  insuperable  difficulty  in 
the  defense  of  Virginia.  More  than  once  it  was  the  impreg 
nable  asylum  for  discomfited  Federal  hosts ;  and  as  a  base  of 
operations  for  the  enemy,  there  was  no  period  of  the  war  when 
it  did  not  challenge  a  vigilant  observation  from  Richmond. 
To  the  efficient,  bold,  and  skillful  defense  of  the  peninsula,  by 
Magruder,  the  Confederate  capital  owed  its  safety  for  twelve 


302  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

months,  not  less  than  to  the  successful  defense  made  upon  the 
Potomac  border.  Dependent  upon  the  command  of  Huger 
was  the  defense,  not  only  of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth,  but  of 
an  extensive  back  country,  besides  the  naval  defenses  then  in 
preparation  at  Gosport. 

But  in  addition  to  these  important  objects,  is  to  be  remem 
bered  the  inexperience  of  both  officers  and  men,  totally  dis 
qualifying  them  for  those  prompt  and  vigorous  movements 
for  which  they  were  subsequently  distinguished.  Discipline 
and  organization  were  yet  to  be  supplied.  The  army  at 
Manassas  in  July,  1861,  at  Centreville,  in  the  ensuing  autumn, 
or  even  in  front  of  Eichmond,  in  the  summer  of  1862,  was 
altogether  a  different  instrument  from  that  compact  force, 
which  the  genius  of  Lee  had  welded,  when  he  threw  it,  with 
crushing  impetus,  upon  the  columns  of  Hooker  at  Chancel- 
lorsville.  But,  after  all,  as  will  be  abundantly  exhibited 
hereafter,  concentration  was  preeminently  the  characteristic  of 
the  Confederate  military  policy.  Especially  did  the  present 
campaign,  in  all  its  parts,  hinge  upon  the  successful  execution 
of  this  principle. 

Confronting  the  command  of  Beauregard,  at  Manassas,  was 
a  considerable  Federal  army,  under  General  McDowell,  cover 
ing  Washington,  and  threatening  an  advance  along  the  line  of 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  and  Virginia  Central  Railroads. 
Under  General  Patterson  another  large  Federal  force  confronted 
General  Johnston,  and  threatened  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
General  McClellan,  with  a  force  greatly  outnumbering  the 
small  commands  opposed  to  him,  operated  in  Western  Vir 
ginia — the  common  name  of  the  section  of  country  embraced 
between  the  Ohio  and  Cheat  Rivers,  and  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Great  Kanawha  and  Gauley  Rivers. 


STRATEGIC   DESIGNS.  303 

A  heavy  force  at  Fortress  Monroe,  threatening,  with  incursions, 
the  entire  tide-water  section  of  the  State,  sufficiently  occupied 
the  commands  of  Magruder  and  Huger. 

The  Confederate  plan  of  campaign,  approved  in  the  early 
summer,  in  its  leading  features  was  adhered  to  with  perti 
nacity  and  success.  This  plan,  jointly  approved  by  the  Gov 
ernment  and  the  two  commanders  upon  whom  its  execution 
devolved,  contemplated  defensive  operations,  and  the  union, 
at  the  critical  moment,  of  the  forces  of  Beauregard  and  John 
ston,  for  the  destruction  of  McDowell's  command,  whenever  it 
should  begin  its  march  southward.  President  Davis  and  Gen 
eral  Lee,  at  Richmond,  were  in  regular  communication  with 
the  two  commanders  in  the  field,  and  all  operations  were 
directed  with  a  view  to  the  destruction  of  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy. 

General  Scott,  upon  the  Federal  side,  also  looked  to  the  co 
operation  of  Patterson  with  McDowell,  and  expected  him  either 
to  defeat  Johnston,  or  to  so  employ  him  as  to  prevent  his  re 
inforcement  of  Beauregard,  when  the  latter  should  be  assailed 
by  the  overwhelming  force  of  McDowell.  The  remoteness 
of  Magruder  and  Huger,  and  the  impossibility  of  sufficient 
secrecy  in  the  transfer  of  any  portion  of  their  commands  to 
the  theatre  of  operations,  placed  them  outside  of  the  calcula 
tion.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Confederate  forces  in 
"Western  Virginia.  Apprehension  of  danger  from  the  com 
mand  of  McClellan  was  experienced  by  the  Confederate  au 
thorities,  especially  after  the  disastrous  defeat  of  General  Gar- 
nett.  There  can  be  little  doubt,  however,  that  the  Government 
and  people  of  the  North  considered  their  army,  immediately 
upon  the  ground,  ample  for  the  contemplated  work,  and  did 
not  feel  the  necessity  of  looking  elsewhere  for  reinforcements. 


304  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  small  force  at  Manassas,  when  General  Beauregard  as 
sumed  command,  was  increased  by  subsequent  accessions,  until, 
by  the  middle  of  July,  it  numbered  about  twenty  thousand 
men.  His  duties  were  a  vigilant  observation  of  the  enemy 
and  such  defensive  preparations  as  were  necessary.  The  pivot 
of  the  campaign  was  elsewhere.  If  Patterson  could  success 
fully  occupy  Johnston  until  the  crisis  at  Manassas  was  passed, 
the  result  was  doubtful,  at  least ;  but  if  Johnston,  at  the  re 
quired  moment,  could  elude  his  adversary,  and  reinforce  Beau- 
regard,  the  probabilities  were  most  promising  to  the  Confed 
erates.  In  the  sequel,  this  proved  a  result  far  more  easily 
attained  than  had  been  hoped  for.  The  campaign  thus  be 
came  a  series  of  maneuvres,  with  the  Confederates  in  posses 
sion  of  the  decided  advantage  of  an  interior  line. 

General  Patterson,  apparently  imbecile  or  bewildered,  com 
mitted  a  series  of  blunders,  to  be  accounted  for  upon  no  pos 
sible  hypothesis  accrediting  to  him  even  ordinary  acquaintance 
with  the  palpable  principles  of  the  science  of  war.  What  his 
repeated  advances,  retreats,  and  flank  movements  could  have 
been  designed  to  accomplish,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine,  as  his 
situation  plainly  prevented  his  escape  from  Johnston  and  rein 
forcement  of  McDowell,  before  Johnston  could  reach  Beaure 
gard.  General  Patterson's  failure  to  attack  Johnston  pre 
ordained  the  disaster  to  McDowell  on  the  21st  of  July. 
Johnston,  aided  by  the  vigilance  and  daring  of  the  "  indefati 
gable  "  Stuart,  was  fully  apprised  of  every  movement  of  his 
adversary.  With  comparatively  little  difficulty  he  escaped 
from  his  front,  and,  in  accordance  with  the  plan  previously 
indicated,  reinforced  Beauregard  with  the  greater  portion  of 
his  force. 

With  the  details  of  the  overwhelming  disaster  to  the  Feb- 


BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  305 

eral  arms,  at  Manassas,  on  the  21st  of  July,  we  are  not  here 
interested.  Our  aim  has  been  to  glance  briefly  at  the  relations 
sustained  by  President  Davis  to  the  preliminary  campaign 
which  culminated  in  success  so  brilliant  and  valuable.  In 
accordance  with  his  preconceived  purpose  to  be  present,  if 
possible,  at  the  consummation  of  plans  in  which  he  felt 
so  profound  an  interest,  President  Davis  left  Richmond  on 
Sunday  morning,  July  21st,  for  the  scene  of  the  expected 
battle.  Reaching  the  battle-field  while  the  struggle  was 
still  in  progress,  it  was  his  privilege  to  witness  the  flight,  in 
utter  confusion  and  dismay,  of  the  Federal  hosts  in  their  first 
serious  conflict  with  the  patriot  army.  His  presence  upon  the 
field  was  the  inspiration  of  unbounded  enthusiasm  among  the 
troops,  to  whom  his  name  and  bearing  were  the  symbols  of 
victory.  His  dispatch  from  the  battle-field,  on  Sunday  night, 
will  long  be  remembered  by  those  who  gathered  from  it  their 
first  intelligence  of  the  great  victory : 

"  MANASSAS  JUNCTION,  Sunday  Night. 

"  Night  has  closed  upon  a  hard-fought  field.  Our  forces  were 
victorious.  The  enemy  were  routed,  and  precipitately  fled,  aban 
doning  a  large  amount  of  arms,  knapsacks,  and  baggage.  The 
ground  was  strewn  for  miles  with  those  killed,  and  the  farm 
houses  and  ground  around  were  filled  with  the  wounded.  Pursuit 
was  continued  along  several  routes  towards  Leesburg  and  Centre- 
ville,  until  darkness  covered  the  fugitives.  We  have  captured 
many  field  batteries  and  stands  of  arms,  and  one  of  the  United 
States  flags.  Many  prisoners  have  been  taken.  Too  high  praise 
can  not  be  bestowed,  whether  for  the  skill  of  the  principal  officers, 
or  the  gallantry  of  all  our  troops.  The  battle  was  mainly  fought 
on  our  left.  Our  force  was  15,000;  that  of  the  enemy  estimated 
at  35,000.  JEFF'N  DAVIS." 

20 


306  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

He  remained  at  Manassas,  in  consultation  with  Generals 
Beau  regard  and  Johnston,  until  the  morning  of  Tuesday,  July 
23d.  The  return  of  the  President  to  Richmond  was  the  oc 
casion  of  renewed  patriotic  rejoicings.  An  immense  crowd 
awaited  at  the  railroad  depot,  in  expectancy  of  his  arrival, 
and  both  there  and  at  his  hotel  occurred  most  enthusiastic 
demonstrations  of  popular  delight  at  the  success  of  the  army, 
and  of  public  regard  for  himself.*  At  night  Mr.  Davis  ad 
dressed,  with  thrilling  effect,  an  immense  audience,  from  a 
window  of  the  Spottswood  Hotel,  recounting  some  of  the  in- 

*The  speech  made  by  Mr.  Davis  at  the  depot  of  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad  was  not  reported  in  the  newspapers.  The  writer,  in  company 
with  two  friends,  was  in  the  crowd  which  greeted  the  return  of  Mr.  Davis 
to  the  capital,  and  such  was  the  effect  of  the  scene  and  the  glowing  words 
of  the  speaker,  that  neither  can  ever  be  forgotten.  A  few  hours  subse 
quently  to  the  scene  at  the  depot,  the  words,  as  given  below,  were  re 
peated,  in  the  presence  of  several  persons  who  heard  Mr.  Davis,  and  were 
pronounced  by  them  the  identical  language  used  by  him.  They  were 
preserved  in  writing,  and  are  now  published  for  the  first  time.  Apart 
from  its  historical  interest,  the  speech  is  a  remarkable  specimen  of 
spontaneous,  sententious  eloquence,  eminently  appropriate  to  the  oc 
casion  : 

"Fellow-citizens  of  the  Confederate  States  : 

"  I  rejoice  with  you,  this  evening,  in  those  better  and  happier  feelings 
which  we  all  experience,  as  compared  with  the  anxiety  of  three  days  ago. 
Your  little  army — derided  for  its  want  of  numbers — derided  for  its  want 
of  arms — derided  for  its  lack  of  all  the  essential  material  of  war — has 
met  the  grand  army  of  the  enemy,  routed  it  at  every  point,  and  it  now 
flies,  in  inglorious  retreat,  before  our  victorious  columns.  We  have 
taught  them  a  lesson  in  their  invasion  of  the  sacred  soil  of -Virginia;  we 
have  taught  them  that  the  grand  old  mother  of  Washington  still  nurtures 
a  band  of  heroes ;  and  a  yet  bloodier  and  far  more  fatal  lesson  awaits 
them,  unless  they  speedily  acknowledge  that  freedom  to  which  you  were 
born." 


EESULTS   OF   THE   VICTORY.  307 

cidents  of  the  battle,  which  he  declared  to  be  a  decisive  victory, 
if  followed  by  energetic  measures,  and  counseled  moderation 
and  forbearance  in  victory,  with  unrelaxed  preparations  for 
future  trials.  It  was  upon  this  occasion  that  he  uttered  the 
memorable  injunction,  "  Never  be  haughty  to  the  humble,  or 
humble  to  the  haughty." 

The  immediate  and  palpable  consequence  of  the  victory  of  Man- 
assas  was  the  rescue  of  the  Confederacy  from  the  peril  by  which, 
for  weeks,  it  had  been  threatened.  The  South  was  now  plainly  a 
power,  capable  of  fighting  ably  and  vigorously,  and  with  greatly 
improved  prospects  of  success,  for  the  independence  which  it 
had  asserted.  Time  was  to  develop  a  far  greater  value  in  this 
wonderful  success  than  was  then  made  available.  A  few  days 
only  were  required  to  exhibit,  what  at  first  appeared  merely  a 
thorough  repulse  of  the  Federal  army,  as  an  overwhelming 
rout,  capable  of  being  followed  to  such  results  as  might  have 
changed  even  the  fate  of  a  nation.  Not  many  weeks  sufficed 
to  convince  the  Southern  people  of  the  fact  which  must  ever 
dwell  among  their  saddest  associations,  that  an  opportunity,  in 
estimable  in  value,  and  almost  unparalleled  in  its  flattering 
inducements  to  a  people  situated  as  they  were,  had  been  ut 
terly  unappreciated  and  irrevocably  lost. 

In  the  numerous  accounts  which  have  been  written,  repre 
senting  all  shades  of  opinion  from  different  stand-points  on 
both  sides,  and  from  the  wide  discussion  which  has  resulted, 
history  can  be  at  no  loss  for  material  upon  which  to  base  an 
intelligent  estimate  of  this  battle,  and  of  the  extent  to  which 
the  victors  reaped  the  advantages  of  success.  Differences  of 
opinion  have  prevailed,  and  will,  in  all  probability,  continue 
to  prevail,  respecting  the  purely  military  questions  involved 
in  the  discussion  of  the  absence  of  such  a  vigorous,  perti- 


308  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

nacious,  and  unrelenting  pursuit  by  the  Confederates  as  was 
necessary  to  secure  the  fruits  of  a  decisive  victory.  But  the 
stubborn  conviction,  nevertheless,  remains,  and  will  never  be 
eradicated  from  the  Southern  mind — that,  barring  the  imme 
diate  security  to  the  Confederate  capital,  Manassas  was  but  a 
barren  victory,  where  results  of  a  most  decisive  character  were 
within  easy  reach.  Nor  is  this  popular  impression  unsus- 
tained  by  such  competent  military  authority,  as  will  command 
respect  for  its  judgment,  upon  those  aspects  of  the  question, 
upon  which  a  military  judgment  is  alone  valuable. 

So  emphatic  became  the  public  condemnation  of  the  inac 
tivity  of  the  army,  and  especially  when,  by  subsequent  infor 
mation,  was  revealed  the  real  condition  of  the  enemy  after  his 
overwhelming  disaster,  that  inquiry  was  naturally  made  as  to 
the  authorship  of  such  an  erroneous  policy.  The  presence  of 
President  Davis,  both  during  a  portion  of  the  battle  and  dur 
ing  the  day  following,  was  promptly  seized  upon  as  affording 
a  clue  to  the  mystery.  For  months  he  rested  under  the  sus 
picion  of  having,  by  peremptory  order,  stopped  the  pursuit  of 
the  enemy,  in  the  face  of  the  protestations  of  his  generals,  who 
would  have  pressed  it  to  the  extent  of  attainable  results. 

How  such  an  impression — so  utterly  in  conflict  with  the  facts — 
could  have  obtained,  by  whom,  or  for  what  purpose  it  was 
disseminated,  it  is  now  needless  to  inquire.  The  slander  was, 
at  length,  after  having  been  circulated  to  the  injury  of  Mr. 
Davis  throughout  the  country,  so  conclusively  answered  as  to 
receive  not  even  the  pretense  of  belief,  save  from  an  unscrup 
ulous  partisanship,  at  all  times  deaf  to  facts  which  could  not 
be  perverted  injuriously  to  the  President.  It  nevertheless  had 
served  a  purpose,  in  preparing  the  popular  mind  for  those  con 
stantly  iterated  charges  of  "executive  interference,"  in  the 


MISREPRESENTATIONS    REFUTED.  309 

plans  and  dispositions  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  which 
followed  at  subsequent  stages  of  the  war. 

It  may  be  asked,  Why  did  Mr.  Davis  suffer  this  suspicion, 
when  the  proof  of  its  injustice  might  have  been  so  easily  ad 
duced?  This  inquiry  would  indicate  an  imperfect  acquaint 
ance  with  that  devoted  patriotism  and  knightly  magnanimity 
which  belong  to  his  character.  Any  explanation  acquitting 
himself,  must  have  thrown  the  responsibility  upon  Generals 
Johnston  and  Beauregard,  and  he  preferred  rather  to  suffer  an 
undeserved  reproach,  than  to  excite  distrust  of  two  officers, 
then  enjoying  the  largest  degree  of  popular  confidence.  With 
him,  selfish  considerations  were  never  permitted  to  outwreigh 
the  interests  of  the  country.  Actuated  by  this  impulse,  he,  in 
more  than  one  instance,  where  the  names  of  men  high  in  pub 
lic  favor  were  used  in  his  disparagement,  refused,  even  in  self- 
defense,  that  retaliation,  which  must  have  hurt  the  cause  in 
proportion  as  it  diminished  confidence  in  its  prominent  repre 
sentatives.  Mr.  Davis,  with  that  decorum  which  has  equally 
illustrated  his  public  and  private  life,  recognized  the  special 
propriety  of  a  denial  of  these  injurious  rumors  from  other 
sources,  fully  apprized  of  their  falsity,  and  from  which  such 
an  acquittal  of  himself  would  have  come  with  becoming  can 
dor  and  grace. 

Justice,  proverbially  slow,  has  been  tardy  indeed  in  its 
awards  to  Mr.  Davis;  but  in  this  instance,  as  it  must  inevi 
tably  in  others,  it  has  come  time  enough  for  his  historical 
vindication.  The  reader,  uninformed  as  to  the  merits  of  this 
question,  will  be  content  with  a  limited  statement  from  the 
mass  of  testimony,  which  has  ultimately  acquitted  Mr.  Davis 
of  having  prevented  the  pursuit  of  the  Federal  army  after  its 
overthrow  upon  the  field  of  Manasses.  In  a  publication,  pre- 


310  LIFE  OF  JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

senting  an  elaborate  indictment  against  Mr.  Davis,  as  the  main 
instrument  of  the  downfall  of  the  Confederacy,  written  since 
the  war,  is  found  the  following  admission :  "  As  is  known,  he 
(President  Davis)  was  at  Man  asses  the  evening  of  the  21st 
July,  1861.  Until  a  late  hour  that  night  he  was  engaged 
with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  at  the  quarters  of 
the  latter,  in  discussing  the  momentous  achievements  of  the 
day,  the  extent  of  which  was  not  as  yet  recognized  at  all  by 
him  or  his  generals.  Much  gratified  with  known  results, 
his  bearing  was  eminently  proper.  He  certainly  expressed  no 
opposition  to  any  forward  movement;  nor  at  the  time  dis 
played  a  disposition  to  interpose  his  opinion  or  authority 
touching  operations  and  plans  of  campaign."* 

General  Johnston,  in  a  communication  published  since  the 
war,  assumes  the  responsibility  of  the  failure  to  pursue,  and, 
with  the  advantage  of  retrospect,  defends  that  course  with  co 
gent  reasoning  and  an  interesting  statement  of  facts.  Says 
General  Johnston:  "'The  substantial  fruit7  of  this  victory 
was  the  preservation  of  the  Confederacy.  No  more  could  have 
been  hoped  for.  The  pursuit  of  the  enemy  was  not  continued 
because  our  cavalry  (a  very  small  force)  was  driven  back  by 
the  '  solid  resistance '  of  the  United  States  infantry.  Its  rear 
guard  was  an  entire  division,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  and 
was  twelve  or  fifteeen  times  more  numerous  than  our  two  little 
bodies  of  cavalry.  The  infantry  was  not  required  to  continue 
the  pursuit,  because  it  would  have  been  harassing  it  to  no 
purpose.  It  is  well  known  that  infantry,  unencumbered  by 
baggage  trains,  can  easily  escape  pursuing  cavalry ." 

That  no  farther  results  were  to  be  hoped  for  than  the  arrest 
of  the  Federal  advance  toward  Richmond,  he  endeavors  to  de- 
*  The  Harper  s  Magazine  article  of  General  Jordan. 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S   STATEMENTS.  311 

monstrate  as  follows:  "A  movement  upon  Washington  was 
out  of  the  question.  We  could  not  have  carried  the  intrench- 
ments  by  assault,  and  had  none  of  the  means  to  besiege  them. 
Our  assault  would  have  been  repulsed,  and  the  enemy,  then 
become  the  victorious  party,  would  have  resumed  their  march 
to  Richmond;  but  if  we  had  captured  the  intrench  men  ts,  a 
river,  a  mile  wide,  lay  between  them  and  Washington,  com 
manded  by  the  guns  of  a  Federal  fleet.  If  we  had  taken 
Alexandria,  which  stands  on  low  and  level  ground,  those  guns 
would  have  driven  us  out  in  a  few  hours,  at  the  same  time 
killing  our  friends,  the  inhabitants.  We  could  not  cross  the 
Potomac,  and  therefore  it  was  impracticable  to  conquer  the 
hostile  capital,  or  emancipate  oppressed  Maryland." 

But  these  statements,  ample,  as  far  as  they  go,  in  the  vindi 
cation  of  Mr.  Davis,  only  partially  tell  the  story  of  Manassas. 
They  do  not  fully  describe  his  real  relation  to  the  question, 
though  we  are  far  from  imputing  to  General  Johnston  an  in 
tentional  omission.  A  statement  of  Mr.  Davis'  views  was  not 
necessarily  germane  to  General  Johnston's  explanation  of  his 
own  conduct.  His  purpose  is  to  establish  the  reasons  which 
induced  him  to  decline  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  or  rather,  which, 
in  his  judgment,  made  pursuit  impracticable.  Nor  is  it 
germane  to  our  purpose  to  discuss  these  reasons;  to  attempt 
either  a  demonstration  of  their  fallacy  or  an  argument  in  their 
support.  They  have  not  been  accepted  as  conclusive  either  by 
the  public,  or  by  unanimous  military  judgment. 

The  great  name  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  himself  an  actor 
in  the  most  thrilling  scenes  of  that  wonderful  triumph  of 
Southern  valor,  and  dating  from  that  day  his  record  upon  the 
"  bead-roll  of  fame,"  is  authoritatively  given  in  opposition  to 
the  policy  which  General  Johnston  approves.  In  this  connee- 


312  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tion,  we  can  not  forbear  to  quote  the  biographer  of  that  illus 
trious  man,  in  passages  showing  that  wondrous  intuition  of 
great  soldiership,  more  distinctive,  perhaps,  of  Jackson,  than 
of  any  commander  of  the  present  century,  excepting  only  Na 
poleon.  Professor  Dabney  says:  " Jackson,  describing  the 
manifest  rout  of  the  enemy,  remarked  to  the  physicians,  that 
he  believed  '  with  ten  thousand  fresh  men  he  could  go  into  the 
city  of  Washington/  "  Again,  after  a  most  graphic  picture  of 
the  condition  of  the  Federal  army,  its  demoralization,  panic, 
and  utter  incapacity  to  meet  an  attack  by  the  victorious  Con 
federates,  and  an  able  statement  of  the  inducements  to  a  vig 
orous  pursuit,  the  biographer  of  General  Jackson  makes  this 
impressive  statement:  "With  these  views  of  the  campaign, 
General  Jackson  earnestly  concurred.  His  sense  of  official 
propriety  sealed  his  lips ;  and  when  the  more  impatient  spirits 
inquired,  day  after  day,  why  they  were  not  led  after  the 
enemy,  his  only  answer  was  to  say :  '  That  is  the  affair  of  the 
commanding  generals/  But  to  his  confidential  friends  he 
afterward  declared,  when  no  longer  under  the  orders  of  those 
officers,  that  their  inaction  was  a  deplorable  blunder;  and  this 
opinion  he  was  subsequently  accustomed  to  assert  with  a 
warmth  and  emphasis  unusual  in  his  guarded  manner."* 

Mr.  Davis  was  far  from  approving  the  inaction  which  fol 
lowed  Manassas.  He  confidently  expected  a  different  use  of 
the  victory.  When  called  away  by  the  pressing  nature  of  his 
official  duties  at  Richmond,  he  left  the  army  with  a  heart 
elastic  with  hope,  at  what  he  considered  the  certainty  of  even 

*  The  Federal  official  reports  are  overwhelmingly  in  confirmation  of 
these  views  of  General  Jackson.  General  McClellan  stated  that  "in  no 
quarter  were  the  dispositions  for  defense  such  as  to  offer  resistance  to  a 
respectable  body  of  the  enemy." 


DAVIS   FAVORS   PURSUIT.  313 

more  glorious  and  valuable  achievements.  His  speech  at  the 
depot  in  Richmond,  which  we  have  given  elsewhere,  is  evi 
dence  of  his  exultant  anticipations.  The  speech  at  the  Spotts- 
wood,  entering  more  into  details,  still  better  authenticates  his 
hopes  of  an  immediate  and  successful  advance.*  There  could 
be  no  misinterpretation  of  the  ardor  with  which,  in  glowing 
sentences,  he  predicted  the  immediate  and  consecutive  tri 
umphs  of  what  he  proudly  termed  the  "  gallant  little  army." 

Indeed,  before  leaving  Manassas,  President  Davis  favored 
the  most  vigorous  pursuit  practicable.  On  the  evening  of  the 
battle,  while  the  victory  was  assured,  but  by  no  means  com 
plete,  he  urged  that  the  enemy,  still  on  the  field,  (Heintzel- 
man's  troops,  as  subsequently  appeared,)  be  warmly  pressed,  as 
was  successfully  done.  During  the  night  following  the  en 
gagement  he  made  a  disposition  of  a  portion  of  the  troops, 
with  a  view  to  an  advance  in  the  morning.  These  troops  were 
removed,  but  not  by  himself,  to  meet  an  apprehended  attack 
upon  the  head-quarters  of  the  army.  An  advance  on  Monday, 
the  22d  July,  was  out  of  the  question,  in  consequence  of  the 
heavy  rain. 

It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  President  Davis  fully  ap 
preciated,  on  Sunday  night,  the  21st,  the  overwhelming  rout 
of  the  Federal  army,  nor  that  he  advocated,  as  practicable,  an 
immediate  movement  in  pursuit,  by  the  entire  army.  ]STo  one 
could  have  anticipated  the  utter  disorganization  attending  the 
flight  of  the  Federals.  He  had,  too,  positive  evidence  of  the 
confusion  prevailing  among  portions  of  the  Southern  troops. 

*The  writer  heard  this  speech  of  Mr.  Davis,  and  his  recollection  is 
positive  of  the  encouragement  extended  by  the  President  to  the  hope  of 
an  immediate  forward  movement.  The  recollection  of  the  author  of  "  The 
Diary  of  a  Rebel  War  Clerk"  seems  to  be  substantially  the  same. 


314  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Summoned  by  a  message  from  a  youthful  connection,  who  was 
mortally  wounded,  Mr.  Davis  rode  over  a  large  portion  of  the 
field,  in  a  vain  search  for  the  regiment  to  which  the  young 
man  was  attached.  Upon  his  return,  he  accidentally  met  an 
officer  who  directed  him  to  the  locality  of  the  regiment,  where 
he  found  the  corpse  of  his  relative.  The  evidences  of  disor 
ganization,  upon  which  General  Johnston  dwells  with  so  much 
force  and  emphasis,  were  indeed  palpable,  but  Mr.  Davis  con 
fidently  believed  that  an  efficient  pursuit  might  be  made  by 
such  commands  as  were  in  comparatively  good  condition. 
Such  were  his  impressions  then,  and  that  he  contemplated 
immediate  activity  as  the  sequel  of  Manassas,  is  a  matter  of 
indisputable  record. 

That  Mr.  Davis  did  not  insist  upon  the  undeferred  execu 
tion  of  his  own  views,  is  proof  less  of  his  approval  of  the 
course  pursued,  than  of  an  absence  of  that  pragmatic  disposi 
tion  with  which  he  was  afterwards  so  persistently  charged. 
His  subsequent  hearty  tributes  to  Beauregard  and  Johnston, 
and  prompt  recognition  of  their  services,  show  how  far  he  was 
elevated  above  that  mean  intolerance,  which  would  have  made 
him  incapable  of  according  merit  to  the  opinions  and  actions 
of  others,  when  adverse  to  his  own  conclusions. 

This  determined  spirit  of  misrepresentation  of  the  motives 
and  conduct  of  the  President,  beginning  thus  early — respecting 
the  origin  of  which  we  shall  have  more  to  say  hereafter — was 
to  prove  productive  of  the  most  serious  embarrassments  to  the 
Confederate  cause.  The  first  great  success  in  arms  achieved 
by  the  South,  was  to  originate  questions  tending  to  excite  dis 
trust  in  the  capacity  of  the  Executive,  and  subsequently  dis 
trust  of  his  treatment  of  those  who  were  under  his  authority. 
Misrepresentation  was  not  to  cease  with  the  attempt  already 


TRIVIAL   ACCUSATIONS.  315 

mentioned  to  impair  public  confidence  in  Mr.  Davis.  A  prag 
matic  interference  with  the  plans  of  his  generals  was  persistently 
charged  upon  him.  The  almost  uninterrupted  inactivity  of  the 
main  army  in  Virginia,  following  the  battle  of  Manassas,  by 
which  the  enemy  was  permitted,  without  molestation,  to  or 
ganize  a  new  army — a  subject  of  constant  and  exasperated 
censure  by  the  public — was  falsely  attributed  to  Mr.  Davis' 
interference  with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard.  It  is  a 
sad  evidence  of  the  license  characteristic  of  a  purely  partisan 
criticism,  that  this  falsely  alleged  interference  has  even  been 
ascribed  to  the  instigations  of  a  mean  envy  of  the  popularity 
of  those  officers. 

The  purely  personal  differences  of  public  men  are  not  the 
proper  subject-matter  of  historical  discussion.  In  the  prose 
cution  of  our  endeavor  to  give  an  intelligent  and  candid 
Narrative  of  the  events  of  the  war,  in  so  far  as  President  Davis 
was  connected  with  them,  we  shall  have  occasion  to  dwell  upon 
those  differences  between  himself  and  others  respecting  im 
portant  questions  of  policy  which  are  known  to  have  existed. 
We  do  not  see  that  the  personal  relations  of  President  Davis 
with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  are  here  a  subject  of 
appropriate  inquiry.  Nor  are  those  minor  questions  of  detail 
as  to  the  organization  of  the  army,  which  arose  between  them, 
of  such  significance  as  to  justify  elaborate  discussion  here. 
That  President  Davis  chose  to  exercise  those  plain  privileges 
with  which  the  Constitution  invested  him;  that  he  should 
have  consulted  that  military  knowledge  which  his  education 
and  service  had  taught  him  ;  that  he  should  make  available 
his  valuable  experience  as  Minister  of  War;  and  that  he  should 
have  failed  to  interpret  the  acts  of  Congress  agreeably  to  the 
tastes  of  generals  in  the  field,  rather  than  according  to  his 


316  LIFE   OF   JEFFEB6ON   DAVIS. 

own  judgment,  is  certainly  singular  evidence  upon  which  to 
base  charges  of  "pragmatism,"  "persecution,"  and  "envy" 
of  those  generals.* 


*  One  evidence  of  this  "persecution"  would  appear  to  consist  in  the  fact 
that  the  President,  having  reluctantly  commissioned  Generals  Lovell  and 
G.  W.  Smith,  upon  the  recommendations  of  Generals  Beauregard  and 
Johnston,  chose  also  to  commission,  at  the  same  time,  with  a  similar 
rank,  General  Van  Dora,  giving  the  latter  a  senior  commission.  Smith 
and  Lovell  had  but  recently  come  to  the  South,  both  being  residents  of 
New  York,  before  the  war,  while  Van  Dorn  had  promptly  sought  service 
in  the  Confederate  army  before  hostilities  commenced,  had  done  excellent 
service,  and  been  constantly  in  front  of  the  enemy.  Another  proof  of 
"  persecution "  is  that  the  President  refused  to  permit  such  an  organ 
ization  of  the  army  as  he  believed  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  laws  of 
Congress. 

The  commonly  assigned  origin  of  the  difference  between  President 
Davis  and  General  Beauregard,  which  gave  rise  to  so  much  scandal  and 
falsehood  during  the  war,  was  the  suppression  of  the  preliminary  por 
tion  of  General  B.'s  report  of  the  battle  of  Manassas.  The  correct 
version  of  that  matter  is  now  well  known.  President  Davis  did  not 
suppress  any  portion  of  Beauregard' s  report.  He  did  object  to  cer 
tain  preliminary  statements  of  the  report,  and  requested  that  they  should 
be  altered  or  omitted.  When  this  was  declined,  the  President  sent  the 
report  to  Congress,  accompanied  by  an  indorsement  of  his  own,  correct 
ing  what  he  conceived  to  be  errors.  General  Beauregard' s  friends  in 
Congress,  unwilling  that  these  comments  of  the  President  should  be 
published,  suppressed  both  the  objectionable  passages  and  the  executive 
indorsement.  So  that  they,  and  not  the  President,  occasioned  that 
"suppression,"  from  which  arose  much  gossip  and  mystery.  A  sufficient 
answer  to  these  charges  of  personal  antagonism  by  the  President  to  these 
two  officers,  should  be  the  fact  that  he  retained  them  in  command  of  the 
two  largest  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  until  relinquished  by  them,  in  the 
one  case,  because  of  sickness,  and  in  the  other,  in  consequence  of  a  wound 
which  caused  disability. 


M'CLELLAN'S  VICTORY  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA.      317 

While  the  main  struggle  in  Virginia  was  yet  undecided,  the 
Confederate  force,  under  General  Garnett,  in  Western  Vir 
ginia,  had  been  disastrously  defeated  by  the  Federal  army  of 
General  McClellan.  The  Confederate  commander,  a  brave 
and  promising  officer,  was  killed,  in  a  gallant  endeavor  to 
protect  the  retreat  of  his  command.  This  achievement  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  though  attributable  mainly  to  his  vastly  superior 
force,  was  attended  by  evidences  of  skill,  which  indicated  him 
as  a  prominent  figure  in  the  events  of  the  immediate  future. 
In  the  midst  of  the  gloom  and  disappointment  consequent 
upon  the  disaster  at  Manassas,  General  McClellan  appeared  to 
the  Northern  Government  and  masses  to  be  an  officer  specially 
recommended,  by  his  late  success,  for  the  important  charge  of 
the  army  designed  to  protect  the  capital.  He  was  imme 
diately  summoned  to  Washington,  and  placed  in  charge  of  its 
defenses.  With  rare  capacity  for  general  military  administra 
tion,  and  with  especial  aptitude  for  organization,  General 
McClellan  addressed  himself  with  vigor  and  success  to  the 
work  assigned  him.  Under  his  direction,  the  defenses  of 
Washington  were  speedily  put  in  admirable  condition,  and 
within  a  few  months,  he  had  created  an  army  which,  in  disci 
pline,  organization,  and  equipment,  would  have  compared 
favorably  with  the  best  armies  of  the  world. 

General  McClellan  was  too  sagacious  and  prudent  a  com 
mander  to  repeat  the  errors  of  his  predecessor.  He  was  evi 
dently  determined  not  to  undertake  an  aggressive  campaign 
until  his  preparations  were  completed.  During  the  progress 
of  those  preparations,  he  endeavored  also  to  provide  against 
those  aggressive  movements  which  he  evidently  anticipated 
from  his  adversaries.  But  the  autumn  and  winter  were  to 
pass  away  without  any  serious  demonstration  by  the  Confeder- 


318  LIFE    OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

ate  commanders,  and  with  but  one  important  movement  of  the 
enemy. 

In  the  early  fall,  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  ad 
vanced  to  a  position  in  close  proximity  to  the  Federal  capital. 
Unable,  however,  to  provoke  an  engagement  with  the  Federal 
commander,  whose  present  purposes  were  purely  defensive  and 
preparatory,  the  Confederate  army  withdrew  from  the  front  of 
Washington,  and  retired  within  its  former  lines  about  Manas- 
sas  and  Centreville. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October,  an  engagement  of  some  im 
portance  occurred  near  Leesburg,  occasioned  by  an  attempt  of 
General  McClellan  to  throw  a  force  across  the  Potomac, 
doubtless  with  the  view  of  an  advance  on  the  Confederate 
.left  wing.  The  numbers  engaged  in  this  engagement  were 
comparatively  small,  which  rendered  more  remarkable  its  san 
guinary  character.  Nearly  the  entire  Federal  force,  though 
outnumbering  more  than  two  to  one  the  Confederate  force, 
was  captured  or  destroyed.  There  was  good  reason  to  regard 
this  movement  as  preliminary  to  a  general  advance  of  the 
Federal  army.  The  battle  of  Leesburg  was  very  dispiriting 
in  its  effects  upon  the  North,  and  equally  re-assuring  to  the 
Southern  Government  and  people.  No  other  operations  of 
note  occurred  during  the  autumn  and  winter  upon  the  lines 
of  the  Lower  Potomac. 

General  Jackson,  who  by  a  circumstance  which  is  now  well 
known  to  the  world,  had  acquired  at  Manassas  the  sobriquet 
of  "  Stonewall,"  in  September,  1861,  was  made  a  Major-Gen- 
eral.  Late  in  December,  in  charge  of  a  considerable  force,  he 
executed,  with  indifferent  success,  a  movement  against  detach 
ments  of  the  enemy  in  the  neighborhood  of  Romney,  and 
other  points  along  the  Upper  Potomac. 


EVENTS  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA  AND  MISSOURI.         319 

The  disasters  sustained  by  the  Confederates  in  Western  Vir 
ginia,  in  the  early  summer,  were  not  repaired  by  the  transfer 
of  General  Lee  to  that  quarter.  A  large  and  valuable  sec 
tion  of  country  remained  as  the  enemy's  trophy,  almost  un 
disputed  at  the  termination  of  the  campaign.  The  reputation 
of  General  Lee  suffered  severely  from  the  absence  of  that  suc 
cess  which  was  anticipated  from  his  presence  in  command.  '  It 
is  a  noteworthy  circumstance  that  when,  a  few  months  after 
ward,  the  President  placed  Lee  in  command  of  the  main  army 
of  Virginia,  his  ill-success  in  Western  Virginia  was  alleged 
as  conclusive  evidence  of  his  unfitness  for  the  position  to 
which  "  executive  partiality  "  had  assigned  him. 

In  the  meantime,  upon  the  distant  theatre  of  Missouri,  the 
war  had  assumed  a  most  interesting  phase.  Many  months 
before  the  legally-elected  legislature  of  that  State  adopted  an 
ordinance  of  secession,  Missouri  was  contributing  valuable  aid 
to  the  struggling  Confederacy.  Driven  by  the  oppressive 
course  of  the  Federal  Government  into  resistance,  in  spite  of 
their  efforts  to  save  their  State  from  the  destructive  presence 
of  war,  the  Southern  men  of  Missouri  organized  under  the 
leadership  of  General  Sterling  Price  and  Governor  Jackson. 
Accessions  of  men  from  all  portions  of  the  State  were  con 
stantly  made  to  the  patriot  forces,  and,  within  a  few  weeks,  a 
large  force  was  upon  the  southern  border,  animated  by  an 
enthusiastic  desire  to  undertake  the  redemption  of  their  homes. 
But  the  Missourians,  though  sufficiently  numerous  to 
constitute  an  effective  army,  were  confronted  by  difficulties 
which  would  have  appalled  men  of  less  heroic  purpose,  or 
enlisted  in  an  inferior  cause.  Hostilities  had  been  precipitated 
upon  them  while  they  were  entirely  unprepared — wanting 
arms,  ammunition,  and  other  indispensable  material  of  war. 


320  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  remoteness  of  Missouri  from  the  seat  of  government,  and 
the  inadequate  transportation,  prevented  that  prompt  and 
efficient  aid  by  the  Confederate  authorities  which  it  was 
equally  their  interest  and  inclination  to  afford.  Nevertheless, 
with  almost  miraculous  rapidity,  the  army  of  General  Price 
was  organized,  and  supplied  with  such  material  as  he  could 
obtain. 

The  Federal  commander,  in  his  march  southward  from  St. 
Louis,  pursued,  with  considerable  vigor,  the  various  detach 
ments  of  the  patriots  who  were  hastening  to  the  standards  of 
Price.  After  several  minor  engagements,  in  which  the  Mis- 
sourians  displayed  the  most  devoted  heroism,  a  considerable 
battle  was  fought,  early  in  August,  near  Springfield,  in  the 
south-western  corner  of  the  State,  in  which  the  Federal  army 
was  disastrously  defeated,  and  its  commander  killed.  In  this 
battle,  the  Missouri  forces  were  aided  by  a  Confederate  force, 
under  General  McCulloch,  which  had  advanced  northward 
from  Arkansas.  Later  in  the  year,  General  Price  advanced 
through  the  central  portion  of  the  State,  receiving  large  addi 
tions  to  his  army,  and  captured  the  largest  garrison  of  Fed 
eral  troops  in  Northern  Missouri.  Having  accomplished  these 
valuable  aims,  he,  with  great  skill  and  daring,  effected  a  safe 
retreat  to  the  south-western  frontier.  President  Davis,  in  a 
message  to  Congress,  echoed  the  hearty  appreciation  of  the 
Southern  people,  in  a  special  tribute  to  the  valor  and  devotion 
of  the  southern  population  of  Missouri. 

Kentucky  also  had  become  the  theatre  of  hostilities.  The 
Federal  Government,  recognizing  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky 
so  long  as  was  necessary  to  mature  their  plans  for  her  subju 
gation,  finally  insisted  upon  making  her  a  party  to  the  war, 
and  invaded  her  territory  with  a  view  to  operations  against 


EVENTS   IN   KENTUCKY.  321 

the  Confederacy.  President  Davis  thus  stated  the  motives  of 
the  policy  adopted  by  the  Confederate  Government  respecting 
Kentucky : 

"  Finding  that  the  Confederate  States  were  about  to  be  invaded 
through  Kentucky,  and  that  her  people,  after  being  deceived  into 
a  mistaken  security,  were  unarmed,  and  in  danger  of  being  subju 
gated  by  the  Federal  forces,  our  armies  were  marched  into  that 
State  to  repel  the  enemy,  and  prevent  their  occupation  of  certain 
strategic  points,  which  would  have  given  them  great  advantages  in 
the  contest — a  step  which  was  justified,  not  only  by  the  necessities 
of  self-defense  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  States,  but  also  by 
a  desire  to  aid  the  people  of  Kentucky.  It  was  never  intended  by 
the  Confederate  Government  to  conquer  or  coerce  the  people  of 
that  State;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  declared  by  our  Generals 
that  they  would  withdraw  their  troops  if  the  Federal  Government 
would  do  likewise.  Proclamation  was  also  made  of  the  desire  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky,  and  the  intention,  by  the  wishes 
of  her  people,  as  soon  as  they  were  free  to  express  their  opinions. 

"  These  declarations  were  approved  by  me ;  and  I  should  regard 
it  as  one  of  the  best  effects  of  the  march  of  our  troops  into  Ken 
tucky,  if  it  should  end  in  giving  to  her  people  liberty  of  choice, 
and  a  free  opportunity  to  decide  their  own  destiny,  according  to 
their  own  will." 

Not  long  after  the  occupation  of  various  points  in  Kentucky, 
by  the  respective  armies,  an  engagement  occurred  at  Belmont, 
on  the  Missouri  shore,  near  Columbus,  resulting  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Federal  force  engaged.  The  Confederate  forces  engaged 
were  a  portion  of  the  command  of  General  Polk,  and  the  de 
feated  Federal  commander  was  General  U.  S.  Grant. 

Before  the  first  year  of  the  war  terminated,  the  Confederates 
experienced  reverses  resulting  from  the  naval  superiority  of 
21 


322  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

the  enemy.  Expeditions  were  undertaken  against  the  Caro 
lina  coast,  and  were  successful  to  the  extent  of  securing  a  per 
manent  lodgment  of  the  Federal  forces. 

In  the  month  of  November  the  forcible  seizure,  by  a  Fede 
ral  naval  officer,  of  the  persons  of  Messrs.  John  Slidell  and 
James  M.  Mason,  commissioners,  respectively,  from  the  Confed 
erate  States  to  France  and  England,  and,  at  the  time,  passen 
gers  on  an  English  steamer,  excited  strong  hope  of  those  com 
plications  between  the  United  States  and  European  powers 
which  were  reasonably  anticipated  by  the  South.  This  act 
was  a  palpable  outrage  and  violation  alike  of  international  law 
and  comity.  It  was,  nevertheless,  indorsed  by  public  senti 
ment  at  the  North,  in  manifold  forms  of  expression. 

In  England,  the  intelligence  of  an  outrage  upon  the  national 
flag  was  received  with  outbursts  of  popular  indignation,  which 
compelled  the  Government  to  make  a  resentful  demand  upon 
the  United  States.  The  course  of  the  English  Government 
was  characteristic  of  the  nation  which  it  represented.  There 
was  neither  discussion  nor  parley,  but  a  simple  imperative  de 
mand  for  the  surrender  of  the  commissioners  and  their  at 
taches. 

Never  was  so  deep  a  humiliation  imposed  upon  a  people  as  that 
imposed  by  the  course  of  the  Federal  authorities  upon  the  North. 
The  prisoners,  over  whose  capture  the  whole  North  had  but  re 
cently  exulted,  as  at  the  realization  of  the  fruits  of  a  brilliant 
victory,  were  surrendered  immediately.  Mr.  Seward  even  de 
clared  that  they  were  surrendered  "  cheerfully/'  and  in  accord 
ance  with  the  "  most  cherished  principles  of  American  states 
manship,"  and  advanced  an  argument  in  favor  of  complying 
with  the  demands  of  the  British  Government,  far  more  to  have 
been  expected  from  a  British  diplomatist,  than  from  the  lead- 


THE  "TRENT  AFFAIR."  323 

ing  statesman  of  a  people  who  had  promptly  indorsed  the 
outrage. 

This  concession  of  the  Federal  Government  was  the  first  of 
numerous  disappointments  in  store  for  the  Southern  people,  in 
the  hope,  so  universally  indulged,  of  foreign  intervention.  Ex 
pectation  of  immediate  complications  between  England  and 
the  United  States,  received  great  encouragement  from  the  ear 
lier  phase  of  the  "Trent  affair,"  as  was  called  the  seizure  of 
Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell.  Consequent  upon  the  correspond 
ence  between  the  Governments  of  England  and  the  United 
States,  growing  out  of  the  "Trent  affair,"  were  announce 
ments  in  Parliament,  which  should  have  discouraged  the  an 
ticipation  of  interference  by  England,  at  least  with  the  cabinet 
then  in  power.  Lord  John  Russell  declared  that  the  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports  was  effective,  in  spite  of  abundant  evi 
dence,  and  in  spite,  even,  of  the  declarations  of  the  British 
consul  at  Charleston  to  the  contrary.  This  concession  was 
intended,  doubtless,  as  a  salvo  to  the  North  for  its  deep  hu 
miliation,  and  was,  indeed,  rightly  construed  as  an  evidence 
of  the  real  sympathies  of  the  British  cabinet  in  the  American 
struggle.  In  this  aspect,  it  was  an  assurance  of  no  little  sig 
nificance. 

At  the  election,  in  November,  Mr.  Davis,  without  opposi 
tion,  was  chosen  the  first  President  of  the  Confederacy,  under 
the  permanent  government,  which  was  soon  to  succeed  the 
provisional  organization.  Mr.  Stephens  was  reflected  Vice- 
President. 

In  his  message  to  the  provisional  Congress,  at  the  begin 
ning  of  its  last  session,  the  President  thus  sketched  the  situa 
tion  at  the  close  of  the  first  year  of  the  war : 


324  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

"  To  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  Sates : 

li  The  few  weeks  which  have  elapsed  since  your  adjournment 
have  brought  us  so  near  the  close  of  the  year,  that  we  are  now 
able  to  sum  up  its  general  results.  The  retrospect  is  such  as 
should  fill  the  hearts  of  our  people  with  gratitude  to  Providence 
for  his  kind  interposition  in  their  behalf.  Abundant  yields  have 
rewarded  the  labor  of  the  agriculturist,  whilst  the  manufacturing 
interest  of  the  Confederate  States  was  never  so  prosperous  as  now. 
The  necessities  of  the  times  have  called  into  existence  new  branches 
of  manufactures,  and  given  a  fresh  impulse  to  the  activity  of  those 
heretofore  in  operation.  The  means  of  the  Confederate  States  for 
manufacturing  the  necessaries  and  comforts  of  life,  with  inthem- 
selves,  increase  as  the  conflict  continues,  and  we  are  rapidly  becom 
ing  independent  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  for  the  supply  of  such 
military  stores  and  munitions  as  are  indispensable  for  war. 

"  The  operations  of  the  army,  soon  to  be  partially  interrupted 
by  the  approaching  winter,  have  afforded  a  protection  to  the 
country,  and  shed  a  lustre  upon  its  arms,  through  the  trying  vicis 
situdes  of  more  than  one  arduous  campaign,  which  entitle  our 
brave  volunteers  to  our  praise  and  our  gratitude. 

"  From  its  commencement  up  to  the  present  period,  the  war  has 
been  enlarging  its  proportions  and  extending  its  boundaries,  so  as 
to  include  new  fields.  The  conflict  now  extends  from  the  shores 
of  the  Chesapeake  to  the  confines  of  Missouri  and  Arizona ;  yet 
sudden  calls  from  the  remotest  points  for  military  aid  have  been 
met  with  promptness  enough,  not  only  to  avert  disaster  in  the  face 
of  superior  numbers,  but  also  to  roll  back  the  tide  of  invasion  from 
the  border. 

"  When  the  war  commenced,  the  enemy  were  possessed  of  cer 
tain  strategic  points  and  strong  places  within  the  Confederate 
States.  They  greatly  exceeded  us  in  numbers,  in  available  re 
sources,  and  in  the  supplies  necessary  for  war.  Military  estab 
lishments  had  been  long  organized,  and  were  complete ;  the  navy, 


PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE.  325 

and,  for  the  most  part,  the  army,  once  common  to  both,  were  in 
their  possession.  To  meet  all  this,  we  had  to  create,  not  only  an 
army  in  the  face  of  war  itself,  but  also  military  establishments 
necessary  to  equip  and  place  it  in  the  field.  It  ought,  indeed,  to 
be  a  subject  of  gratulation  that  the  spirit  of  the  volunteers  and 
the  patriotism  of  the  people  have  enabled  us,  under  Providence, 
to  grapple  successfully  with  these  difficulties. 

"A  succession  of  glorious  victories  at  Bethel,  Bull  Run,  Man- 
assas,  Springfield,  Lexington,  Leesburg,  and  Belmont,  has  checked 
the  wicked  invasion  which  greed  of  gain,  and  the  unhallowed  lust 
of  power,  brought  upou  our  soil,  and  has  proved  that  numbers 
cease  to  avail,  when  directed  against  a  people  fighting  for  the  sacred 
right  of  self-government  and  the  privileges  of  freemen.  After 
seven  months  of  war,  the  enemy  have  not  only  failed  to  extend 
their  occupancy  of  our  soil,  but  new  States  and  Territories  have 
been  added  to  our  Confederacy ;  while,  instead  of  their  threatened 
march  of  unchecked  conquest,  they  have  been  driven,  at  more 
than  one  point,  to  assume  the  defensive;  and,  upon  a  fair  com 
parison  between  the  two  belligerents,  as  to  men,  milita  s  means, 
and  financial  condition,  the  Confederate  States  are  relatively  much 
stronger  now  than  when  the  struggle  commenced." 


326  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

PROSPECTS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1862  —  EXTREME  CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH  - 
EXTRAVAGANT  EXPECTATIONS  -  THE  RICHMOND  EXAMINER  ON  CONFEDERATE 
PROSPECTS  -  WAR  BETWEEN  ENGLAND  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  PREDICTED  - 
THE  BLOCKADE  TO  BE  RAISED  -  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY  DECREED  BY 
HEAVEN  -  RESULT  OF  THE  BOASTFUL  TONE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  PRESS  -  THE 
CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  NOT  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THE  DISASTERS  OF  1862  - 
PRESIDENT  DAVIS  URGES  PREPARATION  FOR  A  LONG  WAR:  —  HIS  WISE  OPPOSI 
TION  TO  SHORT  ENLISTMENTS  OF  TROOPS  -  PREMONITIONS  OF  MISFORTUNES 
IN  THE  WEST  -  THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES  IN  KENTUCKY  -  GENERAL  ALBERT 
SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  -  HIS  CAREER  BEFORE  THE  WAR  —  CHARACTER  -  APPEAR 
ANCE  -  THE  FRIEND  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  -  MUTUAL  ESTEEM  -  SIDNEY  JOHN 
STON  IN  KENTUCKY  —  HIS  PLANS  —  HIS  DIFFICULTIES  —  THE  FORCES  OF  GRANT 
AND  BUELL  -  CRUEL  DILEMMA  OF  GENERAL  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  —  A  REVERSE  — 
GRANT  CAPTURES  FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON  —  LOSS  OF  KENTUCKY  AND 
TENNESSEE  -  FEDERAL  DESIGNS  IN  THE  EAST  -  BURNSIDE  CAPTURES  ROAN- 
OKE  ISLAND  -  SERIOUS  NATURE  OF  THESE  REVERSES  -  POPULAR  DISAPPOINT 
MENT  -  ORGANIZED  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  CONFEDERATE  ADMINISTRATION  - 
CHARACTER  AND  MOTIVES  OF  THIS  OPPOSITION  -  AN  EFFORT  TO  REVOLUTIONIZE 
PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  CABINET  -  ASSAULTS  UPON  SECRETARIES  BENJAMIN  AND 
MALLORY  —  CORRECT  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  REVERSES  -  CON 
GRESSIONAL  CENSURE  OF  MR.  BENJAMIN  -  SECRETARY  MALLORY  —  CHARAC 
TERISTICS  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  MIND  -  THE  PERMANENT  GOVERNMENT  -  SECOND 
INAUGURATION  OF  MR.  DAVIS  —  SEVERITY  OF  THE  SEASON  -  THE  CEREMONIES  - 
APPEARANCE  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS  —  HIS  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS  -  ITS  EFFECT  - 
POPULAR  RE-ASSURANCE  —  MESSAGE  TO  CONGRESS  —  COMMENTS  OF  RICHMOND 
PRESS. 


TTTHEN  President  Davis  held  his  first  New  -Year's  recep- 

*  '      tion,  as  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  infant  Confederacy, 

there  were  not  wanting  signs  of  the  approaching  shadows, 


OVER-CONFIDENCE    OF   THE    SOUTH.  327 

which  were  to  throw  in  temporary  eclipse  the  brilliant  fore 
ground  of  the  first  year  of  the  war.  Richmond  was  then  in 
its  exultant  spirit,  its  gayety,  festivity,  and  show,  the  type  of 
that  fatal  confidence  in  Southern  invincibility,  which,  in  a  few 
weeks  of  disaster,  was  brought  to  grief  and  humiliation.  v 

In  that  numerous  and  brilliant  assemblage,  representing  the 
various  branches  of  the  new  government,  civil,  naval,  and 
military,  members  of  Congress  and  of  State  Legislatures,  and 
admiring  citizens,  eager  to  make  formal  tender  of  their  esteem 
to  the  first  President  of  the  South,  there  were  few  who  dis 
cerned  the  omens  of  the  coming  storm,  which  was  to  shake  to  its 
foundation,  the  power  of  which  that  occasion  was  an  imposing 
symbol.  Perhaps  there  were  as  few  who  could  penetrate  his 
assuring  exterior  of  grace,  gentleness,  and  dignity,  and  share 
the  anxiety  with  which,  even  in  the  midst  of  popular  adula 
tion,  he  contemplated  the  approach  of  that  stern  trial  for  which 
the  country  was  so  deficient  in  preparation. 

"With  singular  accord  of  opinion,  writers,  who  had  an  inside 
view  of  the  Southern  conduct  of  the  war,  have  commented  upon 
the  disasters  consequent  upon  the  period  of  fancied  security 
and  relaxed  exertions  which  followed  the  battle  of  Manassas. 
"We  can  not  share,  however,  the  shallow  and  unphilosophical 
conclusion  which  pronounces  the  glorious  triumph  of  Manassas 
a  calamity  to  the  South.  The  temporary  salvation  of  the 
Confederacy,  guaranteed  by  that  victory,  was  not  its  only 
fruit.  Manassas  gave  a  stamp  of  prestige  to  Southern  valor 
and  soldiership,  which  not  even  a  deluge  of  subsequent  disas 
ters  could  efface.  It  gave  an  imperishable  record  and  an  un 
dying  incentive  to  resolution. 

Yet  it  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  the  public  apathy,  en 
gendered  by  an  exaggerated  estimate  of  the  value  of  the 


328  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

numerous  and  consecutive  triumphs  of  the  preceding  summer 
and  autumn,  was  measurably  productive  of  evil  consequences. 
Encouraged  by  the  press,  in  many  instances,  the  Southern 
people  saw,  in  the  comparatively  easy  triumphs  of  their  supe 
rior  valor  over  undisciplined  Northern  mobs — for  which  Ma- 
nassas,  Belmont,  Leesburg,  and  similar  engagements  constituted 
the  mere  apprenticeship  of  war — the  auguries  significant  of  a 
speedy  attainment  of  their  independence.  Inflated  orators  and 
boastful  editorials  proclaimed  the  absolute  certainty  of  early 
interference  of  foreign  powers,  in  behalf  of  the  South,  as  the 
source  of  the  indispensable  staples  of  cotton  and  tobacco.  In 
the  face  of  the  enormous  preparations  of  the  enemy,  his  mon 
ster  armies,  numbering,  in  December,  1861,  more  than  six 
hundred  thousand  men ;  his  numerous  fleets  for  sea-board  oper 
ations,  and  iron-clad  floating  batteries  for  the  interior  streams, 
comparatively  insignificant  successes  were  pointed  to  as  suffi 
cient  proofs  of  the  inability  of  the  enemy  to  make  any  serious 
impression  upon  Southern  territory. 

The  Richmond  Examiner,  which  had  early  evinced  a  dispo 
sition  hostile  to  President  Davis  and  his  administration,  the 
ablest  and  most  influential  journal  of  the  South,  destined  to 
furnish  both  the  brains  and  inspiration  in  support  of  future 
opposition,  was  conspicuous  in  its  contempt  for  the  fighting 
qualities  of  the  North,  and  vehement  in  its  prophesies  of  good 
fortune  for  the  Confederacy.  Late  in  December,  the  Examiner, 
commenting  upon  recent  intelligence  from  the  North,  said: 
"  All  other  topics  become  trifles  beside  the  tidings  of  England 
which  occupies  this  journal,  and  all  commentary  that  diverts 
public  attention  from  that  single  point  is  impertinence.  The 
effect  of  the  outrage  of  the  Trent  on  the  public  sentiment  of 
Great  Britain  more  than  fulfills  the  prophesy  that  we  made 


VIEWS  OF   THE   RICHMOND   EXAMINER.  329 

when  the  arrest  of  the  Confederate  ministers  was  a  fresh  event. 
All  legal  quibbling  and  selfish  calculation  has  been  consumed 
like  straw  in  the  burning  sense  of  incredible  insult.  The 
Palmerston  cabinet  has  been  forced  to  immediate  and  decisive 
measures ;  and  a  peremptory  order  to  Lord  Lyons  comes  with 
the  steamer  that  brings  the  news  to  the  American  shore.  He 
is  directed  to  demand  the  unconditional  surrender  of  Messrs* 
Mason  and  Slidell,  to  place  them  in  the  position  they  were 
found  beneath  the  British  flag,  and  a  complete  disavowal  of 
their  seizure  as  an  authorized  act.  Now,  ike  Northern  Govern 
ment  has  placed  itself  in  such  a  position  that  it  can  do  none  of  these 
things.  The  Abolitionist  element  of  the  Northern  States  would  go 
straight  to  revolution  at  the  least  movement  toward  a  surrender 
of  the  captives;  the  arrest  was  made  by  the  deliberately  writ 
ten  orders  of  the  Government,  already  avowed  and  published 
beyond  the  hope  of  apology  or  possibility  of  retraction. 

"  The  United  States  can  do  absolutely  nothing  but  refuse  the 
demands  of  Great  Britain,  and  abide  the  consequences  of  that 
refusal.  What  they  will  be  can  be  clearly  foretold :  first,  there 
will  be  the  diplomatic  rupture;  Lord  Lyons  will  demand  his 
passports,  and  Mr.  Adams  will  be  sent  away  from  London; 
then  will  follow  an  immediate  recognition  of  the  Southern  Con 
federacy,  with  encouragement  and  aid  in  fitting  out  its  vessels, 
and  supplying  their  wants  in  the  British  ports  and  islands. 
Lastly,  a  war  will  be  evolved  from  these  two  events." 

Continuing  its  comments  upon  what  it  terms  the  "raving 
madness  "  of  the  North,  the  Examiner  says :  "  Then  came  the 
proclamation  of  Lincoln.  Nothing  but  insanity  could  have 
dictated  it;  and  without  it  the  secession  of  Virginia  was  impos 
sible.  Then  their  crazy  attempt  to  subdue  a  country  not  less  diffi 
cult  to  conquer  than  Russia  itself,  with  an  armed  mob  of  loafers." 


330  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

In  the  contemplation  of  the  pleasing  sketch  which  its  imagi 
nation  had  executed,  the  Examiner  asks :  "  Spectators  of  these 
events,  who  can  doubt  that  the  Almighty  fiat  has  gone  forth 
against  the  American  Union,  or  that  the  Southern  Confederacy 
is  decreed  by  the  Divine  Wisdom  ?  "  It  declares  that  the  "  dull 
est  worldling,  the  coolest  Atheist,  the  most  hardened  cynic, 
might  be  struck  with  awe  by  the  startling  and  continued 
interposition  of  a  power  beyond  the  control  or  cognizance  of 
men  in  these  aifairs ; "  and  triumphantly  asks :  "  Who  thought, 
when  the  Trent  was  announced  to  sail,  that  on  its  deck,  and  in 
the  trough  of  the  weltering  Atlantic,  the  key  of  the  blockade 
would  be  lost?" 

The  natural  and  inevitable  result  of  the  assurances  tendered 
to  the  people,  was  to  lull  the  patriotic  ardor  which  marked  the 
first  great  uprising  for  defense,  when  two  hundred  thousand 
men  sprung  to  arms.  There  can  be  no  justice  in  holding  the 
Confederate  Government  responsible  for  the  popular  apathy, 
which  it  had  no  agency  in  producing,  or  for  the  weakness  of 
the  armies,  which,  next  to  the  naval  weakness  of  the  South, 
was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  disasters  of  the  early  months 
of  1862. 

Since  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  the  Government  had 
been  indefatigable  in  its  efforts  to  promote  enlistments  of  vol 
unteers  for  the  war,  instead  of  the  twelve-months'  system, 
which  could  be  adequate  for  the  demands  of  a  temporary  exi 
gency  only,  and  not  for  such  a  terrific  struggle  as  must  result 
from  the  temper  and  resources  of  the  two  contestants.  Vol 
unteering  was  as  yet  the  only  method  of  raising  troops  sanc 
tioned  by  law,  or  likely  to  meet  popular  approval.  The 
country  was  not  yet  prepared  for  an  enforced  levy  of  troops ; 
and  it  is  only  necessary  to  remember  the  opposition,  in  certain 


MR.  DAVIS*  IDEAS   OF   THE   WAR.  331 

quarters,  to  the  execution  of  the  subsequent  conscription  law, 
adopted  under  the  pressure  of  disasters  which  made  its  neces 
sity  plain  and  inevitable,  to  conjecture  the  temper  in  which 
such  a  measure  would  have  been  met,  in  the  over-confident 
arid  foolishly  exultant  tone  of  the  press  and  public  in  the 
winter  of  1861. 

Mr.  Davis  especially  sought  to  disabuse  the  public  mind  of 
its  fallacious  hope  of  a  short  contest,  by  his  efforts  to  place  the 
military  resources  of  the  South  upon  a  footing  capable  of  indef 
inite  resistance  to  an  attempt  at  conquest,  which  was  to  end 
only  with  the  success  or  exhaustion  of  the  North.  Conscious 
of  the  perpetual  disorganization  and  decimation  of  the  armies 
which  must  result  from  the  system  of  short  enlistments,  he 
had,  early  in  the  war,  attracted  unfriendly  criticism  by  his 
refusal  of  any  more  six  or  twelve-months'  volunteers  than  were 
necessary  to  meet  the  shock  of  the  enemy's  first  advance.  It 
was  clear  to  his  mind  that,  under  the  wretched  system  of  short 
enlistments,  which  he  characterized  as  a  "frightful  cause  of 
disaster,"  the  country  must,  at  some  period  of  the  war,  be  vir 
tually  without  an  army.  Such  was  the  case  in  January  and 
February,  1862,  when  the  enemy  eagerly  pressed  his  immense 
advantage  while  the  process  of  furloughs  and  reenlistments 
was  in  progress,  and  the  army  almost  completely  disorganized. 

Such  a  crisis  was  inevitable,  and  had  it  not  occurred  then, 
it  would  merely  have  been  deferred,  to  be  encountered  at  a 
period  when  the  capacity  of  the  Confederacy  was  even  less 
adequate  for  its  perils.  The  lesson  was  not  without  its  value, 
since  it  drove  the  country  and  the  press  to  a  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  independence  was  not  to  be  won  by  shifts  and 
dalliance,  by  temporary  expedients,  and  by  spasmodic  popular 
uprisings  for  temporary  exigencies. 


332  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  efforts  of  the  Government  were  unceasing  to  prepare  for 
the  tremendous  onset  of  the  enemy  in  almost  every  quarter  of 
the  Confederacy,  which  it  must  have  been  blind,  indeed,  not  to 
anticipate.  The  responses  to  the  calls  of  the  Government  were 
neither  in  numbers  nor  enthusiasm  encouraging.  The  people 
were  blind  in  their  confidence,  and  deaf  to  appeals  admon 
ishing  them  of  perils  which,  in  their  fancied  security,  they 
believed  impossible  of  realization.  But  this  soothing  sense  of 
security  was  soon  to  have  a  terrible  awakening.  The  Confed 
erate  Government  had  recognized  the  peculiar  perils  menacing 
the  western  section  of  its  territory.  There  for  weeks  rested  the 
anxious  gaze  of  President  Davis,  and  thence  were  to  come  the 
first  notes  of  alarm — the  immediate  premonitions  of  disaster. 

Immediately,  upon  the  occupation  of  Kentucky  by  the 
Confederate  forces,  had  begun  the  development  of  a  plan  of 
defense  by  the  Southern  generals.  The  command  of  General 
Polk,  constituting  the  Confederate  left,  was  at  Columbus.  On 
the  upper  waters  of  the  Cumberland  River,  in  South-eastern 
Kentucky,  was  a  small  force  constituting  the  Confederate  right, 
commanded  first  by  General  Zollicoffer,  and  afterward  by 
General  Crittenden.  At  Bowling  Green,  with  Green  River  in 
front,  and  communicating  by  railway  with  Nashville  and  the 
South,  was  the  main  Confederate  force  in  Kentucky,  com 
manded  by  General  Buckner  until  the  arrival  of  General 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  whom  President  Davis  had  commis 
sioned  a  full  general  in  the  Confederate  service,  and  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  Western  Department. 

Apart  from  the  historical  interest  which  belongs  to  the 
name  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  and  from  the  dramatic  inci 
dent  of  his  death  at  the  very  climax  of  a  splendid  victory, 
which  immediately  paled  into  disaster  upon  his  fall,  as  the 


ALBERT   SIDNEY   JOHNSTON.  333 

long  and  valued  friend  of  Jefferson  Davis,  lie  is  entitled  to 
special  mention  in  the  biography  of  the  latter. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  born  in  Mason  County,  Ken 
tucky,  in  1803.  He  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1826;  was 
commissioned  as  Lieutenant  of  infantry ;  served  in  the  Black 
Hawk  war  with  distinction;  resigned  and  settled  in  Texas  in 
1836.  He  volunteered  as  a  private  in  her  armies  soon  after 
the  battle  of  San  Jacinto.  His  merit  soon  raised  him  from 
the  ranks,  and  he  was  appointed  senior  Brigadier-General,  and 
succeeded  General  Houston  in  the  command  of  the  Texan 
army.  In  1838  he  was  appointed  Texan  Secretary  of  War, 
and  in  1839  organized  an  expedition  against  the  hostile  Chero- 
kees,  in  which  he  routed  them  completely  in  a  battle  on  the 
river  Neches.  He  warmly  advocated  the  annexation  of  Texas 
to  the  United  States,  and  after  this  union  was  effected,  he  took 
part  in  the  Mexican  war.  His  services  at  the  siege  of  Mon 
terey  drew  upon  him  the  public  favor  and  the  thanks  of  Gen 
eral  Butler.  He  continued  in  the  army,  and  in  1857,  was 
sent  by  President  Buchanan  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
United  States  Army  to  subdue  the  Mormons.  His  successful 
advance  in  the  Great  Salt  Lake  City,  and  the  skill  and  address 
with  which  he  conducted  a  difficult  enterprise,  largely  increased 
his  fame.  When  the  war  commenced  between  the  North  and 
South,  he  was  in  California,  but  when  he  learned  the  progress 
of  the  revolution,  he  resigned  his  commission  and  set  out  from 
San  Francisco,  to  penetrate  by  land  to  Richmond,  a  distance 
of  two  thousand  three  hundred  miles. 

The  safe  arrival  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  within 
the  lines  of  the  Confederacy,  was  greeted  with  a  degree  of 
public  acclamation  hardly  less  enthusiastic  than  would  have 
signalized  the  intelligence  of  a  great  victory.  It  was  known 


334  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

that  the  Federal  authorities,  anxious  to  prevent  so  distinguished 
and  valuable  an  accession  to  the  generalship  of  the  South,  were 
intent  upon  his  capture.  For  weeks  popular  expectation  had 
been  strained,  in  eager  gaze,  for  tidings  of  the  distinguished 
commander,  who,  beset  by  innumerable  perils  and  obstacles, 
was  making  his  way  across  the  continent,  not  less  eager  to  join 
his  countrymen,  than  were  they  to  feel  the  weight  of  his  noble 
blade  in  the  unequal  combat. 

Few  of  the  eminent  soldiers,  who  had  sought  service  under 
the  banners  of  the  Confederacy,  had  a  more  brilliant  record  of 
actual  service ;  and  to  the  advantages  of  reputation,  General 
Johnston  added  those  graces  and  distinctions  of  person  with 
which  the  imagination  invests  the  ideal  commander.  He  was 
considerably  past  middle  age ;  his  height  exceeded  six  feet,  his 
frame  was  large  and  sinewy ;  his  every  movement  and  posture 
indicated  vigorous  and  athletic  manhood.  The  general  expre- 
sion  of  his  striking  face  was  grave  and  composed,  but  inviting 
rather  than  austere. 

The  arrival  of  General  Johnston  in  Richmond,  early  in 
September,  was  a  source  of  peculiar  congratulation  to  Presi 
dent  Davis.  Between  these  illustrious  men  had  existed,  for 
many  years,  an  endearment,  born  of  close  association,  common 
trials  and  triumphs,  and  mutual  confidence,  which  rendered 
most  auspicious  their  cooperation  in  the  cause  of  Southern  in 
dependence. 

"Albert  Sidney  Johnston,"  says  Professor  Bledsoe,  in  a 
recent  publication,  "  who,  take  him  all  in  all,  was  the  simplest, 
bravest,  grandest  man' we  have  ever  known,  once  said  to  the 
present  writer :  ( There  is  no  measuring  such  a  man  as  Davis ; ' 
and  this  high  tribute  had  a  fitting  counterpart  in  that  which 
Davis  paid  Johnston,  when  discussing,  in  the  Federal  Senate, 


PLANS   OF   GENERAL   JOHNSTON.  335 

the  Utah  expedition.      Said  he 'I  hold  that 

the  country  is  indebted  to  the  administration  for  having  se 
lected  the  man  who  is  at  the  head  of  the  expedition ;  who,  as 
a  soldier,  has  not  a  superior  in  the  army  or  out  of  it;  and 
whose  judgment,  whose  art,  whose  knowledge  is  equal  to  this 
or  any  other  emergency ;  a  man  of  such  decision,  such  resolu 
tion  that  his  country's  honor  can  never  be  tarnished  in  his 
hands ;  a  man  of  such  calmness,  such  kindness,  that  a  deluded 
people  can  never  suffer  by  harshness  from  him.'" 

President  Davis  immediately  tendered  to  General  Johnston 
the  command  of  one  of  the  two  grand  military  divisions  of 
the  Confederacy,  and  he  as  promptly  repaired  to  the  scene  of 
his  duties. 

The  general  features  of  General  Johnston's  policy  contem 
plated  a  line  of  defense  running  from  the  Mississippi  through 
the  region   immediately  covering  Nashville  to   Cumberland 
Gap — the  key  to  the  defense  of  East  Tennessee  and  South 
western  Virginia,  and  thus  to  the  most  vital  line  of  commu 
nication  in  the  South.     It  is  easy  to  conceive  the  large  force 
requisite  for  so  important  and  difficult  a  task,  against  the  im 
mense  armies  of  Grant  and  Buell,  numbering,  in  the  aggregate, 
more  than  one  hundred  thousand  men.     Despite  the  earnest 
appeals  of  General  Johnston,  and  notwithstanding  that  upon 
the  successful  maintenance  of  his  position  depended  the  suc 
cessful  defense  of  the  entire  southern  and  south-western  sec 
tions  of  the  Confederacy,  his  force,  at  the  last  of  January,  1862, 
did  not  exceed  twenty-six  thousand  men.     Informed   of  his 
perilous  situation,  the  Confederate  Government  could  do  no 
more  than  second  the  appeals  and  remonstrances  of  General 
Johnston.     Slight  accessions  were  made  to  his  force  from  the 
States  which  were  menaced,  but,  as  results  speedily  demon- 


336  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

strated,  he  was  unable  to  meet  the  enemy  with  an  adequate 
force  at  any  one  of  the  vital  points  of  his  defensive  line. 

In  the  immediate  front  of  General  Johnston's  position  was 
the  army  of  Buell,  estimated  at  forty  thousand  men,  which, 
during  the  entire  winter,  was  in  training  for  its  meditated  ad 
vance  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  in  the  direction  of  Nash- 
ville.  Under  Grant,  at  Cairo,  was  an  army  of  more  than  fifty 
thousand  men,  which,  in  cooperation  with  a  formidable  naval 
force,  was  designed  to  operate  against  Nashville,  and,  by  se 
curing  possession  of  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland 
Rivers,  to  hold  Kentucky  and  West  Tennessee.  General  John 
ston's  position  was  indeed  a  cruel  dilemma,  and  was  sufficiently 
explained  in  a  letter  to  President  Davis,  representing  the  inad 
equacy  of  his  force,  for  either  front  of  attack,  upon  a  line  whose 
every  point  demanded  ample  defense.  Only  a  self-denying 
patriotism  could  have  induced  General  Johnston  to  occupy  his 
false  position  before  the  public,  winch  accredited  to  him  an  army 
ample  even  for  aggressive  warfare.  With  an  almost  certain 
prospect  of  disaster,  he  nevertheless  resolved  to  make  the  su 
preme  effort  which  alone  could  avert  it. 

His  plan  was  to  meet  Grant's  attack  upon  Nashville  with 
sixteen  thousand  men,  hoping,  in  the  meanwhile,  by  boldly 
confronting  Buell  with  the  residue  of  his  forces,  to  hold  in 
check  the  enemy  in  his  immediate  front.  During  the  winter, 
by  a  skillful  disposition  of  his  forces  and  adroit  maneuvers,  he 
deceived  the  enemy  as  to  his  real  strength,  and  thus  deferred 
the  threatened  advance  until  the  month  of  February. 

The  month  of  January,  1862,  was  to  witness  the  first  check 
to  the  arms  of  the  Confederacy,  after  seven  months  of  uninter 
rupted  victory.  The  scene  of  the  disaster  was  near  Somerset, 
Kentucky.  The  forces  engaged  were  inconsiderable  as  com- 


A   TRAIN   OF   DISASTERS.  337 

pared  with  the  conflicts  of  a  few  weeks  later,  but  the  result 
was  disheartening  to  the  impatient  temper  of  the  South,  not 
yet  chastened  by  the  severe  trials  of  adversity.  General  Crit- 
tenden  was  badly  defeated,  though,  as  is  probable,  through  no 
erroneous  calculation  or  defective  generalship  on  his  part.  A 
melancholy  feature  of  the  disaster  was  the  death  of  General 
Zollicoffer.  With  the  repulse  and  retreat  of  the  Confederate 
forces  after  the  battle  of  Fishing  Creek,  as  the  action  was  called, 
followed  the  virtual  possession  of  South-eastern  Kentucky  by 
the  Federal  army.  The  Confederate  line  of  defense  in  Ken 
tucky  was  thus  broken,  and  the  value  of  other  positions  ma 
terially  impaired. 

Early  in  February  the  infantry  columns  of  Grant  and  the 
gunboats  of  Commodore  Foote  commenced  the  ascent  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  The  immediate  object  of  assault  was  Fort 
Henry,  an  imperfectly  constructed  fortification,  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  river,  near  the  dividing  line  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee.  After  a  signal  display  of  gallantry  by  its  com 
mander,  General  Tilghman,  the  fort  was  surrendered,  the  main 
body  of  the  forces  defending  it  having  been  previously  sent 
to  Fort  Donelson,  the  principal  defense  of  the  Cumberland 
River.  The  capture  of  Fort  Henry  opened  the  Tennessee 
River,  penetrating  the  States  of  Tennessee  and  Alabama,  and 
navigable  for  steamers  for  more  than  two  hundred  miles,  to 
the  unchecked  advance  of  the  enemy. 

General  Grant  promptly  advanced  to  attack  Fort  Donel 
son.  After  a  series  of  bloody  engagements  and  a  siege  of 
several  days,  Fort  Donelson  was  surrendered,  with  the  gar 
rison  of  more  than  nine  thousand  men.  This  result  was  in 
deed  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Confederacy,  and  produced  a  most 
alarming  crisis  in  the  military  affairs  of  the  Western  Depart- 
22 


338  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ment.  General  Johnston  was  near  Nashville,  with  the  force 
which  had  lately  held  Bowling  Green,  the  latter  place  having 
been  evacuated  during  the  progress  of  the  fight  at  Fort  Don- 
elson.  Nashville  was  immediately  evacuated,  and  the  rem 
nant  of  General  Johnston's  army  retreated  southward,  first  to 
Murfreesboro',  Tennessee,  and  afterwards  crossed  the  Tennes 
see,  at  Decatur,  Alabama. 

In  January,  General  Beauregard  had  been  transferred  from 
Virginia  to  Kentucky,  and,  at  the  time  of  the  surrender  of 
Nashville,  was  in  command  of  the  forces  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Columbus,  Kentucky,  which  protected  the  passage  of  the 
Mississippi.  The  entire  Confederate  line  of  defense  in  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  having  been  lost  with  the  surrender  of 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  its  various  posts  became  unten 
able.  In  a  subsequent  portion  of  this  narrative,  we  shall  trace 
the  results  of  the  Confederate  endeavor  to  establish  a  new  line 
of  defense  in  the  West  by  a  judicious  and  masterly  combina 
tion  of  forces. 

Meanwhile,  the  preparations  of  the  enemy  in  the  East  were 
even  more  formidable  and  threatening  than  in  the  West.  It 
was  in  Virginia  that  the  "elastic  spirit"  of  the  North,  as  the 
Richmond  Examiner  termed  the  alacrity  of  the  consecutive  pop 
ular  uprisings  in  favor  of  the  war  at  the  North,  was  chiefly  am 
bitious  and  hopeful  of  decisive  results  in  favor  of  the  Union. 
Here  was  to  be  sought  retrieval  of  the  national  honor  lost  at 
Manassas ;  here  was  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  which,  once 
taken,  the  "rebellion  would  collapse."  The  energy  and  ad 
ministrative  ability  of  General  McClellan  had  accomplished 
great  results  in  the  creation  of  a  fine  army  and  the  security 
of  the  capital.  But,  with  the  opening  of  the  season  favorable 
to  military  operations,  he  was  expected  to  accomplish  far  more 


EXTENT  OF  THE  REVERSES.  339 

decisive  results — nothing  less  than  the  capture  of  Richmond, 
the  expulsion  of  the  Confederate  authority  from  Virginia,  and 
the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  army  at  Manassas. 

Until  the  opening  of  spring,  military  operations  in  Virginia 
were  attended  by  no  events  of  importance.  But  the  East  was 
not  to  be  without  its  contribution  to  the  unvarying  tide  of 
Confederate  disaster.  In  the  month  of  February,  Roanoke 
Island,  upon  the  sea-line  of  North  Carolina,  defended  by  Gen 
eral  Wise,  with  a  single  brigade,  was  assaulted  by  a  powerful 
combined  naval  and  military  expedition,  under  General  Burn- 
side,  and  surrendered,  with  its  garrison.  This  success  opened 
to  the  enemy  the  sounds  and  inlets  of  that  region,  with  their 
tributary  streams,  and  gave  him  easy  access  to  a  productive 
country  and  important  communications. 

It  was  not  difficult  to  estimate  correctly  the  serious  nature 
of  these  successive  reverses  covering  nearly  every  field  of  im 
portant  operations.  They  were  of  a  character  alarming,  in 
deed,  in  immediate  consequences,  and,  necessarily,  largely  af 
fecting  the  destiny  of  the  war  in  its  future  stages.  Retreat, 
evacuation,  and  surrender  seemed  the  irremediable  tendency 
of  affairs  every-where.  Thousands  of  prisoners  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  the  capital  of  the  most  important  State 
in  the  West  occupied,  the  Confederate  centre  was  broken,  the 
great  water-avenues  of  the  south-west  open  to  the  enemy,  the 
campaign  transferred  from  the  heart  of  Kentucky  to  the  north 
ern  borders  of  the  Gulf  States,  and  hardly  an  available  line  was 
left  for  the  recovery  of  the  lost  territory. 

Within  a  few  weeks  the  extravagant  hopes  of  the  South  were 
brought  to  the  verge  of  extreme  apprehension.  The  public 
mind  was  not  to  be  soothed  by  the  affected  indifference  of  the 
press  to  calamities,  the  magnitude  of  which  was  too  palpable, 


340  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

in  the  presence  of  actual  invasion  of  nearly  one  half  the  South 
ern  territory,  and  of  imminent  perils  threatening  the  speedy 
culmination  of  adverse  fortune  to  the  Confederacy.  Richmond, 
which,  during  the  war,  was  at  all  times  the  reflex  of  the  hopes 
and  aspirations  of  the  South,  was  the  scene  of  gloom  and  de 
spondency,  in  painful  contrast  with  the  ardent  and  gratulatory 
tone  so  lately  prevalent. 

Popular  disappointment  rarely  fails  in  its  search  for  scape 
goats  upon  which  to  visit  responsibility  for  misfortunes.  A 
noticeable  result  of  the  Confederate  reverses  in  the  beginning  of 
1862  was  the  speedy  evolution  of  an  organized  hostility  to  the 
administration  of  President  Davis.  The  season  was  eminently 
propitious  for  outward  demonstrations  of  feeling,  heretofore 
suppressed,  in  consequence  of  the  brilliant  success,  until  re 
cently,  attending  the  movement  for  Southern  independence. 
The  universal  and  characteristic  disposition  of  the  masses  to 
receive,  with  favor,  censure  of  their  rulers,  and  to  charge 
public  calamities  to  official  failure  and  maladministration,  was 
an  inviting  inducement,  in  this  period  of  public  gloom,  to  the 
indulgence  of  partisan  aspirations  and  personal  spleen. 

To  one  familiar  with  the  political  history  of  the  South  dur 
ing  the  decade  previous  to  secession,  there  could  be  no  diffi 
culty  in  penetrating  the  various  motives,  instigating  to  union, 
for  a  common  purpose,  the  heterogeneous  elements  of  this  op 
position.  Prominent  among  its  leaders  were  men,  the  life-long 
opponents  of  the  President,  notorious  for  their  want  of  adhe 
sion  to  any  principle  or  object  for  its  own  sake,  and  especially 
lukewarm,  at  all  times,  upon  issues  vitally  affecting  the  safety 
of  the  South.  These  men  could  not  forget,  even  when  their 
allegiance  had  been  avowed  to  the  sacred  cause  of  country  and 
liberty,  the  rancor  engendered  in  the  old  contests  of  party. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION   ASSAILED.  341 

Some,  in  addition  to  disappointed  political  ambition,  arising 
from  the  failure  of  the  President  to  tender  them  the  foremost 
places  in  the  Government,  had  personal  resentments  to  gratify. 
Much  the  larger  portion  of  the  opposition,  which  continued, 
until  the  last  moments  of  the  Confederacy,  to  assail  the  Gov 
ernment,  had  its  origin  in  these  influences,  and  they  speedily 
attracted  all  restless  and  impracticable  characters — born  Jaco 
bins,  malcontents  by  the  decree  of  nature,  and  others  of  the 
class  who  are  "  never  at  home  save  in  the  attitude  of  contra 
diction." 

At  first  feeble  in  influence,  this  faction,  by  pertinacious  and  un 
scrupulous  efforts,  eventually  became  a  source  of  embarrassment, 
and  promoted  the  wide-spread  division  and  distrust  which,  in 
the  latter  days  of  the  Confederacy,  were  so  ominous  of  the 
approaching  catastrophe.  Its  earliest  shafts  were  ostensibly  not 
aimed  at  the  President,  since  there  was  no  evidence  that  the 
popular  affection  for  Mr.  Davis  would  brook  assaults  upon 
him,  but  assumed  the  shape  of  accusations  against  his  consti 
tutional  advisers.  A  deliberate  movement,  cloaked  in  the 
disguise  of  respectful  remonstrance  and  petition,  sustained  by 
demagogical  speeches — which,  though  artfully  designed,  in 
many  instances  revealed  the  secret  venom — was  arranged, 
upon  the  assembling  of  the  First  Congress  under  the  per 
manent  Government,  to  revolutionize  the  cabinet  of  President 
Davis. 

Mr.  Benjamin,  the  Secretary  of  "War,  and  Mr.  Mallory, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  were  the  objects  of  especial  and  most 
envenomed  assault.  They  were  assailed  in  Congress,  and  by  a 
portion  of  the  Richmond  press,  as  directly  chargeable  with  the 
late  reverses.  Yet  it  should  have  been  plain  that  the  most 
serious  of  these  disasters  were  attributable  chiefly  to  the  over- 


342  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

whelming  naval  preponderance  of  the  enemy — an  advantage 
not  to  have  been  obviated  entirely  by  any  degree  of  foresight 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  naval  secretary — and  by  a 
deficiency  of  soldiers,  for  which  the  country  itself,  and  not  Mr. 
Benjamin,  was  to  be  censured. 

The  indisputable  facts  in  the  case  were  ample  in  the  vindi 
cation  of  Mr.  Mallory,  as  to  the  insufficient  defenses  of  the 
Western  rivers,  now  in  Federal  possession.  The  obvious 
dangers  of  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers,  as  an 
avenue  of  access  to  the  heart  of  the  South,  were  not  over 
looked  by  the  Government.  The  channels  of  these  rivers 
are  navigable  during  a  large  portion  of  the  year,  and  the  two 
streams  gradually  approach  each  other,  as  they  pass  from  Ten 
nessee  into  Kentucky,  on  their  course  to  the  Ohio,  coming  at 
one  point  within  less  than  three  miles  of  each  other,  and 
emptying  their  waters  only  ten  miles  apart.  The  facilities 
afforded  by  their  proximity  for  combined  military  and  naval 
operations,  were  necessarily  apparent.  The  Government  con 
templated  the  defense  of  these  streams  by  floating  defenses 
the  only  means  by  which  they  could  be  debarred  to  the  enemy. 
The  Provisional  Congress,  however,  by  a  most  singular  and 
fatal  oversight  of  the  recommendation  of  the  Government, 
made  no  appropriation  for  floating  defenses  on  the  Tennessee 
and  Cumberland,  until  the  opportunity  to  prepare  them  had 
passed. 

It  authorized  the  President  to  cause  to  be  constructed  thir 
teen  steam  gunboats  for  sea-coast  defense,  and  such  floating 
defenses  for  the  Mississippi  River  as  he  might  deem  best 
adapted  to  the  purpose ;  but  no  provision  was  made  for  armed 
steamers  on  the  large  Western  interior  rivers  until  the  month 
of  January,  1862,  when  an  act  was  approved  appropriating 


SECRETARIES   MALLOEY  AND   BENJAMIN.  343 

one  million  of  dollars,  to  be  expended  for  this  purpose,  at  the 
discretion  of  the  President,  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  of  the 
Navy,  as  he  might  direct.  This  was  less  than  Jour  weeks 
before  the  actual  advance  of  the  Federal  gunboats,  and  was, 
of  course,  too  late  for  the  needed  armaments.  The  appropria 
tion  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  for  equipment  and  re 
pairs  of  vessels  of  the  Confederate  navy,  hardly  sufficed  to 
enable  the  Secretary  of  that  department  to  maintain  a  few  frail 
steamers  on  the  Tennessee,  hastily  prepared  from  commercial 
or  passenger  boats,  and  very  imperfectly  armed. 

A  congressional  investigating  committee  censured  Mr.  Ben 
jamin  and  General  Huger  as  responsible  for  the  capture  of 
Eoanoke  Island  and  its  garrison.  The  latter  affair  was  indeed 
a  disaster  not  to  be  lightly  palliated,  and  was  one  of  those  in 
explicable  mishaps,  which,  upon  retrospection,  we  see  should 
have  been  avoided,  though  it  is  at  least  doubtful  who  is  justly 
censurable.  It  is,  however,  only  just  to  state  that  no  view  of 
the  Roanoke  Island  disaster  has  ever  been  presented  to  the 
writer,  which  did  not  acquit  General  Wise  of  all  blame. 
His  exculpation  was  complete  before  every  tribunal  of 
opinion. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  real  merit  of  these  issues  made 
against  Secretaries  Mallory  and  Benjamin,  it  is  very  certain 
that  those  two  gentlemen  continued  to  be  the  objects  of  marked 
disfavor  from  those  members  of  Congress,  and  that  portion  of 
the  Richmond  press  known  to  be  hostile  to  the  administration 
of  Mr.  Davis.  Popular  prejudice  is  proverbially  unreasoning, 
and  it  was  indeed  singular  to  note  how  promptly  the  public 
echoed  the  assaults  of  the  hostile  press  against  these  officials, 
upon  subsequent  occasions,  when  they  were  held  account- 


344  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 

able  for  disasters  with  which  they  had  no  possible  connec 
tion.* 

This  period  of  Confederate  misfortunes  gave  the  first  verifi 
cation  of  a  fact  which  afterward  had  frequent  illustration,  that 
the  resolution  of  the  South,  so  indomitable  in  actual  contest, 
staggered  under  the  weight  of  reverses.  The  history  of  the 
war  was  a  record  of  the  variations  of  the  Southern  mind  be 
tween  extreme  elation  and  immoderate  depression.  Extrava 
gant  exultation  over  success,  and  immoderate  despondency  over 
disaster,  usually  followed  each  other  in  prompt  succession.  Over 
estimating,  in  many  instances,  the  importance  of  its  own  vic 
tories,  the  South  quite  as  frequently  exaggerated  the  value  of 
those  won  by  the  enemy.  There  was  thus  a  constant  de 
parture  from  the  middle  ground  of  dispassionate  judgment, 
which  would  have  accurately  measured  the  real  situation; 
making  available  its  opportunities,  by  a  vigorous  prosecution 
of  advantage,  and  overcoming  difficulties  by  energetic  prepara 
tion. 

But  this  despondency  happily  gave  place  to  renewed  de 
termination,  as  the  success  of  the  enemy  brought  him  nearer 
the  homes  of  the  South,  and  made  more  imminent  the  evils 
of  subjugation.  A  grand  and  noble  popular  reanimation  was 
the  response  to  the  renewed  vigor  and  resolution  of  the  Gov 
ernment. 

When  the  Confederate  Government  was  organized  at  Mont 
gomery,  the  operation  of  the  provisional  constitution  was 

*  The  friends  of  Mr.  Mallory,  in  illustration  of  this  unreasoning  preju 
dice,  were  accustomed  to  declare  that,  "  were  a  Confederate  vessel  to 
sink  in  a  storm,  in  the  middle  of  the  ocean,  the  Richmond  Examiner  and 
Mr.  Foote  would  advocate  the  censure  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  as 
responsible  for  her  loss." 


THE  " PERMANENT"  GOVERNMENT.       345 

limited  to  the  period  of  one  year,  to  be  superseded  by  the  per 
manent  government.  No  material  alteration  of  the  political 
organism  was  found  necessary,  nor  was  there  any  change  in 
the  personnel  of  the  administration — Mr.  Davis  having  been 
unanimously  chosen  President  at  the  election  in  November, 
and  retaining  his  administration  as  it  existed  at  the  close  of 
the  functions  of  the  provisional  constitution.  Though  the 
change  was  thus  merely  nominal,  the  occasion  was  replete  with 
historic  interest  to  the  people  whose  liberties  were  involved  in 
the  fate  of  the  government,  now  declared  "permanent."  It 
was,  indeed,  an  assumption  of  a  new  character — a  declaration, 
with  renewed  emphasis,  of  the  high  and  peerless  enterprise  of 
independent  national  existence;  an  introduction  to  a  future, 
promising  a  speedy  fulfillment  of  inestimable  blessings  or 
"woes  unnumbered." 

On  the  18th  of  February,  1862,  the  first  Congress,  under  the 
permanent  constitution  of  the  Confederate  States,  assembled  in 
the  capitol  at  Richmond.  On  the  22d  occurred  the  ceremony 
of  the  inauguration  of  President  Davis. 

To  the  citizens  of  Richmond  and  others  who  were  spectators, 
the  scene  in  Capitol  Square,  on  that  memorable  morning,  was 
marked  by  gloomy  surroundings,  the  recollection  of  which  re 
calls,  with  sad  interest,  suggestive  omens,  which  then  seemed 
to  betoken  the  adverse  fate  of  the  Confederacy.  The  season 
was  one  of  unusual  rigor,  and  the  preceding  month  of  public 
calamity  and  distress  had  been  fitly  commemorated  by  a  pro 
tracted  series  of  dark  and  cheerless  days.  Never,  within 
the  recollection  of  the  writer,  had  there  been  a  day  in  Rich 
mond  so  severe,  uncomfortable,  and  gloomy,  as  the  day  ap 
pointed  for  the  ceremony  of  inauguration.  For  days  previous 
heavy  clouds  had  foreshadowed  the  rain,  which  fell  contin- 


346  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

uously  during  the  preceding  night,  and  which  seemed  to 
increase  in  volume  on  the  morning  of  the  ceremony.  The 
occasion  was  in  singular  contrast  with  that  which,  a  year  pre 
vious,  had  witnessed  the  installment  of  the  provisional  govern 
ment — upon  a  day  whose  genial  sunshine  seemed  prophetic  of 
a  bright  future  for  the  infant  power  then  launched  upon  its 
voyage. 

But  however  wanting  in  composure  may  have  been  the 
public  mind,  and  whatever  the  perils  of  the  situation,  the  voice 
of  their  twice-chosen  chief  quickly  infused  into  the  heart  of 
the  people,  that  unabated  zeal  and  unconquerable  resolution, 
with  which  he  proclaimed  himself  devoted  anew  to  the  deliver 
ance  of  his  country.  The  inaugural  address  was  a  noble  and 
inspiring  appeal  to  the  patriotism  of  the  land.  Its  eloquent, 
candid,  and  patriotic  tone  won  all  hearts;  and  even  the  un 
friendly  press  and  politicians  accorded  commendation  to  the 
dignity  and  candor  with  which  the  President  avowed  his 
official  responsibility;  the  manly  frankness  with  which  he  de 
fended  departments  of  the  government  unjustly  assailed;  and 
the  assuring,  defiant  courage,  with  which  he  invited  all  classes 
of  his  countrymen  to  join  him  in  the  supreme  sacrifice,  should 
it  become  necessary. 

The  inaugural  ceremonies  were  as  simple  and  appropriate  as 
those  witnessed  at  Montgomery  a  year  previous.  The  mem 
bers  of  the  Confederate  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
with  the  members  of  the  Virginia  Legislature,  awaited  in  the 
hall  of  the  House  of  Delegates  the  arrival  of  the  President. 
In  consequence  of  the  limited  capacity  of  the  hall,  compara 
tively  few  spectators — a  majority  of  them  ladies — witnessed  the 
proceedings  there.  Immediately  fronting  the  chair  of  the 
speaker  were  the  ladies  of  Mr.  Davis'  household,  attended  by 


CEEEMONIES   OF   INAUGUEATION.  347 

relatives  and  friends.  In  close  proximity  were  members  of 
the  cabinet. 

A  contemporary  account  thus  mentions  this  scene :  "  It  was 
a  grave  and  great  assemblage.  Time-honored  men  were  there, 
who  had  witnessed  ceremony  after  ceremony  of  inauguration 
in  the  palmiest  days  of  the  old  confederation;  those  who  had 
been  at  the  inauguration  of  the  iron- willed  Jackson ;  men  who, 
in  their  fiery  Southern  ardor,  had  thrown  down  the  gauntlet 
of  defiance  in  the  halls  of  Federal  legislation,  and  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy  avowed  their  determination  to  be  free;  and 
finally  witnessed  the  enthroning  of  a  republican  despot  in 
their  country's  chair  of  state.  All  were  there ;  and  silent  tears 
were  seen  coursing  down  the  cheeks  of  gray-haired  men,  while 
the  determined  will  stood  out  in  every  feature." 

The  appearance  of  the  President  was  singularly  imposing, 
though  there  were  visible  traces  of  his  profound  emotion,  and 
a  pallor,  painful  to  look  upon,  reminded  the  spectator  of  his 
recent  severe  indisposition.  His  dress  was  a  plain  citizen's 
suit  of  black.  Mr.  Hunter,  of  Virginia,  temporary  President 
of  the  Confederate  Senate,  occupied  the  right  of  the  platform ; 
Mr.  Bocock,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  left. 
When  President  Davis,  accompanied  by  Mr.  Orr,  of  South 
Carolina,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Arrangements,  on  the 
part  of  the  Senate,  reached  the  hall  and  passed  to  the  chair  of 
the  Speaker,  subdued  applause,  becoming  the  place  and  the 
occasion,  greeted  him.  A  short  time  sufficed  to  carry  into 
effect  the  previously  arranged  programme,  and  the  dis 
tinguished  procession  moved  to  the  Washington  monument, 
where  a  stand  was  prepared  for  the  occasion. 

Hon.  James  Lyons,  of  Virginia,  Chairman  of  the  House 
Committee  of  Arrangements,  called  the  assemblage  to  order, 


348  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

and  an  eloquent  and  appropriate  prayer  was  offered  by  Bishop 
Johns,  of  the  Diocese  of  Virginia.  The  President,  having  re 
ceived  a  most  enthusiastic  welcome  from  the  assemblage,  with 
a  clear  and  measured  accent,  delivered  his  inaugural  address : 

FELLOW-CITIZENS  :  On  this,  the  birthday  of  the  man  most  iden 
tified  with  the  establishment  of  American  independence,  and  be 
neath  the  monument  erected  to  commemorate  his  heroic  virtues 
and  those  of  his  compatriots,  we  have  assembled,  to  usher  into 
existence  the  permanent  government  of  the  Confederate  States. 
Through  this  instrumentality,  under  the  favor  of  Divine  Provi 
dence,  we  hope  to  perpetuate  the  principles  of  our  revolutionary 
fathers.  The  day,  the  memory,  and  the  purpose  seem  fitly  asso 
ciated. 

It  is  with  mingled  feelings  of  humility  and  pride  that  I  appear 
to  take,  in  the  presence  of  the  people,  and  before  high  Heaven, 
the  oath  prescribed  as  a  qualification  for  the  exalted  station  to 
which  the  unanimous  voice  of  the  people  has  called  me.  Deeply 
sensible  of  all  that  is  implied  by  this  manifestation  of  the  people's 
confidence,  I  am  yet  more  profoundly  impressed  by  the  vast  re 
sponsibility  of  the  office,  and  humbly  feel  my  own  unworthiness. 

In  return  for  their  kindness,  I  can  only  offer  assurances  of  the 
gratitude  with  which  it  is  received,  and  can  but  pledge  a  zealous 
devotion  of  every  faculty  to  the  service  of  those  who  have  chosen 
me  as  their  Chief  Magistrate. 

When  a  long  course  of  class  legislation,  directed  not  to  the  gen 
eral  welfare,  but  to  the  aggrandizement  of  the  Northern  section 
of  the  Union,  culminated  in  a  warfare  on  the  domestic  institutions 
of  the  Southern  States;  when  the  dogmas  of  a  sectional  party,  sub 
stituted  for  the  provisions  of  the  constitutional  compact,  threatened 
to  destroy  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  States,  six  of  those  States, 
withdrawing  from  the  Union,  confederated  together  to  exercise  the 
right  and  perform  the  duty  of  instituting  a  government  which 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS.  349 

would  better  secure  the  liberties  for  the  preservation  of  which 
that  Union  was  established. 

Whatever  of  hope  some  may  have  entertained  that  a  returning 
sense  of  justice  would  remove  the  danger  with  which  our  rights 
were  threatened,  and  render  it  possible  to  preserve  the  Union  of 
the  Constitution,  must  have  been  dispelled  by  the  malignity  and 
barbarity  of  the  Northern  States  in  the  prosecution  of  the  exist 
ing  war.  The  confidence  of  the  most  hopeful  among  us  must  have 
been  destroyed  by  the  disregard  they  have  recently  exhibited  for 
all  the  time-honored  bulwarks  of  civil  and  religious  liberty.  Bas- 
tiles  filled  with  prisoners,  arrested  without  civil  process,  or  indict 
ment  duly  found ;  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  suspended  by  execu 
tive  mandate ;  a  State  Legislature  controlled  by  the  imprisonment 
of  members  whose  avowed  principles  suggested  to  the  Federal  ex 
ecutive  that  there  might  be  another  added  to  the  list  of  seceded 
States ;  elections  held  under  threats  of  a  military  power ;  civil  offi 
cers,  peaceful  citizens,  and  gentle  women  incarcerated  for  opinion's 
sake,  proclaimed  the  incapacity  of  our  late  associates  to  administer 
a  government  as  free,  liberal,  and  humane  as  that  established  for 
our  common  use. 

For  proof  of  the  sincerity  of  our  purpose  to  maintain  our  ancient 
institutions,  we  may  point  to  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederacy 
and  the  laws  enacted  under  it,  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that,  through 
all  the  necessities  of  an  unequal  struggle,  there  has  been  no  act, 
on  our  part,  to  impair  personal  liberty  or  the  freedom  of  speech, 
of  thought,  or  of  the  press.  The  courts  have  been  open,  the  ju 
dicial  functions  fully  executed,  and  every  right  of  the  peaceful 
citizen  maintained  as  securely  as  if  a  war  of  invasion  had  not  dis 
turbed  the  land. 

The  people  of  the  States  now  confederated  became  convinced 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  a  sectional  majority,  who  would  pervert  the  most  sa 
cred  of  all  trusts  to  the  destruction  of  the  rights  which  it  was 


350  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

pledged  to  protect.  They  believed  that  to  remain  longer  in  the 
Union  would  subject  them  to  a  continuance  of  a  disparaging  dis 
crimination,  submission  to  which  would  be  inconsistent  to  their 
welfare  and  intolerable  to  a  proud  people.  They,  therefore,  de 
termined  to  sever  its  bonds,  and  establish  a  new  confederacy  for 
themselves. 

The  experiment,  instituted  by  our  revolutionary  fathers,  of  a 
voluntary  union  of  sovereign  States,  for  purposes  specified  in  a 
solemn  compact,  had  been  prevented  by  those  who,  feeling  power 
and  forgetting  right,  were  determined  to  respect  no  law  but  their 
own  will.  The  Government  had  ceased  to  answer  the  ends  for 
which  it  had  been  ordained  and  established.  To  save  ourselves 
from  a  revolution  which,  in  its  silent  but  rapid  progress,  was 
about  to  place  us  under  the  despotism  of  numbers,  and  to  pre 
serve,  in  spirit  as  well  as  in  form,  a  system  of  government 
we  believed  to  be  peculiarly  fitted  to  our  condition  and  full  of 
promise  for  mankind,  we  determined  to  make  a  new  association, 
composed  of  States  homogeneous  in  interest,  in  policy,  and  in 
feeling. 

True  to  our  traditions  of  peace  and  love  of  justice,  we  sent 
commissioners  to  the  United  States  to  propose  a  fair  and  amica 
ble  settlement  of  all  questions  of  public  debt  or  property  which 
might  be  in  dispute.  But  the  Government  at  Washington,  deny 
ing  our  right  to  self-government,  refused  even  to  listen  to  any 
proposals  for  a  peaceful  separation.  Nothing  was  then  left  to  us 
but  to  prepare  for  war. 

The  first  year  in  our  history  has  been  the  most  eventful  in  the 
annals  of  this  continent.  A  new  government  has  been  established, 
and  its  machinery  put  in  operation,  over  an  area  exceeding  seven 
hundred  thousand  square  miles.  The  great  principles  upon  which 
we  have  been  willing  to  hazard  every  thing  that  is  dear  to  man 
have  made  conquests  for  us  which  could  never  have  been  achieved 
by  the  sword.  Our  Confederacy  has  grown  from  six  to  thirteen 


INAUGURAL   ADDRESS.  351 

States;  and  Maryland,  already  united  to  us  by  hallowed  mem 
ories  and  material  interests,  will,  I  believe,  when  able  to  speak 
with  unstifled  voice,  connect  her  destiny  with  the  South.  Our 
people  have  rallied,  with  unexampled  unanimity,  to  the  support 
of  the  great  principles  of  constitutional  government,  with  firm 
resolve  to  perpetuate  by  arms  the  rights  which  they  could  not 
peacefully  secure.  A  million  of  men,  it  is  estimated,  are  now 
standing  in  hostile  array,  and  waging  war  along  a  frontier  of  thou 
sands  of  miles;  battles  have  been  fought,  sieges  have  been  con 
ducted,  and,  although  the  contest  is  not  ended,  and  the  tide  for 
the  moment  is  against  us,  the  final  result  in  our  favor  is  not 
doubtful. 

The  period  is  near  at  hand  when  our  foes  must  sink  under  the 
immense  load  of  debt  which  they  have  incurred — a  debt  which, 
in  their  efforts  to  subjugate  us,  has  already  attained  such  fearful 
dimensions  as  will  subject  them  to  burdens  which  must  continue 
to  oppress  them  for  generations  to  come. 

We,  too,  have  had  our  trials  and  difficulties.  That  we  are  to 
escape  them  in  the  future  is  not  to  be  hoped.  It  was  to  be  ex 
pected,  when  we  entered  upon  this  war,  that  it  would  expose  our 
people  to  sacrifices,  and  cost  them  much  both  of  money  and  blood. 
But  we  knew  the  value  of  the  object  for  which  we  struggled,  and 
understood  the  nature  of  the  war  in  which  we  were  engaged.  Noth 
ing  could  be  so  bad  as  failure,  and  any  sacrifice  would  be  cheap  as 
the  price  of  success  in  such  a  contest. 

But  the  picture  has  its  lights  as  well  as  its  shadows.  This  great 
strife  has  awakened  in  the  people  the  highest  emotions  and  qual 
ities  of  the  human  soul.  It  is  cultivating  feelings  of  patriotism, 
virtue,  and  courage.  Instances  of  self-sacrifice  and  of  generous 
devotion  to  the  noble  cause  for  which  we  are  contending  are  rife 
throughout  the  land.  Never  has  a  people  evinced  a  more  deter 
mined  spirit  than  that  now  animating  men,  women,  and  children 
in  every  part  of  our  country.  Upon  the  first  call,  the  men  fly  to 


352  LIFE   OP   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

arms;  and  wives  and  mothers  send  their  husbands  and  sons  to 
battle  without  a  murmur  of  regret. 

It  was,  perhaps,  in  the  ordination  of  Providence  that  we  were 
to  be  taught  the  value  of  our  liberties  by  the  price  which  we  pay 
for  them. 

The  recollections  of  this  great  contest,  with  all  its  common  tra 
ditions  of  glory,  of  sacrifices,  and  of  blood,  will  be  the  bond  of 
harmony  and  enduring  affection  amongst  the  people,  producing 
unity  in  policy,  fraternity  in  sentiment,  and  joint  effort  in  war. 

Nor  have  the  material  sacrifices  of  the  past  year  been  made 
without  some  corresponding  benefits.  If  the  acquiescence  of 
foreign  nations  in  a  pretended  blockade  has  deprived  us  of  our 
commerce  with  them,  it  is  fast  making  us  a  self-supporting  and 
an  independent  people.  The  blockade,  if  effectual  and  perma 
nent,  could  only  serve  to  divert  our  industry  from  the  production 
of  articles  for  export,  and  employ  it  in  supplying  commodities 
for  domestic  use. 

It  is  a  satisfaction  that  we  have  maintained  the  war  by  our  un 
aided  exertions.  We  have  neither  asked  nor  received  assistance 
from  any  quarter.  Yet  the  interest  involved  is  not  wholly  our 
own.  The  world  at  large  is  concerned  in  opening  our  markets  to 
its  commerce.  When  the  independence  of  the  Confederate  States 
is  recognized  by  the  nations  of  the  earth,  and  we  are  free  to  fol 
low  our  interests  and  inclinations  by  cultivating  foreign  trade,  the 
Southern  States  will  offer  to  manufacturing  nations  the  most  favor 
able  markets  which  ever  invited  their  commerce.  Cotton,  sugar, 
rice,  tobacco,  provisions,  timber,  and  naval  stores  will  furnish  at 
tractive  exchanges.  Nor  would  the  constancy  of  these  supplies  be 
likely  to  be  disturbed  by  war.  Our  confederate  strength  will  be 
too  great  to  attempt  aggression;  and  never  was  there  a  people 
whose  interests  and  principles  committed  them  so  fully  to  a  peace 
ful  policy  as  those  of  the  Confederate  States.  By  the  character 
of  their  productions,  they  are  too  deeply  interested  in  foreign 


INAUGURAL   ADDRESS.  353 

commerce  wantonly  to  disturb  it.  War  of  conquest  they  can  not 
wage,  because  the  Constitution  of  their  Confederacy  admits  of  no 
coerced  association.  Civil  war  there  can  not  be  between  States 
held  together  by  their  volition  only.  This  rule  of  voluntary  as 
sociation,  which  can  not  fail  to  be  conservative,  by  securing  just 
and  impartial  government  at  home,  does  not  diminish  the  security 
of  the  obligations  by  which  the  Confederate  States  may  be  bound 
to  foreign  nations.  In  proof  of  this,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that, 
at  the  first  moment  of  asserting  their  right  of  secession,  these 
States  proposed  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of  a  common  liability 
for  the  obligations  of  the  General  Government. 

Fellow-citizens,  after  the  struggles  of  ages  had  consecrated  the 
right  of  the  Englishman  to  constitutional  representative  govern 
ment,  our  colonial  ancestors  were  forced  to  vindicate  that  birth 
right  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  Success  crowned  their  efforts,  and 
they  provided  for  their  posterity  a  peaceful  remedy  against  future 
aggression. 

The  tyranny  of  an  unbridled  majority,  the  most  odious  and  least 
responsible  form  of  despotism,  has  denied  us  both  the  right  and 
the  remedy.  Therefore  we  are  in  arms  to  renew  such  sacrifices 
as  our  fathers  made  to  the  holy  cause  of  constitutional  liberty. 
At  the  darkest  hour  of  our  struggle,  the  provisional  gives  place 
to  the  permanent  government.  After  a  series  of  successes  and 
victories,  which  covered  our  arms  with  glory,  we  have  recently 
met  with  serious  disasters.  But,  in  the  heart  of  a  people  resolved 
to  be  free,  these  disasters  tend  but  to  stimulate  to  increased  re 
sistance. 

To  show  ourselves  worthy  of  the  inheritance  bequeathed  to  us 
by  the  patriots  of  the  Revolution,  we  must  emulate  that  heroic 
devotion  which  made  reverse  to  them  but  the  crucible  in  which 
their  patriotism  was  refined. 

With  confidence  in  the  wisdom  and  virtue  of  those  who  will 
share  with  me  the  responsibility,  and  aid  me  in  the  conduct  of 
23 


354  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

public  affairs;  securely  relying  on  the  patriotism  and  courage  of 
the  people,  of  which  the  present  war  has  furnished  so  many  ex 
amples,  I  deeply  feel  the  weight  of  the  responsibilities  I  now,  with 
unaffected  diffidence,  am  about  to  assume ;  and,  fully  realizing  the 
inadequacy  of  human  power  to  guide  and  to  sustain,  my  hope  is 
reverently  fixed  on  Him,  whose  favor  is  ever  vouchsafed  to  the 
cause  which  is  just.  With  humble  gratitude  and  adoration,  ac 
knowledging  the  Providence  which  has  so  visibly  protected  the 
Confederacy  during  its  brief  but  eventful  career,  to  Thee,  0 
G-od!  I  trustingly  commit  myself,  and  prayerfully  invoke  Thy 
blessing  on  my  country  and  its  cause. 

The  effect  of  this  address  upon  the  public  was  electrical. 
The  anxious  and  dispirited  assemblage,  which,  for  more  than  an 
hour  previous  to  the  arrival  of  the  President,  had  braved  the 
inclement  sky  and  traversed  the  almost  impassable  avenues  of 
Capitol  Square,  in  eager  longing  for  re-assuring  words  from 
him  upon  whose  courage  and  will  so  much  depended,  was  not 
disappointed.  A  consciousness  of  a  burden  removed,  of 
doubts  dispelled,  of  the  re-assured  feeling,  which  comes  with 
strengthened  conviction  that  confidence  has  not  been  misplaced, 
animated  and  thrilled  the  crowd  as  it  caught  the  impressive 
tones  and  gestures  of  the  speaker.  In  the  memory  of  every 
beholder  must  forever  dwell  the  imposing  presence  of  Mr. 
Davis,  as,  with  uplifted  hands,  he  pronounced  the  beautiful 
and  appropriate  petition  to  Providence,  which  forms  the  pero 
ration. 

The  message  sent  by  President  Davis  to  Congress,  a  few 
days  after  the  inauguration,  is  hardly  inferior  in  importance, 
as  a  historical  document,  to  the  inaugural  address.  In  view 
of  its  explanations  of  the  earlier  policy  of  the  Confederate 


MESSAGE.  355 

Government,  of  the  causes  of  recent  disasters,  and  indications 
of  important  changes  in  the  future  conduct  of  the  war,  we 
present  entire  this  first  message  of  Mr.  Davis  to  the  First 
Congress  assembled  under  the  permanent  Constitution : 

To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Confederate  States — 

In  obedience  to  the  constitutional  provision,  requiring  the 
President,  from  time  to  time,  to  give  to  the  Congress  information 
of  the  state  of  the  Confederacy,  and  recommend  to  their  consid 
eration  such  measures  as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient, 
I  have  to  communicate  that,  since  my  message  at  the  last  session  of 
the  Provisional  Congress,  events  have  demonstrated  that  the  Gov 
ernment  had  attempted  more  than  it  had  power  successfully  to 
achieve.  Hence,  in  the  effort  to  protect,  hy  our  arms,  the  whole 
of  the  territory  of  the  Confederate  States,  sea-board  and  inland,  we1 
have  been  so  exposed  as  recently  to  encounter  serious  disasters. 
When  the  Confederacy  was  formed,  the  States  composing  it  were, 
by  the  peculiar  character  of  their  pursuits,  and  a  misplaced  confi 
dence  in  their  former  associates,  to  a  great  extent,  destitute  of  the 
means  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  on  so  gigantic  a  scale  as  that 
which  it  has  attained.  The  workshops  and  artisans  were  mainly 
to  be  found  in  the  Northern  States,  and  one  of  the  first  duties 
which  devolved  upon  this  Government  was  to  establish  the  necessary 
manufactories,  and  in  the  meantime  to  obtain,  by  purchase  from 
abroad,  as  far  as  practicable,  whatever  was  required  for  the  public 
defense.  No  effort  has  been  spared  to  effect  both  these  ends, 
and  though  the  results  have  not  equaled  our  hopes,  it  is  believed 
that  an  impartial  judgment  will,  upon  full  investigation,  award  to 
the  various  departments  of  the  Government  credit  for  having  done 
all  which  human  power  and  foresight  enabled  them  to  accom 
plish. 

The  valor  and  devotion  of  the  people  have  not  only  sustained 


356  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

the  efforts  of  the  Government,  but  have  gone  far  to  supply  its 
deficiencies. 

The  active  state  of  military  preparations  among  the  nations  of 
Europe,  in  April  last,  the  date  when  our  agents  first  went  abroad, 
interposed  unavoidable  delays  in  the  procurement  of  arms,  and  the 
want  of  a  navy  has  greatly  impeded  our  efforts  to  import  military 
supplies  of  all  sorts. 

I  have  hoped  for  several  days  to  receive  official  reports  in  re 
lation  to  our  discomfiture  at  Roanoke  Island,  and  the  fall  of  Fort 
Donelson.  They  have  not  yet  reached  me,  and  I  am,  therefore, 
unable  to  communicate  to  you  such  information  of  those  events, 
and  the  consequences  resulting  from  them,  as  would  enable  me  to 
make  recommendations  founded  upon  the  changed  condition  which 
they  have  produced.  Enough  is  known  of  the  surrender  of 
Roanoke  Island  to  make  us  feel  that  it  was  deeply  humiliating, 
however  imperfect  may  have  been  the  preparations  for  defense. 
The  hope  is  still  entertained  that  our  reported  losses  at  Fort 
Donelson  have  been  greatly  exaggerated,  inasmuch  as  I  am  not 
only  unwilling,  but  unable  to  believe  that  a  large  army  of  our 
people  have  surrendered  without  a  desperate  effort  to  cut  their 
way  through  investing  forces,  whatever  may  have  been  their  num 
ber,  and  to  endeavor  to  make  a  junction  with  other  divisions  of 
the  army.  But  in  the  absence  of  that  exact  information  which 
can  only  be  afforded  by  official  reports,  it  would  be  premature  to 
pass  judgment,  and  my  own  is  reserved,  as  I  trust  yours  will  be, 
until  that  information  is  received.  In  the  meantime,  strenuous 
efforts  have  been  made  to  throw  forward  reinforcements  to  the 
armies  at  the  positions  threatened,  and  I  can  not  doubt  that  the 
bitter  disappointments  we  have  borne,  by  nerving  the  people  to 
still  greater  exertions,  will  speedily  secure  results  more  accordant 
with  our  just  expectation,  and  as  favorable  to  our  cause  as  those 
which  marked  the  earlier  periods  of  the  war. 

The  reports  of  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  the  Navy  will  ex- 


MESSAGE.  357 

hibit  the  mass  of  resources  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  which  we 
have  been  enabled  to  accumulate,  notwithstanding  the  very  serious 
difficulties  against  which  we  have  contended. 

They  afford  the  cheering  hope  that  our  resources,  limited  as 
they  were  at  the  beginning  of  the  contest,  will,  during  its  pro 
gress,  become  developed  to  such  an  extent  as  fully  to  meet  our 
future  wants. 

The  policy  of  enlistment  for  short  terms,  against  which  I  have 
steadily  contended  from  the  commencement  of  the  war,  has,  in  my 
judgment,  contributed,  in  no  immaterial  degree,  to  the  recent  re 
verses  which  we  have  suffered,  and  even  now  renders  it  difficult  to 
furnish  you  an  accurate  statement  of  the  army.  When  the  war 
first  broke  out,  many  of  our  people  could  with  difficulty  be  per 
suaded  that  it  would  be  long  or  serious.  It  was  not  deemed 
possible  that  any  thing  so  insane  as  a  persistent  attempt  to  subju 
gate  these  States  could  be  made — still  less  that  the  delusion 
would  so  far  prevail  as  to  give  to  the  war  the  vast  proportions 
which  it  has  assumed.  The  people,  incredulous  of  a  long  war, 
were  naturally  averse  to  long  enlistment,  and  the  early  legislation 
of  Congress  rendered  it  impracticable  to  obtain  volunteers  for  a 
greater  period  than ,  twelve  months.  Now,  that  it  has  become 
probable  that  the  war  will  be  continued  through  a  series  of  years, 
our  high-spirited  and  gallant  soldiers,  while  generally  reenlisting, 
are,  from  the  fact  of  having  entered  the  service  for  a  short  term, 
compelled,  in  many  instances,  to  go  home  to  make  the  necessary 
arrangements  for  their  families  during  their  prolonged  absence. 

The  quotas  of  new  regiments  for  the  war,  called  for  from  the 
different  States,  are  in  rapid  progress  of  organization.  The  whole 
body  of  our  new  levies  and  reenlisted  men  will  probably  be  ready 
in  the  ranks  within  the  next  thirty  days.  But,  in  the  meantime, 
it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  give  an  accurate  statement  of  the 
number  of  our  forces  in  the  field.  They  may,  in  general  terms, 
be  stated  at  four  hundred  regiments  of  infantry,  with  a  proper- 


358  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tionate  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  the  details  of  which  will  be 
shown  by  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  I  deem  it  proper  to 
advert  to  the  fact  that  the  process  of  furloughs  and  reenlistment  in 
progress  for  the  last  month  had  so  far  disorganized  and  weakened 
our  forces  as  to  impair  our  ability  for  successful  defense ;  but  I 
heartily  congratulate  you  that  this  evil,  which  I  had  foreseen  and 
was  powerless  to  prevent,  may  now  be  said  to  be  substantially  at 
an  end,  and  that  we  shall  not  again,  during  the  war,  be  exposed  to 
seeing  our  strength  diminished  by  this  fruitful  cause  of  disaster — 
short  enlistments. 

The  people  of  the  Confederate  States,  being  principally  en 
gaged  in  agricultural  pursuits,  were  unprovided  at  the  commence 
ment  of  hostilities  with  ships,  ship-yards,  materials  for  ship-building, 
or  skilled  mechanics  and  seamen,  in  sufficient  numbers  to  make  the 
prompt  creation  of  the  navy  a  practicable  task,  even  if  the  required 
appropriations  had  been  made  for  the  purpose.  Notwithstanding 
our  very  limited  resources,  however,  the  report  of  the  Secretary 
will  exhibit  to  you  a  satisfactory  progress  in  preparation,  and 
a  certainty  of  early  completion  of  vessels  of  a  number  and  class 
on  which  we  may  confidently  rely  for  contesting  the  vaunted 
control  of  the  enemy  over  our  waters. 

The  financial  system,  devised  by  the  wisdom  of  your  predeces 
sors,  has  proved  adequate  to  supplying  all  the  wants  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  notwithstanding  the  unexpected  and  very  large  increase 
of  expenditures  resulting  from  the  great  augmentation  in  the 
necessary  means  of  defense.  The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  will  exhibit  the  gratifying  fact  that  we  have  no  floating 
debt ;  that  the  credit  of  the  Government  is  unimpaired,  and  that 
the  total  expenditure  of  the  Government  for  the  year  has  been,  in 
round  numbers,  one  hundred  and  seventy  millions  of  dollars — less 
than  one-third  the  sum  wasted  by  the  enemy  in  his  vain  effort  to 
conquer  us — less  than  the  value  of  a  single  article  of  export — the 
cotton  crop  of  the  year. 


MESSAGE.  359 

The  report  of  the  Postmaster-General  will  show  the  condition 
of  that  department  to  be  steadily  improving — its  revenue  increas 
ing,  and  already  affording  the  assurance  that  it  will  be  self-sus 
taining  at  the  date  required  by  the  Constitution,  while  affording 
ample  mail  facilities  for  the  people. 

In  the  Department  of  Justice,  which  includes  the  Patent  Office 
and  Public  Printing,  some  legislative  provision  will  be  required, 
which  will  be  specifically  stated  in  the  report  of  the  head  of  that 
department. 

I  invite  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  duty  of  organizing  a 
Supreme  Court  of  the  Confederate  States,  in  accordance  with  the 
mandate  of  the  Constitution. 

I  refer  you  to  my  message  communicated  to  the  Provisional 
Congress  in  November  last,  for  such  further  information  touching 
the  condition  of  public  affairs,  as  it  might  be  useful  to  lay  before 
you ;  the  short  interval  which  has  since  elapsed  not  having  produced 
any  material  changes  in  that  condition,  other  than  those  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made. 

In  conclusion,  I  cordially  welcome  representatives  who,  recently 
chosen  by  the  people,  are  fully  imbued  with  their  views  and  feel 
ings,  and  can  so  ably  advise  me  as  to  the  needful  provisions  for 
the  public  service.  I  assure  you  of  my  hearty  cooperation  in  all 
your  efforts  for  the  common  welfare  of  the  country. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

The  message,  not  less  than  the  inaugural  address,  was  re 
ceived  with  many  evidences  of  public  reanimation.  The 
following  extracts  indicate  the  state  of  feeling  in  Richmond  at 
this  period : 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  MESSAGE. 
(From  the  Richmond  Whig,  Feb.  26, 1862.) 

The  President  makes  a  candid  and  frank  confession  of  our 
recent  reverses.  Very  justly,  he  does  not  regard  them  as  vital  to 


360  LIFE   OF   JEFFEIISON    DAVIS. 

our  cause ;  but  they  will  entail  a  long  war  upon  us.  Tliat  long 
war  ensures  our  independence,  and  the  ultimate  confusion  and 
ruin  of  the  Yankees 

The  Examiner,  of  the  same  date,  in  the  opening  paragraph 
of  its  leader,  said : 

The  President's  Message  is  a  manly  and  dignified  document, 
but,  like  the  inaugural,  it  contains  not  a  solitary  word  indicating 
the  plan  or  policy  of  the  Government.  Far  from  objecting  to  this 
characteristic,  we  think  it  eminently  proper  that  the  executive 
should  keep  its  counsels  from  the  public  eye,  and  that  the  Con 
gress  should  withdraw  its  deliberations  from  the  public  ear.  What 
is  wanted  from  the  one  is  distinct  and  peremptory  orders;  and 
from  the  other,  decisive  and  adequate  provisions  for  the  public 
safety.  The  duty  of  the  country  is  unhesitating  obedience ;  of 
the  soldiers,  the  courage  that  prefers  death  in  glory,  like  Jennings 
Wise. 


BEANIMATION   OF   THE  SOUTH.  361 


CHAPTEE    XII. 

POPULAR  DELUSIONS  IN  THE  EARLY  STAGES  OP  THE  WAR — A  FEW  CONFLICTS 
AND  SACRIFICES  NOT  SUFFICIENT — MORE  POSITIVE  RECOGNITION  OF  MR.  DAVIS' 

VIEWS — HIS  CANDID  AND  PROPHETIC  ANNOUNCEMENTS — MILITARY  REFORMS 

CONSCRIPTION  LAW  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  PRESIDENT'S  VIEWS  AND 

COURSE  AS  TO  THIS  LAW — HIS  CONSISTENT  REGARD  FOR  CIVIL  LIBERTY  AND 
OPPOSITION  TO  CENTRALIZATION — RECOMMENDS  CONSCRIPTION — BENEFICIAL 
RESULTS  OF  THE  LAW — GENERAL  LEE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  "  UNDER  THE 
PRESIDENT" — NATURE  OF  THE  APPOINTMENT  —  FALSE  IMPRESSIONS  COR 
RECTED — MR.  DAVIS*  CONFIDENCE  IN  LEE,  DESPITE  POPULAR  CENSURE  OF  THE 

LATTER CHANGES  IN  THE  CABINET — MR.   BENJAMIN'S   MANAGEMENT  OF  THE 

WAR  OFFICE — DIFFICULTIES  OF  THAT  POSITION — THE  CHARGE  OF  FAVORITISM 
AGAINST  MR.  DAVIS  IN  THE  SELECTION  OF  HIS  CABINET — HIS  PERSONAL  RE 
LATIONS  WITH  THE  VARIOUS  MEMBERS  OF  HIS  CABINET — ACTIVITY  IN  MILI 
TARY  OPERATIONS — THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE  OF  ELK  HORN— OPERA 
TIONS  EAST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI GENERALS  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAURE- 

GARD — ISLAND  NO.  10 — CONCENTRATION  OF  TROOPS  BY  THE  CONFEDERATE 
AUTHORITIES — FAVORABLE  SITUATION — SHILOH — A  DISAPPOINTMENT — DEATH 
OF  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON — TRIBUTE  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS — POPULAR  VERDICT 

UPON  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH GENERALS    BEAUREGARD,    BRAGG,    AND   POLK 

ON  THE  BATTLE — THE  PRESIDENT  AGAIN  CHARGED  WITH  "INJUSTICE"  TO 
BEAUREGARD — THE  CHARGE  ANSWERED — FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS— NAVAL 
BATTLE  IN  HAMPTON  ROADS — NAVAL  SUCCESSES  OF  THE  ENEMY. 

h&ve  briefly  indicated  the  causes  which  DOW  elevated 
the  Southern  people  to  a  more  intelligent  appreciation 
of  the  nature  and  necessities  of  the  struggle  in  which  they 
were  engaged.  There  was  reason  for  the  congratulation  which 
President  Davis  experienced  at  the  unmistakable  evidences  of 
the  awakening  of  the  public  mind  to  the  stern  duties  which, 
from  the  beginning,  he  had  sedulously  inculcated. 


362  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

The  progress  of  the  war  had  already  developed  the  existence 
of  numerous  errors  upon  both  sides,  and  had  exploded  many 
cherished  theories  having  possession  of  the  popular  mind  of 
each  section,  with  reference  to  the  power,  resources,  and  spirit 
of  its  antagonist.  Both  parties  had  entered  into  the  contest 
with  the  firm  conviction  of  certain  triumph,  and  with  the  pur 
pose  to  make  the  struggle  as  short  as  possible.  The  war-cry 
of  the  North  was  "Let  it  be  short,  sharp,  and  decisive;"  and 
they  appealed  to  their  numbers,  wealth,  and  sectional  hatred, 
as  elements  of  superiority,  which  would  inevitably  end  the  war 
in  their  favor  in  a  few  months.  The  South  was  equally  dis 
posed  to  a  speedy  conclusion.  With  the  masses  of  the  South 
and  the  majority  of  their  advisers,  the  predominant  idea  and 
aspiration  was  to  teach  the  enemy,  by  prompt  and  heavy  blows, 
the  impossibility  of  successful  invasion,  and  thus  shorten  the 
period  of  bloodshed.  Thus  both,  from  a  necessity  which  nei 
ther  was  able  to  avoid,  began  with  gigantic  preparations, 
hoping,  by  a  few  mighty  conflicts  of  arms,  and  one  lavish  sac 
rifice  of  life  and  treasure,  to  bring  to  prompt  arbitrament  an 
issue  which  was  the  growth  of  a  century. 

But  the  aroused  spirit  of  sectional  strife  was  not  to  be  ap 
peased  by  a  single  holocaust.  The  American  people,  a  youth 
ful  giant,  totally  uneducated  in  the  experience  of  war,  having 
never  yet  tested  their  strength  and  dimensions,  would  not 
consent  that  the  game  of  empire  should  be  decided  by  a  single 
dramatic  denouement,  a  Waterloo,  a  Solferino,  or  Sadowa. 
Manassas  had  been  the  bitter  but  beneficent  chastisement  of 
the  North,  and  the  reproof  was  accepted  with  that  wonderful 
elasticity,  which  afterwards  amazed  the  world  with  its  manifest 
ations  after  the  most  disheartening  failures.  A  rebuke  no  less 
signal  waited  upon  the  South,  and  its  correcting  influence  im- 


POPULAR   RESPONSE   TO   THE   PRESIDENT.  363 

mediately  exhibited  a  temper  which  was  the  temporary  salvation 
of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  inspiration  to  a  series  of  cam 
paigns  among  the  most  memorable  in  the  annals  of  warfare. 

With  the  inauguration  of  the  permanent  government  came 
not  only  renewed  resolution  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  but 
a  more  positive  recognition  and  adoption  of  the  views  of  Presi 
dent  Davis.  We  have  elsewhere  described  the  antagonism 
between  those  views  and  the  theory  of  the  leaders  at  Mont 
gomery,  shared  by  the  press  and  people  of  the  South,  which 
derided  any  other  hypothesis  than  a  six-months'  war,  with 
the  certainty  of  independence.  Whatever  weight  may  be  ac 
credited  to  the  statements  which  we  have  made  in  demonstra 
tion  of  Mr.  Davis'  conviction,  that  the  war  would  be  one  of 
unexampled  magnitude  and  long  duration;  whatever  may  be 
the  rational  inference  from  his  opposition  to  a  military  system 
contemplating  a  war  lasting  six  or  twelve  months;  whatever 
the  credence  extended  to  his  own  subsequent  oTSekcatipns  of 
the  difficulties  preventing  the  complete  preparation  for  the 
emergency,  which  he  contemplated,*  at  least  there  was  no 

*  The  careful  reader  will  hardly  have  overlooked  the  passage,  in  the 
Message  to  Congress,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  in  which  Mr.  Davis  thus 
alludes  to  this  subject:  "The  active  state  of  military  preparation  among 
the  nations  of  Europe,  in  April  last,  the  date  when  our  agents  first  went 
abroad,  interposed  unavoidable  delays  in  the  procurement  of  arms,  and 
the  want  of  a  navy  has  greatly  impeded  our  efforts  to  obtain  military 
supplies  of  all  sorts." 

A  few  months  later,  he  said,  speaking  with  characteristic  candor :  "  I 
was  among  those  who,  from  the  beginning,  predicted  war  as  the  conse 
quences  of  secession,  although  I  must  admit  that  the  contest  has  assumed 
proportions  more  gigantic  than  I  had  anticipated.  I  predicted  war,  not 
because  our  right  to  secede  and  to  form  a  government  of  our  own  was 
not  indisputable  and  clearly  denned  in  the  spirit  of  that  declaration, 


364  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

room  for  misconception  of  his  expectations  as  to  the  war  in  its 
future  stages. 

Congratulating  the  Confederate  Congress  upon  the  auspicious 
awakening  of  the  popular  mind  from  dangerous  delusions,  even 
through  the  hard  experience  of  adversity,  he  admonishes  Con- 

which  rests  the  right  to  govern  on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  but  saw 
that  the  wickedness  of  the  North  would  precipitate  a  war  upon  us." — 
Address  before  Mississippi  Legislature,  December,  1862. 

Mr.  Davis  here  candidly  admits  that  the  "gigantic  proportions"  of  the 
war  exceeded  his  expectations,  as  they  did  also  the  expectations  of  the 
whole  country  and  of  the  world.  He  did  foresee  a  great  war,  and  pre 
pared  for  it;  but  he  was  not  guilty  of  the  foolish  pretension  that  the  war 
simply  realized  his  expectations,  when  every  statesman  of  Europe  and 
America  was  deceived,  both  as  to  its  duration  and  magnitude.  Who 
believes  that  Napoleon  the  First,  equally  the  unrivaled  master  of  war  and 
diplomacy,  would  pretend  that  he  foresaw  the  extent  and  duration,  or  the 
results,  of  the  wars  of  the  empire?  that  he  realized  the  inextinguishable 
nature  of  English  hostility,  or  anticipated  the  numerous  perfidies  of 
Austria?  Mr.  Seward,  who  is  likely  to  be  remembered,  with  some  dis 
tinction,  in  connection  with  the  diplomacy  and  statesmanship  of  the  late 
war,  constantly  predicted  its  termination  in  "ninety  days."  No  opinion 
can  be  truthfully  ascribed  to  Mr.  Davis  indicating  a  light  estimate  of  the 
struggle  either  before  or  during  the  war.  Yet  there  is  a  retrospective 
statesmanship  in  the  South  which  now  claims  that  he  should  have  been 
lifted  to  its  own  preternatural  powers,  and  from  the  first  have  seen  every 
phase  and  incident.  How  absurd  must  this  pretension  appear  to  the 
sober  judgment  of  fifty  years  hence. 

Mr.  Davis  was  even  accredited  in  Richmond,  by  an  extravagant  and 
unfounded  popular  report,  with  the  prophecy  that  "children  then  (1862) 
unborn  would  be  soldiers  in  the  war  between  the  North  and  South." 
People  in  those  days  saw  nothing  in  the  action  of  the  Government  indi 
cating  its  faith  in  a  short  war.  Their  only  consolation  was  found  in  the 
editorials  of  Richmond  newspapers  predicting  foreign  intervention  should 
McClellan  be  defeated. 


MILITARY   REFORMS.  365 

gress  and  the  country  to  prepare  for  a  "war  lasting  through  a 
term  of  years"  But  a  few  weeks  later  and  he  invited  the 
Legislature  of  Virginia  to  contemplate  a  possible  duration  of 
the  war  for  twenty  years  upon  the  soil  of  that  State.  In 
all  his  declarations,  public  and  private,  was  evidenced  the 
adherence  to  that  original  conviction  of  a  struggle  long, 
bloody,  and  exhaustive,  and  with  varying  fortune,  which  had 
prompted  the  heroic  assurance,  at  his  first  inauguration  at 
Montgomery,  of  an  "inflexible"  pursuit  of  the  object  of  inde 
pendence. 

President  Davis  sufficiently  exposed,  in  his  first  message  to 
the  new  Congress,  the  evil  consequences  of  the  pernicious  mili 
tary  system  under  which  the  war  had  thus  far  been  conducted. 
Indeed,  its  evils  were  apparent,  and  the  country  responded  to 
the  urgent  appeals  of  the  President  for  a  more  efficient  organ 
ization  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy — one  that  should 
insure  a  force  sufficient  to  meet  the  present  exigency  and  to 
provide  for  future  defense.  It  was  with  considerable  reluc 
tance  that  he  finally  recommended  the  adoption  of  the  act  of 
conscription.  Constitutional  scruples  were  at  least  debatable, 
but  there  could  be  no  question  as  to  the  appearance  of  bad 
faith  by  the  Government,  with  the  patriotic  volunteers,  who 
had  responded  at  the  first  call  to  arms,  and  who  were  now 
compelled  to  remain  in  the  field,  by  a  law  adopted,  just  as 
their  term  of  service  was  expiring.  Yet  this  was  the  class 
necessarily  constituting  the  majority  of  those  who  would 
be  subject  to  the  operation  of  the  law,  as  they  were  a  ma 
jority,  or  an  approximate  majority,  of  the  arms-bearing  popu 
lation. 

To  one  so  peculiarly  jealous  of  encroachments  by  the  central 
power  upon  the  privileges  of  the  States,  the  proposition  had 


366  LIFE   OP   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

additional  objections.  Mr.  Davis  had  hoped  to  avoid  the 
necessity  of  a  measure,  so  much  after  the  manner  of  military 
despotism,  and  sought  to  take  advantage  of  the  patriotic  ardor 
exhibited  upon  the  first  rush  to  arms,  by  inducing  enlistments 
for  the  war.  Especially  distasteful  was  a  resort  to  compulsion 
into  the  ranks,  in  a  war  the  success  of  which  necessarily  de 
pended  upon  the  voluntary  and  patriotic  aid  of  the  people, 
while  the  enemy,  without  difficulty,  raised  a  half  million  of 
men  for  their  schemes  of  conquest. 

Second  to  the  object  of  independence  only,  the  controlling 
aspiration  of  President  Davis  was,  that  the  war  might  not 
terminate  in  the  destruction  of  civil  liberty.  With  evident 
pride,  he  proclaimed  the  honorable  fact  that,  "  through  all  the 
necessities  of  an  unequal  struggle,  there  has  been  no  act  on 
our  part  to  impair  personal  liberty  or  the  freedom  of  speech, 
of  thought,  or  of  the  press."*  His  consistent  regard  for  civil 
liberty  was  preserved  even  in  instances  where  additions  to  the 
executive  authority  would  result.  The  role  of  Louis  Qua- 
torze,  of  Frankenstein,  or  of  Csesar,  presented  no  attractions 
to  the  republican  executive,  whose  position  and  authority  were, 
themselves,  a  protest  against  the  exercise  of  arbitrary  and  un- 
granted  powers. 

It  is  a  striking  evidence  of  the  contempt  for  consistency, 
manifested  by  Mr.  Davis'  assailants,  that  these  virtues,  so  com 
mendable  in  the  executive  of  a  free  people,  should  then  have 
actually  constituted  the  ground  of  accusation,  by  those  who 
subsequently  charged  him  with  an  ambition  to  unite  in  himself 
all  the  departments  of  the  Government.  There  arose,  at  this 
time,  a  demagogical  demand  for  a  "  Dictator  " — that  morbid 
aspiration  characteristic  of  men  of  weak  nerve  and  deficient 
*  Inaugural  Address,  February  22,  1862. 


THE  CONSCRIPTION   LAW.  367 

fortitude,  which  vainly  seeks  to  make  Government  more  pow 
erful  for  good  purposes,  by  removing  all  restraints  upon  its 
power  to  do  evil. 

Emphatic  in  the  assertion  of  the  authority  conferred  by  the 
Constitution  upon  his  position,  President  Davis  was  no  less 
persistent  in  his  refusal  to  countenance  the  investiture  of  him 
self  with  dictatorial  powers. 

But  the  stern  and  pressing  exigencies  of  the  times  out 
weighed  considerations  of  even  the  gravest  import,  and  induced 
a  resort  to  that  measure  which  the  President  had  hoped  to 
avoid,  but  upon  which  now  depended  the  salvation  of  the 
country.  In  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  the 
President,  Congress,  on  the  16th  of  April,  1862,  adopted  the 
conscription  law,  which  was  thenceforward,  with  many  ma 
terial  modifications  rendered  necessary  by  circumstances,  the 
basis  of  the  military  system  of  the  Confederacy.  This  law 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  President,  during  the  war,  every 
citizen  not  belonging  to  a  class  exempted,  between  the  ages 
of  eighteen  and  thirty-five,  thus  annulling  all  contracts  made 
with  volunteers  for  short  terms.  By  this  act,  the  States  sur 
rendered  their  control  over  such  of  their  citizens  as  came 
within  the  terms  of  the  act,  and  in  each  State  were  located 
camps  of  instruction,  for  the  reception  and  training  of  con 
scripts.  There  were  other  features  of  the  conscription  law, 
having  in  view  an  increased  solidity  and  harmony  of  the  army 
organization. 

It  is  impossible  to  overestimate  the  immediate  benefits  real 
ized  to  the  Confederacy  from  this  legislation.  The  incipient 
disorganization  of  the  army,  consequent  upon  the  numerous 
furloughs  granted  to  such  of  the  men  as  would  reenlist  for 
the  war,  was  instantly  checked ;  large  additions  were  made  to 


368  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

commands  already  in  the  field,  and  the  discipline  and  general 
frame-work  of  the  army  greatly  improved. 

Second  in  importance  to  the  adoption  of  the  act  of  con 
scription  only,  among  the  accessions  of  strength  to  the  military 
system  of  the  Confederacy  at  this  period,  was  the  appointment 
of  General  Lee  to  the  general  command  of  the  armies,  "  under 
the  direction  of  the  President."* 

The  nature  of  the  position  thus  assigned  to  one  whom  the 
concurrent  criticism  of  his  age  pronounces  the  most  eminent 
of  American  commanders,  has  been  much  misunderstood,  and 
with  its  discussion  has  been  associated  much  injurious  misrep 
resentation  of  President  Davis. 

General  Lee,  after  the  failure  of  his  campaign  in  North 
western  Virginia,  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  became  the  object 
of  a  vast  amount  of  disparaging  criticism.  His  case  was, 
indeed,  in  marked  coincidence  with  that  of  Sidney  Johnston. 
Both  were  distinguished  in  the  Federal  service ;  previous  to 
the  war  they  were  generally  conceded  to  be  the  ablest  officers 
of  that  service;  both  were  known  to  have  been  the  class 
mates  of  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  intimate  friends.  In  their 
first  campaigns,  both  were  adjudged,  by  the  hot  and  impulsive 
temper  of  the  time,  to  have  committed  gross  and  signal  fail- 

*  The  order  was  in  these  terms : 

41  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  "I 

"ADJUTANT  AND  HIS  INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  f 

"  March  13, 1862.  J 

General  Orcbrs, 

No.  14. 

"General  Robert  E.  Lee  is  assigned  to  duty  at  the  seat  of  Government; 
and,  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  is  charged  with  the  conduct 
of  military  operations  in  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy. 

"  By  command  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

«S.  COOPER, 

"Adjutant  and  Inspector-General" 


LEE  COMMANDING  GENERAL.  369 

ure.  Neither  had  many  apologists.  Johnston  was  declared  an 
imbecile— a  mere  martinet,  without  any  of  the  qualities  of 
true  generalship;  and  Lee  was  pronounced  incompetent  for 
higher  duties  than  the  clerical  performances  of  the  War  Office. 

President  Davis  alone  remained  firm  in  behalf  of  these  two 
men,  whom  a  few  months  sufficed  to  triumphantly  vindicate. 
What  nobler  vindication  should  he  himself  claim  than  that, 
through  his  firmness  and  discernment,  was  given  the  needed 
opportunity  to  the  three  great  soldiers — Lee,  Sidney  Johnston, 
and  Stonewall  Jackson — who,  above  all  others,  have  illustrated 
American  warfare.* 

It  has  been  erroneously  supposed  and  asserted,  that  General 
Lee  was  assigned  the  position  of  commanding  general  at  the 
special  instance  of  Congress,  and  in  obedience  to  the  pro 
claimed  will  of  the  people.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
concurrence  of  the  Confederate  Congress  in  the  selection  made 
by  President  Davis  of  Lee  for  that  position,  there  is  no  ground 
for  the  hypothesis  that  the  Southern  people  welcomed  this  pro 
motion  of  General  Lee  as  an  assurance  of  good  fortune  in  the 
future  conduct  of  the  war. 

Indeed,  the  act  of  Congress,  creating  the  office  of  command 
ing  general,  was  adopted  at  the  special  suggestion  of  the  Pres 
ident,  who  immediately  assigned  Lee  to  the  discharge  of  its 
duties.  Congress  designed  General  Lee  to  be  Minister  of  War, 
and,  with  a  view  to  the  promotion  of  that  purpose,  repealed  a 
provision  wrhich  deprived  of  his  rank  in  the  army,  a  general 

*  The  fact  is  not  generally  known  that  the  President  was,  upon  two 
occasions,  assailed  with  urgent  petitions  for  the  removal  of  Stonewall 
Jackson,  which  he  peremptorily  rejected  on  both  occasions;  first,  after 
the  campaign  about  Romney,  in  December,  1861,  and  again,  after  the 
battle  of  Kernstown,  March,  1862. 
24 


370  LIFE   OF    JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

assigned  to  the  control  of  the  War  Office.  But  President 
Davis  clearly  understood  the  broad  and  palpable  distinction, 
between  the  talents  requisite  for  successful  administration  of 
that  department  of  the  Government,  and  the  genius  of  a  great 
soldier.  He  had  too  just  an  appreciation  of  the  high  military 
qualities  of  Lee,  to  consent  to  their  virtual  entombment  in  a 
civil  position.  In  accordance  with  these  suggestions,  the  Pres 
ident  obtained  the  adoption  of  the  necessary  legislation,  and 
conferred  upon  General  Lee  the  control  and  supervision  of  the 
purely  military  affairs  and  operations  of  the  war  administra 
tion.  Thus  it  was  neither  in  compliance  with  the  action  of 
Congress,  nor  in  deference  to  the  popular  will,  that  President 
Davis  selected  an  appropriate  sphere  for  the  genius  of  Lee, 
where  it  "  soon  dawned  upon  the  admiration  of  mankind,  and 
retained  its  effulgence  undimmed  to  the  last."* 

The  terms  of  the  order  assigning  General  Lee  to  duty,  "  un 
der  the  direction  of  the  President,"  have  been  construed  to 
signify,  that  it  was  not  designed  that  he  should  exercise  those 
appropriate  functions  which  obviously  appertain  to  the  posi 
tion  of  commanding-general.  It  has  been  argued  that  the 
President  thus  created  Lee  a  sort  of  "  chief  of  staff,"  or  orna 
mental  attache  of  his  military  household,  with  a  purely  com 
plimentary  and  meaningless  title.  The  selections  made  by  Mr. 
Davis,  of  Lee  first,  and,  subsequently,  of  Bragg,  as  incumbents 
of  the  position,  sufficiently  repel  this  absurd  conclusion.  It 
is  true  that  the  President  did  not  delegate  to  these  officers  his 
constitutional  functions  as  command er-in-chief,  but  to  assist 
and  advise  him,  in  the  discharge  of  those  arduous  and  labori 
ous  functions,  required  no  ordinary  skill  and  experience.  The 

*  I  am  mainly  indebted  for  these  facts  to  a  recent  publication  by  Pro 
fessor  Bledsoe,  late  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  of  the  Confederate  States. 


CHANGES    IN   THE   CABINET.  371 

well-known  confidence,  reposed  by  the  President  in  General 
Lee,  may  accurately  measure  the  influence  of  the  latter,  upon 
the  Confederate  military  administration. 

In  the  progress  of  those  events,  which  have  thus  far  en 
grossed  our  attention,  notable  changes  had  occurred  in  the 
cabinet.  Early  in  the  summer  of  1861,  Mr.  Toombs  had 
surrendered  the  portfolio  of  State,  and  Mr.  Hunter,  a  former 
United  States  Senator  from  Virginia,  whose  name  was  prom 
inently  associated  with  the  political  history  of  the  Union  for 
more  than  twenty  years,  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Con 
federate  administration.  During  the  ensuing  winter,  Mr. 
Hunter  retired  from  the  cabinet,  and  was  transferred  to  the 
Confederate  Senate. 

Mr.  Benjamin,  originally  Attorney-General,  had  been  tem 
porarily  assigned  to  the  War  Department,  upon  the  resignation 
of  Mr.  "Walker,  who  was  the  first  incumbent.  The  connection 
of  Mr.  Benjamin  with  the  War  Office  continued  for  several 
months,  when  he  was  transferred  to  the  Department  of  State, 
where  he  remained  until  the  overthrow  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  period  of  his  administration  of  the  War  Department 
measures  an  important  space  in  the  history  of  the  Confeder 
acy.  It  was  a  period  marked  by  numerous,  consecutive,  and 
appalling  disasters,  and,  as  has  been  already  seen,  Mr.  Benja 
min  did  not  escape  the  penalty  of  official  position  during  a 
season  of  public  calamity.  We  have  glanced  briefly  at  the 
question  of  his  official  responsibility,  not  with  a  view  to  his 
vindication,  though  we  have  denied  the  justice  of  the  unlim 
ited  reproach,  which  pursued  both  himself  and  Secretary  Mai- 
lory,  long  after  even  the  pretext  had  disappeared. 

The  censure  of  Mr.  Benjamin  was  based  upon  the  assump 
tion  that  he  was  responsible  for  reverses,  which  a  more  skillful 


372  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

and  attentive  management  would  have  avoided.  Yet  the  facts 
establish  the  declaration  of  Mr.  Davis  that  those  reverses  were 
unavoidable.  They,  indeed,  simply  foreshadowed  the  fact, 
which  the  country  soon  after  realized,  of  the  immense  disad 
vantage  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  all  cases  where  the  naval 
facilities  of  the  enemy  could  be  made  available.  Can  it  be 
successfully  maintained  that  another  in  the  place  of  Mr.  Ben 
jamin  would  have  prevented  the  fall  of  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  of  Roanoke  Island,  of  Newbern,  of  Memphis,  of 
Island  No.  10,  and  of  New  Orleans?  General  Randolph,  the 
successor  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  is  universally  conceded  to  have 
made  a  competent  secretary  of  wrar  during  his  brief  term ;  yet 
will  it  be  maintained  that  had  General  Randolph,  instead  of 
^tr.  Benjamin,  been  the  successor  of  Mr.  Walker,  that  all,  or 
any  of  those  disasters  would  have  been  prevented  ? 

Mr.  Benjamin  can  hardly  be  deemed  less  fortunate  than  his 
successors.  Messrs.  Randolph  and  Breckinridge  were,  perhaps, 
fortunate  in  the  brief  period  of  their  responsibility,  or  they, 
too,  might  have  shared  the  public  censure  so  freely  lavished 
upon  Messrs.  Walker,  Benjamin,  and  Seddon. 

Perhaps  no  more  thankless  position  was  ever  assumed  by 
an  official  than  the  management  of  the  War  Department  of 
the  Confederate  States.  The  difficult  problem  propounded  by 
Theraistocles — "to  make  a  small  state  a  great  one" — was  of 
easy  solution,  compared  to  that  presented  the  luckless  incum 
bent  of  an  office,  in  which  the  abundance  of  responsibilities 
and  embarrassments  was  commensurate  only  with  the  poverty 
of  resources  with  which  to  meet  them.  To  create  an  army 
from  a  population  of  between  five  and  six  millions,  able  to 
successfully  cope  with  an  adversary  supported  by  a  home 
population  of  twenty-five  millions,  aided  by  the  inexhaustible 


THE   CHAKGE   OF    FAVOKITISM.  373 

reserves  of  Europe;  with  blockaded  ports,  a  newly-organized 
Government,  and  a  country  of  limited  manufacturing  means; 
to  match  in  the  material  of  war  the  wealthiest  and  most 
productive  nation  in  the  world;  to  maintain  the  strength  and 
efficiency  of  an  army  decimated  by  its  own  unnumbered  vic 
tories,  and  from  a  population  depleted  by  successive  conscrip 
tions,  was  the  encouraging  task  devolving  upon  President 
Davis  and  his  Secretary  of  War.  It  is,  at  least,  reasonable  to 
doubt  whether  even  the  genius  of  Napoleon,  or  of  Carnot,  was 
ever  summoned  to  such  an  enterprise. 

No  allegation  was  made  more  freely  and  persistently  against 
Mr.  Davis  than  that  of  favoritism.  At  times  he  was  repre 
sented  as  a  merciless,  inexorable,  capricious  master,  who  would 
tolerate  neither  intelligence  nor  independence  in  his  subordi 
nates,  who  were  required  to  be  the  subservient  agents  of  his 
will.  Again,  he  was  declared  an  imbecile  puppet  in  the  hands 
of  Mr.  Benjamin,  who,  with  an  amazing  protean  adaptability, 
assumed  the  character  of  Richelieu,  Mazarin,  Wolsey,  or  Jef 
freys,  as  might  meet  the  convenience  of  the  censors.  At  all 
times,  however,  the  public  was  urged  to  believe  Mr.  Davis 
was  engaged  in  devising  rewards  for  unworthy  favorites,  who, 
while  obsequious  to  his  whims,  insolent  in  the  enjoyment  of 
his  bounty,  and  secure  under  the  executive  aegis,  were  surely 
carrying  the  cause  to  perdition. 

This  allegation  of  favoritism  was  assumed  to  have  a  con 
spicuous  illustration  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  for  whom 
the  President  retained  his  partiality  even  after  he  had  been 
censured  by  Congress,  and  when  his  unpopularity  was  not  to 
be  concealed.  The  same  motive  was  affirmed,  however,  in  the 
selection  of  his  other  advisers ;  and  to  obviate  the  necessity  of 
detail  hereafter,  we  will  dispose  of  this  subject  at  once. 


374  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Despite  the  persistent  assertion  to  the  contrary,  the  fact  is 
indisputable,  that,  in  the  selection  of  no  single  member  of  his 
cabinet,  did  Jefferson  Davis  make  use  of  the  opportunity  to 
reward  either  a  friend  or  a  partisan.  In  no  case  did  personal 
favor  even  remotely  influence  his  choice,  save  in  the  appoint 
ment  of  Mr.  Seddon  as  Secretary  of  War — an  appointment 
made  with  the  universal  acclaim  of  the  public  and  the  news 
papers.  James  A.  Seddon  and  Jefferson  Davis  were,  indeed, 
friends  of  twenty  years'  standing;  but,  besides,  Mr.  Seddon 
was  recommended  not  more  by  the  confidence  of  the  President, 
than  by  the  unlimited  confidence  of  the  country  in  his  intellect, 
integrity,  and  patriotism. 

Personal  details  are  frequently  not  to  be  denied  an  impor 
tant  historical  bearing,  and  the  motives  of  Mr.  Davis,  in  the 
choice  of  his  cabinet,  claim  no  insignificant  page  in  his  official 
history.  We  have  briefly  adverted  elsewhere  to  some  of  these 
considerations. 

When  the  Confederate  cabinet  was  organized  at  Montgom 
ery,  Robert  Toombs  was  placed  at  its  head ;  yet  between  Davis 
and  Toombs  there  had  not  been  close  intimacy,  hardly  mutual 
confidence — certainly  nothing  like  ardent  friendship.  But 
Mr.  Toombs  represented  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
people  of  Georgia,  the  wealthiest  and  largest  State  of  the  Con 
federacy  at  that  period,  as  determined  at  their  last  election. 
He  was  peculiarly  the  representative  public  man  of  Georgia ; 
the  most  prominent  citizen  of  his  State,  repeatedly  selected 
for  its  highest  honors,  and  then  a  reputed  statesman.  When 
Mr.  Toombs  resigned,  his  successor  was  Mr.  Hunter,  who  had 
served  with  Mr.  Davis  in  the  Senate,  and  in  whose  qualifica 
tions  the  President  had  confidence.  They  had  both  been 
friends  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  disciples  of  his  political  school. 


RELATIONS   WITH    HIS   CABINET.  375 

Political  accord  by  no  means  signifies  personal  intimacy,  and 
while  Mr.  Hunter  has  many  admirers,  and  was  greatly  re 
spected  in  Virginia  and  in  the  Senate,  he  has  not  been  gener 
ally  accredited  with  marked  sympathetic  tendencies. 

Mr.  Benjamin  was  originally  made  Attorney-General,  because 
of  his  high  legal  reputation,  and  because  Louisiana  was  en 
titled  to  a  representative  in  the  cabinet,  but  not  because  of 
personal  considerations,  since  his  relations  with  Mr.  Davis 
were  neither  intimate  nor  cordial.  The  partiality  of  the  Presi 
dent  for  Mr.  Benjamin  was,  indeed,  an  after-thought — the 
result  of  observation  of  his  wonderful  mental  resources,  his  un- 
equaled  capacities  for  labor  and  zealous  devotion  to  the  cause. 

Mr.  Mallory  was  recommended  for  the  Navy  Department 
by  his  previous  experience.  There  had  been  mutual  kind  feel 
ing  between  himself  and  Mr.  Davis  as  Senators,  but  nothing 
like  close  association.  Mr.  Davis  had  never  seen  Mr.  Walker 
until  he  was  appointed  Secretary  of  War,  in  accordance  with 
the  emphatic  choice  of  Alabama.  General  Randolph  was  ap 
pointed  solely  in  consequence  of  Mr.  Davis'  convictions  of  his 
fitness.  Previous  to  the  war  General  Randolph  was  undistin 
guished,  save  in  Virginia,  where  his  fine  capacity  and  exalted 
worth  were  becomingly  appreciated.  General  Breckinridge, 
the  last  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  was  sufficiently  recom 
mended  by  his  talents  and  position.  Mr.  Memminger  was 
made  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  not  as  the  friend  of  Mr. 
Davis,  but  as  the  choice  of  South  Carolina.  With  Mr.  Tren- 
holm,  his  successor,  the  President  had  no  personal  acquaint 
ance,  until  he  became  a  member  of  the-  cabinet.  Mr.  Davis, 
the  last  Attorney-General,  was  originally  neither  a  personal 
friend  nor  a  party  associate  of  the  President;  nor  was  Mr. 
Watts,  his  predecessor. 


376  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

With  the  favorable  response  of  Congress  and  the  people  to 
the  vigorous  and  timely  suggestions  of  the  President,  began  a 
more  spirited  prosecution  of  the  war,  though  the  season  of 
peril  was  not  yet  tided  over,  nor  the  current  of  adversity  ex 
hausted.  Already  there  were  numerous  indications  of  the  in 
creased  scale,  and  enlarged  theatre  of  operations,  which  the  war 
now  demanded. 

At  the  conclusion  of  active  operations  in  the  Trans- Missis 
sippi  district,  in  the  autumn  of  1861,  the  State  forces  of  Mis 
souri,  still  retaining  their  separate  organization,  under  General 
Price,  and  the  Confederate  forces  of  McCulloch,  were  located 
south  of  Springfield,  near  the  Arkansas  line.  An  unfortunate 
phase  of  the  Southern  conduct  of  the  war  in  this  quarter,  and 
one  from  which  arose  no  little  apprehension,  was  the  appar 
ently  irreconcilable  difference  between  Generals  Price  and 
McCulloch.  With  a  view  to  secure  the  indispensable  element 
of  harmony,  President  Davis,  during  the  winter,  appointed 
Major-General  Earl  Van  Dorn,  an  able  and  gallant  officer, 
to  the  supreme  command  of  military  operations  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  department.  General  Van  Dorn  was  a  favorite 
with  the  President,  and  his  services  had  already  been  of  a 
character  to  justify  the  high  expectations,  indulged  not  less  by 
himself  than  by  the  public,  of  fortunate  results  of  the  unan 
imity,  at  last  secured  in  a  quarter  where  its  absence  had  been 
severely  felt. 

The  result  of  the  enemy's  movements,  begun  early  in  Janu 
ary,  1862,  was  the  retreat  of  the  weak  column  of  Price  to  the 
Boston  Mountains,  in  Arkansas,  where  McCulloch  was  en 
camped.  This  junction  of  the  two  commands  did  not  result  in 
cooperation  until  the  arrival  of  General  Van  Dorn,  early  in 
March.  With  a  vigor  characteristic  of  this  officer's  career, 


EVENTS   IN   THE   WEST.  377 

Van  Dora  advanced  against  the  enemy,  advantageously  posted, 
and  with  numbers  superior  to  his  own  force.  The  result  was 
the  battle  of  Elk  Horn,  a  brilliant  but  fruitless  engagement, 
in  which  the  Southern  commander,  in  consequence  of  the  want 
of  discipline  among  his  soldiers,  and  partially  through  the 
effects  of  those  earlier  dissensions  with  which  he  had  no  con 
nection,  failed  to  realize  the  ends  at  which  he  aimed.* 

Elk  Horn  was  probably  the  most  considerable  engagement, 
in  point  of  the  numbers  engaged,  fought  during  the  war,  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  Unimportant  in  its  bearing  upon  the 
general  character  of  the  war,  it  was  a  decided  check  upon  the 
aspiration  of  the  Confederate  Government  to  recover  Missouri, 
and  to  give  its  authority  a  solid  establishment  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  region.  This  was  afterward  the  least  important 
theatre  of  the  war,  though  subsequent  events  there  were  by  no 
means  unworthy  of  record.  Even  at  this  early  stage,  the  war 
was  rapidly  tending  to  Si  concentration  of  the  energies  of  both 
parties,  upon  the  more  vital  points  of  conflict  in  Virginia,  and 
the  central  zone  of  the  Confederacy.  A  few  weeks  later  Gen 
erals  Van  Dorn  and  Price,  with  the  major  portion  of  the 
Trans-Mississippi  army,  were  transferred  to  the  scene  of  oper 
ations  east  of  the  great  river. 

General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  after  his  retreat  from 
Nashville,  consequent  upon  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson,  paused 
at  Murfreesboro',  Tennessee,  for  a  sufficient  period  to  receive 
accessions  to  his  force,  which  increased  it  to  the  neighborhood 
of  twenty  thousand  men.  These  accessions  were  portions  of 
the  command  lately  operating  in  South-eastern  Kentucky,  and 
remnants  of  the  forces  lately  defending  Fort  Donelson.  Gen- 

*In  this  engagement  General  Benjamin  McCulloch,  of  Texan  fame,  a 
brave  and  efficient  soldier,  was  killed. 


378  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

eral  Beauregard,  having  evacuated  Columbus,  which,  in  com 
mon  with  the  other  posts  of  the  former  Confederate  line  of 
defense  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  became  untenable  with 
the  loss  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers,  concentrated 
his  forces  at  Corinth,  in  the  northern  part  of  Mississippi. 

The  evacuation  of  Columbus  did  not  necessarily  give  the 
enemy  control  of  the  Mississippi  above  Memphis.  A  strong 
position  was  taken  by  the  Confederate  forces  at  Island  No.  10, 
forty-five  miles  below  Columbus.  Considerable  anticipation 
was  indulged  by  the  Southern  public,  of  a  successful  stand  at 
this  point  for  the  control  of  the  Mississippi.  It  was,  however, 
captured  by  the  enemy ;  and  in  the  loss  of  two  thousand  men 
and  important  material  of  war  by  its  surrender,  the  Confeder 
acy  sustained  another  severe  blow,  and  the  Federal  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  justly  congratulated  the  North,  upon  a  "triumph 
not  the  less  appreciated  because  it  was  protracted  and  finally 
bloodless." 

The  retirement  of  the  forces  of  General  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston  south  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  the  location  of  General 
Beauregard's  command  at  Corinth,  readily  suggested  the  prac 
ticability  of  a  cooperation,  by  those  two  commanders,  for  the 
defense  of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  extensive  rail 
road  system,  of  which  Corinth  is  the  centre.  With  the  ap 
probation  of  President  Davis,  a  concentration  of  troops,  from 
various  quarters,  ensued,  and,  about  the  first  of  April,  an  ad 
mirable  army  of  forty  thousand  men  was  assembled  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Corinth,  and  upon  the  railroads  leading  to 
that  point.  There  was  no  situation  during  the  war  more  as 
suring  of  good  fortune  to  the  Confederates,  than  that  presented 
in  Northern  Mississippi  in  the  early  days  of  April,  1862.  Pres 
ident  Davis  indulged  the  highest  anticipations  from  this  grand 


A   CHEERING   PROMISE   DISAPPOINTED.  379 

combination  of  forces  which  he  so  cordially  approved.  He 
confidently  expected  a  victory  from  the  Western  army,  led  by 
that  officer  whose  capacity  he  trusted  above  all  others,  which 
should  more  than  compensate  for  the  heavy  losses  of  the  pre 
vious  campaign.  General  Johnston  was  no  less  hopeful  of  the 
situation.  The  conjuncture  was  indeed  rare  in  its  opportuni 
ties.  The  exposed  situation  of  General  Grant,  whose  command 
lay  upon  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  with  a  most 
remarkable  want  of  appreciation  of  its  precarious  position  by 
its  commander,  and  a  total  absence  of  provision  for  its  safety, 
invited  an  immediate  attack  by  the  Confederate  commander, 
before  the  Federal  column  could  be  reinforced  by  Buell,  then 
making  rapid  marches  from  Nashville. 

The  incidents  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  are  familiar  to  the 
world.  It  constitutes,  perhaps,  the  most  melancholy  of  that 
series  of  "  lost  opportunities "  in  the  Confederate  conduct  of 
the  war,  upon  which  history  will  dwell  with  sad  interest.  The 
first  day's  victory  promised  fruits  the  most  brilliant  and  en 
during.  The  action  of  the  second  day  can  only  be  construed 
as  a  Confederate  disaster.  Such  was  the  sentiment  of  the 
South,  and  such  must  be  the  verdict  of  history. 

Shiloh  was,  perhaps,  the  sorest  disappointment  experienced  by 
the  South,  until  the  loss  of  Yicksburg,  and  the  defeat  of  Gettys 
burg  threatened  the  approaching  climacteric  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  public  grief  at  the  death  of  General  Johnston  was  tinged 
with  remorse,  for  the  unmerited  censure  with  which  the  popu 
lar  voice,  encouraged  by  the  press,  had  previously  assailed  him. 
Not  until  his  death  did  the  South  appreciate  the  worth  of  this 
great  soldier.  Never,  perhaps,  had  there  been  a  more  sublime 
instance  of  self-abnegation  than  was  displayed  by  Sidney  John 
ston. 


380  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

All  through  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1861  he  had  main 
tained  his  perilous  position  in  Kentucky,  confronted  by  forces 
quadruple  his  own,  and  yet  assailed  by  an  impatient  and  ig 
norant  public,  for  not  essaying  invasion,  with  a  force  which 
subsequent  events  proved  inadequate  for  defense.  But  not 
even  the  hideous  array  of  facts  following  the  reverses  of  Feb 
ruary  secured  his  vindication;  still  he  was  assailed  by  an  un 
reasoning  public,  instigated  by  a  carping,  partisan  press.  He 
was  ridiculed  as  incompetent — as  one  who  had  traversed  the 
curriculum  of  West  Point,  only  to  become  educated  in  the  frip 
pery  of  military  etiquette.  For  the  first  time,  President  Davis 
was  charged  with  a  desire  to  reward  favorites,  even  at  the  risk 
of  the  public  welfare,  as  illustrated  by  his  retention  in  high 
command,  of  one  whom  actual  trial  had  proven  incapable,  and 
undeserving  of  his  previous  reputation. 

But  President  Davis,  happily  for  his  own  fame,  not  less 
than  for  the  fame  of  this  illustrious  victim  of  popular  clamor, 
was  unmoved  by  the  censures  of  the  public,  and  the  invectives 
of  the  newspapers.  He  did  not  permit  the  confidence  which, 
upon  deliberate  judgment,  and  upon  a  long  and  intimate  ac 
quaintance,  he  had  reposed  in  General  Johnston,  to  be  shaken, 
and  sternly  repelled  the  clamor  against  him,  as  he  afterwards 
did  in  the  case  of  Lee,  and  even  of  Stonewall  Jackson.  His 
habitual  reply  to  importunate  petitions  for  the  removal  of 
Johnston  was :  "  If  Sidney  Johnston  is  incompetent  to  com 
mand  an  army,  then  the  Confederacy  has  no  general  fit  for 
that  position." 

Humanity  rejoices  in  no  attribute  more  noble  than  the  ca 
pacity  for  warm  and  enduring  friendship ;  and  there  is  nothing 
more  exalted  in  the  character  of  Jefferson  Davis  than  his  de 
votion  to  his  friends.  At  all  times  as  true  as  steel  to  those 


TRIBUTE   TO   SIDNEY    JOHNSTON.  381 

for  whom  he  professes  attachment,  he  knows  no  cold  medium, 
cherishes  no  feeling  of  indifference,  but  his  nature  kindles  re- 
sponsively  to  the  warmth  in  the  bosom  of  others.  A  like 
enthusiasm  towards  himself  has  usually  been  the  reward  of  his 
heroic  constancy.  In  Sidney  Johnston  there  was  that  touching 
union  of  chivalric  generosity  and  tender  sympathy,  which  pe 
culiarly  qualified  him  for  fellowship  with  Jefferson  Davis.  Such 
friendship,  as  that  which  united  them,  rises  to  the  sublimity  of 
the  noblest  virtue,  and  presents  a  spectacle  honorable  to  human 
nature. 

President  Davis  commemorated  the  death  of  General  John 
ston  in  a  communication  to  Congress,  and  in  terms  of  touch 
ing  and  appropriate  feeling.  Said  he: 

"  But  an  all-wise  Creator  has  been  pleased,  while  vouchsafing  to 
us  His  countenance  in  battle,  to  afflict  us  with  a  severe  dispensa 
tion,  to  which  we  must  bow  in  humble  submission.  The  last, 
long,  lingering  hope  has  disappeared,  and  it  is  but  too  true  that 
General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  is  no  more.  My  long  and  close 
friendship  with  this  departed  chieftain  and  patriot  forbid  me  to 
trust  myself  in  giving  vent  to  the  feelings,  which  this  intelligence 
has  evoked.  Without  doing  injustice  to  the  living,  it  may  safely 
be  said  that  our  loss  is  irreparable.  Among  the  shining  hosts  of 
the  great  and  good  who  now  cluster  around  the  banner  of  our 
country,  there  exists  no  purer  spirit,  no  more  heroic  soul,  than 
that  of  the  illustrious  man  whose  death  I  join  you  in  lamenting. 
In  his  death  he  has  illustrated  the  character  for  which,  through 
life,  he  was  conspicuous — that  of  singleness  of  purpose  and  de 
votion  to  duty  with  his  whole  energies.  Bent  on  obtaining  the 
victory  which  he  deemed  essential  to  his  country's  cause,  he  rode 
on  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  object,  forgetful  of  self,  while 
his  very  life-blood  was  fast  ebbing  away.  His  last  breath  cheered 


382  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

his  comrades  on  to  victory.  The  last  sound  he  heard  was  their 
shout  of  victory.  His  last  thought  was  his  country,  and  long  and 
deeply  will  his  country  mourn  his  loss." 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  an  incident  of  the  war  justifying 
more  than  a  passing  notice.  Never  since  Manassas,  and  never 
upon  any  subsequent  occasion,  had  the  Confederacy  an  oppor 
tunity  so  abundant  in  promise.  The  utmost  exertions  of  the 
Government  had  been  employed  to  make  the  Western  army 
competent  for  the  great  enterprise  proposed  by  its  commander. 
The  situation  of  Grant's  army  absolutely  courted  the  tremendous 
blow  with  which  Johnston  sought  its  destruction,  a  result  which, 
in  all  human  calculation,  he  would  have  achieved  had  his  life 
been  spared.  At  the  moment  of  his  death  a  peerless  victory 
was  already  won ;  the  heavy  masses  of  Grant  were  swept  from 
their  positions;  before  nightfall  his  last  reserve  had  been 
broken,  and  his  army  lay,  a  cowering,  shrunken,  defeated 
rabble,  upon  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee.  That,  at  such  a 
moment,  the  army  should  have  been  recalled  from  pursuit, 
especially  when  it  was  known  that  a  powerful  reinforcement, 
ample  to  enable  the  enemy  to  restore  his  fortunes,  was  hasten 
ing,  by  forced  marches,  to  the  scene,  must  ever  remain  a  source 
of  profound  amazement. 

It  was  the  story  of  Manassas  repeated,  but  with  a  far  more 
mournful  significance.  It  was  not  the  failure  to  gather  the 
fruits  of  the  most  complete  victory  of  the  war,  nor  the  irre 
parable  loss  of  Sidney  Johnston,  which  filled  the  cup  of  the 
public  sorrow.  Superadded  to  these  was  the  alarming  discov 
ery  that  the  second  great  army  of  the  Confederacy,  in  the 
death  of  its  commander,  was  deprived  of  the  genius  which 
alone  had  been  proven  capable  of  its  successful  direction. 
Johnston  had  no  worthy  successor,  and  the  Western  army 


COMMENTS  UPON   SHILOH.  383 

discovered  no  leader  capable  of  conducting  it  to  the  goal 
which  its  splendid  valor  deserved. 

A  very  perceptible  diminution  of  what  had  hitherto  been 
unlimited  confidence,  not  only  in  the  genius,  but  even  in  the 
good  fortune  of  Beauregard,  was  the  result  of  his  declared 
failure  at  Shiloh.  Not  even  his  distinguished  services,  subse 
quently,  were  sufficient  to  entirely  eiface  that  unfortunate  rec 
ord.  Military  blunders,  perhaps  the  most  excusable  of  human 
errors,  are  those  which  popular  criticism  is  the  least  disposed 
to  extenuate.  The  reputation  of  the  soldier,  so  sacred  to  him 
self,  and  which  should  be  so  jealously  guarded  by  his  country, 
is  often  mercilessly  mutilated  by  that  public,  upon  whose  grat 
itude  and  indulgence  he  should  have  an  unlimited  demand. 
We  shall  not  undertake  to  establish  the  justice  of  the  public 
verdict,  which  has  been  unanimous,  that  the  course  of  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  involved,  at  least,  an  "extraordinary  aban 
donment  of  a  great  victory."  It  only  remains  to  state  the 
material  from  which  a  candid  and  intelligent  estimate  is  to  be 
reached. 

General  Beauregard  has  explained  his  course,  in  terms 
which,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  were  at  least  satisfactory  to  him 
self.  His  official  report  says :  "  Darkness  was  close  at  hand ; 
officers  and  men  were  exhausted  by  a  combat  of  over  twelve 
hours  without  food,  and  jaded  by  the  march  of  the  preceding 
day  through  mud  and  water." 

General  Bragg,  who  conspicuously  shared  the  laurels  of  the 
first  day's  action,  has  recorded  a  memorable  protest  against 
the  course  adopted  at  its  close.  Says  General  Bragg.  .  .  . 
"  It  was  now  probably  past  four  o'clock,  the  descending  sun 
warning  us  to  press  our  advantage  and  finish  the  work  before 
night  should  compel  us  to  desist.  Fairly  in  motion,  these 


384  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

commands  again,  with  a  common  head  and  a  common  pur 
pose,  swept  all  before  them.  Neither  battery  nor  battalion 
could  withstand  their  onslaught.  Passing  through  camp  after 
camp,  rich  in  military  spoils  of  every  kind,  the  enemy  was 
driven  headlong  from  every  position,  and  thrown  in  confused 
masses  upon  the  river  bank,  behind  his  heavy  artillery,  and 
under  cover  of  his  gunboats  at  the  landing.  He  had  left  nearly 

the  whole  of  his  light  artillery  in  our  hands." 

The  enemy  had  fallen  back  in  much  confusion,  and  ivas  crowded, 
in  unorganized  masses,  upon  the  river  bank,  vainly  striving  to 
cross.  They  were  covered  by  a  battery  of  heavy  guns,  well 
served,  and  their  two  gunboats,  now  poured  a  heavy  fire 
upon  our  supposed  position,  for  we  were  entirely  hid  by  the 
forest.  Their  fire,  though  terrific  in  sound,  and  producing  some 
consternation  at  first,  did  us  no  damage,  as  the  shells  all  passed 

over,  and  exploded  far  beyond  our  position The 

sun  was  about  disappearing,  so  that  little  time  was  left  us  to 

finish  the  glorious  work  of  the  day Our  troops, 

greatly  exhausted  by  twelve  hours'  incessant  fighting,  without 
food,  mostly  responded  to  the  order  with  alacrity,  and  the  move 
ment  commenced  with  every  prospect  of  success 

Just  at  this  time,  an  order  was  received  from  the  commanding 
general  to  withdraw  the  forces  beyond  the  enemy's  fire. 

The  testimony  of  General  Polk,  also  a  distinguished  partici 
pant  in  the  battle,  was  concurrent  with  that  of  General  Bragg, 
and  no  less  emphatic  in  its  suggestions.  In  his  report  is  to 
be  found  the  following  passage : 

"The  troops  under  my  command  were  joined  by  those  of  Gen 
erals  Bragg  and  „  Breckinridge,  and  my  fourth  brigade,  under 
General  Cheathara,  from  the  right.  The  field  was  clear.  The 


COMMENTS   UPON  SHILOH.  385 

rest  of  the  forces  of  the  enemy  were  driven  to  the  river  and  under 
its  bank.  We  had  one  hour  or  more  of  daylight  still  left ;  were 
within  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  four  hundred  yards  of  the 
enemy's  position,  and  nothing  seemed  wanting  to  complete  the 
most  brilliant  victory  of  the  war,  but  to  press  forward  and  make  a 
vigorous  assault  on  the  demoralized  remnant  of  his  forces. 

"At  this  juncture  his  gunboats  dropped  down  the  river,  near 
the  landing,  where  his  troops  were  collected,  and  opened  a  tre 
mendous  cannonade  of  shot  and  shell  over  the^bank,  in  the  direc 
tion  from  which  our  forces  were  approaching.  The  height  of  the 
plain  on  which  we  were,  above  the  level  of  the  water,  was  about 
one  hundred  feet,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to  give  great  elevation 
to  his  guns,  to  enable  him  to  fire  over  the  bank.  The  consequence 
was  that  shot  could  take  effect  only  at  points  remote  from  the 
river's  edge.  They  were  comparatively  harmless  to  our  troops 
nearest  the  bank,  and  became  increasingly  so  to  us  as  we  drew  near 
the  enemy  and  placed  him  between  us  and  his  boats. 

"Here  the  impression  arose  that  our  forces  were  waging  an 
unequal  contest — that  they  were  exhausted,  and  suffering  from  a 
murderous  fire,  and  by  an  order  from  the  commanding  general 
they  were  withdrawn  from  the  field." 

President  Davis  could  only  share  the  universal  dissatisfac 
tion  with  the  unfortunate  termination  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 
A  conclusive  evidence  of  his  forbearance  and  justice  is  seen 
in  the  fact,  that  he  did  not  avail  himself  of  the  opportunity  to 
displace  an  officer,  toward  whom  he  was  charged  with  enter 
taining  such  bitter  and  implacable  animosity,  when  public 
sentiment  would,  in  all  probability,  have  approved  the  expe 
diency  of  that  step.  But  General  Beauregard  was  in  no  danger 
of  mean  resentment  from  President  Davis,  who  so  frequently 
braved  the  anger  of  the  public  against  its  distinguished  serv- 
25 


386  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ants.  General  Beauregard  retained  the  control  of  the  "Western 
army,  without  interference  from  the  executive,  and  within 
a  few  weeks,  by  the  successful  execution  of  his  admirable 
retreat  from  Corinth,  which  he  justly  declared  "equivalent  to 
a  brilliant  victory,"  did  much  to  repair  his  damaged  reputa 
tion.*  So  eminent,  in  its  perfection  and  success,  was  the 

*When  General  Beauregard  had  eluded  Halleck  at  Corinth,  and 
brought  his  army  to  Tupelo,  he  turned  over  the  command  to  General 
Bragg,  and  sought  repose  and  recuperation  at  Bladon  Springs,  Alabama. 
Those  who  assume  to  be  the  friends  and  admirers  of  General  Beauregard, 
but  who  are  far  more  anxious  to  establish  a  mean  malignity  in  the 
character  of  Mr.  Davis,  than  to  exalt  their  favorite,  have  laid  great  stress 
upon  the  fact,  that  the  President  then  placed  Bragg  in  command  of  the 
army  for  the  ensuing  campaign,  thus  placing  Beauregard  in  retirement. 
There  can  be  little  difficulty  in  comprehending  the  commendable  motives 
which  prompted  Mr.  Davis  to  this  course.  The  period  of  General  Beau- 
regard's  absence  from  his  command  (three  weeks,  it  is  understood)  would 
protract  the  period  of  inactivity  until  midsummer.  Time  was  precious. 
The  Western  army  had  done  nothing  but  lose  ground  all  the  current 
year,  and,  meanwhile,  Lee  was  preparing  his  part  of  the  operations,  by 
which  the  Government  hoped  to  throw  the  enemy  back  upon  the  frontier. 
Was,  then,  the  Western  army  to  lie  idle,  awaiting  the  disposition  and 
convenience  of  one  man?  With  the  approval  of  the  army  and  the 
country,  the  President  appointed  to  the  vacated  command,  an  able  and 
devoted  soldier,  whose  reputation  and  service  justified  the  trust.  The 
writer  has  seen  nothing  from  General  Beauregard  approving  the  assaults 
of  his  pretended  admirers  upon  Mr.  Davis,  and  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
suppose  that  he  does  not  indorse  them. 

It  is  also  urged  that  Mr.  Davis,  when  pressed  to  remove  Bragg  and 
replace  Beauregard,  declared  that  he  would  not,  though  the  whole  world 
should  unite  in  the  petition.  Very  likely,  and  altogether  proper  that  he 
should  not  remove  an  officer  while  in  the  actual  execution  of  his  plans 
of  campaign.  But  there  can  be  no  better  explanation  than  that  given  by 
Mr.  Davis :  "  The  President  remarked,  that  so  far  as  giving  Beauregard 


FALL   OF   NEW  ORLEANS.  387 

retreat  of  Beauregard  with  his  little  army  from  the  front  of 
Halleck,  who  had  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  men,  that 
a  portion  of  the  Northern  press  admitted  that  while  Shiloh 
made  Grant  ridiculous,  Corinth  made  a  corpse  of  Halleck's 
military  reputation. 

As  yet  there  had  been  no  compensating  advantage  gained  by 
the  Confederacy  to  repair  the  disasters  sustained  in  the  early 
part  of  the  year.  Indeed,  the  train  of  reverses  had  hardly 
been  more  than  temporarily  interrupted,  when  a  calamity  hardly 
less  serions  than  the  loss  of  Tennessee  happened  in  the  loss  of 
New  Orleans,  the  largest,  most  populous,  and  most  wealthy 
city  of  the  Confederacy.  This  event  was  speedily  followed  by 
the  calamitous  results  which  were  to  be  expected.  It  was  the 
virtual  destruction  of  Confederate  rule  in  Louisiana.  It  cut 
off  the  available  routes  to  Texas,  so  inestimable  in  its  irnpor- 

command  of  Bragg's  army  is  concerned,  that  was  out  of  the  question. 
Bragg  had  arranged  all  his  plans,  and  had  co-intelligence  with  the  De 
partment,  with  Kirby  Smith,  and  Humphrey  Marshall ;  and  to  put  a  new 
commander  at  the  head  of  the  army  would  be  so  prejudicial  to  the  public 
interests,  he  would  not  do  it  if  the  whole  world  united  in  the  petition.1' 

But  President  Davis  never  designed  that  General  Beauregard  should  be 
without  a  command.  With  that  just  appreciation  of  the  real  merits  of  his 
generals,  apart  from  the  cheap  applause  or  unmerited  censure  of  the 
crowd,  which  distinguished  most  of  his  selections,  he  placed  General 
Beauregard  in  charge  of  the  coast  defenses,  where  his  reputation  was 
certainly  much  enhanced.  In  this  oft-repeated  and  unfounded  charge  of 
"injustice"  and  "persecution,"  in  the  case  of  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston,  as  in  that  of  General  Beauregard,  there  is  no  specification,  more 
awkwardly  sustained,  than  that  which  denies  the  abundant  opportunity 
enjoyed  by  each  of  those  officers,  for  the  display  of  the  superior  genius 
asserted  for  them  by  their  admirers.  The  slightest  acquaintance  with 
the  history  of  the  war  will  verify  this  statement. 


388  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tance  as  a  source  of  grain  and  cattle;  gave  the  enemy  a  base  of 
operations  against  the  entire  gulf  region,  and  was  altogether 
disheartening  to  the  South.* 

Some  time  previous  to  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  which 
occurred  in  the  latter  days  of  April,  the  Confederacy  had  made 
its  most  serious  effort  to  dispute  the  hitherto  absolute  naval 
supremacy  of  the  North.  On  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  oc 
curred  the  famous  naval  engagement  in  Hampton  Roads,  be 
tween  the  Confederate  iron-clad  Virginia,  and  the  Federal 
Monitor.  Ever  since  the  summer  of  1861,  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  had  been  preparing,  at  Gosport  Navy-yard,  a  formidable 
naval  contrivance — a  shot-proof,  iron-plated  steam  battery. 
The  result  of  the  experiment  was  a  success,  which  did  much 
to  relieve  the  Navy  Department  of  undeserved  reproach,  and 
to  produce  a  revolution  in  theories  relating  to  naval  science 
and  architecture  all  over  the  world. 

About  this  period  the  activity  of  the  naval  forces  of  the 
enemy  was  rewarded  by  additional  successes.  The  towns  of 

*  Much  crimination  and  recrimination  followed  the  fall  of  New  Orleans. 
It  is,  at  least,  safe  to  say,  that  public  opinion  in  the  South  was  much 
divided,  as  to  where  the  burden  of  censure  for  this  dire  and  unexpected 
calamity  should  properly  rest.  The  intelligence  of  the  capture  of  the  city 
was  an  appalling  surprise,  not  only  to  the  public  in  Richmond,  but  to  the 
Government.  President  Davis  declared  that  the  event  was  totally  unex 
pected  by  him.  The  fall  of  New  Orleans  was  one  of  those  instances,  in 
which  the  Confederates  had  decided  for  them,  in  a  most  unsatisfactory 
manner,  the  long  disputed  question  as  to  the  efficiency  of  shore  batteries 
against  vessels  of  war.  Precedents  established,  when  sailing  vessels  were 
used  in  warfare,  were  overthrown  by  the  experience  of  steam  vessels, 
especially  when  iron-plated.  Commodore  Farragut,  with  perfect  success 
and  comparative  ease,  passed  the  forts  below  New  Orleans,  after  the 
chief  of  the  naval  force  had  despaired  of  their  reduction. 


FEDERAL   NAVAL,   SITCCEaSES.  389 

Newbern,  Washington,  and  other  places  of  less  note  in  North 
Carolina,  were  captured  by  naval  expeditions  in  conjunction 
with  detachments  from  the  army  of  General  Burnside.  The 
successes  of  the  Burnside  expedition,  which  had  been  prepared 
by  the  North  with  such  large  expectations,  were  by  no  means 
inconsiderable ;  but  they  were  soon  lost  sight  of  in  the  presence 
of  the  more  absorbing  operations  in  the  interior.  The  naval 
resistance  of  the  South  had  thus  far  necessarily  been  feeble. 
In  the  subsequent  progress  of  the  war,  except  in  rare  instances, 
it  disappeared  altogether  as  an  element  in  the  calculation  of 
means  of  defense. 

The  vulnerability  of  the  South  upon  the  sea-coast,  and  along 
the  lines  of  her  navigable  rivers,  measured  the  extent  of  the 
good  fortune  of  the  enemy.  The  North  was  shortly  to  yield 
a  reluctant  recognition  of  the  comparatively  insignificant  influ 
ence  of  its  long  train  of  triumphs  in  the  promotion  of  subju 
gation.  Upon  the  soil  of  Virginia — classic  in  its  memories  of 
contests  for  freedom,  the  chosen  battle-ground  of  the  Confed 
eracy — was  soon  to  be  shed  the  effulgence  of  the  proudest 
achievements  of  Southern  genius  and  valor — a  radiance  as 
splendid  as  ever  shone  upon  the  blazing  crest  of  war. 


390  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 


THE  "ANACONDA  SYSTEM  — HOW  FAR  IT  WAS  SUCCESSFUL — TERRITORIAL  CON 
FIGURATION   OF   THE  SOUTH   FAVORABLE   TO   THE   ENEMY ONE   THEATRE   OF 

WAR  FAVORABLE  TO  THE  CONFEDERATES THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA 

THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES THE  POTOMAC  LINES CRITICAL  SITUATION  IN 

VIRGINIA EVACUATION  OF  MANASSAS TRANSFER  OF  OPERATIONS  TO  THE 

PENINSULA — MAGRUDER'S  LINES — EVACUATION  OF  YORKTOWN — STRENGTH 
OF  THE  OPPOSING  FORCES  BEFORE  RICHMOND DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  "  VIR 
GINIA " PANIC  IN  RICHMOND — MR.  DAVIS'  CALMNESS  AND  CONFIDENCE 

HE  AVOWS  HIMSELF  "  READY  TO  LEAVE  HIS  BONES  IN  THE  CAPITAL  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY" — REPULSE  OF  THE  GUNBOATS — "MEMENTOES  OF  HEROISM" — 
JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN — A  SERIES  OF  VICTORIES,  WITH  IMPORTANT 

RESULTS BATTLE  OF   "  SEVEN  PINES  " A  FAILURE GENERAL  JOHNSTON 

WOUNDED PRESIDENT  DAVIS  ON  THE  FIELD PRESIDENT  DAVIS  AND  GEN 
ERAL  JOHNSTON AN  ATTEMPT  TO  FORESTALL  THE  DECISION  OF  HISTORY — 

RESULTS   OF   LEE'S  ACCESSION   TO   COMMAND JOHNSTON'S    GENERALSHIP — • 

MR.  DAVIS*  ESTIMATE  OF  LEE — LEE?S  PLANS THE  ADVISORY  RELATION  BE 
TWEEN  DAVIS  AND  LEE THEIR  MUTUAL  CONFIDENCE  NEVER  INTERRUPTED — • 

CONFEDERATE  STRATEGY  AFTER  M'CLELLAN's  DEFEAT  BEFORE  RICHMOND 

MAGICAL  CHANGE  IN  THE  FORTUNES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  INVASION 

OF  MARYLAND ANTIETAM TANGIBLE  PROOFS  OF  CONFEDERATE  SUCCESS 

GENERAL  BRAGG — HIS  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN CONFEDERATE  HOPES BATTLE 

OF  PERRYVILLE BRAGG  RETREATS ESTIMATE  OF  THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN 

OF    1862 — OTHER    INCIDENTS    OF    THE    WESTERN    CAMPAIGN REMOVAL    OF 

M'CLELLAN — A  SOUTHERN  OPINION  OF  M'CLELLAN — BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKS- 
BURG BATTLE  OF  MURFREESBORO' BATTLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE THE  SITUA 
TION  AT  THE  CLOSE  OF  1862 PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  RECOMMENDATIONS  TO 

CONGRESS HIS  VISIT  TO  THE  SOUTH-WEST ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE  MISSISSIPPI 

LEGISLATURE. 

FT! HE    Federal    Government    frankly    accepted    the    true 
-*-   teachings  of  the  war  in  its  earlier  stages,  and  no  feature 


THE  "ANACONDA  SYSTEM."  391 

of  the  lesson  was  more  palpable  than  the  inferiority  of  the 
North  in  the  art  of  war  and  military  administration.  No 
longer  trusting,  to  any  extent  whatever,  to  a  contest  of  prowess 
with  an  enemy  whose  incomparable  superiority  was  already 
established,  Mr.  Lincoln,  his  cabinet,  and  his  military  advisers, 
were  concurrent  in  their  convictions  of  the  necessity  of  a  policy 
which  should  make  available  the  numerical  superiority  of  the 
North.  The  "  anaconda  system  "  of  General  Scott,  adhered  to 
by  General  McClellan,  and  sanctioned  by  the  Government  and 
the  people,  though  by  no  means  new  in  the  theory  and  prac 
tice  of  war,  was  based  upon  a  just  and  sagacious  view  of  the 
situation. 

To  overwhelm  the  South  by  mere  material  weight,  to  crush 
the  smaller  body  by  the  momentum  of  a  larger  force,  compre 
hends  the  Federal  design  of  the  war,  undertaken  at  the  incep 
tion  of  operations  in  1862.  The  success  attending  the  execu 
tion  of  this  design  we  have  described  in  preceding  pages.  We 
have  accredited  to  the  enemy  the  full  extent  of  his  successes, 
and  endeavored  to  demonstrate  that  they  resulted  not  from 
Confederate  maladministration,  but  from  a  vigorous  and  timely 
use  of  his  advantages  and  opportunity  by  the  enemy.  But 
while  according  to  the  North  unexampled  energy  in  prepara 
tion,  and  an  unstinted  donation  of  its  means  to  the  purpose, 
which  it  pursued  with  indomitable  resolution,  no  concession  of 
an  improved  military  capacity  is  demanded,  from  the  fact  that 
use  was  made  of  obvious  advantages  not  to  be  overlooked  even 
by  the  stupidity  of  an  Aulic  council. 

We  have  shown  that  the  preponderating  influence  in  the 
achievement  of  the  enemy's  victories  in  the  winter  and  spring 
of  1862,  was  his  naval  supremacy.  Even  at  that  period  it 
was  palpable  that,  without  his  navy,  his  scheme  of  invasion 


392  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 

would  be  the  veriest  abortion  ever  exposed  to  the  ridicule  of 
mankind.  The  maritime  facilities  of  the  enemy  were,  in  the 
end,  decisive  of  the  contest  in  his  favor. 

Upon  those  fields  of  military  operations  which  have  thus  far 
occupied  our  attention,  we  have  seen  how  propitious  to  the 
enemy's  plans,  in  every  instance,  was  the  geographical  config 
uration.  Wherever  a  navigable  river  emptied  into  the  sea, 
which  was  the  undisputed  domain  of  the  North,  or  intersected 
its  territory,  a  short  and,  in  many  instances,  almost  bloodless 
struggle  had  ended  in  the  expulsion  or  capture  of  the  Con 
federates  defending  its  passage.  Yet,  in  many  instances,  these 
results  had  a  most  serious  bearing  upon  the  decision  of  the 
war.  It  was  impossible  for  Sidney  Johnston  to  hold  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  unless  the  Mississippi,  running  parallel 
with  his  communications,  and  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee, 
running  in  their  rear,  should  remain  sealed  to  the  enemy.  It 
was  equally  impracticable  to  hold  the  region  bordering  upon 
the  North  Carolina  sounds  after  the  fall  of  Roanoke  Island. 
After  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  the  entire  avenue  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  except  the  limited  section  between  Yicksburg  and 
Port  Hudson,  was  open  to  the  enemy,  giving  him  bases  of 
operations  upon  both  its  banks,  and  opening  to  his  ravages 
vast  sections  of  the  Confederacy. 

Thus  had  the  naval  supremacy  of  the  enemy  brought  him, 
in  a  few  days,  to  the  very  heart  of  extensive  sections  of  terri 
tory,  which  never  could  have  been  reduced  to  his  sway,  had  he 
been  compelled  to  fight  his  way  overland  from  his  frontiers. 
Thus  was  the  great  element  of  space,  usually  so  potent  in  the 
defense  of  an  invaded  people,  annihilated,  almost  before  the 
struggle  had  been  fairly  begun. 

The  upper  regions  of  Eastern  Virginia,  remote  from  the 


THE   FEDERAL,  ARMIES   IN  VIRGINIA.  393 

navigable  tributaries  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  larger  rivers, 
was  the  only  theatre  of  war,  where  the  superior  valor  and  skill 
of  the  Confederates  could  claim  success  from  the  Federal  hosts, 
deprived  of  their  gunboats  and  water  communications.  Here, 
though  not  entirely  neutralized,  his  water  facilities  did  not  at 
all  times  avail  the  enemy  ;  here  the  struggle  was  more  equal, 
and  here  was  demonstrated  that  superior  manhood  and  sol 
diership  of  the  South,  which,  not  even  an  enemy,  if  candid, 
will  deny. 

Of  the  seven  hundred  thousand  men,  which  were  claimed  as 
under  arms  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  in  the  begin 
ning  of  1862,  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  more  than  a  half 
million  were  actually  in  the  field,  and  of  these  at  least  one- 
half,  were  operating  in  Virginia,  with  Eichmond  as  the  com 
mon  goal  of  their  eager  and  expectant  gaze.  The  army  of 
McClellan,  numbering  little  less  than  two  hundred  thousand 
men,  in  the  vicinity  of  Washington,  was  entitled  to  the  lavish 
praise,  which  he  bestowed  upon  it,  in  his  declaration,  that  it 
was  "magnificent  in  material,  admirable  in  discipline  and  in 
struction,  excellently  equipped  and  armed."  In  the  valley 
of  the  Shenondoah  was  the  army  of  Banks,  more  than  fifteen 
thousand  strong.  General  Fremont,  with  about  the  same 
force,  commanded  the  "Mountain  Department,"  embracing 
the  highland  region  of  Western  Virginia.  By  the  first  of 
March  these  various  commands,  with  other  detachments,  had 
reached  an  aggregate  of  quite  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men. 

We  have  sufficiently  described  those  causes,  by  which  the 
already  disproportionate  strength  of  the  Confederates,  previous 
to  the  adoption  of  the  conscription  act,  and  the  inception  of 
the  more  vigorous  and  stringent  military  policy  of  the  Con- 


394  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

federate  Government,  was  reduced  to  a  condition  in  most 
alarming  contrast  with  the  enormous  preparations  of  the 
enemy. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  still  held  his  position,  with  a 
force  which,  on  the  first  of  March,  barely  exceeded  forty  thou 
sand  men.  The  command  of  General  Stonewall  Jackson,  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  did  not  exceed  thirty-five  hundred, 
embracing  all  arms.  General  Magruder  held  the  Peninsula 
of  York  and  James  Rivers,  covering  the  approaches  to  Rich 
mond  in  that  direction,  with  eleven  thousand  men,  and  General 
Huger  had  at  Norfolk  and  in  the  vicinity  not  more  than  ten 
thousand.  The  Confederate  force  in  Western  Virginia  was 
altogether  too  feeble  for  successful  defense,  and  indeed,  the 
Government  had  some  months  previous  abandoned  the  hope 
of  a  permanent  occupation  of  that  region. 

The  Confederate  authorities  had  long  since  ceased  to  cherish 
hope  of  offensive  movements  upon  the  line  of  the  Potomac. 
Circumstances  imposed  a  defensive  attitude,  attended  with 
many  causes  of  peculiar  apprehension  for  the  fate  of  the  issue 
in  Virginia.  Weeks  of  critical  suspense,  and  vigilant  observa 
tion  of  the  threatening  movements  of  the  Federal  forces,  were 
followed  by  the  transfer  of  the  principal  scene  of  operations  to 
the  Peninsula. 

The  evacuation  of  the  position  so  long  held  by  General 
Johnston  at  Manassas,  executed  with  many  evidences  of  skill, 
but  attended  with  much  destruction  of  valuable  material,  was 
followed  immediately  by  an  advance  of  General  McClellan  to 
that  place.  The  necessity  of  a  retirement  by  General  Johnston 
to  an  interior  line  had  been  duly  appreciated  by  the  Confed 
erate  Government,  though  there  were  circumstances  attending 
the  immediate  execution  of  the  movement,  which  detracted 


EVACUATION   OF   MANASSAS.  395 

from  its  otherwise  complete  success.  The  destruction  of  valu 
able  material,  including  an  extensive  meat-curing  establish 
ment,  containing  large  supplies  of  meat,  and  established  by 
the  Government,  which  ensued  upon  the  evacuation  of  Manas- 
sas,  elicited  much  exasperated  censure.  Similar  occurrences  at 
the  evacuation  of  Yorktovvn,  a  few  weeks  later,  revived  a 
most  unpleasant  recollection  of  scenes  incident  to  the  retreat 
from  Manassas.  The  extravagant  destruction  of  property,  in 
many  instances  apparently  reckless  and  wanton,  marking  the 
movements  of  the  Confederate  armies  at  this  period,  was  a 
bitter  sarcasm  upon  the  practice,  by  many  of  its  prominent 
officers,  of  that  economy  of  resources  which  the  necessities  of 
the  Confederacy  so  imperatively  demanded. 

Not  only  the  weakness  of  his  forces  indicated  to  General 
Johnston  the  perils  of  his  position,  but  the  territorial  config 
uration  again  came  to  the  aid  of  the  enemy,  and  gave  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  the  option  of  several  avenues  to  the  rear  of  the 
Confederate  army.  It  is  not  improbable  that  McClellan  ap 
preciated  the  extremity  of  Johnston's  situation,  and  has,  indeed, 
assigned  other  reasons  for  his  advance  upon  Manassas  than  the 
expectation  of  an  engagement,  where  the  chances  would  have 
been  overwhelmingly  in  his  favor.  At  all  events,  the  retire 
ment  of  General  Johnston  to  the  line  of  the  Rapidan,  imposed 
upon  the  Federal  general  an  immediate  choice  of  a  base  from 
which  to  assail  the  Confederate  capital.  Originally  opposed  to 
an  overland  movement  via  Manassas,  McClellan  was  now 
compelled  to  abandon  his  favorite  plan  of  a  movement  from 
Urbanna,  on  the  Rappahanock,  by  which  he  hoped  to  cut  off 
the  Confederate  retreat  to  Richmond,  in  consequence  of  John 
ston's  retirement  behind  the  Rappahanock.  General  McClellan 
promptly  adopted  the  movement  to  the  peninsula,  a  plan  which 


396  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

i 

he  had  previously  considered,  but  which  he  regarded  "as  less 
brilliant  and  less  promising  decisive  results."  * 

When  General  Johnston  left  Manassas,  it  is  probable  that 
he  was  not  fully  decided  as  to  the  position  which  he  should 
select.  Receiving  a  dispatch  f  from  President  Davis,  he  halted 
the  army,  and  immediately  the  President  left  Richmond  for 
Johnston's  head-quarters,  for  the  purpose  of  consultation. 
General  Johnston's  position  now  was  simply  observatory  of 
the  enemy.  It  was  yet  possible  that  McClellan  might  under 
take  an  overland  movement;  and,  indeed,  a  portion  of  his 
force  had  followed  the  retreating  Confederates.  In  that  event 
Johnston  would  occupy  the  line  upon  which  Lee  subsequently 
foiled  so  many  formidable  Federal  demonstrations.  From  his 
central  position  he  could  also  promptly  meet  a  serious  demon 
stration  against  Richmond  from  the  Chesapeake  waters  or  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  When  the  numerous  transports  at  Fort 
ress  Monroe,  debarking  troops  for  the  peninsula,  revealed  the 
enemy's  real  purpose,  the  army  of  General  Johnston  was 
carried  to  the  lines  of  Magruder,  at  Yorktown.  Johnston 
was,  however,  decidedly  ppposed  to  the  movement  to  the  Pen 
insula,  declaring  it  untenable,  and  urging  views  as  to  the 
requirements  of  the  situation,  which  competent  criticism  has 
repeatedly  commended. 

*  These  revelations  of  the  designs  of  McClellan  are  derived  from  the 
admirable  work  of  Mr.  Swinton — the  "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac" — perhaps  the  ablest  and  most  impartial  contribution  yet  made  to 
the  history  of  the  late  war. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  General  Grant  attempted  nearly  the  same  approach 
to  Richmond  and  was  signally  foiled — a  fact  which  he  promptly  recog 
nized,  by  his  change  of  plan,  after  his  bloody  repulse  at  Cold  Harbor, 
June  3,  1864. 

f  This  dispatch  was  in  substance :  "  Halt  the  army  where  it  is." 


FEDERAL   DESIGNS.  397 

While  the  transfer  of  Johnston's  army  to  the  Peninsula  was 
in  process  of  execution,  the  situation  in  Virginia  was,  in  the 
highest  degree,  critical.  The  strength  of  Magruder  was  neces 
sarily  so  divided,  that  the  actual  force,  defending  the  line 
threatened  by  McClellan  with  eighty  thousand  men,  was  less 
than  six  thousand  Confederates.  Meanwhile  the  various  Fed 
eral  detachments  in  other  quarters  were  cooperating  with  the 
main  movement  of  McClellan.  Banks  and  Shields  were  ex 
pected,  by  their  overwhelming  numbers,  to  crush  Jackson  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  then,  forming  a  junction  with  the 
large  force  of  Fremont,  who  was  required  to  capture  Staunton, 
it  was  designed  that  these  combined  forces  should  unite  with 
the  army  of  McDowell,  advancing  from  the  direction  of  Fred- 
ericksburg,  at  some  point  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Thus  a 
force,  aggregating  more  than  seventy  thousand  men,  threatening 
Richmond  from  the  north,  was  to  unite  with  McClellan  ad 
vancing  from  the  east.  Such  was,  in  brief,  the  Federal  plan 
of  campaign,  which  the  North  expected  to  accomplish  the  re 
daction  of  Richmond  and  the  total  destruction  of  the  Confed 
erate  power  in  Virginia.  It  does  not  devolve  upon  us  to 
discuss,  in  detail,  the  defects  of  this  faulty  combination,  but 
the  sequel  will  show  how  promptly  and  triumphantly  the 
Confederate  leaders  availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity 
presented  by  this  crude  arrangement  of  their  adversaries. 

Happily  the  bold  attitude  and  skillful  dispositions  of  Ma 
gruder  were  aided  by  the  over-tentative  action  of  his  antagon 
ist.  The  latter,  greatly  exaggerating  the  force  in  his  front, 
and  convinced  of  the  hopelessness  of  an  assault  upon  the 
Confederate  works,  permitted  the  escape  of  the  golden  moment, 
and  prepared  for  a  regular  siege  of  Yorktown.  In  the  mean 
time  General  Magruder  describes  his  situation  to  have  been  as 


398  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

follows:  "Through  the  energetic  action  of  the  Government, 
reinforcements  began  to  pour  in,  and  each  hour  the  Army  of 
the  Peninsula  grew  stronger  and  stronger,  until  anxiety  passed 
from  my  mind  as  to  the  result  of  an  attack  upon  us." 

The  untenability  of  the  Peninsula  was  very  soon  made  ap 
parent,  and  the  important  advantage  of  time  having  been 
gained,  and  the  escape  of  General  Huger's  command  from  its 
precarious  position  at  Norfolk  secured,  General  Johnston  aban 
doned  the  works  at  Yorktown,  retreating  to  the  line  of  the 
Chickahominy,  near  Eichmond.  This  movement  was  made 
in  obedience  to  the  necessities  of  the  situation,  and  was  in 
accordance  with  his  original  desire  for  a  decisive  engagement 
with  McClellan,  at  an  interior  point,  where  a  concentration  of 
the  Confederate  forces  would  be  more  practicable.  General 
McClellan  did  not  pursue  the  retreating  column  with  much 
energy  after  the  decisive  blow  given  his  advance  at  Williams- 
burg,  by  Longstreet. 

With  the  arrival  of  Johnston  upon  the  Richmond  lines,  the 
Confederate  Government  began,  with  energy  and  rapidity,  the 
concentration  of  its  forces.  The  superb  command  of  Huger 
was  promptly  transferred  to  Johnston,  and  troops  from  the 
Carolinas  were  thrown  forward  to  Richmond  as  rapidly  as 
transportation  facilities  would  permit.  By  the  last  of  May  the 
Confederate  forces  in  front  of  Richmond  reached  an  aggregate 
of  seventy-five  thousand  men.  McClellan  had  sustained  losses 
on  the  Peninsula  which  reduced  his  strength  to  the  neighbor 
hood  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand. 

A  cruel  necessity  of  the  evacuation  of  Norfolk  and  Ports 
mouth  was  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  iron-clad 
« Virginia,"  which  had  so  long  prevented  the  ascent  of  James 
River  by  the  Federal  gunboats.  So  invaluable  was  this  vessel 


ALARM    IX    RICHMOXD.  399 

in  the  defense  of  Richmond,  that  McClellan  had  named,  as  an 
essential  condition  of  a  successful  campaign  on  the  Peninsula, 
that  she  should  be  "  neutralized."  It  was  found  impossible  to 
convey  the  Virginia  to  a  point  unoccupied  on  either  shore  of 
the  river  by  the  enemy's  forces,  and,  by  order  of  her  com 
mander,  the  vessel  was  destroyed.  Immediately  a  fleet  as 
cended  the  river  for  the  purpose  of  opening  the  water  highway 
to  the  Confederate  capital. 

The  intelligence  of  the  destruction  of  the  "  Virginia,"  and 
the  advance  of  the  Federal  fleet,  was  received,  in  Richmond, 
with  profound  consternation.  No  one,  unless  at  that  time  in 
Richmond,  can  realize  the  sense  of  extreme  peril  experienced 
by  the  public.  There  were  few  who  dared  indulge  the  hope 
of  a  successful  defense  of  the  city  against  the  dreaded  "  gun 
boats  "  and  "  monitors  "  of  the  enemy,  which,  the  people  then 
believed,  were  alike  invulnerable  and  irresistible. 

The  wise  precautionary  measures  of  the  Government,  in  pre 
paring  its  archives  for  removal,  in  case  of  emergency,  to  a 
point  of  safety,  greatly  increased  the  panic  of  the  public.  Ru 
mors  of  a  precipitate  evacuation  of  the  city,  by  the  Confederate 
authorities,  were  circulated,  and  there  was  wanting  no  possible 
element  which  could  aggravate  the  public  alarm,  save  the  calm 
demeanor  of  President  Davis,  and  the  deliberate  efforts  of  the 
authorities — Confederate,  State,  and  municipal — to  assure  the 
safety  of  the  city.  The  courage  and  confidence  of  the  Presi 
dent,  in  the  midst  of  this  almost  universal  alarm,  in  which 
many  officers  of  the  Government  participated,  quickly  aroused 
an  enthusiastic  and  determined  spirit  in  the  hearts  of  a  brave 
people.  Knowing  the  critical  nature  of  the  emergency,  he 
was  nevertheless  resolved  to  exhaust  every  expedient  in  the 
defense  of  Richmond,  and  then  to  abide  the  issue.  His  noble 


400  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

and  defiant  declaration  was :  "  I  am  ready  and  willing  to  leave 
my  bones  in  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy."  In  response  to 
resolutions  from  the  Virginia  Legislature,  urging  the  defense 
of  the  city  to  the  last  extremity,  he  avowed  his  predetermined 
resolution  to  hold  Richmond  until  driven  out  by  the  enemy, 
and  animated  his  hearers  by  an  assurance  of  his  conviction, 
that,  even  in  that  contingency,  "  the  war  could  be  successfully 
maintained,  upon  Virginia  soil,  for  twenty  years."* 

The  accounts  of  the  enemy  were  required  to  demonstrate 
to  the  citizens  of  Richmond,  that,  by  the  obstructions  in  the 
channel  of  the  river,  and  the  erection  of  the  impregnable  bat 
teries  at  Drewry's  Bluff,  their  homes  were  again  secured  from 

*The  incidents  of  this  trying  period,  when  Richmond  was  doubly 
threatened  by  the  hosts  of  McClellan,  and  the  gunboats  in  the  river,  are 
"  mementoes  of  heroism,"  proudly  illustrating  the  unconquerable  spirit  of 
that  devoted  city  and  its  rulers.  We  give  the  resolution  passed  by  the 
Legislature  on  the  occasion  referred  to — May  14,  1862: 

"Resolved  by  the  General  Assembly,  That  this  General  Assembly  ex 
presses  its  desire  that  the  capital  of  the  State  be  defended  to  the  last 
extremity,  if  such  defense  is  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  Confederate  States ;  and  that  the  President  be  assured,  that 
whatever  destruction  or  loss  of  property,  of  the  State,  or  individuals  shall 
hereby  result,  will  be  cheerfully  submitted  to." 

Two  days  after,  at  a  public  meeting  of  the  citizens  of  Richmond,  Gov 
ernor  Letcher  said,  that  under  no  circumstances  would  he  approve  the 
surrender  of  the  city,  and  avowed  his  readiness  to  endure  bombardment, 
if  necessary.  In  the  same  stout  spirit  spoke  Mayor  Mayo : 

"I  say  now — and  I  will  abide  by  it — when  the  citizens  of  Richmond 
demand  of  me  to  surrender  the  capital  of  Virginia,  and  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  to  the  enemy,  they  must  find  some  other  man  to  fill  my  place.  I  will 
resign  the  mayoralty.  And  when  that  other  man  elected  in  my  stead 
shall  deliver  up  the  city,  I  hope  I  may  have  physical  courage  and  strength 
enough  left  to  shoulder  a  musket  and  go  into  the  ranks." 


JACKSON'S  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  401 

the  presence  of  the  invaders.  The  significance  of  that  brief 
engagement,  during  which  the  guns  were  distinctly  audible  in 
Richmond,  was  very  soon  made  evident  in  the  loss  of  their 
terrors  by  the  Federal  gunboats.  President  Davis  was  a  spec 
tator  of  the  engagement,  by  which  the  Confederate  capital  was 
rescued  from  imminent  peril  of  capture. 

But  the  repulse  of  the  gunboats  in  James  River,  with  its 
assuring  and  significant  incidents,  was  the  precursor  of  far 
more  brilliant  successes,  which,  it  was  evident,  would  largely 
affect  the  decision  of  the  general  issue  in  Virginia.  In  the 
months  of  May  and  June,  1862,  was  enacted  the  memorable 
"  Valley  campaign  "  of  Stonewall  Jackson — a  campaign  which, 
never  excelled,  has  no  parallel  in  brilliant  and  accurate  con 
ception,  celerity,  and  perfection  of  execution,  save  the  Italian 
campaign  of  Napoleon  in  1796.  General  Jackson's  exploits  in 
the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  present  an  aggregate  of  military 
achievements  unrivaled  by  any  record  in  American  history. 

On  the  23d  of  March,  Jackson  fought  the  battle  of  Kerns- 
town,  near  Winchester,  with  three  thousand  Virginians  against 
eighteen  full  Federal  regiments,  sustaining,  throughout  an 
entire  day,  an  audacious  assault  upon  Shields'  force,  and 
at  dark  leisurely  retiring  with  his  command,  after  having 
inflicted  upon  the  enemy  a  loss  nearly  equal  to  his  own 
strength.  Elsewhere  has  been  mentioned  the  effort  made  to 
induce  President  Davis  to  remove  Jackson,  in  compliance  with 
the  popular  dissatisfaction  at  his  failure  to  achieve,  against 
such  overwhelming  odds,  more  palpable  fruits  of  victory.  The 
immediate  consequence  of  Kernstown  was  the  check  of  Banks' 
advance  in  the  Valley,  and  the  recall  of  a  large  force,  then  on 
the  way  from  Banks  to  aid  McClellan's  designs  against 
Johnston. 

26 


402  LIFE  OF  JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

Leaving  General  Ewell,  whose  division  had  been  detached 
from  Johnston,  to  intercept  any  demonstration  by  Banks  in 
the  Valley,  or  across  the  Blue  Ridge,  Jackson  united  his  com 
mand  with  that  of  General  Edward  Johnson,  a  full  brigade, 
and  defeating  the  advance  of  Fremont,  under  Milroy,  at  Mc 
Dowell,  compelled  a  disorderly  retreat  by  Fremont  through 
the  mountains  of  Western  Virginia.  Returning  to  the  Valley, 
he  assaulted,  with  his  united  force,  the  column  of  Banks, 
annihilated  an  entire  division  of  the  enemy,  pursued  its  fugi 
tive  remnants  to  the  Potomac,  and  threatened  the  safety  of 
the  Federal  capital.  Alarmed  for  Washington,  Mr.  Lincoln 
halted  McDowell  in  his  plans  of  cooperation  with  McClellan, 
and  for  weeks  the  efforts  of  the  Federal  Government  were 
addressed  to  the  paramount  purpose  of  "catching  Jackson." 
Eluding  the  enemy's  combinations,  Jackson  turned  upon  his 
pursuers,  again  defeated  Fremont  at  Cross  Keys,  and  imme 
diately  crossing  the  Shenandoah,  secured  his  rear,  and  destroyed 
the  advance  of  Shields  within  sight  of  its  powerless  confed 
erate.  Resuming  his  retreat,  Jackson  paused  at  Weyer's  Cave, 
and  awaited  the  summons  of  his  superiors  to  enact  his  thrill 
ing  role  in  the  absorbing  drama  at  Richmond.  Within  the 
short  period  of  seventy  days,  Jackson  achieved  at  Kernstown, 
McDowell's,  Front  Royal,  Winchester,  Strasburg,  Harrison- 
burg,  Cross  Keys,  and  Port  Republic,  eight  tactical  victories, 
besides  innumerable  successful  combats.  But  he  had  done 
more.  He  had  wrought  the  incomparable  strategic  achieve 
ment  of  neutralizing  sixty  thousand  men  with  fifteen  thou 
sand;  he  had  recalled  McDowell,  when,  with  outstretched 
arm,  McClellan  had  already  planted  his  right  wing,  under 
Porter,  at  Hanover  Court-house,  to  receive  the  advance  of 
the  cooperating  column  from  Fredericksburg. 


"SEVEN  PINES."  403 

Meanwhile  the  lines  of  Richmond  had  been  the  scene  of 
no  incident  of  special  interest  until  the  battle  of  "  Seven 
Pines/7  on  the  31st  of  May.  After  his  arrival  upon  the 
Chickahominy,  McClellan  had  been  steadily  fortifying  his 
lines,  and  wherever  an  advance  was  practicable,  preparing 
approaches  to  Richmond.  His  line,  extending  over  a  space 
of  several  miles,  was  accurately  described  by  the  course  of  the 
Chickahominy,  from  the  village  of  Mechanicsville,  five  miles 
north  of  Richmond,  to  a  point  about  four  miles  from  the  city, 
in  an  easterly  direction.  Having  partially  executed  his  design 
of  bridging  the  Chickahominy,  McClellan  had  crossed  that 
stream,  and  in  the  last  days  of  May,  his  left  wing  was  forti 
fied  near  the  locality  designated  the  "  Seven  Pines."  This 
initiative  demonstration  by  McClellan,  which  placed  his  army 
astride  a  variable  stream,  was  sufficiently  provocative  of  the 
enterprise  of  his  antagonist.  To  increase  the  peril  of  the 
isolated  wing  of  the  Federal  army,  a  thunder-storm,  occurring 
on  the  night  of  the  29th  of  May,  had  so  swollen  the  Chicka 
hominy  as  to  render  difficult  the  accession  of  reinforcements 
from  the  main  body. 

Such  was  the  situation  which  invited  the  Confederate  com 
mander  to  undertake  the  destruction  of  the  exposed  column 
of  his  adversary — a  movement  which,  if  successful,  might  have 
resulted  in  the  rout  of  the  entire  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  open 
ing  a  way  to  his  rear,  and  securing  his  utter  overthrow.  Seven 
Pines  was  an  action,  in  which  the  color  of  victory  was  entirely 
with  the  Confederates,  but  it  was  the  least  fruitul  engage 
ment  fought  by  the  two  armies  in  Virginia.  There  was  no 
engagement  of  the  war  in  which  the  valor  of  the  Confederate 
soldier  was  more  splendidly  illustrated,  though  happily  that 
quality  then  did  not  require  so  conspicuous  a  test.  However 


404  LIFE  OF  JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

able  in  design,  it  was  in  execution  a  signal  failure — a  series 
of  loose,  indefinite  and  disjointed  movements,  wanting  in  co 
operation,  and  apparently  in  able  executive  management. 

President  Davis,  in  company  with  General  Lee,  was  present 
during  most  of  the  engagement.  Frequently  under  fire,  and 
in  consultation  with  his  generals  in  exposed  positions,  he  was 
conspicuous  chiefly  by  his  efforts  to  animate  the  troops,  and 
his  presence  was  greeted  with  evidences  of  the  enthusiasm  and 
confidence  which  it  inspired. 

The  battle  of  "  Seven  Pines/'  in  itself  barren  of  influence 
upon  the  decision  of  the  campaign,  was  nevertheless  attended 
by  an  incident — the  painful  and  disabling  wound  received  by 
General  Johnston,  in  all  probability  decisive  of  the  future 
history  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Leading  to  an 
immediate  and  positive  change  of  policy,  it  is  hardly  a  bold 
declaration  that  this  incident  determined  the  future  of  the  war 
in  Virginia. 

A  disposition  has  been  freely  indulged  to  influence  the  sen 
tence  of  history,  by  placing  President  Davis  and  General 
Johnston  in  a  sort  of  antithetical  juxtaposition,  as  exponents 
of  different  theories  as  to  the  proper  conduct  of  the  war  by 
the  South.  In  view  of  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy,  it  has 
been  ingeniously  contended  that  the  result  vindicated  the  wis 
dom  of  General  Johnston's  views.  But  besides  its  evident  un 
fairness  to  Mr.  Davis,  no  criticism  could  be  founded  less  upon 
the  intrinsic  merits  of  the  case.  Overzealous  and  intemperate 
partisans  generally  evince  aptitude  in  the  exaggeration  of 
minor  differences  between  the  leaders,  whose  interests  they 
profess  to  have  at  heart.  Such  results  are  not  unfrequent  in 
the  lives  of  eminent  public  men.  In  the  case  of  General 
Beauregard,  the  unhappy  effects  of  officious  intermeddling  and 


LEE   IN   COMMAND.  405 

misrepresentation,  from  such  sources,  between  the  President 
and  that  distinguished  officer,  are  especially  notable. 

But  the  assumption  that  events  have  vindicated  the  wisdom 
of  General  Johnston's  views,  in  their  declared  antagonism  to 
those  of  Mr.  Davis,  is  altogether  unsustained.  The  immediate 
results  of  a  change  of  commanders,  and  a  consequent  inaugu 
ration  of  a  different  policy  * — a  policy  in  accordance  with  Mr. 
Davis'  own  views,  may,  with  far  more  reason,  be  alleged  in  sup 
port  of  a  contrary  theory.  The  vigorous  and  aggressive  policy 
adopted  and  executed  by  Lee  not  only  accorded  with  the  wishes 
of  the  President,  but  fulfilled  the  long-deferred  popular  expec 
tation,  and  agreeably  disappointed  the  public  in  Lee's  capacity. 
For  despite  the  general  disappointment  at  the  absence  of  de 
cisive  achievements  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  commanded  far  more  of  public  confidence,  than 
did  General  Lee  at  the  period  of  the  latter's  accession  to 
command. 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  disadvantageous  to  Lee,  than 
the  contrast  so  freely  indicated  between  himself  and  other 
officers.  Johnston  was  criticised  merely  because  of  the  absence 
of  brilliant  and  decisive  achievements.  Lee  was  assumed  to 
have  proven  his  incompetency  by  egregious  failure.  He  was 
ridiculed  as  a  closet  general.  His  campaigns  were  said  to 
exist  only  on  paper — to  consist  of  slow  methodical  tactics,  and 
incessant  industry  with  the  spade,  and  he  was  pronounced 

*  It  is  only  fair  to  state  that  General  Johnston  proposed  operations, 
similar  in  their  main  features  to  those  of  Lee,  though  it  does  not  there 
fore  follow  that  they  would  have  been  equally  successful.  Johnston's 
ability  as  a  strategist  can  not  be  questioned,  and  to  those  who  closely  and 
intelligently  studied  his  campaigns,  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  hia 
aggressive  qualities,  though  in  this  respect,  results  were  not  in  his  favor. 


406  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

totally  deficient  in  aggressive  qualities.  A  prominent  Rich 
mond  editor,  criticising  his  North-western  Virginia  campaign, 
asserted  that  the  unvarying  intelligence  from  Lee  was  that  he 
was  "hopelessly  stuck  in  the  mud,"  and  an  officer  was  heard 
to  compare  him  to  a  terrapin,  needing  the  application  of  a  hot 
coal  to  his  back  to  compel  him  to  action.  But  with  the 
lapse  of  a  fortnight  that  army,  which  received  the  intelligence 
of  Lee's  appointment  to  command  with  misgiving  and  distrust, 
began  to  experience  renewed  life  and  hope.  It  was  not  the 
few  additional  brigades  given  to  that  army  which  so  soon 
started  it  upon  its  irresistible  career  of  victory.  A  mighty 
hand  projected  its  impetus,  and  directed  its  magnificent  valor 
against  those  miles  of  intrenchments  which  it  had  seen  grow 
more  and  more  formidable,  itself  meanwhile  an  inactive  spec 
tator. 

Lee  found  the  army  within  sight  of  Richmond ;  he  lifted 
it  from  the  mud  of  the  Chickahominy,  defeated  an  enemy  in 
trenched  and  in  superior  force ;  pursued  the  panting  and  dis 
heartened  fugitives  to  the  shelter  of  their  shipping  ;  defeated  a 
second  army — then  both  together — within  hearing  of  the  Fed 
eral  capital;  fought  an  indecisive  battle  upon  the  enemy's  soil, 
and  reestablished  the  Confederate  line  upon  the  frontier.  Is  it  a 
matter  of  wonder  that  the  President,  the  army,  and  the  people 
recognized  the  significance  of  these  results,  and  applauded  the 
substitution  of  the  new  system  and  the  new  status  for  the  old  ? 
A  better  explanation  of  so  pronounced  a  contrast  is  needed 
than  tliat  the  "prejudice"  or  "injustice"  of  Davis  withheld 
from  Johnston,  five  or  even  ten  thousand  men,  which  he  gave 
to  Lee. 

Yet  there  could  be  no  hypothesis  more  presumptuous,  in 
view  of  the  abundant  testimony  of  competent  military  judg- 


JOHNSTON'S   GENERALSHIP.  407 

ment,  and  none  more  palpably  untenable,  than  that  which 
would  deny  greatness  as  a  soldier  to  Johnston.  As  a  consum 
mate  master  of  strategy,  in  that  sense  which  contemplates  the 
movements  of  heavy  masses,  and  looks  to  grand  ultimate 
results,  Johnston  has  probably  few  equals.  His  sagacity  in 
the  divination  of  an  enemy's  designs  is  remarkable ;  and  if 
he  be  considered  as  having  marked  deficiencies,  they  must  bo 
counted  as  a  lack  of  Jackson's  audacity,  of  Lee's  confident 
calculation  and  executive  perfection.  The  South  regards 
Lee  as  beyond  criticism.  Jefferson  Davis  is  accustomed  to 
say  "the  world  has  rarely  produced  a  man  to  be  compared 
with  Lee."  Yet  in  mere  intellectuality,  it  is  at  least 
questionable  whether  Johnston  had  his  superior  among  the 
Southern  leaders. 

But  it  often  happens  that  qualities,  however  great,  are  not 
those  which  the  occasion  demands.  That  marvelous  union  of 
qualities  in  Lee,  which  has  placed  him  almost  above  parallel, 
probably  made  him  alone  adequate  to  the  hazardous  posture 
of  affairs  at  Richmond  in  the  summer  of  1862.  The  result, 
at  least,  made  evident  to  the  world,  the  wisdom  of  the  Presi 
dent,  in  that  choice,  which  was  at  first  declared  the  undeserved 
reward  of  an  incompetent  favorite. 

Whatever  may  be  alleged  to  the  contrary,  President  Davis 
at  all  times,  to  the  full  extent  of  his  power,  aided  General 
Johnston  in  the  consummation  of  his  designs.  To  assert  that, 
upon  any  occasion,  he  either  interposed  obstacles  to  Johnston's 
success,  or  denied  him  any  means  in  his  power  to  confer,  is 
to  question  that  personal  fidelity  of  Jefferson  Davis,  which  his 
bitterest  enemy  should  be  ashamed  to  deny.  Few  Southern 
men,  at  least,  have  yet  attained  that  measure  of  malignity,  or 
that  hardihood  of  mendacity. 


408  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

General  Lee  was  not  dilatory  in  his  preparations  to  gratify- 
that  longing  aspiration  which  the  President,  on  his  own  be 
half,  and  in  the  name  of  the  country,  briefly  expressed,  that 
"  something  should  be  done."  Lee  had  a  carte  blanche,  but 
frequent  and  anxious  were  the  consultations  between  the  Pres 
ident  and  himself.  The  world  now  knows  what  followed  those 
days  and  nights  of  anxious  conference,  in  which  were  weighed 
the  chances  of  success,  the  cost  of  victory,  and  the  possibilities 
of  defeat.  The  plan  executed  by  General  Lee  was  one  of  the 
most  hazardous  ever  attempted  in  war,  but  it  was  not  less 
brilliant  than  bold,  and  at  least  one  precedent  had  been  fur 
nished  by  the  great  master  of  the  art  of  war  at  Austerlitz. 
Its  perils  were  obvious,  but  the  sublime  confidence  of  Lee  in 
the  success  of  his  combinations  went  far  to  secure  its  own  jus 
tification. 

During  the  week  of  engagements  which  followed,  the  Pres 
ident  was  constantly  with  the  army  and  fully  advised  of  its 
movements.*  The  cordial  recognition  of  this  advisory  rela 
tion  between  himself  and  Lee,  is  indicated  by  the  natural 
pride,  and  becoming  sense  of  justice,  with  which  the  latter,  in 
the  report  of  his  operations  against  McClellan,  mentions  the 
approving  presence  of  the  President,  during  the  execution  of 

*  Mr.  Davis  was  every  day  upon  the  battle-field,  and  from  this  circum 
stance  the  impression  prevailed  in  Richmond  that  he  was  directing  the 
army  in  person.  A  common  report,  which  I  have  never  seen  contradicted, 
was  that  the  President  narrowly  escaped  death  during  the  progress  of  the 
battles.  As  related  to  the  writer,  the  circumstance  was  as  follows:  The 
President,  in  company  with  General  Magruder  and  other  officers,  was  at 
a  farm-house,  upon  which  one  of  the  Federal  batteries  was  preparing  to 
open.  General  Lee,  apprised  of  the  President's  whereabouts,  sent  a  cou 
rier  to  warn  him  of  his  danger,  and  he  and  his  companions  escaped  with 
out  injury,  just  as  the  Federal  battery  opened  fire. 


DAVIS  AND  LEE.  409 

his  plans.  This  noble  harmony  between  Davis  and  Lee, 
equally  creditable  to  each,  was  never  interrupted  by  one  sin 
gle  moment  of  discord.  It  was  never  marred  by  dictation  on 
one  side,  or  complaint  on  the  other.  Unlike  other  command 
ers,  Lee  never  complained  of  want  of  means,  or  of  opportunity 
for  the  execution  of  his  plans.  Satisfied  that  the  Government 
was  extending  all  the  aid  in  its  power,  he  used,  to  the  best 
advantage,  the  means  at  hand  and  created  his  opportunities. 
Lee  never  charged  the  President  with  improper  interference 
with  the  army,  but  freely  counseled  with  his  constitutional 
commander-in-chief,  whom  he  knew  to  be  worthy  of  the  trust 
conferred  by  the  country  in  the  control  of  its  armies.  Presi 
dent  Davis  fully  comprehended  and  respected  the  jealous  func 
tions  of  military  command,  and  in  the  exercise  of  that  trust 
no  one  would  have  more  quickly  resented  unauthorized  official 
interference.  A  soldier  himself,  he  recognized  freedom  of  ac 
tion  as  the  privilege  of  the  commander;  as  a  statesman,  he 
rendered  that  cordial  cooperation,  which  is  the  duty  of  gov 
ernment. 

When  Lee  had  driven  McClellan  from  his  position  along 
the  Chickahominy,  he  had  raised  the  siege  of  Richmond.  The 
retreat  of  McClellan  to  the  James  River,  conducted  with  such 
admirable  skill,  and  aided  by  good  fortune,  placed  the  Federal 
army  in  a  position  where,  secure  itself,  another  offensive  move 
ment  against  the  Confederate  capital  might,  in  time,  be  un 
dertaken.  Confederate  strategy,  however,  soon  relieved  Rich 
mond  from  the  apprehension  of  attack,  and  in  less  than  two 
months  from  the  termination  of  the  pursuit  of  McClellan,  Lee, 
by  a  series  of  masterly  strokes,  demolished  the  armies  under 
Pope,  united  for  the  defense  of  Washington,  and  was  prepar 
ing  an  invasion  of  Maryland. 


410  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

An  almost  magical  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Confeder 
acy  was  wrought  by  these  active  and  brilliant  operations,  em 
bracing  so  short  a  period,  and  marked  by  results  of  such  mag 
nitude. 

Not  only  were  the  two  main  armies  of  the  enemy  defeated, 
but  the  entire  Federal  campaign  in  the  East  had  been  entirely 
disconcerted.  Eichmond  was  saved,  Washington  menaced, 
and  McClellan  forced  back  to  the  initial  point  of  his  cam 
paign.  Western  Virginia,  the  Carolina  coast,  and  other  local 
ities,  for  months  past  in  Federal  occupation,  were  almost 
divested  of  troops  to  swell  the  hosts  gathering  for  the  rescue 
of  Washington,  and  to  meet  the  dreaded  advance,  northward, 
of  Lee's  invincible  columns.  From  the  heart  of  Virginia  the 
cloud  of  war  was  again  lifted  to  the  Potomac  frontier ;  the 
munificent  harvests  of  the  valley  counties,  of  Fauquier,  Lou- 
don,  and  the  fertile  contiguous  territory,  were  again  in  Con 
federate  possession,  and  a  numerous  and  victorious  army  was 
now  anxious  to  be  led  across  the  Eubicon  of  the  warring 
sections. 

From  harrowing  apprehension,  from  vague  dread  of  inde 
finable  but  imminent  peril,  the  South  was  transported  to  the 
highest  round  of  confident  expectation.  The  North,  which,  in 
the  last  days  of  June,  eagerly  awaited  intelligence  of  McClel- 
lan's  capture  of  Eichmond,  now  regarded  its  own  capital  as 
doomed,  and  did  not  permit  itself  to  breathe  freely  until 
McClellan  announced  the  safety  of  Pennsylvania,  when  Lee 
had  retired  to  Virginia. 

The  inducements  which  invited  a  movement  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  across  the  Potomac  were  manifold.  Whatever 
judgment  the  result  may  now  suggest,  the  invasion  of  Mary 
land  was  alike  dictated  by  sound  military  policy  and  justi- 


INVASION   OF   MARYLAND.  411 

fied  by  those  moral  considerations  which  are  ever  weighty  in 
war.  The  overwhelming  defeat  of  Pope  more  than  realized 
the  hope  of  President  Davis  and  General  Lee,  when  the  stra 
tegic  design  of  a  movement  northward  was  put  in  execution, 
by  which  was  sought  the  double  purpose  of  withdrawing 
McClellan  from  James  River  and  effectually  checking  the 
advance  of  Pope.  The  successive  and  decisive  defeats  of  Pope 
offered  the  prospect  of  an  offensive  by  which  the  splendid 
successes  of  the  campaign  might  be  crowned  with  even  more 
valuable  achievements.  Demoralized,  disheartened,  in  every 
way  disqualified  for  effectual  resistance,  the  remnants  of  the 
armies  which  Lee  had  beaten,  each  in  succession,  and  then 
combined,  would  be  an  easy  prey  to  his  victorious  legions, 
could  they  be  brought  to  a  decisive  field  engagement.  There 
yet  remained  time,  before  the  end  of  the  season  of  active  oper 
ations,  for  crushing  blows  at  the  enemy,  which  would  finish 
the  work  thus  far  triumphantly  successful. 

To  inflict  still  greater  damage  upon  the  enemy — to  so  oc 
cupy  him  upon  the  frontier  as  to  prevent  another  demon 
stration  against  Richmond  during  the  present  year — to  indi 
cate  friendship  and  sympathy  for  the  oppressed  people  of 
Maryland — to  derive  such  aid  from  them  as  their  condition 
would  enable  them  to  extend,  were  the  potent  inducements 
inviting  the  approbation  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to  a 
movement  across  the  Potomac.  President  Davis  was  pledged 
to  an  invasion  of  the  enemy's  country  whenever  it  should 
prove  practicable.  Now,  if  ever,  that  policy  was  to  be  ini 
tiated.  Hitherto  the  enemy's  power,  not  the  will  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  had  prevented.  Now  that  power 
was  shattered.  The  mighty  fabric  trembled  to  its  base,  and 
who  would  now  venture  to  estimate  the  consequences  of  a 


412  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

brilliant  victory  by  Lee,  on  Maryland  soil,  in  September, 
1862?  What  supporter  of  the  Union  can  now  dwell,  without 
a  shudder,  upon  the  imagination,  even,  of  a  repetition,  at  Antie- 
tam,  of  the  story  of  the  Chickahominy,  or  Second  Manassas? 

The  climax  of  the  Maryland  campaign  was  the  battle  of 
Antietam — a  drawn  battle,  but  followed  by  the  early  with 
drawal  of  the  Confederate  army  into  Virginia.  It  is  unneces 
sary  to  dwell  upon  the  causes  conspiring  to  give  this  portion 
of  the  campaign  many  of  the  features  of  failure.  With  a  force 
greatly  reduced  by  the  straggling  of  his  weary  and  exhausted 
troops,  Lee  was  unable  to  administer  the  crushing  blow  which 
he  had  hoped  to  deliver.*  As  a  consequence,  the  people  of 
Maryland,  of  whom  a  large  majority  were  thoroughly  patriotic 
and  warm  in  their  Southern  sympathies,  were  not  encouraged 
to  make  that  effective  demonstration  which  would  inevitably 
have  followed  a  defeat  of  McClellan. 

Nevertheless,  there  was  some  compensation  in  the  terrible 
punishment  inflicted  upon  the  enemy  at  Antietam;  and  there 
was  the  heightened  prestige,  so  greatly  valued  by  the  South  at 
this  period,  in  the  eyes  of  Europe,  arising  from  the  temper 
and  capacity  of  the  weaker  combatant  to  undertake  so  bold  an 
enterprise.  In  the  tangible  evidences  of  success  afforded  by  the 
capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  with  its  numerous  garrison,  supplies 
of  arms  and  military  stores,  was  seen  additional  compensation 
for  the  abandonment  of  the  scheme  of  invasion. 

*  A  serious  disadvantage  suffered  by  General  Lee  was  the  capture  of  his 
plan  of  battle  by  General  McClellan.  Completely  informed  as  to  his  ad 
versary's  movements,  and  with  ninety  thousand  men  against  thirty-three 
thousand,  the  wonder  is,  that  McClellan  did  not  overwhelm  the  Confeder 
ate  army.  The  means  by  which  the  enemy  obtained  this  important  paper 
was  a  subject  of  much  gossip  in  the  Confederacy. 


THE   KENTUCKY   CAMPAIGN.  413 

An  interval  of  repose  was  permitted  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  after  its  return  from  Maryland,  in  its  encampments 
near  Winchester,  during  which  it  was  actively  strengthened 
and  recruited  to  the  point  of  adequate  preparation  for  ex 
pected  demonstrations  of  the  enemy. 

The  operations  of  the  Western  army,  in  many  respects,  were 
a  brilliant  counterpart  to  the  campaign  in  Virginia,  though 
lacking  its  brilliant  fruits.  We  have  mentioned  the  circum 
stance  which  placed  General  Braxton  Bragg  in  command  of 
the  Western  army,  after  its  successful  evacuation  of  Corinth. 
General  Bragg  was  equally  high  in  the  confidence  of  the 
President  and  the  Southern  people.  Greatly  distinguished  by 
his  services  in  Mexico,  his  skillful  handling,  at  Shiloh,  of  the 
magnificent  corps  of  troops,  which  his  discipline  had  made  a 
model  of  efficiency,  more  than  confirmed  his  Mexican  fame. 

Space  does  not  permit  us  to  follow,  in  detail,  the  execution 
of  the  able  and  comprehensive  strategy,  by  which  General 
Bragg  relieved  large  sections  of  Tennessee  and  Alabama  from 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  penetrated  the  heart  of  Kentucky, 
maintained  an  active  offensive  during  the  summer,  and  trans 
ferred  the  seat  of  war  to  the  Federal  frontier.  A  part  of  these 
operations  was  the  hurried  retreat  of  BuelPs  immense  army, 
from  its  posts  in  Alabama  and  Tennessee,  for  the  defense  of 
Louisville  and  Cincinnati ;  large  captures  of  prisoners,  horses, 
arms  and  military  stores;  and  the  brilliant  progress  and 
successive  victories  of  Kirby  Smith  and  Morgan.  For  weeks 
the  situation  in  Kentucky  seemed  to  promise  the  unqualified 
success  of  the  entire  Western  campaign.  There  was,  indeed, 
reasonable  hope  of  a  permanent  occupation  of  the  larger 
portion  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  by  the  Confederate 
forces. 


414  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

But  the  battle  of  Perryville — an  engagement  not  unlike 
Antietam  in  its  doubtful  claim  as  a  Federal  victory — was  fol 
lowed  by  the  retreat  of  General  Bragg,  which  was  executed 
with  skill,  and  with  results  going  far  to  relieve  the  disappoint 
ment  of  the  popular  hope  of  a  permanent  occupation  of  Ken 
tucky.  Buell,  on  his  arrival  at  Louisville,  whither  he  had  re 
treated,  received  heavy  reinforcements,  which  greatly  increased 
his  already  superior  numbers;  and  Perryville,  a  battle  which 
General  Bragg  fought,  rather  to  secure  his  retreat  than  with 
the  expectation  of  a  decisive  victory,  would  have  been  an  over 
whelming  Confederate  success,  had  Bragg  been  sufficiently 
strong  to  follow  up  his  advantage. 

No  Confederate  commander,  save  Lee  and  Jackson,  was  ever 
able  to  present  a  claim  of  a  successful  campaign  so  well  grounded 
as  the  Kentucky  campaign  of  Bragg.  With  a  force  of  forty 
thousand  men,  he  killed,  wounded,  and  captured  more  than 
twenty  thousand  of  the  enemy ;  took  thirty  pieces  of  artillery, 
thousands  of  small  arms ;  a  large  supply  of  wagons,  harness, 
and  horses ;  and  an  immense  amount  of  subsistence,  ample  not 
only  for  the  support  of  his  own  army,  but  of  other  forces  of 
the  Confederacy.  During  the  succeeding  autumn  and  winter, 
Bragg's  army  was  conspicuous  for  its  superior  organization, 
admirable  condition  and  tone;  was  abundantly  supplied  with 
food  and  clothing,  and  larger  in  numbers  than  when  it  started 
upon  its  campaign  in  August.  Moreover,  General  Bragg  re 
deemed  North  Alabama  and  Middle  Tennessee,  and  recovered 
possession  of  Cumberland  Gap,  the  doorway,  through  the 
mountains,  to  Knoxville  and  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Rail 
road — the  main  avenue  from  Richmond  to  the  heart  of  the 
Confederacy.  Evincing  his  determination  to  hold  the  recov 
ered  territory,  General  Bragg,  within  a  month  from  his  return 


415 

from  Kentucky,  was  confronting  the  principal  army  of  the 
enemy,  in  the  West,  before  Nashville. 

Incidental  to  the  movement  of  Bragg  into  Kentucky,  and 
constituting  a  part  of  the  programme,  attempted  upon  the 
large  theatre  of  the  Western  campaign,  were  the  repulse  of 
the  first  attack  of  the  enemy  upon  Yicksburg,  the  partial  fail 
ure  of  General  Breckinridge's  expedition  to  Baton  Rouge,  and 
the  serious  reverse  sustained  by  Van  Dorn  at  Corinth.  In 
connection  with  the  more  important  demonstration  into  Ken 
tucky,  these  incidents  of  the  Western  campaign  may  be  briefly 
aggregated  as  the  recovery  of  the  country  between  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga,  and  the  important  advantage  of  a  secure 
occupation  of  Yicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  thus  closing  the 
Mississippi  to  the  enemy  for  two  hundred  miles. 

Subsequent  operations  in  Virginia,  at  the  close  of  1862, 
were  entirely  favorable  to  the  Confederacy.  While  the  two 
armies  were  confronting  each  other,  with  the  imminent  pros 
pect  of  active  and  important  operations,  General  McClellan 
was  relieved,  and  one  of  his  corps  commanders,  General  Burn- 
side,  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Federal  army  of  the 
Potomac.  As  is  now  universally  acknowledged,  General  Mc 
Clellan  was  sacrificed  to  the  clamor  of  a  political  faction.  By 
this  act  Mr.  Lincoln  became  responsible  for  much  of  the  ill- 
fortune  which  awaited  the  Federal  arms  in  Virginia. 

Perhaps  among  his  countrymen,  a  Southern  tribute  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  may  constitute  but  feeble  praise.  He  was  un 
questionably  the  ablest  and  most  accomplished  soldier  exhib 
ited  by  the  war  on  the  Northern  side.  "  Had  there  been  no 
McClellan,"  General  Meade  is  reported  to  have  said,  "there 
would  have  been  no  Grant."  In  retirement,  if  not  exile, 
General  McClellan  saw  the  armies  which  his  genius  created, 


416  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

achieve  undeserved  distinction  for  men,  his  inferiors  in  all  that 
constitutes  true  generalship.  He  saw  the  feeble  and  wasted 
remnant  of  an  army,  with  which  he  had  grappled  in  the  day 
of  its  glory  and  strength,  surrender  to  a  multitudinous  host, 
doubly  as  large  as  the  army  with  which  he  had  given  Lee  his 
first  check  at  Antietam.  A  true  soldier,  McClellan  was  also 
a  true  gentleman,  an  enemy  whose  talents  the  South  respects 
none  the  less,  because  he  did  not  wantonly  ravage  its  homes, 
nor  make  war  upon  the  helpless,  the  aged,  and  infirm.  Presi 
dent  Davis,  who,  while  Federal  Secretary  of  War,  conferred 
upon  McClellan  a  special  distinction,  held  his  genius  and  at 
tainments  in  high  estimation.  He  received  the  intelligence  of 
his  removal  with  profound  satisfaction. 

The  North  was  not  required  to  wait  long  for  a  competent 
test  of  the  new  commander's  capacity.  Foiled  and  deceived 
by  Lee,  in  a  series  of  maneuvres,  the  results  of  which  made 
him  only  less  ridiculous  than  the  gasconading  Pope  among 
Federal  commanders,  Burnside  finally  assailed  Lee,  on  the 
13th  December,  at  Fredericksburg.  The  result  was  a  bloody 
slaughter,  unequaled  in  previous  annals  of  the  war,  an  over 
whelming  repulse,  and  a  demoralized  retreat  across  the  Rap- 
pahannock. 

The  Western  campaign  terminated  with  the  battle  of  Mur- 
freesboro'.  The  Federal  commander,  Rosecrans,  the  successor 
of  Buell,  advanced  from  Nashville  to  drive  Bragg  from  his 
position.  A  brilliant  and  vigorous  attack  by  Bragg,  on  the 
31st  December,  routed  an  entire  wing  of  the  Federal  army ; 
on  the  second  day  the  action  was  more  favorable  to  Rosecrans, 
who  had  retreated,  after  his  reverse  on  the  first  day,  to  stronger 
positions.  Receiving  information  that  the  enemy  was  strongly 


IMPROVED   PROSPECTS   OF   THE   CONFEDERACY.         417 

reenforcing,  General  Bragg  fell  back  to  Tullahoma,  a  position 
more  favorable  for  strategic  and  defensive  purposes. 

The  transfer,  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  of  the  troops  of 
Price  and  Van  Dorn  to  the  army  east  of  the  Mississippi,  had 
almost  divested  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department  of  interest  in 
the  public  mind.  After  Elk  Horn,  there  was  but  one  consid 
erable  engagement,  in  1862,  west  of  the  Mississippi.  This  was 
the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  a  fruitless  victory,  won  by  Gen 
eral  Hindman,  about  the  middle  of  December.  The  country 
north  of  the  Arkansas  River  continued  to  be  nominally  held 
by  the  Federal  forces. 

Thus,  in  nearly  every  quarter,  the  second  year  of  the  war 
terminated  with  events  favorable  to  the  prospects  of  Southern 
independence.  Though  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Con 
federacy  was  contracted,  the  world  was  not  far  from  regarding 
the  task  of  subjugation  as  already  a  demonstrated  and  hope 
less  failure.  All  the  invasive  campaigns  of  the  enemy,  save 
the  first  shock  of  his  overwhelming  onsets  against  weak  and 
untenable  posts,  in  the  winter  and  early  spring,  had  been 
brought  to  grief,  and  nowhere  had  he  maintained  himself  away 
from  his  water  facilities.  An  unexampled  prestige  among 
nations  now  belonged  to  the  infant  power,  which  had  carried 
its  arms  from  the  Tennessee  to  the  Ohio,  had  achieved  a  week 
of  victories  before  its  own  capital,  and  carried  the  war  back 
to  its  threshold.  After  such  achievements  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  rightly  claimed  from  those  powers  which  have  assumed 
to  be  the  arbiters  of  international  right  an  instant  recognition 
upon  the  list  of  declared  and  established  nationalities. 

In  our  brief  and  cursory  glance  at  military  operations, 
•we  have  omitted  to  mention  the  action  of  the  Government 
designed  to  promote  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war. 
27 


418  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

This  action  is  mainly  comprehended  by  the  various  sug 
gestions  of  the  President's  messages  to  Congress.  These  rec 
ommendations  related  chiefly  to  measures  having  in  view  the 
increased  efficiency  of  the  service.  He  invited  the  attention 
of  Congress,  especially,  to  the  necessity  of  measures  securing 
the  proper  execution  of  the  conscription  law,  and  the  consoli 
dation  of  companies,  battalions  and  regiments,  when  so  reduced 
in  strength  as  to  impair  that  uniformity  of  organization, 
which  was  necessary  in  the  army.  Legislation  was  urged, 
having  in  view  a  better  control  of  military  transportation  on 
the  railroads,  and  the  improvement  of  their  defective  condi 
tion.  The  President  also  recommended  various  propositions 
relating  to  organization  of  the  army,  and  an  extension  of  the 
provisions  of  the  conscription  law,  embracing  persons  between 
the  ages  of  thirty-five  and  forty-five  years. 

About  the  middle  of  December  President  Davis  visited  the 
camps  of  the  Western  Department,  spending  several  weeks  in 
obtaining  information  as  to  the  condition  and  wants  of  that 
section  of  the  Confederacy,  and  devising  expedients  for  a  more 
successful  defense  in  a  quarter  where  the  Confederate  cause 
was  always  seriously  menaced.  His  presence  was  highly  bene 
ficial  in  allaying  popular  distrust,  founded  upon  the  supposi 
tion  that  Virginia  and  the  Atlantic  region  engrossed  the  at 
tention  of  the  Government  to  the  exclusion  of  concern  for  the 
"West  and  the  Mississippi  Valley.  When  the  President  re 
turned  to  Richmond,  there  were  signs  of  popular  animation 
in  the  South-west,  which  justified  a  more  confident  hope  of 
the  cause,  than 'the  South  was  permitted  to  indulge  at  any 
other  period  of  the  struggle. 

An  incident  of  this  visit  was  the  address  of  the  President 
before  the  Mississippi  Legislature.  The  warm  afiection  of 


MR.   DAVIS  IN   MISSISSIPPI.  419 

Mr.  Davis  for  Mississippi  is  more  than  reciprocated  by  the 
noble  and  chivalrous  people  of  that  State.  He  was  always 
proud  of  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  such  a  community, 
and  Mississippi  can  never  abate  her  affection  for  one  who  so 
illustrated  her  name  in  the  council  chamber  and  upon  the  field 
of  battle.  In  this  address  he  alluded,  with  much  tenderness, 
to  this  reciprocal  attachment,  declaring,  that  though  "as 
President  of  the  Confederate  States,  he  had  determined  to 
make  no  distinction  between  the  various  parts  of  the  country — 
to  know  no  separate  State — yet  his  heart  always  beat  more 
warmly  for  Mississippi,  and  he  had  looked  on  Mississippi 
soldiers  with  a  pride  and  emotion,  such  as  no  others  inspired." 
Declaring  that  his  course  had  been  dictated  by  the  sincere 
purpose  of  promoting  the  cause  of  independence,  he  admon 
ished  the  country  to  prepare  for  a  desperate  contest,  with  a 
power  armed  for  the  purposes  of  conquest  and  subjugation. 
He  characterized  severely  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  the 
North.  Reviewing  its  progress,  and  recounting  the  immense 
disadvantages,  with  which  the  South  contended,  he  maintained 
that  the  South  should  congratulate  itself  on  its  achievements, 
and  not  complain  that  more  had  not  been  accomplished.  The 
conscription  law  was  explained  and  defended  as  to  many  of 
its  features  not  clearly  understood  by  the  people.  We  give 
an  extract  from  Mr.  Davis'  remarks  as  to  the  Confederate 
conscription,  a  subject  of  vast  misrepresentation  during  the 
war,  and  of  much  ignorant  censure  since : 

"  I  am  told  that  this  act  has  excited  some  discontentment,  and 
that  it  has  provoked  censure  far  more  severe,  I  believe,  than  it 
deserves.  It  has  been  said  that  it  exempts  the  rich  from  military 
service,  and  forces  the  poor  to  fight  the  battles  of  the  country. 
The  poor  do,  indeed,  fight  the  battles  of  the  country.  It  is  the 


420  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

poor  who  save  nations  and  make  revolutions.  But  is  it  true  that, 
in  this  war,  the  men  of  property  have  shrunk  from  the  ordeal  of 
the  battle-field  ?  Look  through  the  army  ;  cast  your  eyes  upon 
the  maimed  heroes  of  the  war  whom  you  meet  in  your  streets  and 
in  the  hospitals  ;  remember  the  martyrs  of  the  conflict ;  and  I  am 
sure  you  will  find  among  them  more  than  a  fair  proportion  drawn 
from  the  ranks  of  men  of  property.  The  object  of  that  portion 
of  the  act  which  exempts  those  having  charge  of  twenty  or  more 
negroes,  was  not  to  draw  any  distinction  of  classes,  but  simply  to 
provide  a  force,  in  the  nature  of  a  police  force,  sufficient  to  keep 
our  negroes  in  control.  This  was  the  sole  object  of  the  clause. 
Had  it  been  otherwise,  it  would  never  have  received  my  signature. 
As  I  have  already  said,  we  have  no  cause  to  complain  of  the 
rich.  All  our  people  have  done  well ;  and,  while  the  poor  have 
nobly  discharged  their  duties,  most  of  the  wealthiest  and  most 
distinguished  families  of  the  South  have  representatives  in  the 
ranks.  I  take,  as  an  example,  the  case  of  one  of  your  own  repre 
sentatives  in  Congress,  who  was  nominated  for  Congress  and 
elected,  but  still  did  a  sentinel's  duty  until  Congress  met.  Nor 
is  this  a  solitary  instance,  for  men  of  largest  fortune  in  Mississippi 
are  now  serving  in  the  ranks." 


The  President  strongly  and  eloquently  recommended  the 
provision  by  the  Legislature  for  the  families  of  the  absent 
soldiers  of  Mississippi.  Said  he  :  "  Let  this  provision  be  made 
for  the  objects  of  his  affection  and  his  solicitude,  and  the  sol 
dier,  engaged  in  fighting  the  battles  of  his  country,  will  no 
longer  be  disturbed  in  his  slumbers  by  dreams  of  an  unpro 
tected  and  neglected  family  at  home.  Let  him  know  that  his 
mother  Mississippi  has  spread  her  protecting  mantle  over  those 
he  loves,  and  he  will  be  ready  to  fight  your  battles,  to  protect 
your  honor,  and  in  your  cause  to  die." 


VIEW  OF   THE   SITUATION.  421 

The  address  concluded  with  an  earnest  appeal  for  unrelaxed 
exertion,  and  the  declaration  that,  "in  all  respects,  moral  as 
well  as  physical,  the  Confederacy  was  better  prepared  than  it 
was  a  year  previous" — a  declaration  verified  not  less  by  the 
favorable  situation  than  by  the  evident  apprehension  of  the 
North  and  the  expectations  of  Europe. 


422  LIFE   OF   JEFFEHSOX   DAVIS. 


CHAPTEE   XIV. 


RESPECT  OF  MANKIND  FOR  THE  SOUTH— THE  MOST  PROSPEROUS  PERIOD  OF  THE 
WAR — HOW  MR.  DAVIS  CONTRIBUTED  TO  THE  DISTINCTION  OF  THE  SOUTH — 
FACTION  SILENCED — THE  EUROPEAN  ESTIMATE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS — HOW 
HE  DIGNIFIED  THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  SOUTH — HIS  STATE  PAPERS — HIS  ADMINIS 
TRATION  OF  CIVIL  MATTERS — THE  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  PRESIDENTS 
— MR.  DAVIS'  OBSERVANCE  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  RESTRAINTS — ARBITRARY  AD 
MINISTRATION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN — MR.  DAVIS'  MODERATION — HE  SEEKS  TO  CON 
DUCT  THE  WAR  UPON  CIVILIZED  IDEAS — AN  ENGLISH  CHARACTERIZATION  OF 
DAVIS — COLONEL  FREEMANTLfi's  INTERVIEW  WITH  HIM — MR.  GLADSTONE'S 
OPINION — THE  PURELY  PERSONAL  AND  SENTIMENTAL  ADMIRATION  OF  EUROPE 
FOR  THE  SOUTH— INCONSISTENT  CONDUCT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  GREAT  POWERS — 
THE  LONDON  "  TIMES  "  BEFORE  M'CLELLAN's  DEFEAT— THE  CONFEDERACY  EN 
TITLED  TO  RECOGNITION  BY  EUROPE ENGLAND  S  SYMPATHY  WITH  THE  NORTH 

— DIGNIFIED  ATTITUDE  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS  UPON  THE  SUBJECT  OF  RECOGNI 
TION — HIS  EARLY  PREDICTION  UPON  THE  SUBJECT — FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND 
EXPOSED  TO  INJURIOUS  SUSPICIONS — TERGIVERSATIONS  OF  THE  PALMERSTON 
CABINET THE  BROAD  FARCE  OF  "BRITISH  NEUTRALITY" — ENGLAND  DE 
CLINES  TO  UNITE  WITH  FRANCE  IN  AN  OFFER  OF  MEDIATION  BETWEEN  THE 
AMERICAN  BELLIGERENTS— ENGLAND'S  "POLICY" — SHE  SOUGHT  THE  RUIN  OF 
BOTH  SECTIONS  OF  AMERICA — CULMINATION  OF  THE  ANTISLAVERY  POLICY  OF 
THE  NORTH— MR.  LINCOLN'S  CONVERSATION  WITH  A  KENTUCKY  MEMBER  OF 
CONGRESS — THE  WAR  A  "  CRIME  "  BY  MR.  LINCOLN'S  OWN  SHOWING — VIOLA 
TION  OF  PLEDGES  AND  ARBITRARY  ACTS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT — THE 
MASK  REMOVED  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM — THE  REAL  PURPOSE  OF 
EMANCIPATION — MR.  DAVIS*  ALLUSION  TO  THE  SUBJECT — INDIGNATION  OF  THE 

SOUTH  AT  THE  MEASURE MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  TEXAS  AND  MISSISSIPPI 

VICKSBURG PORT  HUDSON LOSS  OF  ARKANSAS  POST FEDERAL  FLEET  RE 
PULSED  AT  CHARLESTON PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  CAMPAIGN — UNITY  AND 

CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH MR.  DAVIS*  ADDRESS  TO  THE  COUNTRY IMPOR 
TANT  EXTRACTS GENERAL  LEE  PREPARES  FOR  BATTLE HIS  CONFIDENCE 

CONDITION  OF  HIS  ARMY — BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE — JEFFERSON  DAVIS* 
TRIBUTE  TO  STONEWALL  JACKSON. 

r INHERE   is  much  justice  in  the  sentiment  that  declares 
-•-    that   there  can  be  magnificence  even  in  failure.     Men 


THE   EUROPEAN   ESTIMATE   OF   MR.    DAVIS.  423 

often  turn  to  the  contemplation  of  roles  enacted  in  history, 
ending  in  disaster  and  utter  disappointment  of  the  originating 
and  vitalizing  aspiration,  with  far  more  of  interest  than  has 
been  felt  in  following  records  marked  by  the  palpable  tokens 
of  complete  success. 

It  may  well  be  doubted,  whether  the  Confederate  States  of 
America,  even  had  victory  crowned  their  prolonged  struggle 
of  superhuman  valor  and  unstinted  sacrifice,  could  have  com 
manded  more  of  the  esteem  of  mankind,  than  will  be  awarded 
them  in  the  years  to  come.  Retrospect  of  the  most  prosperous 
period  of  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy — the  interval  be 
tween  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  December,  1862,  and  the 
ensuing  midsummer — reveals  a  period  in  which  there  was 
wanting  no  element  of  glory,  of  pride,  or  of  hope.  Many  a 
people,  now  proudly  boasting  an  honored  recognition  at  the 
council-board  of  nations,  might  envy  the  fame  of  the  meteor 
power  which  flashed  across  the  firmament,  with  a  glorious 
radiance  that  made  more  mournful  its  final  extinguishment. 

A  notable  feature  of  the  distinction  which  the  South,  at  that 
time  especially,  commanded  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  was  the 
enthusiastic  and  universal  tribute  of  mankind  to  the  leader, 
whose  genius,  purity,  dignity,  and  eloquence  so  adorned  the 
cause  of  his  country.  The  North  sought  to  console  its  wounded 
national  pride  by  accounting  for  the  crushing  and  humiliating 
defeats  of  the  recent  campaign,  by  contrasts  between  the 
able  leadership  of  its  antagonist,  and  its  own  imbecile  admin 
istration.  At  the  South  faction  was  silenced,  in  the  presence 
of  the  wondrous  results  achieved  in  spite  of  its  own  outcries 
and  prophecies  of  failure.  Demagogues,  in  such  a  season  of 
good  fortune,  ceased  their  charges  of  narrowness,  of  rash 
zealotry,  of  favoritism,  of  incompetency,  seemingly  conscious, 


424  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

for  once,  of  the  praise  which  they  bestowed  upon  the  Exec 
utive,  whom  they  accused  of  usurping  all  the  authority  of 
the  Government,  in  ascribing  such  results  to  his  unaided  ca 
pacity. 

From  Europe,  in  the  beginning,  so  prejudiced  against  the 
South  and  its  cause,  so  misinformed  of  Southern  motives,  and 
unacquainted  with  Southern  history,  came  the  tribute  of  dis 
interested  eulogy,  the  more  to  be  valued,  because  reluctantly 
accorded,  to  the  Confederacy  and  its  ruler.  To  Europe  the 
South  was  now  known  not  only  through  a  series  of  unparal 
leled  victories ;  as  a  people  who  had  successfully  asserted  their 
independence  for  nearly  two  years,  against  such  odds  as  had 
never  been  seen  before ;  as  a  land  of  valiant  soldiers,  of  great 
generals,  and  of  large  material  resources.  If  possible,  above 
these,  the  statesmen  and  politicians  of  Europe  admired  the 
administrative  capacity,  which,  they  declared,  had  given  a  su 
perior  model  and  a  new  dignity  to  the  science  of  statesman 
ship.  To  the  educated  circles  of  Europe  the  new  power  was 
introduced  by  State  papers,  which  were  declared  to  be  models, 
not  less  of  skilled  political  narration  and  exposition,  than  of 
literary  purity  and  excellence.  Accustomed  to  hear  the  South 
twitted  as  a  people  dwarfed  and  debased  by  the  demoralization 
of  African  slavery,  the  educated  classes  of  England  acknowl 
edged  the  surprise  and  delight  they  experienced  from  the  power 
ful  and  splendid  vindications  of  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy,  in 
the  messages  of  Mr.  Davis.  It  has  been  truthfully  remarked 
that  there  could  be  no  better  history  of  the  war  than  that  con 
tained  in  his  numerous  state  papers.  They  are  the  exhaust 
ive  summary,  and  unanswerable  statement  of  the  imperishable 
truths  which  justify  the  South,  and  overwhelm  her  enemies  with 
the  proof  of  their  own  acts  of  wrong  and  violence. 


CIVIL  ADMINISTRATION.  425 

Under  the  new  light  given  to  mankind,  as  to  the  origin, 
nature,  and  purposes  of  the  American  Union,  which  Mr.  Davis 
so  lucidly  explained,  Europe  soon  recognized  his  position  as 
something  else  than  that  of  a  ruler  of  an  insurgent  district. 
But  not  only  as  the  chosen  Executive  of  eleven  separate 
communities,  several  of  which  European  governments  had 
previously  recognized  as  sovereign ;  as  one  who  had  organized 
great  armies,  maintained  them  in  the  field,  and  selected  lead 
ers  for  their  command  already  illustrious  in  the  annals  of  war ; 
not  for  these  and  other  features  of  enduring  fame,  alone,  was 
Jefferson  Davis  admired  in  Europe.  The  contrast  between 
the  civil  administrations  of  the  hostile  sections  was  viewed  as, 
perhaps,  the  chiefly  remarkable  phase  of  the  struggle. 

President  Lincoln,  beginning  the  war  with  usurpation,  had 
committed,  in  its  progress,  every  possible  trespass  upon  the 
Federal  Constitution,  and  was  now  under  the  influence  of  a 
faction  whose  every  aim  contemplated  the  overthrow  of  that 
instrument.  President  Davis,  supported  by  a  confiding  peo 
ple,  and  an  overwhelming  majority  of  every  Southern  com 
munity,  ruled  in  strict  conformity  with  the  laws  of  the  land 
and  its  Constitution.  In  the  midst  of  a  revolution,  unexam 
pled  in  magnitude,  in  fierceness,  and  vindictiveness  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  and  of  difficulties  in  his  own  administration,  he 
furnished  an  example  of  courage,  humanity,  and  magnanimity, 
together  with  the  observance  of  order,  civil  freedom,  and  legal 
and  constitutional  restraints  unexampled  in  history.  In  the 
Confederacy,  the  Roman  maxim,  Inter  arma  silent  leges,  uni 
versally  recognized  and  practiced  among  nations,  had  an  em 
phatic  repudiation,  so  far  as  concerned  the  exercise  of  power 
by  the  executive  department.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
exceptional  cases  of  unauthorized  oppression  or  violence,  there 


426  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

was  always  redress  in  the.  judiciary  department  of  the  Govern 
ment,  which  continued  in  pure  and  dignified  existence  until 
the  end. 

The  President,  obeying  the  dictates  of  exalted  patriotism — 
acting  always  for  the  public  good,  if  not  always  with  unim 
peachable  wisdom,  at  least  with  incorruptible  integrity — made 
no  attempt  at  improper  interference  with  Congress,  nor  sought 
to  exercise  undue  influence  over  its  deliberations.  The  press, 
usually  the  first  bulwark  of  the  public  liberties  to  attract  the 
exercise  of  depotism,  so  trammeled  at  the  North,  was  free  in 
the  South  every-where;  in  some  instances,  to  the  extent  of 
licentiousness,  and  to  the  positive  injury  of  the  cause. 

In  marked  contrast  with  these  exhibitions  were  the  evi 
dences  of  coming  despotism  at  the  North.  The  Federal  ju 
diciary  was  rapidly  declining  from  its  exalted  purity,  before 
the  exactions  of  military  power;  the  Federal  Congress  was 
charged  by  the  press  with  open  and  notorious  corruption,  and 
was  aiding  Mr.  Lincoln  in  usurpations  which  startled  the  des 
potisms  of  Europe,  and  have  since  led  to  the  annihilation  of 
the  republican  character  of  the  Government. 

Conspicuous,  too,  was  the  desire  of  Mr.  Davis  to  conduct 
the  war  upon  a  civilized  and  Christian  basis.  His  forbearance, 
his  moderation,  and  stern  refusal  to  resort  to  retaliation,  under 
circumstances  such  as  would  have  justified  its  exercise  in  re 
sponse  to  the  cruelties  and  outrages  of  the  enemy,  amazed  the 
European  spectator,  and  at  times  dissatisfied  his  own  coun 
trymen.  "  Retaliation  is  not  justice,"  was  his  habitual  reply 
to  urgent  demands,  and  again  and  again  did  he  decline  to 
"  shed  one  drop  of  blood  except  on  the  field  of  battle."  Never 
forgetting  the  dignity  of  the  contest,  he,  up  to  the  last  mo 
ment  of  his  authority,  redeemed  the  pledge  which  he  had  made 


ENGLISH   OPINIONS  OF  DAVIS.  427 

in  the  first  weeks  of  the  war :  "  to  smite  the  smiter  with  manly 
arms,  as  did  our  fathers  before  us." 

There  have  been  few  spectacles  presented  to  the  admiring 
gaze  of  mankind,  more  worthily  depicted  than  that  union  of 
capacities  and  virtues  in  Jefferson  Davis,  which  so  eminently 
qualified  him,  in  the  opinion  of  foreigners,  for  the  position  he 
held.  An  English  writer  has  eloquently  sketched  him  as  "  one 
of  the  world's  foremost  men,  admired  as  a  statesman,  respected 
as  an  earnest  Christian,  the  Washington  of  another  generation 
of  the  same  race.  A  resolute  statesman,  calm,  dignified,  sway 
ing  with  commanding  intellect  the  able  men  that  surrounded 
him ;  eloquent  as  a  speaker,  and  as  a  writer  giving  state  papers 
to  the  world  which  are  among  the  finest  compositions  in  our 
time ;  of  warm  domestic  affections  in  his  inner  life,  and  strong 
religious  convictions;  held  up  by  vigor  of  the  spirit  that 
nerved  an  exhausted  and  feeble  frame — such  was  the  chosen 
constitutional  ruler  of  one-fourth  of  the  American  people." 

Colonel  Freemantle,  a  distinguished  English  officer,  whose 
faithful  and  impartial  narrative  of  his  extended  observations 
of  the  American  war,  commended  him  to  the  esteem  of  both 
parties,  thus  concludes  an  account  of  an  interview  with  Presi 
dent  Davis,  in  the  spring  of  1863 : 

"During  my  travels  many  people  have  remarked  to  me  that 
Jefferson  Davis  seems,  in  a  peculiar  manner,  adapted  to  his  office. 
His  military  education  at  West  Point  rendered  him  intimately 
acquainted  with  the  higher  officers  of  the  army;  and  his  post  of 
Secretary  of  War,  under  the  old  Government,  brought  officers  of 
all  ranks  under  his  immediate  personal  knowledge  and  supervision. 
No  man  could  have  formed  a  more  accurate  estimate  of  their 
respective  merits.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  which  gave  the 
Confederates  such  an  immense  start  in  the  way  of  generals ;  for, 


428  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

having  formed  his  opinion  with  regard  to  appointing  an  officer, 
Mr.  Davis  is  always  most  determined  to  carry  out  his  intention 
in  spite  of  every  obstacle.  His  services  in  the  Mexican  war  gave 
him  the  prestige  of  a  brave  man  and  a  good  soldier.  His  services 
as  a  statesman  pointed  him  out  as  the  only  man  who,  by  his  un 
flinching  determination  and  administrative  talent,  was  able  to  con 
trol  the  popular  will.  People  speak  of  any  misfortune  happening 
to  him  as  an  irreparable  evil  too  dreadful  to  contemplate." 

Mr.  Gladstone,  a  member  of  the  British  cabinet,  the  emi 
nent  leader  of  a  party  in  English  politics,  and  a  sympathizer 
with  the  objects  of  the  war  as  waged  by  the  North,  avowed  his 
enthusiastic  appreciation  of  the  lustre  reflected  upon  the  new 
Government,  by  its  able  administration,  in  the  assertion  that 
"  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  had  created  a  nation." 

But  the  admiration  of  Europe  was  to  prove  a  mere  senti 
ment,  unaccompanied  by  any  practical  demonstration  of  sym 
pathy.  In  view  of  the  course  so  persistently  adhered  to  by 
the  great  powers  of  Europe,  it  is  curious  to  note  the  purely 
sentimental  and  personal  character  of  their  professed  sympathy 
for  the  South.  The  earliest  expression  of  foreign  opinion  indi 
cated  a  reluctant  recognition  of  the  valor  and  devotion  of  a 
people,  from  whom  they  had  not  expected  the  exhibition  of 
such  qualities.  When,  by  the  protraction  of  the  struggle,  the 
brilliant  feats  of  arms  executed  by  the  Southern  armies,  the 
indomitable  resolution  of  the  South,  and  its  evident  purpose 
to  encounter  every  possible  sacrifice  for  sake  of  independence, 
there  was  no  longer  ground  for  misapprehension,  they  still 
disregarded  all  the  precedents  and  principles  which  had  gov- 
erend  their  course  respecting  new  nationalities. 

Applauding  the  valor  of  the  Southern  soldiery,  the  heroism, 
endurance,  and  self-denial  of  a  people  whom  they  repeatedly 


THE    LONDON   "  TIMES "   ON  RECOGNITION.  429 

declared  to  have  already  established  their  invincibility;  rapt 
urous  in  their  panegyrics  upon  the  genius,  zeal,  and  Christian 
virtues  of  the  Confederate  leaders ;  they  never  interposed  their 
boasted  potentiality  in  behalf  of  justice,  right,  and  humanity. 
English  writers  were  eloquent  in  acknowledgment  of  the  addi 
tional  distinction  conferred  upon  Anglo-Saxon  statesmanship 
and  literature  by  Davis;  diligent  in  tracing  the  honorable 
English  lineage  of  Lee,  and  establishing  the  consanguinity  of 
Jackson;  but  English  statesmen  persistently  disregarded  those 
elevated  considerations  of  humanity  and  philanthropy,  which 
they  have  so  much  vaunted  as  prompting  their  intercourse  with 
nations.  Confessing  a  new  enlightenment  from  the  expositions 
of  Mr.  Davis,  and  from  diligent  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the 
Federal  Government,  Europe  soon  avowed  its  convictions  in 
favor  of  the  legal  and  constitutional  right  of  secession  asserted 
by  the  South.  It  declared  that  it  but  awaited  the  exhibition 
of  that  earnestness  of  purpose,  and  that  capacity  for  resistance, 
which  should  establish  the  "  force  and  consistency  "  which  are 
the  requisite  conditions  of  recognized  nationality. 

The  London  Times,  while  the  army  of  McClellan  was  still 
investing  Richmond,  used  language  which  the  North  and  the 
South  accepted  as  significant  and  prophetic.  Said  the  Times: 

"  It  can  not  be  doubted  that  we  are  approaching  a  time  when  a 
more  important  question  even  than  that  of  an  offer  of  mediation 
may  have  to  be  considered  by  England  and  France.  The  Southern 
Confederacy  has  constituted  itself  a  nation  for  nearly  a  year  and  a 
half.  During  that  time  the  attachment  of  the  people  to  the  new 
Government  has  been  indubitably  shown ;  immense  armies  have 
been  raised ;  the  greatest  sacrifices  have  been  endured ;  the  persist 
ence  of  the  South  in  the  war,  through  a  long  series  of  battles — • 
some  victories,  some  defeats — has  shown  the  'force  and  consist- 


430  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ency '  which  are  looked  upon  as  tests  of  nationality.,  Wherever 
the  Government  is  unmolested,  the  laws  are  administered  regularly 
as  in  time  of  peace ;  and  wherever  the  Federals  have  penetrated, 
they  are  received  with  an  animosity  which  they  resent,  as  at  New 
Orleans,  by  a  military  rule  of  intolerable  brutality.  The  vision  of 
a  Union  party  in  the  South  has  been  dispelled,  as  the  Northerners 
themselves  are  compelled,  with  bitterness  and  mortification,  to 
admit. 

"  All  these  circumstances  point  but  to  one  conclusion :  Either 
this  war  must  be  brought  to  an  end,  or  the  time  will  at  last  come 
when  the  South  may  claim  its  own  recognition  by  foreign  nations 
as  an  independent  power.  The  precedents  of  the  American  colo 
nies,  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  of  Belgium,  and  of  Tuscany,  and  of 
Naples  the  other  day,  forbid  us  to  question  this  right  when  asserted 
by  the  Confederate  States.  It  is  our  duty  to  anticipate  this  pos 
sible  event,  and  it  may  be  wise,  as  well  as  generous,  for  statesmen 
on  this  side  of  the  ocean  to  approach  the  American  Government 
in  a  friendly  spirit,  with  the  ofier  of  their  good  offices,  at  this 
great  crisis  of  its  fortunes." 

If  such  a  statement  of  the  question  was  just  and  truthful, 
when  a  numerous  and  confident  army,  under  a  leader  of  proven 
skill,  was  engaged  in  close  siege  of  the  capital  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  how  much  more  unanswerable  were  its  conclusions  when 
McClellan  was  defeated  ?  "What  were  the  evidences  of  "  force 
and  consistency"  demanded  after  the  combined  armies  of 
McClellan  and  Pope  were  hurled  back  upon  the  Potomac; 
after  Bragg  had  forced  Buell  to  the  Ohio;  and  when  Freder- 
icksburg  had  crowned  six  months  of  success  with  a  victory 
that  inevitably  imposed  a  defensive  attitude  upon  the  North 
during  the  entire  winter? 

When  Chancellorsville  inflicted  a  defeat,  the  most  decisive 


DIGNIFIED   ATTITUDE   OF   ME.  DAVIS.  431 

and  humiliating  of  the  war,  upon  the  North,  there  was  indeed 
no  longer  even  a  pretext,  by  whicn  could  be  disguised  the 
evident  purpose  of  England  not  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  a 
cause  with  which  she  had  no  sympathy,  whatever  her  con 
strained  respect  for  its  champions  and  defenders.  The  loss 
of  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg  in  the  ensuing  summer,  so  pro 
ductive  of  distrust  in  Europe  of  the  Confederate  cause,  was 
quickly  followed  by  developments  which  dispelled  nearly  all 
remaining  hope  of  that  recognition  which  it  was  equally  the 
right  of  the  Confederacy  to  hope,  and  the  duty  of  Europe  to 
render. 

The  attitude  of  the  Confederate  Government,  in  its  relations 
with  European  governments,  was  ever  one  of  imposing  dignity. 
President  Davis  contented  himself  with  calm  and  statesman 
like  presentation  of  the  claims  of  the  cause  which  he  repre 
sented.  His  unanswerable  expositions  of  the  position  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  lucid  discussions  of  international  jurispru 
dence,  never  took  the  semblance  of  supplication,  and  were 
accompanied  by  dignified  remonstrance,  even,  only  when  it 
became  evident  that  the  Confederacy  was  excluded  from  the 
benefits  of  that  policy  which  the  laws  of  nations  and  every 
precedent  demanded.  Hope  of  foreign  assistance  unquestion 
ably  constituted  a  large  share  of  that  confidence  of  success 
which,  until  the  later  stages  of  the  war,  continued  to  animate 
the  South.  Her  people  hoped  for  foreign  aid  in  some  shape, 
because  they  were  confident  of  their  ability  to  demonstrate 
their  right  to  it;  and  they  expected  it  only  when  they  had  de 
monstrated  that  right.  But  never  was  there  any  abatement 
or  relaxation  of  effort  by  the  Confederate  Government  because 
of  this  just  right  and  expectation.  In  the  midst  of  the  most 
cheering  events,  and  when  recognition  appeared  certain,  Pres- 


432  LIFE  OF   JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

ident  Davis  declared  his  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  such 
effort  as  should  secure  independence  without  aid  from  any 
quarter.  In  his  address  to  the  Mississippi  Legislature,  De 
cember,  1862,  from  which  we  have  already  quoted,  he  said: 

"In  the  course  of  this  war  our  eyes  have  been  often  turned 
abroad.  We  have  expected  sometimes  recognition  and  sometimes 
intervention  at  the  hands  of  foreign  nations,  and  we  had  a  right 
to  expect  it.  Never  before,  in  the  history  of  the  world,  had  a 
people  so  long  a  time  maintained  their  ground,  and  showed  them 
selves  capable  of  maintaining  their  national  existence,  without 
securing  the  recognition  of  commercial  nations.  I  know  not  why 
this  has  been  so,  but  this  I  say,  'Put  not  your  trust  in  princes,' 
and  rest  not  your  hopes  on  foreign  nations.  This  war  is  ours; 
we  must  fight  it  out  ourselves;  and  I  feel  some  pride  in  knowing 
that,  so  far,  we  have  done  it  without  the  good-will  of  any  body." 

It  seems,  indeed,  difficult  to  explain  the  course  of  Europe, 
especially  of  England  and  France,  in  the  American  war,  upon 
any  hypothesis  consistent  with  either  courage,  humanity,  or 
the  usages  of  nations.  Delay,  caution,  and  attendance  upon 
results  were  becoming  in  the  beginning;  but,  after  the  defeat 
of  McClellan  upon  the  Chickahominy,  and,  still  more,  at  the 
close  of  operations  in  1862,  they  were  no  longer  exacted  by 
moral  obligation  or  international  comity.  Having  all  the 
attributes  of  an  independent  power — a  power  at  war  with  a 
neighbor,  assailed  by  its  armies,  blockaded  by  its  fleets,  as  had 
been  numerous  other  independent  powers — there  was  nothing 
whatever  anomalous  in  the  situation  of  the  Confederate  States 
forbidding  the  practice  of  plain  justice  towards  them.  Recog 
nition  was  not  only  warranted  by  the  facts  of  the  case,  but  by 
immemorial  usage  in  Europe,  especially  by  the  apposite  prece 
dent  of  the  separation  of  Belgium  from  Holland.  The  exist- 


INJUSTICE   OF   ENGLAND.  433 

ence  of  slavery  in  the  South,  even  though  sanctioned  by  law 
and  the  religious  convictions  of  her  people,  is  an  altogether 
insufficient  explanation  of  a  policy  which  has  exposed  the 
European  great  powers  to  the  suspicion  of  having  been  actu 
ated  by  the  most  unworthy  motives. 

Especially  does  the  course  of  England  seem  indefensible 
towards  a  people,  with  whom  the  war  developed  so  much  of 
common  instinct,  so  many  appeals  of  sympathy  and  evidences 
of  identity  with  herself — a  people  whose  ancestors  were  the 
uncompromising  enemies  of  regicides,  and  had  maintained 
their  loyalty  to  the  crown  of  England  in  spite  of  the  power 
and  threats  of  Cromwell,  whose  Puritan  dominion  New  Eng 
land  acknowledged. 

The  injustice  of  England  did  not  end  with  her  refusal  of 
recognition.  In  the  beginning  she  promptly  proclaimed  "  strict 
neutrality,"  and  her  Premier  declared  the  Confederates  "  bel 
ligerents."  This  phrase,  apparently  a  just  concession  of  the 
declared  independence  of  the  South,  was  gratefully  acknowl 
edged  by  a  struggling  people,  and  evoked  the  fierce  indigna 
tion  of  the  North.  It  was,  however,  designedly  ambiguous, 
and  to  be  interpreted,  philologically  and  practically,  as  the 
prospects  of  the  controversy  or  the  wishes  of  the  Palmerston 
cabinet  might  dictate.  The  English  cabinet  did  not  neces 
sarily  mean  a  recognition  of  a  divided  sovereignty,  justifying 
suspension  of  relations  with  both  sections,  until  the  question 
of  sovereignty  should  be  settled.  The  phrase  "belligerents" 
was  subsequently  declared  to  mean,  merely,  that  the  "two 
sections  were  at  war" — a  fact  which  the  participants  felt  to 
have  already  had  ocular  demonstration.  Meanwhile,  relations 
between  London  and  Washington  were  not  interrupted,  and 
commercial  intercourse  continued  as  before.  But  England  not 
28 


434  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

only  ignored  the  South,  and  denied  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners  a  formal  and  official  audience — her  vessels  respected 
the  Federal  blockade,  while  Confederate  vessels  were  warned 
from  her  coasts.  Such  is  only  a  limited  statement  of  features 
which  made  "English  neutrality"  the  broadest  farce  and  se 
verest  irony  of  the  age.* 

Early  in  1863,  or  late  in  1862,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  pro 
posed  to  England  to  join  France  and  other  powers  in  a  joint 
mediation,  to  suggest  an  armistice  and  a  conference.  This  hu 
mane  proposition  England  refused,  declining  to  take  any  step 
which  might  aid  pacification,  and  thus  did  both  North  and 
South  finally  comprehend  what  was  meant  by  the  "duty  and 
policy  "  of  that  power,  which  had  so  industriously  propagated 
American  dissensions  for  her  own  aggrandizement.  An  edi 
torial  in  the  Richmond  Enquirer,  written,  probably,  by  John 
Mitchel,  pithily  described  the  motives  of  England  in  the  re 
mark  :  "  In  short,  the  North  is  not  yet  bankrupt  enough,  the 
South  not  yet  desolated  enough,  to  suit  the  '  policy '  of  Eng 
land."  France  saved  her  reputation,  upon  the  score  of  humanity 
and  justice,  by  evincing  at  least  a  right  disposition,  though  it  is 
difficult  to  reconcile  her  continued  dalliance  upon  England,  re 
specting  the  American  question,  with  that  bold  policy,  which 
usually  characterizes  the  great  master  of  European  diplomacy. 
France  had,  however,  less  of  interest  and  of  expectation  than 
England,  from  the  dissolution  of  the  Union ;  less  motive  for 
desiring  its  downfall,  and  the  exhaustion  of  both  combatants. 

*  A  sufficient  proof  of  the  injury  done  the  South  by  the  pretended  neu 
trality  of  England  was  the  confession  of  the  British  Foreign  Secretary. 
Said  he :  ''  The  impartial  observance  of  neutral  obligation  by  Her  Maj 
esty's  Government  has  thus  been  exceedingly  advantageous  to  the  cause 
of  the  more  powerful  of  the  two  contending  parties." 


ANTISLAVEKY   LEGISLATION.  435 

Such,  however,  was  the  policy,  adhered  to  by  England  and 
France,  in  defiance  of  legal  and  moral  obligation,  and  to  the 
mortal  injury  of  the  South,  in  her  brave  and  defiant  struggle 
with  that  power,  which  history  may  yet  declare,  the  "great 
powers"  of  Europe  dared  not  defy. 

An  interesting  phase  of  the  war,  in  the  beginning  of  1863, 
was  the  culmination  of  the  policy  of  the  Federal  Government 
respecting  the  subject  of  slavery.  A  brief  space  will  suffice  to 
exhibit  a  record  of  violated  pledges,  of  constitutional  infrac 
tions,  and  abuse  of  power  by  the  Federal  Government,  alto 
gether  unexampled  in  a  war  to  be  hereafter  noted  for  its  arbi 
trary  measures. 

In  the  early  stages  of  the  war  the  North  assumed,  as  the 
justification  of  coercive  measures,  not  only  the  purpose  of  pre 
serving  the  Union,  but  the  relief  of  a  "  loyal  party "  in  the 
South,  who  were  oppressed  by  a  violent  minority  having 
"command  of  the  situation."  Of  this  theory  of  the  war,  as 
waged  by  the  North,  the  conversation  of  President  Lincoln 
with  a  Kentucky  member  of  Congress,  in  the  presence  of  Sen 
ator  Crittenden,  was  sufficiently  declaratory: 

" l  Mr.  Mallory,  this  war,  so  far  as  I  have  any  thing  to  do  with 
it,  is  carried  on  on  the  idea  that  there  is  a  Union  sentiment  in 
those  States,  which,  set  free  from  the  control  now  held  over  it  by 
the  presence  of  the  Confederate  or  rebel  power,  will  be  sufficient 
to  replace  those  States  in  the  Union.  If  I  am  mistaken  in  this, 
if  there  is  no  such  sentiment  there,  if  the  people  of  those  States 
are  determined  with  unanimity,  or  with  a  feeling  approaching 
unanimity,  that  their  States  shall  not  be  members  of  this  Confed 
eracy,  it  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  people  of  the  other  States  to 
force  them  to  remain  in  the  Union ;  and,'  said  he,  '  in  that  con 
tingency — in  the  contingency  that  there  is  not  that  sentiment 


436  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

there— THIS  WAR  IS  NOT  ONLY  AN  ERROR,   IT  IS  A 
CRIME.' " 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  probably  not  a  very  close  student  of  the 
philosophy  of  history,  or  he  would  hardly  have  thus  emphat 
ically  committed  himself  to  a  pledge,  which,  if  observed,  would 
have  inevitably  ended  the  war  in  a  few  weeks.  The  teachings 
of  history  were  valueless,  without  their  unvarying  testimony  to 
the  potency  of  the  sword  of  the  common  enemy  in  healing  the 
divisions  of  an  invaded  country.  It  would  be  difficult,  too, 
to  imagine  what  he  would  have  deemed  that  approximation 
to  unity  in  the  South,  which  would  render  a  further  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war  a  crime.  A  faction  of  "  Union  men,"  trucu 
lent,  treacherous,  and  insidious,  in  their  hostility  to  the  Con 
federate  Government,  unquestionably  existed  in  the  South 
during  the  entire  progress  of  the  war,  but  they  were  few  in 
numbers,  and  their  recognized  leaders  were,  with  hardly  a  sin 
gle  exception,  men  of  abandoned  character,  notoriously  without 
influence,  save  with  their  ignorant  and  unpatriotic  followers. 
But  this  pretense  of  a  Union  party  in  the  South,  which  the 
North,  at  first,  declared  a  majority,  was  conveniently  abandoned, 
when  other  pretexts  were  sought.  In  the  face  of  evidence  not 
to  be  denied,  of  the  profound  and  sincere  purpose  of  separa 
tion,  entertained  by  more  than  seven-eighths  of  the  citizens  of 
the  seceded  States,  the  Northern  conscience  easily  overcame 
its  scruples  as  to  a  war  which  the  Northern  President  had,  by 
anticipation,  pronounced  a  "  Crime." 

Palpable  violations  of  vows  were,  indeed,  marked  character 
istics  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  justified  by  the  facile  and 
pliant  conscience  of  the  North.  The  paramount  purpose  of 
coercion  was  to  maintain  the  authority  and  dignity  of  the  Con 
stitution,  assailed  by  "  rebels  in  arms."  No  theory  was  avowed 


VIOLATIONS   OF  VOWS.  437 

contemplating  any  other  termination  of  the  war,  than  a  sim 
ple  restoration  of  the  "  Union  under  the  Constitution."  The 
assertions  of  the  Northern  press,  and  the  resolutions  of  mass 
meetings  were  re-affirmed  by  the  most  solemn  enactments  of 
the  Federal  Congress,  and  public  declarations  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
that  the  North  sought  merely  to  save  the  Union,  with  the 
form  and  spirit  of  the  Constitution  unimpaired.  In  view  of 
subsequent  events,  it  is  almost  incredible  that  in  Mr.  Lincoln's 
first  inaugural  address  should  be  found  this  passage : 

"  I  declare  that  I  have  no  purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  in 
terfere  with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  States  where  it  exists. 
I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  right  to  do  so,  and  I  have  no  inclina 
tion  to  do  so The  right  of  each  State  to  order  and 

control  its  own  domestic  institutions  according  to  its  own  judg 
ment  exclusively,  is  essential  to  the  balance  of  power  on  which 
the  perfection  and  endurance  of  our  political  fabric  depended." 

Then,  after  the  defeat  at  Bull  -Run,  Congress  passed  the 
following  resolution,  which  was  signed  by  Mr.  Lincoln  as 
President : 

"  Resolved,  That  this  war  is  not  waged  upon  our  part  with  any 
purpose  of  overthrowing  or  interfering  with  the  rights  or  estab 
lished  institutions  of  these  States,  but  to  defend  and  maintain  the 
supremacy  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  preserve  the  Union,  with  all 
the  dignity,  equality,  and  rights  of  the  several  States  unimpaired ; 
that,  as  soon  as  these  objects  are  accomplished,  the  war  ought  to 
cease." 

As  if  to  give  every  possible  form  of  assurance  of  the  legiti 
mate  and  constitutional  objects  of  the  war,  and  leaving  no 
room  for  doubt  in  the  mind  of  posterity,  of  complete  and  un- 


438  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

redeemed   perfidy,   the   Federal   authorities  were  at  especial 
pains  to  declare  their  policy  to  foreign  governments. 

Mr.  Seward,  as  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  State,  in  his  in 
structions  to  Mr.  Dayton,  Minister  to  France,  says : 

"  The  condition  of  slavery  in  the  several  States  will  remain  just 
the  same,  whether  it  (the  rebellion)  succeed  or  fail.  There  is  not 
even  a  pretext  for  the  complaint  that  the  disaffected  States  are 
to  be  conquered  by  the  United  States,  if  the  revolution  fail ;  for 
the  rights  of  the  States,  and  the  condition  of  every  human  being 
in  them,  will  remain  subject  to  exactly  the  same  laws  and  form 
of  administration,  whether  the  revolution  shall  succeed  or  whether 
it  shall  fail." 

There  was  little  room  to  doubt  the  purpose  of  the  North  to 
emancipate  the  slaves  of  the  South,  if  at  any  period  of  the  war 
such  action  could  be  advantageously  taken.  Mr.  Lincoln  al 
ways  manifested  great  timidity  and  reluctance  in  approaching 
the  subject,  and  it  was  observable  that,  at  critical  moments  of 
the  war,  he  courted  the  sympathy  of  the  Democratic  party, 
which  was  opposed  to  the  policy  of  emancipation,  so  impor 
tunately  urged  upon  him  by  the  radical  wing  of  the  Republi 
can  party. 

General  McClellan  had,  with  noble  firmness,  refused  to 
countenance  the  revolutionary  designs  of  the  radical  faction, 
and  his  removal  from  command  after  his  repulse  at  Richmond 
was  the  palpable  and  decisive  triumph  of  the  emancipation 
policy  in  the  sympathies  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  Restored  to  com 
mand,  in  order  that  he  might  save  Washington  from  capture, 
no  other  officer  being  deemed  to  have  the  requisite  ability  and 
confidence  of  the  army,  he  retained  his  position  but  a  few 
weeks  after  that  object  was  accomplished.  By  successive  steps, 


THE   EMANCIPATION    PROCLAMATION.  439 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  finally  brought  to  issue  a  preliminary  procla 
mation  of  emancipation,  in  September,  1862,  which  went  into 
effect  January  1,  1863.  After  the  battle  of  Antietam,  no 
farther  necessity  for  concealment  was  deemed  necessary,  and 
to  the  design  of  subjugation  was  now  added  the  proclaimed 
purpose  to  destroy  the  organic  existence  of  the  States  and  two 
thousand  millions  of  Southern  capital. 

Emancipation  was  justified  by  the  Federal  administration 
as  a  "  military  necessity  " — a  wretched  explanation  from  those 
who  had  boasted  their  ability  to  "exterminate  the  South"  in 
a  few  months.  Since  the  war,  a  claim  of  philanthropy,  as  the 
motive  of  emancipation,  has  been  falsely  asserted.  Reckless 
of  the  fate  of  the  slave,  the  North  sought  only  vengeance 
against  his  master.  In  the  sequel,  each  step  of  despotism  be 
coming  easier  than  its  predecessor,  malice  against  the  master 
has  been  still  the  motive  which  instigated  the  enfranchisement 
of  his  former  slave. 

The  New -Year's  proclamation  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  reaching  the 
Confederacy  at  the  most  auspicious  period  of  its  fortunes,  was 
received  with  evidences  of  just  indignation,  and  of  a  more 
stern  purpose  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  President  Davis 
thus  referred  to  the  subject  in  his  message  to  Congress : 

"  The  public  journals  of  the  North  have  been  received,  contain 
ing  a  proclamation,  dated  on  the  first  day  of  the  present  month, 
signed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  which  he  orders 
and  declares  all  slaves  within  ten  of  the  States  of  the  Confederacy 
to  be  free,  except  such  as  are  found  within  certain  districts  now 
occupied  in  part  by  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  We  may  well 
leave  it  to  the  instincts  of  that  common  humanity  which  a  benefi 
cent  Creator  has  implanted  in  the  breasts  of  our  fellow-men  of  all 
countries  to  pass  judgment  on  a  measure  by  which  several  millions 


440  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSOX   DAVIS. 

of  humaD  beings  of  an  inferior  race — peaceful  and  contented  la 
borers  in  their  sphere — are  doomed  to  extermination,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  they  are  encouraged  to  a  general  assassination  of  their 
masters  by  the  insidious  recommendation  '  to  abstain  from  violence 
unless  in  necessary  self-defense.'  Our  own  detestation  of  those 
who  have  attempted  the  most  execrable  measure  recorded  in  the 
history  of  guilty  man,  is  tempered  by  profound  contempt  for  the 
impotent  rage  which  it  discloses.  So  far  as  regards  the  action  of 
this  Government  on  such  criminals  as  may  attempt  its  execution, 
I  confine  myself  to  informing  you  that  I  shall — unless  in  your 
wisdom  you  deem  some  other  course  more  expedient — deliver  to 
the  several  State  authorities  all  commissioned  officers  of  the  United 
States  that  may  hereafter  be  captured  by  our  forces,  in  any  of  the 
States  embraced  in  the  proclamation,  that  they  may  be  dealt  with 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  those  States  providing  for  the  pun 
ishment  of  criminals  engaged  in  exciting  servile  insurrection. 
The  enlisted  soldiers  I  shall  continue  to  treat  as  unwilling  instru 
ments  in  the  commission  of  these  crimes,  and  shall  direct  their 
discharge  and  return  to  their  homes  on  the  proper  and  usual  pa 
role." 

Mr.  Davis  urged  upon  the  people  the  evidence,  given  by 
this  measure,  of  the  utterly  ruthless  and  unscrupulous  character 
of  the  war  waged  upon  the  South,  and  counseled  the  resolution 
of  "  absolute  and  total  separation  of  these  States  from  tha 
United  States."  The  eloquent  appeals  of  Mr.  Davis  were 
sustained  by  the  united  press  of  the  Confederacy,  and  by  un 
mistakable  indications  of  a  thoroughly  aroused  popular  indig 
nation. 

The  results  of  military  operations,  in  the  winter  months  of 
1863,  were  of  a  character  altogether  favorable  and  re-assuring 
to  the  Confederates.  Movements  on  a  large  scale  were  pre 
vented  by  the  heavy  rains  and  extreme  rigor  of  the  season, 


ATTEMPTS   UPON   VICKSBUEG.  441 

though  there  were  many  incidents  evincing  activity  and  enter 
prise  on  both  sides.  Early  in  January  occurred  the  recapture 
of  Galveston,  Texas,  by  General  Magruder.  This  exploit, 
marked  by  a  display  of  energy,  daring,  and  skill,  was  a  hand 
some  vindication  of  a  most  meritorious  officer,  who,  for  some 
months  previous,  had  suffered  unmerited  censure.  General 
Magruder  had  commanded  a  portion  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  in  the  assault  upon  McClellan,  at  Malvern  Hill. 
The  partial  failure  of  the  attack  secured  the  Federal  retreat, 
and  the  public,  impatient  at  the  check  sustained  at  a  moment 
of  so  much  promise,  visited  an  unwarranted  censure  upon 
Magruder.  President  Davis  acknowledged,  in  a  most  flatter 
ing  letter  to  his  former  classmate,  the  brilliant  achievement 
of  his  command  at  Galveston. 

After  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro',  the  more  important  oper 
ations,  in  the  West,  were  enacted  in  the  State  of  Mississippi. 
The  successful  defense  of  Vicksburg,  in  the  summer  of  1862, 
effectually  closed  the  Mississippi  to  the  Federal  fleets.  To 
reduce  this  stronghold  became  an  object  of  prime  importance 
to  the  Federal  Government,  the  North-western  States  being 
especially  interested  in  securing  the  unobstructed  navigation 
of  the  great  river.  The  Confederate  Government,  equally  ap 
prized  of  the  value  of  Vicksburg,  concentrated  forces  for  its 
defense,  and  made  the  maintenance  of  that  position  one  of  the 
leading  features  of  its  designs  in  the  West. 

A  second  attempt,  under  the  auspices  of  General  Sherman, 
was  made  against  Vicksburg,  in  December,  1862.  The  signal 
failure  attending  this  expedition  brought  upon  Sherman  a  de 
gree  of  reproach,  at  the  North,  in  singular  contrast  with  the 
applause  which  he  received  twelve  months  later.  A  few  weeks 
later,  the  third  attempt  against  Vicksburg  was  undertaken  by 


442  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

General  Grant,  who  sought  to  turn  the  Confederate  defenses, 
through  the  smaller  rivers  connecting  the  Yazoo  and  Missis 
sippi.  This  attempt  was  doomed  to  a  failure  no  less  decided 
and  humiliating  than  that  of  its  predecessor.  On  the  14th  of 
March  the  Confederate  batteries  at  Port  Hudson,  the  lower 
defense  of  the  Mississippi,  repulsed  the  fleet  of  Farragut,  who 
sought,  by  passing  the  batteries,  to  cooperate  with  Porter's 
fleet  above. 

These  repeated  failures  of  the  Federal  demonstrations 
against  the  Confederate  strongholds  on  the  Mississippi,  were 
accepted  as  auspicious  indications  of  continued  successful  de 
fense  in  a  vital  quarter  of  the  Confederacy.  The  loss  of  Ar 
kansas  Post,  with  a  garrison  of  three  thousand  men,  somewhat 
diminished  the  ardor  of  the  congratulation  experienced  by  the 
South  from  the  successes  on  the  Mississippi,  and  General  Beau- 
regard's  signal  defeat  of  the  Federal  fleet  at  Charleston. 

At  the  opening  of  spring,  there  was  wanting  no  indication 
of  the  gigantic  struggle  which  was  to  make  memorable  the 
third  year  of  the  war.  By  common  consent  it  was  declared  that 
this,  if  not  the  last,  would,  at  least,  be  the  decisive  year  of 
the  struggle.  An  imperative  necessity  impelled  the  Federal 
administration  to  the  most  powerful  efforts.  Without  bril 
liant  and  decided  military  results,  the  party  in  opposition  to 
the  war  would  inevitably  gain  possession  of  a  sufficient  num 
ber  of  States,  to  enable  them  to  enter  the  next  Presidential 
contest  with  fair  prospects  of  success.  The  approaching  ex 
piration  of  the  terms  of  service  of  large  numbers  of  his  vet 
eran  troops,  also  impelled  the  enemy  to  early  activity. 

On  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  there  was  apparently 
nothing  left  undone  which  could  increase  the  chances  of  suc 
cess.  This  period  is  remarkable  in  the  history  of  the  war, 


ACTIVITY  OF   THE   CONFEDERATES.  443 

not  less  for  its  auspicious  signs  for  the  Confederacy,  than  for 
the  union  and  cooperation  every-where  observable.  It  was 
equally  a  period  encouraging  hope  and  inviting  effort  to  wring 
from  the  reluctant  North  confession  of  final  defeat,  and  to 
inflict  a  just  punishment  upon  an  enemy,  who  had  but  lately 
proclaimed  his  purpose  to  use  even  the  slaves  of  the  South  for 
the  subjugation  of  her  citizens.  Extraordinary  activity  was 
displayed,  during  the  winter  and  spring,  in  strengthening  the 
army  and  adding  to  its  efficiency,  by  the  execution  of  the  re 
cent  legislation  of  Congress  recommended  by  President  Davis. 
The  utmost  exertions  of  the  Government  were,  of  course,  in 
sufficient  to  strengthen  the  armies  to  the  point  of  equality 
with  the  enormous  array  presented  by  the  enemy  on  every 
theatre  of  operations.  Yet  the  Government,  the  people,  and 
the  army,  with  calmness  and  confidence,  awaited  the  issue,  in 
the  conviction  that  every  preparation  had  been  made  which 
the  resources  of  the  country  admitted. 

Early  in  April,  President  Davis,  in  compliance  with  a  request 
of  Congress,  addressed  an  eloquent  invocation  to  the  coun 
try,  in  behalf  of  the  duties  of  patriotism  at  so  critical  a  moment 
of  the  struggle.  Stating  his  concurrence  in  the  views  of  Con 
gress,  he  declared  his  confidence  in  the  patriotic  disposition  of 
the  people  to  carry  into  effect  the  measures  devised  for  the 
deliverance  of  the  country. 

"Alone,  unaided,"  said  he,  "  we  have  met  and  overthrown 
the  most  formidable  combinations  of  naval  and  military  arma 
ments  that  the  lust  of  conquest  ever  gathered  together  for  the 
conquest  of  a  free  people.  We  began  this  struggle  without  a 
single  gun  afloat,  while  the  resources  of  our  enemy  enabled 
them  to  gather  fleets  which,  according  to  their  official  list, 
published  in  August  last,  consisted  of  four  hundred  and  thirty- 


444  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

seven  vessels,  measuring  eight  hundred  and  forty  thousand 
and  eighty-six  tons,  and  carrying  three  thousand  and  twenty- 
six  guns To  oppose  invading  forces  composed 

of  levies  which  have  already  exceeded  thirteen  hundred  thou 
sand  men,  we  had  no  resources  but  the  unconquerable  valor 
of  a  people  determined  to  be  free." 

Mr.  Davis  alluded  encouragingly  to  the  immediate  prospects 
of  the  war : 

"  Your  devotion  and  patriotism  have  triumphed  over  all  these 
obstacles,  and  calling  into  existence  the  munitions  of  war,  the 
clothing  and  the  subsistence,  which  have  enabled  our  soldiers  to 
illustrate  their  valor  on  numerous  battle-fields,  and  to  inflict  crush 
ing  defeats  on  successive  armies,  each  of  which  our  arrogant  foe 
fondly  imagined  to  be  invincible. 

"  The  contrast  between  our  past  and  present  condition  is  well 
calculated  to  inspire  full  confidence  in  the  triumph  of  our  arms. 
At  no  previous  period  of  the  war  have  our  forces  been  so  numer 
ous,  so  well  organized,  and  so  thoroughly  disciplined,  armed,  and 
equipped,  as  at  present.  The  season  of  high  water,  on  which  our 
enemies  relied  to  enable  their  fleet  of  gunboats  to  penetrate  into 
our  country  and  devastate  our  homes,  is  fast  passing  away ;  yet 
our  strongholds  on  the  Mississippi  still  bid  defiance  to  the  foe,  and 
months  of  costly  preparation  for  their  reduction  have  been  spent 
in  vain.  Disaster  has  been  the  result  of  their  every  effort  to  turn 
or  storm  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  as  well  as  every  attack  on 
our  batteries  on  the  Red  River,  the  Tallahatchie,  and  other  navi 
gable  streams." 

In  this  address*  President  Davis  did  not  fail  to  rebuke  that 
tendency  to  excessive  confidence  from  which  relaxed  exertion  is 
ever  apt  to  follow.  Albeit  he  has  been  so  freely  charged 
with  entertaining  excessive  confidence  himself,  and  encouraging 


THE   QUESTION   OF   FOOD.  445 

others  to  share  his  over-sanguine  and  exaggerated  hopes,  he 
yet  never  lost  an  opportunity  of  rebuking  it  as  a  dangerous 
error. 

The  most  important  feature  of  the  address  is  the  earnest 
and  admonitory  appeal,  for  immediate  exertion,  to  obviate 
the  difficulty  of  obtaining  supplies  for  the  army,  already 
becoming  a  question  of  alarming  concern.  Mr.  Davis  even 
then  avowed  his  conviction  that,  in  such  a  contest  as  the  war 
had  then  become,  the  question  of  food  was  the  "  one  danger 
which  the  Government  of  your  choice  regards  with  apprehen 
sion."  Earnestly  appealing  to  the  "  never-failing  patriotism  " 
of  the  land,  he  said :  "  Your  country,  therefore,  appeals  to  you 
to  lay  aside  all  thought  of  gain,  and  to  devote  yourselves  to 
securing  your  liberties,  without  which  these  gains  would  be 
valueless." 

Keminding  the  country  of  embarrassments,  already  encoun 
tered,  he  indicated  the  only  method  of  avoiding  similar  diffi 
culties  in  future : 

"  Let  your  fields  be  devoted  exclusively  to  the  production  of 
corn,  oats,  beans,  peas,  potatoes,  and  other  food  for  man  and  beast. 
Let  corn  be  sowed  broadcast,  for  fodder,  in  immediate  proximity 
to  railroads,  rivers  and  canals  ;  and  let  all  your  efforts  be  directed 
to  the  prompt  supply  of  these  articles  in  the  districts  where  our 
armies  are  operating.  You  will  then  add  greatly  to  their  efficiency, 
and  furnish  the  means  without  which  it  is  impossible  to  make 
those  prompt  and  active  movements  which  have  hitherto  stricken 
terror  into  our  enemies  and  secured  our  most  brilliant  triumphs." 

Those  who  witnessed  the  operation  of  causes  which  event 
ually  brought  the  country  to  the  verge  of  starvation,  and  made 
Lee's  army — whose  proud  array  of  "tattered  uniforms  and 


446  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

bright  muskets"  had  never  yet  yielded  to  the  onset  of  the 
enemy — the  victim  of  famine,  can  attest  the  fidelity  of  this 
graphic  and  prophetic  sketch : 

"  It  is  known  that  the  supply  of  meat  throughout  the  country 
is  sufficient  for  the  support  of  all ;  but  the  distances  are  so  great, 
the  condition  of  the  roads  has  been  so  bad  during  the  five  months 
of  winter  weather,  through  which  we  have  just  passed,  and  the 
attempt  of  groveling  speculators  to  forestall  the  market,  and  make 
money  out  of  the  life-blood  of  our  defenders,  have  so  much  in 
fluenced  the  withdrawal  from  sale  of  the  surplus  in  hands  of  the 
producers,  that  the  Government  has  been  unable  to  gather  full 
supplies. 

"  The  Secretary  of  War  has  prepared  a  plan,  which  is  appended 
to  this  address,  by  the  aid  of  which,  or  some  similar  means  to  be 
adopted  by  yourselves,  you  can  assist  the  officers  of  the  Govern 
ment  in  the  purchase  of  the  corn,  the  bacon,  the  pork,  and  the 
beef  known  to  exist  in  large  quantities  in  different  parts  of  the 
country.  Even  if  the  surplus  be  less  than  believed,  is  it  not  a 
bitter  and  humiliating  reflection  that  those  who  remain  at  home, 
secure  from  hardship,  and  protected  from  danger,  should  be  in  the 
enjoyment  of  abundance,  and  that  their  slaves  also  should  have  a 
full  supply  of  food,  while  their  sons,  brothers,  husbands,  and  fathers 
are  stinted  in  the  rations  upon  which  their  health  and  efficiency 
depend?" 

The  concluding  paragraph  of  this  address,  so  remarkable  for 
its  eloquence,  and  for  its  frank  and  powerful  statement  of  the 
condition  and  necessities  of  the  Confederacy,  in  one  of  the 
most  thrilling  moments  of  its  fate,  is  as  follows  : 

"  Entertaining  no  fear  that  you  will  either  misconstrue  the  mo 
tives  of  this  address,  or  fail  to  respond  to  the  call  of  patriotism,  I 


CHANCELLORSVILLE.  447 

have  placed  the  facts  fully  and  frankly  before  you.  Let  us  all 
unite  in  the  performance  of  our  duty,  each  in  his  sphere ;  and  with 
concerted,  persistent,  and  well  directed  effort,  there  seems  little 
reason  to  doubt  that,  under  the  blessings  of  Him  to  whom  we 
look  for  guidance,  and  who  has  been  to  us  our  shield  and  strength, 
we  shall  maintain  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  the  Confed 
erate  States,  and  transmit  to  our  posterity  the  heritage  bequeathed 
to  us  by  our  fathers." 

Late  in  March,  General  Lee  intimated  his  convictions,  to 
the  Government,  of  an  early  resumption  of  active  movements 
by  the  enemy.  The  disparity  between  the  main  armies  in 
Virginia  was  even  greater  than  in  previous  campaigns.  Gen 
eral  Hooker,  the  Federal  commander,  had,  under  his  immediate 
direction,  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  men,  while  General 
Lee — in  consequence  of  the  necessary  withdrawal  of  Longstreet, 
with  two  divisions,  to  meet  a  threatened  movement  by  the 
enemy  from  the  south  of  James  River,  and  to  secure  the  sup 
plies  of  an  abundant  section,  open  to  Federal  incursions — had 
less  than  fifty  thousand.*  But  Lee  manifested  his  character 
istic  confidence  and  self-possession  in  the  presence  of  the  per 
ilous  crisis.  Having  adequately  represented  the  situation  to 

*  General  Lee  stated  the  proportion  of  the  Federal  strength  to  his  own 
as  ten  to  three.  Mr.  Swinton  states  Hooker's  force  at  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  infantry,  twelve  thousand  cavalry,  and  four  hundred 
guns.  Lee's  effective  force  was  considerably  less  than  fifty  thousand. 

The  absence  of  Longstreet  was  severely  felt  by  General  Lee  in  his 
operations  against  Hooker.  The  presence  of  a  force  was  absolutely  in 
dispensable  upon  the  south  side  of  James  River,  in  the  early  spring,  to 
meet  the  formidable  Federal  force  in  the  neighborhood  of  Suffolk.  An 
impression,  altogether  erroneous,  however,  prevailed,  that  Longstreet's  de 
tention  from  Lee  was  caused  by  President  Davis.  The  President  event 
ually  ordered  Longstreet  to  Lee,  after  his  delay  at  Richmond. 


448  LIFE  OF  JEFFEHSON    DAVIS. 

his  Government,  he  was  aware  of  the  cordial  cooperation,  to 
the  extent  of  its  ability,  which  had  been  extended.  During 
the  suspension  of  active  hostilities,  his  every  wish  for  the  in 
creased  efficiency  of  his  command  was  promptly  fulfilled,  and 
at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  he  lacked  no  element  of  read 
iness,  save  numbers,  that  which  the  country  could  not  supply, 
and  of  the  absence  of  which,  Lee,  therefore,  never  complained. 
In  every  other  element  of  efficiency,  the  army  of  Northern 
Virginia  was  never  in  better  condition,  than  when  it  eagerly 
awaited  the  advance  of  Hooker  across  the  Rappahannock. 

The  battle  of  Chancellorsville  is  memorable  as  the  most 
decisive  triumph  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
from  the  mournful  incident  of  the  extinction  of  that  noble  life 
which  was  identified  with  its  highest  glory.  The  culmination 
of  Lee's  superb  strategy,  the  most  splendid  illustration  of  his 
master-genius,  was  sadly  emphasized  by  the  irreparable  loss 
of  Stonewall  Jackson. 

Commemorating,  by  a  letter  of  special  thanks  to  the  army, 
a  victory  which  baffled  the  most  perilous  and  boastful  attempt 
yet  made  upon  the  Confederate  capital,  President  Davis  shared 
the  grief  of  a  stricken  country  for  the  loss  of  one  of  its  most 
illustrious  champions.  In  that  procession  of  mourners  which 
followed,  through  the  streets  of  Richmond,  the  bier  of  the 
fallen  hero,  there  was  not  one  who  felt  anguish  more  acute 
than  that  of  the  chief  who  had  so  honored  and  sustained 
Jackson  when  living.* 

*  "Of  Stonewall  Jackson,  Mr.  Davis  spoke  with  the  utmost  tenderness, 
and  some  touch  of  reverential  feeling,  bearing  witness  to  his  earnest  and 
pathetic  piety,  his  singleness  of  aim,  his  immense  energy  as  an  executive 
officer,  and  the  loyalty  of  his  nature,  making  obedience  the  first  of  all 
duties He  had  the  faculty,  or,  rather,  gift  of  exciting  and 


DAVIS*   TRIBUTE   TO   JACKSON.  449 

holding  the  love  and  confidence  of  his  men  to  an  unbounded  degree,  even 
though  the  character  of  his  campaigning  imposed  on  them  more  hard 
ships  than  on  any  other  troops  in  the  service.  Good  soldiers  care  not  for 
their  individual  sacrifices,  when  adequate  results  can  be  shown,  and  these 

General  Jackson  never  lacked 'For  glory  he  lived  long 

enough,'  continued  Mr.  Davis,  with  much  emotion;  'and  if  this  result  had 
to  come,  it  was  the  Divine  mercy  that  removed  him.  He  fell  like  the  eagle, 
his  own  feather  on  the  shaft  that  was  dripping  with  his  life-blood.  In  his 
death,  the  Confederacy  lost  an  eye  and  arm;  our  only  consolation  being 
that  the  final  summons  could  have  reached  no  soldier  more  prepared  to 
accept  it  joyfully.' " — Cravens  Prison  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  pp.  180,  181. 


29 


450  LIFE  OF  JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    XV. 

CONFEDERATE  PROSPECTS  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLCRSVILLE THE  MIL 
ITARY    SITUATION PRIMARY    OBJECTS    OF    THE    CONFEDERATES AFFAIRS    IN 

THE  WEST A  BRIEF  CONSIDERATION  OF  SEVERAL  PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  SUG 
GESTED  TO  THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES VISIONARY  STRATEGY AN  OF 
FENSIVE  CAMPAIGN  ADOPTED THE  INVASION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  JUSTIFIED 

CONDITION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA  AT  THIS  PERIOD — THE 
MOVEMENT  FROM  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK LEADING  FEATURES  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERATE  PLAN LEE'S  STRATEGY  AGAIN  ILLUSTRATED GETTYSBURG A  FATAL 

BLOW  TO  THE  SOUTH LEE   RETURNS  TO  VIRGINIA — THE  SURRENDER  OF  VICKS- 

BURG OTHER    REVERSES EXULTATION    OF    THE  NORTH THE  CONFEDERATE 

ADMINISTRATION  AGAIN  ARRAIGNED  BY  ITS  OPPONENTS THE  CASE  OF  GEN 
ERAL  PEMBERTON POPULAR  INJUSTICE  TO  A  GALLANT  OFFICER A  BRIEF 

REVIEW    OF    THE    SUBJECT PEMBERTON's    APPOINTMENT    RECOMMENDED    BY 

DISTINGUISHED    OFFICERS HIS    ABLE    ADMINISTRATION    IN    MISSISSIPPI HIS 

RESOLUTION  TO  HOLD  VICKSBURG,  AS  THE  GREAT  END  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN — • 
HIS  GALLANTRY  AND  RESOURCES NOBLE  CONDUCT  OF  THIS  PERSECUTED  OF 
FICER A  FURTHER  STATEMENT THE  MISSION  OF  VICE-PRESIDENT  STEPHENS 

ITS  OBJECTS PRESIDENT  DAVIS  SEEKS  TO  ALLEVIATE  THE  SUFFERINGS   OF 

WAR MAGNANIMITY    AND    HUMANITY    OF    THE    OFFER PROUD    POSITION    IN 

THIS  MATTER  OF  THE  SOUTH   AND  HER  RULER THE    FEDERAL    GOVERNMENT 

DECLINES  INTERCOURSE  WITH  MR.    STEPHENS EXPLANATION  OF  ITS  MOTIVES 

CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  MESSRS.    DAVIS  AND  STEPHENS. 

r  I  HIE  situation  of  affairs,  so  eminently  favorable  to  the  Con- 
-•-  federacy,  after  the  victory  of  Chancellorsville,  admitted  no 
doubt  that  the  opportune  occasion  would  be  promptly  seized , 
for  the  delivery  of  a  telling  blow,  which  should  hasten  an  ac 
knowledgment  of  Southern  independence.  A  brief  summary 
of  the  military  situation,  at  the  opening  of  summer,  1863,  will 


A  FAVORABLE  SITUATION.  451 

show  the  simple  and  judicious  policy,  by  which  the  Confed 
erate  administration  proposed  to  make  efficient  use  of  its  ad 
vantages. 

The  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  followed  by  the  disorganized 
retreat  of  the  largest  force  yet  consolidated  for  the  capture  of 
Richmond,  and  the  signal  failure  of  an  attempt,  which,  at  its 
outset,  the  North  declared  to  be  conclusive  of  the  fate  of  the 
Confederacy,  secured  the  safety  of  the  Confederate  capital,  at 
least,  until  another  campaign  could  be  organized.  Moreover, 
it  tendered  to  the  Confederate  authorities  the  choice  of  a  vig 
orous  oifensive,  holding  out  tempting  inducements;  or  a  de 
tachment  of  a  portion  of  Lee's  army  for  the  relief  of  other 
sections  of  the  Confederacy.  With  two-thirds  of  his  own 
force,  Lee  had  repulsed  and  crippled  the  enormous  army  of 
Hooker,  and  it  appeared  reasonably  certain,  that  the  same 
force  could  maintain  a  successful  defensive,  while  the  segment, 
or  its  equivalent,  which  was  absent  at  Chancellors ville,  might 
be  sent,  for  a  temporary  purpose,  to  Bragg,  in  Tennessee,  or 
to  the  relief  of  Pemberton  in  Vicksburg. 

At  the,  opening  of  spring  the  primary  objects  of  the  Con 
federacy  were  the  safety  of  Richmond,  the  safety  of  Vicks 
burg — the  key  to  its  tenure  of  the  Mississippi  Valley — and 
the  holding  of  its  defensive  line  in  Middle  and  East  Tennes 
see,  the  barrier  between  the  enemy  and  the  vitals  of  the  Con 
federacy.  The  first  of  these  objects  was  amply  secured  by  the 
victory  of  Chancellorsville,  leaving  to  the  main  Confederate 
army,  its  own  choice  of  the  field  of  future  operations. 

In  the  Western  Department,  commanded  since  December, 
1862,  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  the  situation  was  less 
promising,  though  by  no  means  forbidding  hope  of  a  favora 
ble  solution.  General  Bragg  maintained  a  somewhat  precari- 


452  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ous  defensive  against  Rosecrans,  who  confronted  the  Confed 
erate  commander,  with  an  army  much  larger  than  that  with 
which  he  had  fought  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro'.  General 
Pemberton,  after  a  series  of  actions,  had  retired  within  the 
lines  of  Vicksburg,  where  he  was  closely  besieged  by  General 
Grant  with  a  numerous  army — the  Federal  fleet  in  the  river, 
meanwhile,  continuing  its  bombardment.  The  characteristic 
stubbornness  of  Grant,  aided  by  his  ample  force,  made  evident 
the  ultimate  fate  of  Vicksburg  and  Pemberton's  army,  either 
by  famine,  or  the  assaults  of  the  enemy,  unless  succor  should 
come  in  the  shape  of  a  demonstration  against  the  besieging 
army,  with  which  the  garrison  might  be  expected  to  cooperate. 
Not  long  after  Pemberton's  retirement  into  Vicksburg,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  reached  Mississippi  and  began  the  collection  of 
a  force,  by  which  it  was  expected  that  the  besieged  stronghold 
and  its  garrison  would  be  relieved. 

But  while  the  situation  in  the  West  thus  seemed  to  invite 
the  presence  of  a  portion  of  tne  army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
relieved  of  any  immediate  danger  from  its  antagonist,  there 
were  cogent  considerations  in  behalf  of  another  policy  which 
was  adopted.  Two  weeks,  at  least,  would  have  been  required, 
in  the  indifferent  condition  of  the  Southern  railroads,  for  the 
transportation  of  a  force  from  Virginia,  competent  to  enable 
Bragg  to  assume  the  aggressive.  A  much  longer  period  would 
have  been  required  to  transfer  to  Jackson,  such  a  force  as 
General  Johnston  would  have  deemed  sufficient  to  justify  an 
attack  upon  Grant.  Besides,  the  government  was  fully  satis 
fied,  that  the  reinforcements  sent  to  Johnston  would  soon  ena 
ble  him  to  make  an  effective  demonstration  against  the  be 
sieging  army,  which,  sustained  by  a  simultaneous  attack  by 
Pemberton  in  front,  would  have  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success. 


PLANS  OF   CAMPAIGN.  453 

The  project  of  a  direct  reinforcement  to  Johnston,  from  Lee's 
army,  was  speedily  abandoned,  and  the  more  practicable  plan 
of  reenforcing  Bragg  was  also  dismissed.  Nothing  whatever 
was  to  be  expected  from  a  victory  by  Bragg  over  Eosecrans, 
unless  it  could  be  made  a  decisive  victory,  ensuring  either  the 
destruction  of  the  Federal  army,  or  the  complete  abandonment 
of  its  advanced  line  in  Tennessee,  for  which  it  had  paid  such 
heavy  toll.  Such  a  result,  necessitating  the  reenforcement  of 
Eosecrans  from  Grant,  meanwhile,  after  the  victory  had  been 
won,  troops  being  sent  to  Johnston  from  Bragg,  was  indeed 
brilliant  to  contemplate.  Or  there  was  another  prospect 
equally  agreeable.  When  Eosecrans  had  been  defeated  troops 
might  be  sent  to  capture  Fort  Pillow,  on  the  Mississippi, 
which,  cutting  off  Grant's  supplies  from  the  North,  as  did  Port 
Hudson  from  the  South,  would  compel  the  Federal  army  at 
Vicksburg  to  fight  for  its  subsistence,  and  under  most  discour 
aging  circumstances.  In  addition  to  these  prospects,  there  .was 
also  the  choice  of  a  movement  for  the  complete  redemption  of 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 

These  brilliant  designs  of  a  visionary  and  vaporing  strategy, 
abundant  in  the  Confederacy  during  the  war,  and  now  osten 
tatiously  paraded  by  the  cheap  wisdom  of  retrospection,  lacked, 
however,  the  essential  feature  of  practicability.  To  have  reen- 
forced  Bragg  sufficiently  from  Lee's  army,  to  have  enabled  him 
to  undertake  the  offensive,  with  any  prospect  of  the  complete 
success  necessary,  would  have  weakened  the  army  in  Virginia 
to  such  an  extent,  as  to  seriously  endanger  Eichmond.  Even 
though  Bragg  were  thus  sufficiently  reenforced  to  defeat  a  nu 
merous  army,  led  by  an  able  commander,  and  occupying  a  po 
sition  of  great  strength,  a  full  month  would  have  been  required 
to  accomplish  the  results  indicated.  Waiving  all  consideration 


454  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

of  the  incertitude  of  battle,  and  assuming  that  success  would 
attend  every  movement  of  the  Confederate  army,  what  reason 
able  calculation  would  enable  Bragg  to  have  gotten  his  forces 
in  readiness,  and  marched  them  either  into  Kentucky  to  Fort 
Pillow,  or  to  Jackson,  in  time  to  have  saved  Vicksburg  ?  But, 
apart  from  the  folly  of  so  weakening  Lee,  as  to  endanger  Rich 
mond  (which  would  have  been  immediately  assailed  by  Hooker, 
with  his  command  of  ninety  thousand  men,  in  cooperation  with 
the  forces  at  Suffolk,  Fortress  Monroe,  and  Winchester — an  ag 
gregate  of  more  than  forty  thousand  more),  to  undertake  oper 
ations  so  doubtful  and  hazardous,  was  the  consideration  of  the 
promising  inducements  for  an  offensive  campaign  in  the  East. 

President  Davis  and  General  Lee  were  concurrent  in  their 
convictions  of  the  wisdom  of  a  campaign  which  should  drive 
the  enemy  from  Virginia,  locate  the  army  in  an  abundant  and 
hostile  country,  and  compensate  for  any  disasters  which  might 
be  sustained  in .  the  West,  by  an  overwhelming  defeat  in  the 
enemy's  country  of  his  main  army,  which  at  once  covered  his 
capital,  and  the  approaches  to  his  large  cities. 

This  bold  and  brilliant  conception  was  equally  justified  by 
the  situation,  and  consistent  with  that  able  military  policy 
which  was  throughout  characteristic  of  the  Confederate  au 
thorities,  and  based  upon  the  only  theory  on  which  a  weak 
power  can  be  successfully  defended  against  invasion. 

The  strategic  theory  which  dictated  the  invasion  of  Penn 
sylvania  was  that  of  the  "defensive,  with  offensive  returns," 
made  forever  famous  by  its  triumphant  practice  by  Frederick 
the  Great — the  favorite  theory  of  Napoleon — not  less  signally 
illustrated  by  Jackson's  Valley  campaign,  and  grandly  exe 
cuted  by  Lee  in  his  irresistible  onset  upon  Pope. 

Twitted  by  the  newspapers  for  their  infatuation  with  the 


AN   OFFENSIVE   DEMANDED.  455 

defensive  attitude,  and  condemned  by  the  voice  of  the  public, 
for  the  maintenance  of  a  policy  which  continually  subjected 
the  soil  of  the  South  to  the  devastations  of  the  enemy,  the 
Confederate  authorities,  neither  in  the  invasion  of  Maryland, 
in  1862,  nor  in  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  yielded  merely 
to  public  clamor.  In  both  instances  President  Davis  and 
General  Lee  were  governed  by  the  sound  military  considera 
tions,  which  in  each  case  justified  the  assumption  of  the  offen 
sive.  Nothing  is  more  universally  conceded  than  the  ultimate 
subjection  of  a  people  who  permit  themselves  to  be  forced 
always  on  the  defensive.  On  the  other  hand,  no  blows  have 
been  so  telling  in  warfare,  as  those  delivered  by  an  antagonist 
who,  lately  on  the  defensive,  at  the  opportune  moment,  when 
the  foe  is  stunned  by  defeat,  assumes  a  skillful  and  vigorous 
offensive. 

It  was  now  the  third  year  of  the  war,  and  for  more  than 
twelve  months  no  considerable  success  had  rewarded  the  enor 
mous  sacrifices  and  expenditures  of  the  North.  The  fluctuating 
sentiment,  characteristic  of  that  section,  had  settled  down  into 
a  feeling  of  indifference  and  distrust,  beyond  which  there  was 
but  one  step  to  the  abandonment  of  the  war  as  a  hopeless  ex 
periment.  The  evident  apprehension,  by  the  Federal  Govern^ 
ment,  of  an  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  attended  by  a  ruinous 
defeat  of  Hooker's  army,  a  result  which  both  sides  considered 
probable,  plainly  demonstrated,  that  the  virtual  termination  of 
the  war  would  be  the  reward  of  a  successful  assumption  of  the 
offensive  by  the  Confederates. 

A  more  favorable  conjuncture,  for  a  final  trial  with  its  old 
antagonist,  could  not  have  been  desired  by  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia.  The  invincible  veterans  of  Longstreet,  oftener 
victors  than  the  Tenth  Legion  of  Ccesar,  had  rejoined  their 


456  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

companions,  who  boasted  the  additional  honors  of  Chancellors- 
ville.  Reinforcements  from  other  quarters  were  added,*  and 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  a  compact  and  puissant  force, 
seventy  thousand  strong,  which  had  never  yet  known  defeat, 
instinctively  expected  the  order  for  advance  into  the  enemy's 
country.  Never  was  the  morale  of  the  army  so  high,  never 
had  it  such  confidence  in  its  own  prowess,  and  in  the  resources 
of  its  great  commander,  and  never  was  intrusted  to  its  valor  a 
mission  so  grateful  to  its  desires,  as  that  tendered  by  President 
Davis,  "  to  force  the  enemy  to  fight  for  their  own  capital  and 
homes." 

Under  Lee  were  trusted  lieutenants,  whose  fame,  like  that 
of  their  followers,  was  world-wide,  and  whose  laurels  were  a 
part  of  the  unnumbered  triumphs  of  the  matchless  valor  of 
that  noble  army.  Longstreet,  the  Lannes  of  the  South,  was 
again  at  the  head  of  his  trained  corps — the  assembled  chivalry 
of  the  South,  in  whose  exploits  every  State  of  the  Confederacy 
claimed  a  glory  peculiarly  its  own.  The  bronzed  veterans  of 
Jackson,  who  had  shared  the  glory  of  their  immortal  leader 
from  Manassas  to  Chancellorsville,  now  followed  Ewell,  the 
maimed  hero,  whom  Jackson  had  named  as  his  successor. 
Under  Hill,  the  youngest  of  the  corps  commanders,  were  men 
worthy  of  a  leader  who,  in  twelve  months,  had  filled  the  suc 
cessive  grades  from  Colonel  to  Lieutenant  General.  The  cav 
alry  was  still  intrusted  to  Stuart,  that  bold,  able  chief,  and 
"  rarely  gallant  and  noble  gentleman,  well  supporting  by  his 
character  the  tradition  that  royal  blood  flowed  in  his  veins." 
With  such  leaders,  and  with  thoroughly  tried  and  efficient 
subordinate  officers,  improved  transportation,  equipment  and 
clothing,  and  with  numbers  approaching  nearer  an  equality 
*  Chiefly  conscripts. 


CONFEDERATE    DESIGNS.  457 

with  the  Federal  army,  than  at  any  other  period,  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  no  more  doubted,  than  did  its  commander 
and  the  Government,  that  it  was  at  the  outset  of  a  campaign 
brilliant  and  decisive  beyond  parallel  in  its  history. 

About  the  middle  of  May,  General  Lee  visited  Richmond, 
when  the  general  features  of  the  campaign  were  determined. 
The  movement  from  the  camps  near  Fredericksburg  and  the 
Rapidan,  commenced  early  in  June.  The  incipient  feature  of 
General  Lee's  plan  was  a  flank  movement,  while  still  con 
fronted  by  the  army  of  the  enemy — perhaps  the  most  delicate 
and  difficult  problem  in  war — by  which,  leaving  the  south 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  he  sought  to  draw  the  Federal 
army  away  from  its  position.  To  meet  the  contingency  of  a 
movement  by  the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  Richmond,  A.  P. 
Hill,  with  his  corps  d'armee,  was  left  near  Fredericksburg. 
That  skillful  officer  ably  executed  his  instructions,  checking 
the  Federal  demonstrations  near  his  lines,  and  concealing  the 
absence  of  the  main  body  of  the  army  until  the  advance  was 
well  under  way.  General  Stuart  fully  performed  his  impor 
tant  part  of  covering  the  movements  of  the  infantry,  by  seiz 
ing  the  mountain  passes,  and  detaining  the  advance  of  the 
enemy,  in  the  execution  of  which  he  fought  several  fierce  cav 
alry  engagements,  winning  them  all  with  inferior  forces.  The 
army  was  marched  through  an  abundant  country,  not  deso 
lated  by  war,  and  affording  good  roads.  Important  incidents 
of  the  advance  were  the  capture  of  Winchester,  Berry  ville,  and 
Martinsburg,  by  the  forces  of  Ewell,  with  their  garrisons,  aggre 
gating  seven  thousand  men,  and  considerable  material  of  war. 

These  brilliant  results  of  Lee's  strategy  were  accomplished 
with  wonderful  regularity  and  promptitude,  and  were  attended 
with  inconsiderable  loss. 


458  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Crossing  the  Potomac,  the  second  stage  of  the  campaign  was 
the  occupation  of  Western  Maryland — the  least  friendly  section 
of  the  State — where  the  army  could  be  abundantly  supplied, 
and  the  important  objects  of  destroying  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  and  the  Cumberland  Canal,  so  valuable  to  the  ene 
my,  could  be  accomplished.  The  next  step  was  to  advance 
into  Pennsylvania,  capturing  large  supplies  much  needed  by 
the  army,  occupying  several  large  towns  of  that  State,  and 
destroying  communications — meanwhile  the  army  living  on 
the  enemy,  and  kept  well  in  hand  for  a  general  engagement, 
whenever  battle  could  be  advantageously  offered.  In  the  execu 
tion  of  this  portion  of  the  plan,  an  extensive  and  fertile  section 
of  Pennsylvania  was  occupied,  strong  detachments  were  pushed 
far  into  the  interior,  and  a  movement  against  Harrisburg  was 
in  preparation,  when  the  advance  of  the  Federal  army  induced 
General  Lee  to  concentrate  his  forces  for  battle. 

The  consummate  strategy  of  Lee  had  now  made  him  appa 
rently  master  of  the  situation,  and  gave  him  the  option  of  ten 
dering  or  declining  a  grand  and  decisive  engagement.  It  is 
impossible  to  overestimate  the  generalship,  which,  within  twen 
ty-five  days,  had  transferred  an  army,  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy,  from  the  Rappahannock  to  the  interior  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  making  large  captures  en  route,  and  inflicting  heavy 
damage  upon  the  Federal  communications,  without  being  even 
momentarily  arrested.  Never  once  had  been  relaxed  the  grasp 
of  that  master-hand  which  controlled  the  army  in  all  its  move 
ments.  Its  various  parts,  within  easy  supporting  distance, 
were  clearly  so  disposed,  as  to  be  readily  assembled,  to  meet 
the  exigency  that  was  inevitable.  When  Lee  drew  in  his 
several  columns  around  Gettysburg,  the  South  confident  in  the 
invincibility  of  the  army,  and  in  the  genius  of  its  leader,  never 


GETTYSBURG.  459 

doubted  the  issue  of  the  grand  trial  of  arms  which  was  at  hand. 
With  more  than  apprehension  the  North  awaited  the  fate  of 
the  army,  upon  which  its  last  hope  of  security  rested.  A  de 
feat  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  now  would  signify,  not  a 
check  in  a  boastful  advance  upon  Richmond,  but  the  capture 
of  Washington,  the  presence  of  the  avenging  columns  of  Lee 
upon  the  banks  of  the  Delaware — perhaps  of  the  dreaded 
Stuart  upon  the  Hudson. 

It  was  contemplated  that  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania 
would  result  in  a  decisive  battle.  Indeed,  that  result  was  in 
evitable,  unless  the  Federal  authorities  should  unresistingly 
submit  to  the  invasion — an  event  not  for  a  moment  to  be  an 
ticipated.  But  a  vital  feature  in  the  theory  of  the  invasion 
was  that  the  position  of  Lee  would  necessitate  an  advance 
against  him  by  the  Federal  commander,  leaving  to  Lee  the 
choice  of  time  and  place  for  giving  battle.  The  calculation 
was  that  Lee  would  be  master  of  the  situation  at  all  times, 
as  indeed  he  undoubtedly  was  until  the  engagement  of  Gettys 
burg  was  joined.  We  are  not  here  at  liberty  to  discuss  the 
details  of  that  battle,  or  to  consider  how  far  it  was  a  depart 
ure  from,  or  in  pursuance  of  the  original  design  of  the  Confed 
erate  campaign.*  If  competent  criticism  shall  condenmn  the 

*It  has  been  generally  assumed  that  General  Lee  committed  grave  er 
rors  at  Gettysburg.  The  following  explanation  by  Lee  shows  the  extreme 
caution  with  which  such  a  judgment  should  be  pronounced :  "  It  had  not 
been  intended  to  fight  a  general  battle  at  such  distance  from  our  base  unless 
attacked  by  the  enemy ;  but,  finding  ourselves  unexpectedly  confronted  by 
the  Federal  army,  it  became  a  matter  of  difficulty  to  withdraw  through 
the  mountains  with  our  large  trains.  At  the  same  time,  the  country  was 
unfavorable  for  collecting  supplies,  while  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy's 
main  body,  as  he  was  enabled  to  restrain  our  foraging  parties  by  occu 
pying  the  passes  of  the  mountains  with  regular  and  local  troops.  A  bat- 


460  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tactics  of  Lee  at  Gettysburg,  he  has  yet  disarmed  censure  by 
the  surpassing  magnanimity  with  which  he  assumed  the  re 
sponsibility. 

The  great  joy  of  the  North  did  not  exaggerate  the  terrible 
blow  sustained  by  the  Confederacy  in  the  failure  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  campaign.  It  was  the  last  serious  demonstration  upon 
Federal  soil  undertaken  by  the  South — all  movements  of  an 
offensive  character  subsequently  undertaken  being  merely  raids 
or  diversions,  designed  to  give  relief  to  the  sorely-pressed  Con 
federate  capital.  It  imposed  upon  the  South  the  cruel  neces 
sity  of  a  continuation  of  the  war  upon  its  own  soil — a  preca 
rious  defensive,  with  a  capacity  of  resistance  greatly  diminished. 

Gettysburg  marked  the  most  serious  step  in  that  decline  of 
Confederate  fortunes  which  the  fall  of  Jackson,  in  the  moment 
of  his  greatest  triumph,  so  ominously  presaged.* 

Yet  the  condition  of  Lee's  army  was  far  from  desperate  on 
the  morning  of  the  4th  of  July,  when  it  still  confronted  its 

tie  thus  became,  in  a  measure,  unavoidable.  Encouraged  by  the  success 
ful  issue  of  the  first  day,  and  in  view  of  the  valuable  results  which  would 
ensue  from  the  defeat  of  the  army  of  General  Meade,  it  was  thought  ad 
visable  to  renew  the  attack." 

Mr.  Swinton,  who  derived  his  information  from  General  Longstreet, 
makes  a  statement  which  throws  much  light  upon  the  theory  with  which 
this  campaign  was  undertaken :  "  Indeed,  in  entering  upon  the  campaign, 
General  Lee  expressly  promised  his  corps  commanders  that  he  would  not 
assume  a  tactical  offensive,  but  force  his  antagonist  to  attack  him." — Cam 
paigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

*  Major  John  Esten  C.ooke  justly  says:  "Gettysburg  was  the  Waterloo 
— Cemetery  Hill  the  Mount  St.  Jean  of  the  war Not  with 
out  good  reason  is  the  anniversary  of  this  great  battle  celebrated  at  the 
North  with  addresses  and  rejoicings — with  crowds,  and  brass  bands,  and 
congratulations.  The  American  Waterloo  is  worth  making  that  noise 
over;  and  the  monument  proposed  there  is  a  natural  conception. 


VICKSBTJEG.  461 

antagonist,  neither  evincing  a  disposition  to  attack.  Eetiring 
in  perfect  order,  and  bringing  off  his  extensive  trains  and 
seven  thousand  prisoners,  he  tendered  the  enemy  battle  at 
Hagerstown,  while  making  preparations  to  recross  the  Poto 
mac.  General  Meade,  an  able  and  prudent  soldier,  made  as 
vigorous  a  pursuit  as  the  crippled  condition  of  his  army  would 
permit.  In  a  short  time  General  Lee  was  once  more  upon  the 
lines  of  the  Rapidan,  and  General  Meade  soon  took  position 
upon  the  Rappahannock.  Here  the  campaign  terminated,  and 
the  two  armies,  like  giants  exhausted  by  a  mighty  wrestle, 
gladly  availed  themselves  of  a  season  of  repose. 

But  Gettysburg  did  not  complete  the  agony  of  the  South. 
The  disastrous  failure  of  the  most  prodigious  and  promising 
enterprise,  undertaken  by  its  largest,  and  heretofore  invincible 
army,  was  simultaneous  with  an  event  hardly  less  fearful  in  its 
consequences.  On  the  fourth  of  July,  the  garrison  of  Vicks- 
burg,  reduced  to  the  point  of  starvation,  surrendered  to  the 
persevering  and  indomitable  Grant.  This  event  signified  the 
loss  of  an  army  of  twenty-five  thousand  men,  the  possession 
by  the  enemy  of  the  Confederate  Gibraltar  of  the  Mississippi 
Valley,  the  loss  of  all  tenure  upon  the  great  river  by  the 
South,  and  the  severance  of  the  Confederacy.  Port  Hudson, 
with  its  garrison  of  five  thousand  men,  being  no  longer  ten 
able,  after  the  fall  of  Yicksburg,  was  immediately  surrendered 
to  the  besieging  army  of  General  Banks.  The  sum  of  Con 
federate  disasters  in  the  summer  of  1863,  was  completed  by  the 
failure  of  the  attempt  to  capture  Helena,  Arkansas,  followed 
by  the  capture  of  Little  Eock,  and  Federal  control  of  the  im 
portant  valley  in  which  it  is  situated. 

Within  ninety  days  the  South  was  brought  from  the  hope 
of  almost  instant  independence  to  the  certainty  of  a  long, 


462  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

bitter,  and  doubtful  struggle.  Its  armies  terribly  shattered, 
its  resources  in  men  and  means  apparently  almost  exhausted, 
it  seemed  for  a  time  doubtful  whether  the  Confederacy  was 
capable  of  longer  endurance  of  the  terrible  ordeal.  The  exult 
ation  of  the  North  was  proportionate  to  the  extent  of  its  vic 
tories.  A  new  lease  was  given  to  the  war.  Confidence  was 
fully  restored,  and  the  Federal  Government  could  now  make 
no  demand,  that  would  be  thought  extravagant,  upon  the 
energies  of  the  North,  for  the  promotion  of  the  object  it  had 
so  much  at  heart.  But  a  few  months  sufficed  to  show  that 
the  constancy  and  fortitude  of  the  South  was  still  capable  of 
a  desperate  struggle  with  the  power  and  determination  of  the 
North. 

This  period  of  misfortune  and  apprehension  was  signalized 
by  a  most  determined  arraignment  of  the  Confederate  ad 
ministration.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  however,  that  in  all 
the  embittered  censure  visited  upon  President  Davis,  for  his 
alleged  responsibility  for  the  crushing  reverses  of  the  summer 
campaign,  there  was  avowed  but  little  censure  of  the  most 
fatal  of  those  disasters — the  failure  of  the  movement  into  Penn 
sylvania.  The  privilege  of  assailing  Mr.  Davis  with  or  with 
out  reason,  did  not  include  the  privilege  to  condemn  Lee  and 
his  army. 

In  the  case  of  Vicksburg  circumstances  were  assumed  to  be 
different.  Without  even  waiting  for  the  facts,  or  for  any  ex 
planation  of  that  terrible  calamity,  General  Pemberton  was 
accused  of  having  betrayed  his  command.  He  was  of  North 
ern  birth,  and  he  had  surrendered  on  the  fourth  of  July — 
such  was  the  evidence  of  Pemberton's  treason.  Despite  the 
fact  that  Johnston  was  known  to  be  in  the  neighborhood  with 
a  force  collected  for  the  relief  of  Vicksburg,  and  though  it  had 


GENERAL    PEMBERTON.  463 

been  plain  to  the  country  for  weeks,  that  Vicksburg  could 
not  be  saved,  except  by  a  successful  demonstration  by  that 
force,  it  was  not  admitted  among  the  possibilities  of  the  case, 
that  Johnston*  shared  the  responsibility  for  the  disaster. 

When,  however,  the  Federal  accounts  revealed  the  gallant 
defense  made  by  Pemberton,  and  thus  put  to  shame  the  un 
worthy  insinuation  of  treachery,  the  censure  of  that  unfortu 
nate  commander  and  the  President  assumed  another  direction. 
Pemberton,  it  was  asserted,  was  notoriously  incompetent,  so 
proven,  and  so  represented  to  the  President  before  his  assign 
ment  to  command  in  Mississippi ;  and  the  indignation  of  the 
country  was  invoked  upon  the  most  signal  instance  of  favoritism 
yet  exhibited.  The  extent  to  which  this  censure  of  Mr.  Davis 
was  successful,  may  be  estimated,  when  it  is  stated  that  no 
act  of  his  administration  so  imperiled  his  popularity  as  did  the 
appointment  of  General  Pemberton.  Yet  it  is  undeniable  that 
this  was  the  result  of  the  unfortunate  sequel  at  Yicksburg, 
and  dictated  by  popular  passion  in  a  moment  of  terrible  dis 
appointment,  rather  than  by  any  sufficient  reason  ever  urged 
to  show  that  the  appointment  was  unwise  and  undeserved. 

Sustained  by  the  recommendations  of  several  of  the  first 
officers  in  the  Confederate  army,  President  Davis  made  Pem 
berton  a  Lieutenant-General,  and  assigned  him  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  Mississippi.  The  command  was 

*  General  Johnston,  whether  willingly  or  unwillingly,  it  is  not  neces 
sary  for  us  to  inquire,  was  the  favorite  of  the  anti-administration  faction. 
His  name  and  opinions  were,  upon  all  occasions,  quoted  to  aid  in  the 
disparagement  of  the  administration.  This  faction  was  as  blind  in  its 
zealotry  in  favor  of  Johnston,  as  in  its  prejudice  against  Davis.  The 
motive  of  this  zealous  championship  of  Johnston  was,  however,  to  off 
set  the  well-known  confidence  of  General  Lee  in  the  President 


464  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

one  of  vital  importance  to  the  country,  and  within  its  lim 
its  were  the  home  and  all  the  possessions  of  Mr.  Davis. 
In  October,  1862,  General  Pemberton  took  charge  of  his  de 
partment,  finding  it  in  a  most  disordered  and  embarrassing 
condition.  His  administration  was  of  a  character  to  give 
great  satisfaction  to  the  Government,  and  its  fruits  were  speed 
ily  realized  in  the  thorough  and  efficient  reorganization  of  an 
army,  but  lately  defeated,  the  improved  efficiency  of  its  vari 
ous  departments,  and  the  successful  defense  of  an  extensive 
district,  with  forty  thousand  men,  against  the  armies  of  Grant 
and  Banks,  the  smallest  of  which  nearly  equaled  the  entire 
force  of  Pemberton.  Indeed,  it  can  hardly  be  alleged  that 
the  administration  of  General  Pemberton,  previous  to  the 
siege  of  Yicksburg,  was  faulty  or  unsatisfactory.  With  what 
justice,  then,  can  it  be  charged  that  Mr.  Davis  retained  in 
command  an  officer  proven  to  be  incompetent? 

In  the  reports  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Pemberton,  written 
from  different  stand-points,  and  each  with  the  object  of  vindi 
cating  its  author,  the  operations  which  led  to  the  retirement 
of  the  latter  within  the  lines  of  Yicksburg  were  elaborately 
discussed.  It  is  at  least  safe  to  state  that  General  Pemberton's 
reasons  are  as  forcibly  stated  in  explanation  of  his  own  con 
duct,  as  are  General  Johnston's  in  demonstration  of  the  errors 
of  his  subordinate.  Pemberton  was  controlled  in  all  his  move 
ments  by  the  paramount  purpose  of  holding  Vicksburg,  the 
last  obstruction  to  the  enemy's  free  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  the  connecting  link  between  the  two  great  divisions 
of  the  Confederacy.  If  he  had  abandoned  Yicksburg,  with  a 
view  to  save  his  army,  and  refused  to  stand  a  siege,  can  it  be 
reasonably  supposed  that  his  assailants  would  have  been  more 
merciful  ?  His  mission  was  to  save  Yicksburg  and  the  Yalley 


GENERAL   PEMBERTON.  465 

of  the  Mississippi,  and,  when  forced  back  by  the  overwhelm 
ing  numbers  of  Grant,  he  preferred  even  to  risk  his  army, 
rather  than  to  surrender  the  objects  of  the  whole  campaign 
without  an  effort. 

During  the  siege,  the  engineering  skill  of  General  Pember- 
ton,  and  his  fertility  of  expedients  were  conspicuously  dis 
played.  Works,  which,  under  the  unceasing  and  concentrated 
fire  of  hundreds  of  guns,  were  demolished,  re-appeared,  in  im 
proved  forms,  which  only  consummate  ingenuity  could  have 
devised.  Works  built  to  withstand  guns  used  in  ordinary 
warfare  were  found  wholly  inadequate  to  resist  the  heavy 
metal  of  the  enemy ;  and,  subjected  to  the  incessant  and  gall 
ing  fire  of  musketry,  the  artillery  could  with  difficulty  be 
worked.  But  the  energy  and  resources  of  General  Pemberton 
met  even  these  difficulties.  The  position  of  the  pieces  was 
constantly  changing;  embankments  disappeared  under  the 
enemy's  fire;  but  the  Confederate  artillery  would  still  be 
found  in  position,  and  stronger  than  before. 

But  the  skill  of  the  commander  and  the  heroic  endurance 
of  the  garrison  were  unavailing.  From  the  first,  relief  from 
without  was  expected.  For  forty-eight  days  this  hope  stimu 
lated  the  commander  and  the  garrison,  and  General  Pemberton 
subsequently  declared  that  he  "  would  have  lived  upon  an 
ounce  a  day,  and  have  continued  to  meet  the  assaults  of  all 
Grant's  army,  rather  than  have  surrendered  the  city,  until 
General  Johnston  had  realized  or  relinquished  that  hope." 
When  the  hope  of  aid  was  finally  abandoned,  the  surrender  of 
Vicksburg  was  simply  a  question  of  time  and  honor.  The 
alternative  was  either  to  capitulate  or  attempt  to  cut  through 
the  enemy's  lines.  In  a  council  of  his  officers,  Pemberton  fa 
vored  the  latter  plan,  but  yielded  to  the  views  of  the  majority. 
30 


466  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

The  case  of  General  Pemberton  was  a  striking  instance  of 
public  ingratitude.  Vindicating  his  devotion  to  the  cause  of 
the  South,  by  surrendering  his  commission  in  the  Federal 
service,  turning  his  back  upon  his  kindred,  and  leaving  a  large 
property  in  the  country  of  the  enemy,  he  was  stigmatized  by 
the  very  people  in  whose  cause  he  had  made  these  sacrifices. 
His  loyalty,  capacity,  and  fidelity  were  questioned,  even  while 
he  was  in  the  front  of  death.  His  noble  reply  to  these  accusa 
tions  can  never  be  forgotten.  Said  he  to  his  troops :  "  You 
have  been  told  that  I  was  disloyal  and  incompetent,  and  that 
I  would  sell  Yicksburg.  Follow  me,  and  you  shall  see  at  what 
price  I  shall  sell  it."  The  story  of  the  devotion  shown  at 
Yicksburg  is  no  mean  one  in  the  history  of  the  Confederacy. 
But  the  great  qualities  of  this  abused  man  have  even  a  nobler 
testimony  than  the  gallantry  of  that  defense.  Convinced  that 
the  cloud  of  prejudice  and  misrepresentation  which  followed 
him,  rendered  useless  to  the  cause  his  services  in  high  position, 
he  tendered  his  resignation  as  a  Lieutenant-General,  and 
requested  to  be  ordered  to  duty  with  his  original  rank  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  of  Artillery.* 

When  the  facts  belonging  to  the  unfortunate  campaign  in 
Mississippi  were  made  known,  the  censure  of  Pemberton  was 
rather  for  what  he  failed  to  do,  than  what  he  had  done.  But 
suppose  the  same  test  should  be  applied  to  General  Johnston ; 
would  there  not  be  found  an  equal  wanting  of  results?  If 
Johnston  was  powerless  to  make  even  a  diversion  with  more 
than  twenty  thousand  men,  (his  force  at  the  time  of  Pember- 

*  The  President  ordered  a  Court  of  Inquiry  for  investigation  of  the  facts 
of  the  campaign  in  Mississippi.  General  Pemberton  requested  that  the 
most  searching  inquiry  should  be  made,  and  that  the  court  be  allowed  to 
invite  all  attainable  testimony  against  him. 


GENERAL   PEMBEBTON.  467 

ton's  surrender,)  how  much  more  helpless  was  Pemberton  to 
check  Grant? 

A  dispassionate  and  careful  inquiry  will  demonstrate  that 
the  operations  of  General  Pemberton,  antecedent  to  the  siege 
of  Vicksburg,  are  far  less  censurable  than  was  assumed  by  his 
assailants.  There  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt,  that  if  worthy 
of  blame,  he  should  not  be  visited  with  the  whole  responsi 
bility.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  Pemberton  could  have 
adopted  a  different  course,  consistently  with  the  main  purpose 
of  the  campaign — which  was  to  prevent  the  capture  of  Vicks- 
burg.  It  is  certain  that  he  would  have  been  doubly  con 
demned,  if  he  had  executed  a  safe  retreat,  and  abandoned  the 
stronghold  without  an  effort  to  save  it. 

A  sufficient  reply  to  the  statement  that  Pemberton  was  ap 
pointed  without  the  desirable  evidence  of  fitness,  is  that  the 
occasion  was  one  precluding  the  employment  of  any  officer 
whose  capacity  for  such  a  command  had  been  proven  by  ample 
trial.  Every  officer  of  established  merit  was  then  in  a  position 
from  which  he  could  not  be  spared.  The  presence  of  Lee  in 
Virginia  was  deemed  necessary  by  the  whole  country.  The 
most  popular  of  his  lieutenants  (Longstreet)  was  then  freely 
criticised  for  an  assumed  failure  in  a  recent  independent  com 
mand  ;  and,  besides,  he  was  obviously  needed  in  the  Pennsyl 
vania  campaign.  Beauregard  was  also  thought  to  be  in  his 
appropriate  place,  in  charge  of  the  coast  defenses ;  and,  indeed, 
it  was  next  to  impossible  to  avoid  the  employment  of  a  com 
paratively  untried  commander  in  some  important  position. 
The  confidence  of  Mr.  Davis  in  Pemberton,  too,  was  amply 
sustained  by  the  testimony  of  officers,  in  whose  judgment  the 
country  confided. 

But  Pemberton  failed,  and  it  was  the  misfortune  of  the 


468  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

President  to  have  conferred  distinction  upon  an  unsuccessful 
commander.  Waiving  all  discussion  of  the  extent  to  which 
Pemberton  may  be  justified,  and  even  conceding  the  appoint 
ment  to  have  been  a  bad  one,  let  us  remember  how  few  really 
capable  commanders  are  produced  by  even  the  greatest  wars. 
Was  President  Davis  to  call  twenty  into  existence,  fit  to  com 
mand  armies,  when  Napoleon  declared  his  armies  did  not  afford 
half  a  dozen  ?  Let  it  be  remembered,  too,  that  it  was  his 
penetration  that  sustained  Lee,  Sidney  Johnston  and  Jackson, 
in  the  face  of  popular  clamor ;  that  he  rewarded,  with  suitable 
acknowledgment,  the  skill  and  gallantry  of  Ewell,  Early, 
Stuart,  Gordon,  Longstreet,  and  Hood ;  of  Breckinridge,  Cle- 
burne,  Magruder,  Morgan,  and  others  whose  names  make  up 
the  brilliant  galaxy  of  Confederate  heroes.* 

That  President  Davis  was  tenacious  of  his  opinions  is  un 
questionably  true,  and  his  firm  grasp  of  his  purposes  was  the 
explanation  of  his  ascendancy  over  other  minds,  and  a  leading 
attribute  of  his  fitness  for  his  position.  But  this  strenuous 

*  It  is  noteworthy  that  when  trial  vindicated  the  confidence  of  Mr. 
Davis  in  an  officer,  of  whose  capacity  the  critics  were  doubtful  (as  was  the 
case  in  numberless  instances),  they  made  no  acknowledgment  of  error. 
For  example,  the  President  was  accused  of  the  most  unworthy  nepotism 
in  his  appointment  of  General  "Dick"  Taylor,  who  was  a  brother  of 
Mr.  Davis'  first  wife.  Yet  that  appointment  was  insisted  upon  by  Stone 
wall  Jackson,  in  whose  army  Taylor  commanded  a  brigade.  The  Presi 
dent  made  Taylor  a  Brigadier,  because  he  thought  him  competent;  and 
afterward  a  Major-General,  because  Jackson  knew  him  to  be  worthy  of  it. 
Did  Taylor's  subsequent  career  vindicate  the  President  or  the  critics? 

The  case  of  the  brave  and  efficient  Early  was  another  instance  in  which 
Mr.  Davis  was  at  variance  with  the  newspaper  and  congressional  censors, 
and  in  which,  as  usual,  the  President  was  sustained  by  Lee.  It  is  needless 
to  multiply  examples. 


469 

adhesion  to  a  settled  aim,  characteristic  of  all  men  born  for  in 
fluence,  is  a  very  different  quality  from  that  unreasoning  zeal 
otry  which  belongs  to  weak  minds.  If,  indeed,  the  favoritism 
of  Mr.  Davis  lost  Vicksburg,  with  equal  justice,  it  may  be 
claimed  that  it  won  the  Seven  Days7  victories,  Manassas,  Fred- 
ericksburg,  and  Chancellorsville. 

An  interesting  event  in  the  history  of  this  period  of  the 
war,  was  the  unsuccessful  mission  of  Vice-President  Stephens, 
to  the  Federal  authorities,  designed,  as  explained  by  President 
Davis,  ato  place  the  war  upon  the  footing  of  such  as  are 
waged  by  civilized  people  in  modern  times."  The  annexed 
correspondence  requires  hardly  a  word  of  explanation.  Con 
sistent  with  the  forbearance  and  humanity,  with  which  Mr. 
Davis  had  endeavored  to  prevent  war,  by  negotiation,  was  this 
effort  to  soften  its  rigors  and  to  abate  the  bitterness  which  it 
had  then  assumed. 

Recent  atrocities  of  the  Federal  authorities*  had  compelled 

*  One  of  the  worst  of  these  proceedings  of  the  enemy,  was  the  execu 
tion  of  Captains  Corbin  and  McGraw.  On  hearing  of  their  fate,  the  Con 
federate  Government  inquired  of  the  Federal  authorities  the  reason  of 
their  actions.  The  response  was,  that  they  were  executed  as  spies.  The 
record  of  their  trial  was  then  demanded.  In  answer  to  this  request,  the 
Federal  Government  furnished  a  copy  of  the  charges  and  specifications 
against  them,  and  of  the  sentence  of  the  court  which  condemned  them, 
but  none  of  the  evidence. 

From  the  papers  thus  furnished,  it  appears  that  it  was  not  true  that 
they  had  been  accused  or  tried  as  spies — that  the  sole  charge  against 
these  unfortunate  gentlemen  was,  that  they  had  recruited  soldiers  for  the 
Confederacy  in  Kentucky,  a  State  embraced  in  our  political  system  and 
represented  regularly  in  the  Confederate  Congress  by  Senators  and  Rep 
resentatives.  Nor  was  the  evidence  of  this  charge  supplied.  Not  a  scin 
tilla  of  proof  appeared  that  these  men  were  spies.  The  sole  pretext  for 
their  execution  was  the  technical  one  that  these  officers  were  recruiting  in 


470  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

the  Confederate  Government  to  seriously  entertain  the  purpose 
of  retaliation.  Reluctant  to  adopt  a  course  which  would  re 
move  the  last  restraint  upon  the  spirit  of  cruelty  and  revenge, 
making  the  war  a  system  of  unmitigated  barbarism  upon  both 
sides,  President  Davis  determined  to  make  an  earnest  appeal 
to  the  humanity  of  the  Federal  authorities.  In  addition  to 
this  object  the  mission  of  Mr.  Stephens  sought  the  arrange 
ment  of  all  disputes  between  the  governments,  respecting  the 
cartel  of  exchange,  upon  a  permanent  and  humane  basis,  by 
which  the  soldiers  of  the  two  armies  should  be  sent  to  their 
homes,  instead  of  being  confined  in  military  prisons. 

To  make  the  mission  more  acceptable  to  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment,  President  Davis  removed  every  obstacle  to  inter 
course  upon  terms  of  equality,  and  selected  a  gentleman  of 
high  position,  of  known  philanthropy  and  moderation,  and 
from  several  reasons  likely  to  obtain  an  audience  of  the  Fed 
eral  authorities.  The  choice  of  time  was  not  less  indicative 
of  the  magnanimity  of  Mr.  Davis.  The  Confederate  army  was 
then  in  Pennsylvania,  apparently  upon  the  eve  of  a  victory 
already  assured,  and  which,  if  gained,  would  have  placed  it  in 
possession  of  the  Federal  capital  and  the  richest  sections  of  the 
North.  At  such  a  moment,  so  promising  in  opportunity  of 
ample  vengeance  for  the  ravages  and  desolation,  which  every 
where  marked  the  presence  of  the  Federal  armies,  the  Confed 
erate  President  tendered  his  noble  plea  in  behalf  of  civilization 
and  humanity.  With  rare  justice  has  it  been  said,  that  this 

one  of  the  States  claimed  by  the  enemy,  as  one  of  the  United  States,  a 
principle  which  applies  equally  to  Virginia  or  South  Carolina,  and  which 
would,  if  carried  out,  sentence  to  the  gallows  every  officer  and  private  we 
had  in  our  service. 


PEOUD   POSITION   OF   MR.    DAVIS.  471 

position  of  Mr.  Davis  "  merited  the  applause  of  the  Christian 
world." 

Mr.  Stephens  was  contemptuously  denied  even  a  hearing. 
The  sequel  soon  revealed  the  explanation  of  the  conduct  of 
the  Federal  Government,  by  which  it  became  doubly  charge 
able  for  the  sufferings  of  a  protracted  war,  in  declining  to  aid 
in  the  abatement  of  its  horrors,  and  by  abruptly  closing  the 
door  against  all  attempts  at  negotiation.  General  Meade  had 
repulsed  General  Lee  at  Gettysburg,  while  Mr.  Stephens  was 
near  Fortress  Monroe.  Flushed  with  triumph  and  insolent 
in  the  belief  that  Lee's  army  could  not  escape  destruction,  the 
Federal  authorities  declared  such  intercourse  with  " rebels"  to 
be  "  inadmissable."  In  other  words,,  detention  of  the  Confed 
erate  prisoners,  and  outrages  upon  the  Southern  people,  were 
part  of  a  political  and  military  system  at  Washington,  and 
would  be  persisted  in.  At  subsequent  stages  of  the  war  were 
seen  the  objects  of  this  policy,  which  the  Federal  Government 
virtually  proclaimed,  and  which  it  persistently  adhered  to. 

The  correspondence  between  President  Davis  and  Vice- 
President  Stephens  proudly  vindicates  the  humanity  and  mag 
nanimity  of  the  South.  It  is  alone  a  sufficient  reply  to  the 
cant  of  demagogues  and  the  ravings  of  conscience-stricken 
fanatics,  over  the  falsely-called  "  Rebel  barbarities." 

OFFICIAL  CORRESPONDENCE. 

RICHMOND,  July  2,  1863. 
Hon.  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  Richmond,  Va. — 

SIR  :  Having  accepted  your  patriotic  offer  to  proceed,  as  a  mil 
itary  commissioner,  under  flag  of  truce,  to  Washington,  you  will 
receive  herewith  your  letter  of  authority  to  the  Commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States. 


472  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

This  letter  is  signed  by  me  as  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Con 
federate  land  and  naval  forces. 

You  will  perceive,  from  the  terms  of  the  letter,  that  it  is  so 
worded  as  to  avoid  any  political  difficulties  in  its  reception.  In 
tended  exclusively  as  one  of  those  communications  between  bel 
ligerents,  which  public  law  recognizes  as  necessary  and  proper 
between  hostile  forces,  care  has  been  taken  to  give  no  pretext  for 
refusing  to  receive  it,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  involve  a  tacit 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy. 

Your  mission  is  simply  one  of  humanity,  and  has  no  political 
aspect. 

If  objection  is  made  to  receiving  your  letter,  on  the  ground  that 
it  is  not  addressed  to  Abraham  Lincoln,  as  President,  instead  of 
Commander-in-chief,  etc.,  then  you  will  present  the  duplicate  let 
ter,  which  is  addressed  to  him  as  President,  and  signed  by  me,  as 
President.  To  this  latter,  objection  may  be  made,  on  the  ground 
that  I  am  not  recognized  to  be  President  of  the  Confederacy.  In 
this  event,  you  will  decline  any  further  attempt  to  confer  on  the 
subject  of  your  mission,  as  such  conference  is  admissable  only  on 
the  footing  of  perfect  equality.  My  recent  interviews  with  you 
have  put  you  so  fully  in  possession  of  my  views,  that  it  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  give  you  any  detailed  instructions,  even  were  I,  at 
this  moment,  well  enough  to  attempt  it. 

My  whole  purpose  is,  in  one  word,  to  place  this  war  on  the  foot 
ing  of  such  as  are  waged  by  civilized  people  in  modern  times  ; 
and  to  divest  it  of  the  savage  character  which  has  been  impressed 
on  it  by  our  enemies,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  and  protests. 

War  is  full  enough  of  unavoidable  horrors,  under  all  its  aspects, 
to  justify,  and  even  to  demand,  of  any  Christian  rulers  who  may 
be  unhappily  engaged  in  carrying  it  on,  to  seek  to  restrict  its 
calamities,  and  to  divest  it  of  all  unnecessary  severities: 

You  will  endeavor  to  establish  the  cartel  for  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  on  such  a  basis  as  to  avoid  the  constant  difficulties  and 


MR.   DAVIS'   LETTER.  473 

complaints  which  arise,  and  to  prevent,  for  the  future,  what  we 
deem  the  unfair  conduct  of  our  enemies,  in  evading  the  delivery 
of  the  prisoners  who  fall  into  their  hands  j  in  retarding  it  by  send 
ing  them  on  circuitous  routes,  and  by  detaining  them,  sometimes 
for  months,  in  camps  and  prisons  ;  and  in  persisting  in  taking 
captives  non-combatants.  „  f  , 

Your  attention  is  also  called  to  the  unheard-of  conduct  of  Fed 
eral  officers,  in  driving  from  their  homes  entire  communities  of 
women  and  children,  as  well  as  of  men,  whom  they  find  in  districts 
occupied  by  their  troops,  for  no  other  reason  than  because  these 
unfortunates  are  faithful  to  the  allegiance  due  to  their  States,  and 
refuse  to  take  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  their  enemies. 

The  putting  to  death  of  unarmed  prisoners  has  been  a  ground 
of  just  complaint  in  more  than,  one  instance,  and  the  recent  exe 
cution  of  officers  of  our  army  in  Kentucky,  for  the  sole  cause  that 
they  were  engaged  in  recruiting  service  in  a  State  which  is  claimed 
as  still  one  of  the  United  States,  but  is  also  claimed  by  us  as  one 
of  the  Confederate  States,  must  be  repressed  by  retaliation,  if  not 
unconditionally  abandoned,  because  it  would  justify  the  like  execu 
tion  in  every  other  State  of  the  Confederacy ;  and  the  practice  is 
barbarous,  uselessly  cruel,  and  can  only  lead  to  the  slaughter  of 
prisoners  on  both  sides — a  result  too  horrible  to  contemplate,  with 
out  making  every  effort  to  avoid  it. 

On  these  and  all  kindred  subjects,  you  will  consider  your  author 
ity  full  and  ample  to  make  such  arrangements  as  will  temper  the 
present  cruel  character  of  the  contest;  and  full  confidence  is  placed 
in  your  judgment,  patriotism,  and  discretion,  that  while  carrying 
out  the  objects  of  your  mission,  you  will  take  care  that  the  equal 
rights  of  the  Confederacy  be  always  preserved. 

Very  respectfully, 
[Signed]  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


474  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

RICHMOND,  8th  July,  1863. 
His  Excellency  Jefferson  Davis — 

SIR  :  Under  the  authority  and  instructions  of  your  letter  to  me 
of  the  2d  instant,  I  proceeded  on  the  mission  therein  assigned, 
without  delay.  The  steamer  Torpedo,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Hunter  Davidson,  of  the  navy,  was  put  in  readiness,  as  soon  as 
possible,  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  tendered  for 
the  service.  At  noon,  on  the  3d,  she  started  down  James  River, 
hoisting  and  bearing  a  flag  of  truce  after  passing  City  Point.  The 
next  day,  the  4th,  at  about  one  o'clock  P.  M.,  when  within  a  few 
miles  of  Newport  News,  we  were  met  by  a  small  boat  of  the  enemy, 
carrying  two  guns,  which  also  raised  a  white  flag  before  approach 
ing  us.  The  officer  in  command  informed  Lieutenant  Davidson 
that  he  had  orders  from  Admiral  Lee,  on  board  the  United  States 
flag-ship  Minnesota,  lying  below,  and  then  in  view,  not  to  allow 
any  boat  or  vessel  to  pass  the  point  near  which  he  was  stationed, 
without  his  permission.  By  this  officer,  I  sent  to  Admiral  Lee  a 
note,  stating  my  objects  and  wishes,  a  copy  of  which  is  hereto  an 
nexed,  marked  A.  I  also  sent  to  the  admiral,  to  be  forwarded, 
another  note,  in  the  same  language, 'addressed  to  the  officer  in 
command  of  the  United  States  forces  at  Fort  Monroe.  The  gun 
boat  proceeded  immediately  to  the  Minnesota  with  these  dispatches, 
while  the  Torpedo  remained  at  anchor.  Between  three  and  four 
o'clock  P.  M.,  another  boat  came  up  to  us,  bearing  the  admiral's 
answer,  which  is  hereunto  annexed,  marked  B.  We  remained  at 
or  about  this  point  in  the  river  until  the  6th  instant,  when,  having 
heard  nothing  further  from  the  admiral,  at  12  o'clock  M.,  on  that 
day,  I  directed  Lieutenant  Davidson  again  to  speak  the  gunboat 
on  guard,  and  to  hand  the  officer  in  command  another  note  to  the 
admiral.  This  was  done.  A  copy  of  this  note  is  appended, 
marked  C.  At  half  past  two  o'clock  P.  M.,  two  boats  approached 
us  from  below,  one  bearing  an  answer  from  the  admiral  to  my 
note  to  him  of  the  4th.  This  answer  is  annexed,  marked  D.  The 


475 

other  boat  bore  the  answer  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  H. 
Ludlow,  to  my  note  of  the  4th,  addressed  to  the  officer  in  com 
mand  at  Fort  Monroe.  A  copy  of  this  is  annexed,  marked  E. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Ludlow  also  came  up  in  person  in  the  boat 
that  brought  his  answer  to  me,  and  conferred  with  Colonel  Ould, 
on  board  the  Torpedo,  upon  some  matters  he  desired  to  see  him 
about  in  connection  with  the  exchange  of  prisoners. 

From  the  papers  appended,  embracing  the  correspondence  re 
ferred  to,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  mission  failed  from  the  refusal 
of  the  enemy  to  receive  or  entertain  it,  holding  the  proposition 
for  such  a  conference  "  inadmissable." 

The  influences  and  views  that  led  to  this  determination,  after 
so  long  a  consideration  of  the  subject,  must  be  left  to  conjecture. 
The  reason  assigned  for  the  refusal  by  the  United  States  Secretary 
of  War,  to  wit :  "  that  the  customary  agents  and  channels  are 
considered  adequate  for  needful  military  communications  and  con 
ferences,"  to  one  acquainted  with  the  facts,  seems  not  only  unsat 
isfactory,  but  very  singular  and  unaccountable,  for  it  is  certainly 
known  to  him  that  these  very  agents,  to  whom  he  evidently  al 
ludes,  heretofore  agreed  upon  in  a  former  conference,  in  reference 
to  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  (one  of  the  subjects  embraced  in 
your  letter  to  me,)  are  now,  and  have  been  for  some  time,  dis 
tinctly  at  issue  on  several  important  points.  The  existing  cartel, 
owing  to  these  disagreements,  is  virtually  suspended,  so  far  as  the 
exchange  of  officers  on  either  side  is  concerned.  Notices  of  re 
taliation  have  been  given  on  both  sides. 

The  efforts,  therefore,  for  the  very  many  and  cogent  reasons  set 
forth  in  your  letter  of  instructions  to  me,  to  see  if  these  differ 
ences  could  not  be  removed,  and  if  a  clearer  understanding  be 
tween  the  parties,  as  to  the  general  conduct  of  the  war,  could  not 
be  arrived  at,  before  this  extreme  measure  should  be  resorted  to 
by  either  party,  was  no  less  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of 
humanity  than  in  strict  conformity  with  the  usages  of  belligerents 


476  LIFE  OF  JEFFEESON  DAVIS. 

in  modern  times.  Deeply  impressed  as  I  was  with  these  views 
and  feelings,  in  undertaking  the  mission,  and  asking  the  confer 
ence,  I  can  but  express  my  profound  regret  at  the  result  of  the 
effort  made  to  obtain  it ;  and  I  can  but  entertain  the  belief,  that 
if  the  conference  sought  had  been  granted,  mutual  good  could 
have  been  effected  by  it ;  and  if  this  war,  so  unnatural,  so  unjust, 
so  unchristian,  and  so  inconsistent  with  every  fundamental  prin 
ciple  of  American  constitutional  liberty,  "must  needs"  continue 
to  be  waged  against  us,  that  at  least  some  of  its  severer  horrors, 
which  now  so  eminently  threaten,  might  have  been  avoided. 
Very  respectfully, 

ALEXANDER  H.  STEPHENS. 


DECLINE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY.  477 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

OPERATIONS  OF  GENERAL  TAYLOR  IN  LOUISIANA — THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  IR 
RECOVERABLY  LOST  TO  THE  CONFEDERACY — FEDERALS  FOILED  AT  CHARLES 
TON — THE  DIMINISHED  CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  SOUTH — FINANCIAL  DERANGE 
MENT — DEFECTIVE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOUTH — MR.  DAVIS'  LIMITED 
CONNECTION  WITH  IT — THE  REASONS  FOR  THE  FINANCIAL  FAILURE  OF  THE 
CONFEDERACY — INFLUENCE  OF  SPECULATION — ANOMALOUS  SITUATION  OF  THE 
SOUTH — MR.  DAVIS'  VIEWS  OF  THE  FINANCIAL  POLICY  OF  THE  SOUTH  AT  THE 
BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR — MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE — BRAGG 
RETREATS  TO  CHATTANOOGA — MORGAN'S  EXPEDITION — SURRENDER  OF  CUM 
BERLAND  GAP — FEDERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  CHATTANOOGA — BATTLE  OF  CHICKA- 

MAUGA — BRAGG' s  EXPECTATIONS — GRANT'S  OPERATIONS — BRAGG  BADLY  DE 
FEATED — PRESIDENT  DAVIS*  VIEW  OF  THE  DISASTER GENERAL  BRAGG  RE 
LIEVED  FROM  COMMAND  OF  THE  WESTERN  ARMY — CENSURE  OF  THIS  OFFICER 
— HIS  MERITS  AND  SERVICES — THE  UNJUST  CENSURE  OF  MR.  DAVIS  AND  GEN 
ERAL  BRAGG  FOR  THE  REVERSES  IN  THE  WEST — OPERATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA 

IN  THE  LATTER  PART  OF  1863 CONDITION   OF   THE   SOUTH    AT  THE  CLOSE   OF 

THE  YEAR — SIGNS  OF  EXHAUSTION — PRESIDENT  DAVIS*  RECOMMENDATIONS — 
PUBLIC  DESPONDENCY — THE  WORK  OF  FACTION — ABUSE  OF  MR.  DAVIS  IN 
CONGRESS — THE  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  HIMSELF  AND  HIS  ASSAILANTS — DEFI 
CIENCY  OF  FOOD HOW  CAUSED — THE  CONFEDERACY  EVENTUALLY  CONQUERED 

BY  STARVATION. 

FT! HOUGH  indicating  that  stage  of  the  war,  when  began  the 
-•-    steady  decline  of  the  Confederacy,  the  summer  of  1863 
was  not  wholly  unredeemed  by  successes,  which,  however  tran 
sient  in  significance,  threw  no  mean  lustre  upon  Southern  arms. 
A  series  of  brilliant  operations  marked  the  career  of  General 
Richard  Taylor  in  Lower  Louisiana.    Preceded  by  a  successful 
campaign  in  the  Lafourche  region,  an  expedition  was  under- 


478  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

taken  by  General  Taylor  against  Brashear  City,  in  the  latter 
days  of  June.  A  strong  and  important  position  was  carried, 
and  eighteen  hundred  prisoners,  with  over  five  millions  of 
dollars  worth  of  stores,  were  captured.  For  some  time  the 
hope  was  indulged,  that  this  success  of  General  Taylor  would 
compel  the  abandonment  of  the  Federal  siege  of  Port  Hud 
son,  and  that  Taylor  could  also  make  a  successful  diversion  in 
favor  of  Vicksburg.  This  hope  was  disappointed,  and  Taylor, 
not  having  the  strength  to  cope  with  the  large  force  of  the 
enemy  sent  against  him,  after  the  fall  of  the  Mississippi  strong 
holds,  was  forced  to  abandon  the  country  which  he  had  so 
gallantly  won.  The  valley  of  the  Mississippi  was  irrecover 
ably  in  Federal  possession,  and  the  Confederacy  was  able  at  no 
subsequent  stage  of  the  war,  to  undertake  any  serious  enter 
prise  for  its  redemption. 

At  Charleston  the  Federal  fleet  and  land  forces  continued, 
during  the  summer,  their  fruitless  and  expensive  attacks.  The 
skill  of  General  Beauregard,  and  the  firmness  of  his  small 
command,  made  memorable  the  siege  of  that  devoted  city,  so 
hated  and  coveted  by  the  North,  yet  among  the  last  prizes  to 
fall  into  its  hands. 

But  momentary  gleams  of  hope  were  insufficient  to  dispel 
the  shadow  of  disaster,  which,  by  midsummer,  seemed  to  have 
settled  upon  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy.  The  violent  blow 
dealt  the  material  capacity  of  the  South  by  the  surrender  of 
Vicksburg ;  the  diminished  prestige,  from  the  serious  check  at 
Gettysburg,  in  its  wondrous  career  of  victory,  and  the  fright 
ful  losses  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  were  immediately 
followed  by  a  marked  abatement  of  that  unwavering  confidence 
in  the  ultimate  result,  which  had  previously  so  stimulated  the 
energy  of  the  South. 


CONFEDERATE  FINANCES.  479 

The  material  disability  and  embarrassment  resulting  from 
the  possession,  by  the  enemy,  of  large  sections  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  and  consequent  contraction  of  its  territorial  area;  the 
destruction  of  property ;  the  serious  disturbance  of  the  whole 
commercial  system  of  the  South,  by  the  loss  of  Yicksburg ; 
and  the  diminished  confidence  of  the  public,  were  attended  by 
a  fatal  derangement  of  the  already  failing  Confederate  system 
of  finance. 

In  the  American  war,  as  in  all  Avars,  the  question  of  finance 
entered  largely  into  the  decision  of  the  result.  At  an  early 
period  many  sagacious  minds  declared  that  the  contest  would 
finally  be  resolved  into  a  question  as  to  which  of  the  belliger 
ents  "  had  the  longer  purse."  In  acceptance  of  this  view,  the 
belief  was  largely  entertained  that  the  financial  distress  in  the 
South,  consequent  upon  the  heavy  reverses  of  this  period, 
clearly  portended  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy. 

President  Davis,  since  the  war,  has  avowed  his  appreciation 
of  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  South,  as  a  controlling  influ 
ence  in  the  failure  of  the  cause.  By  unanimous  consent,  the 
management  of  the  Confederate  finances  has  been  declared  to 
have  been  defective.  The  universal  distress  attendant  upon  a 
depreciated  currency,  which  rarely  improved  in  seasons  of 
military  success,  and  grew  rapidly  worse  with  each  disaster, 
rendered  the  financial  feature  of  Mr.  Davis'  administration, 
peculiarly  vulnerable  to  the  industry  of  a  class  ever  on  the 
alert  for  a  pretext  available  to  excite  popular  distrust  of  the 
President.  With  entire  justice,  we  might  dismiss  this  subject, 
claiming  for  Mr.  Davis  the  benefit  of  the  plea  which  always 
allows  a  ruler  some  exemption  from  responsibility  for  the 
errors  of  a  subordinate.  We  have  rarely  sought  to  fasten  cul 
pability  upon  those  who  differed  with  him,  in  some  instances, 


480  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

perhaps  where  it  would  have  more  clearly  established  his  own 
exculpation.  No  act  or  utterance  of  Mr.  Davis  could  be  urged 
to  show  that  he  ever  claimed  for  himself  the  benefit  of  such  a 
plea.  Fidelity  to  his  friends  is  a  trait  in  his  character,  not 
less  worthy  of  admiration  than  magnanimity  and  forbearance 
to  his  foes.  His  ardent  and  sympathetic  nature  doubtless  often 
condoned  the  errors  of  those  whose  motives  he  knew  to  be 
good ;  but  his  friends  can  testify  that  he  far  more  frequently 
overlooked  the  asperities  of  his  enemies.* 

*  General  D.  H.  Hill  has  given  a  most  manly  exhibition  of  feeling 
toward  Mr.  Davis,  in  an  article  published,  some  months  since,  in  his 
magazine.  We  quote  from  General  Hill,  who  alludes,  at  length,  to  the 
alleged  rancor  of  Mr.  Davis  toward  his  opponents.  General  Hill  prefaces 
his  remarks  with  the  declaration,  that  he  "has  never  been  among  the 
personal  friends  of  Mr.  Davis;"  that  he  was  "at  no  time  an  admirer  of 
his  executive  abilities;"  and  further  declares  himself  to  have  been  the  re 
cipient  of  an  "unexplained,  and  perhaps  unexplainable  wrong,"  at  the 
hands  of  Mr.  Davis.  Says  this  gallant  soldier : 

"  It  was  said  of  Mr.  Davis  that  he  could  see  no  good  in  his  enemies  and 
lio  evil  in  his  friends.  I  know  of  one  instance,  at  least,  of  incorrectness 
of  the  former  statement.  I  was  present  when  a  discussion  took  place  in 
regard  to  the  suppression  of  a  newspaper  because  of  the  disloyal  character 
of  its  articles,  which  were  producing  desertion  in  the  army,  and  disaffec 
tion  among  the  people  at  home.  The  editor  had  been  converted  to  Union 
ism  by  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  and  fall  of  Vicksburg,  and,  like  all  new 
born  proselytes,  was  fiery  in  his  zeal.  A  cabinet  officer  present  said: 

'  This  man  is  not  more  disloyal  than '  (naming  a  well-known  editor, 

whose  assaults  upon  Mr.  Davis  at  this  time  were  very  virulent.)  'I  don't 
see  how  one  paper  can  be  suppressed  without  suppressing  the  other.'  To 

this  a  gentleman  replied:  'You  are  unjust.  Mr. ,  though  an  enemy 

of  the  President,  yet  shows  by  his  abuse  of  the  Yankees  that  he  has  no 
love  for  them.  The  other  editor  betrays  hatred  of  the  President  and  of 
his  own  people.'  Mr.  Davis  immediately  assented  to  this,  saying:  'You 
have  exactly  described  the  difference  between  the  two  men.' But 


SECRETARY    MEMMINGER.  481 

We  have  elsewhere  explained  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Mem- 
minger,  as  having  been  dictated  by  other  considerations  than 
that  of  a  reliance  upon  his  special  fitness.  But  while  doubting 
his  capacity  for  his  difficult  and  anomalous  situation,  we  are 
not  so  sure  that  he  exhibited  such  marked  unfitness  as  should 
have  forbidden  his  retention  in  office,  and  called  for  the  ap 
pointment  of  another,  with  the  expectation  of  a  more  satisfac 
tory  administration.  In  the  end,  yielding  to  the  vast  pressure 
against  him,  Mr.  Memminger  left  the  cabinet,  and  Mr.  Davis 
appointed,  as  his  successor,  a  gentleman  unknown  to  himself, 
but  recommended  as  the  possessor  of  financial  talents  of  a  high 
order.  When  Mr.  Trenholm  became  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
ury,  the  opportunity  for  reform  had  long  since  passed,  if,  in 
deed,  such  an  opportunity  existed  after  the  repulse  at  Gettys 
burg  and  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg.  It  is  hardly  within  the 
range  of  probability,  that,  after  those  reverses,  any  conceivable 
ingenuity  could  have  arrested  the  downward  tendency  of  Con 
federate  finances.  In  the  history  of  Confederate  finance,  before 
those  disasters,  is  to  be  found  much  extenuation,  if  not  ample 

it  is  not  true  that  he  could  see  no  good  in  his  enemies,  and  that  he  pur 
sued  them  with  rancorous  hate.  I  do  not  doubt  that  in  the  comparison 
with  his  supposed  friends,  they  were  in  his  estimation  both  intellectually 
weak  and  morally  perverse.  But,  apart  from  this,  he  could  be  just  and 
appreciative  of  their  merits.  I  saw  him  several  times  during  the  session 
of  a  Confederate  Congress  in  which  he  had  been  harshly  assailed.  Once 
he  alluded  incidentally  to  his  troubles,  but  without  the  least  resentment 
in  language  or  manner.  I  think  that  there  was  no  instance  of  the  supres- 
sion  of  a  newspaper,  though  several  editors  were  notoriously  disloyal  to 
the  Confederate  cause,  and  still  more  of  them  intensely  hostile  to  the  Con 
federate  President.  Like  Washington,  Mr.  Davis  held  'error  to  be  the 
portion  of  humanity,  and  to  censure  it,  whether  committed  by  this  or  that 
public  character,  to  be  the  prerogative  of  a  freeman.'  " 
31 


482  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

apology,  for  a  system  which  was  imposed  by  the  force  of  cir 
cumstances  and  the  novelty  of  the  situation,  rather  than  by 
the  errors  of  one  man,  or  a  number  of  men. 

In  his  message  of  December,  1863,  Mr.  Davis  reviewed  the 
subject  in  all  its  phases,  as  it  had  been  presented  up  to  that 
period,  and  sketched  the  plan,  afterwards  adopted  by  Congress, 
but  without  the  result  hoped  for  of  increasing  the  value  of 
the  currency,  by  compulsory  funding  and  large  taxation.  His 
discussion  of  this  subject  was  always  characterized  by  perspi 
cuity  and  force,  but  finance  was  that  branch  of  administration 
with  which  he  affected  the  least  familiarity,  and  which  he 
least  assumed  to  direct.  Knowing  the  profound  and  unremit 
ting  attention  which  the  subject  required,  he  sought  the  aid  of 
others  competent  for  the  inquiry,  which  he  had  little  leisure  to 
pursue. 

This  subject,  during  the  entire  war,  was  a  fruitful  theme  for 
the  disquisitions  of  charlatans.  Finance  is  a  subject  confessedly 
intricate,  and  but  few  men  in  any  country  are  capable  of  able 
administration  of  this  branch  of  government.  Yet  the  Con 
federacy  swarmed  with  pretenders,  advocating  opposing  theo 
ries,  which  their  authors,  in  every  case,  declared  to  be  infallible. 
The  Confederate  administration  neither  wanted  for  advisers, 
nor  did  it  fail  to  seek  the  advice  of  those  who  were  reputed 
to  have  financial  abilities.  Its  errors  were,  to  a  large  degree, 
shared  by  the  ablest  statesmen  of  the  South. 

Criticism  is  proverbially  easy  and  cheap,  after  the  result  is 
ascertained,  and  we  now  readily  see  the  leading  causes  of  the 
depreciation  of  Confederate  money.  In  the  last  twelve  months 
of  the  war,  the  rapid  and  uninterrupted  depreciation  was  oc 
casioned  by  the  want  of  confidence  in  the  success  of  the  cause, 
on  the  part  of  those  who  controlled  the  value  of  the  money. 


FINANCIAL   DIFFICULTIES.  483 

Such  was  the  alarm  and  distrust  consequent  upon  the  disasters 
of  July,  1863,  that  the  Confederate  currency  is  stated  to  have 
declined  a  thousand  per  cent.,  within  a  few  weeks.  Previous 
to  that  period  the  decline  was  gradual,  but  far  less  alarming 
in  its  indications.  The  plan  adopted  by  the  Government, 
partly  in  deference  to  popular  prejudice  against  direct  taxation 
by  the  general  Government,  and  partly  as  a  necessity  of  the 
situation — that  of  credit  in  the  form  of  paper  issues,  followed 
by  the  enormous  issues  necessary  to  meet  the  expenses  of  a 
war,  increasing  daily  in  magnitude — pampered  the  spirit  of 
speculation,  which,  by  the  close  of  the  second  year,  had  become 
almost  universal.  This  latter  influence  may  safely  be  declared 
to  have  greatly  accelerated  the  unfortunate  result,  and  the  ex 
tent  of  its  prevalence  reflects  an  unpleasant  shadow  upon  the 
otherwise  unmarred  fame  of  the  South  for  self-denying  pa 
triotism. 

It  is  customary  to  speak  of  the  financial  management  of  the 
Confederacy  in  especial  disparagement,  when  contrasted  with 
that  of  the  North.  The  injustice  of  this  contrast,  however,  is 
palpable.  We  are  not  required  to  disparage  the  Federal  finan 
cial  system — which  was,  indeed,  conducted  with  consummate 
tact  and  ingenuity — to  extenuate  the  errors,  in  this  respect,  of 
the  Confederacy.  The  circumstances  of  the  antagonists  were 
altogether  different ;  the  position  of  the  South  financially,  as 
in  other  respects,  was  peculiar  and  anomalous.  Completely 
isolated,  with  a  large  territory,  with  virtually  no  specie  circu 
lation,*  hastily  summoned  to  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  most 
gigantic  war  of  modern  times,  the  South  had  no  alternative 
but  to  resort  to  an  entirely  artificial,  and,  to  some  extent,  un- 

*At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  South  had  only  fifty  millions  of  coin, 
and  had  a  paper  circulation  of  about  the  same  amount 


484  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

tried  system  of  finance.  From  the  outset,  the  basis  of  the 
Confederate  system  was  the  patriotism  and  the  confidence  of 
the  people.  The  first  was  nobly  steadfast,  but  the  second  was 
necessarily  dependent  upon  military  success.  When  at  last  the 
virtual  collapse  of  the  credit  indicated  the  increasing  public 
despondency,  it  was  plain  that  a  catastrophe  was  near  at  hand. 

It  has  been  generally  agreed  that  the  only  scheme  by  which 
the  South  could  have  assured  her  credit,  was  to  have  sent  large 
amounts  of  cotton  to  Europe,  during  the  first  year  of  the  war, 
while  the  blockade  was  not  effective.  This  plan,  if  successfully 
carried  out,  would  have  given  the  Confederacy  a  cash  basis  in 
Europe  of  several  hundred  millions  in  gold,  in  consequence  of 
.the  high  prices  commanded  by  cotton  afterwards.  With  even 
tolerable  management,  the  Confederacy  would  thus  have  been 
assured  means  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  war.  The  merit  of 
this  plan  depended  largely  upon  its  practicability.  Mr.  Davis 
approved  it,  but  it  is  easy  to  imagine  how — engrossed  with 
his  multifarious  cares,  and  occupied  in  meeting  the  pressing 
exigencies  of  each  day — he  lacked  opportunity  to  mature  and 
execute  a  measure  of  so  much  responsibility. 

While  the  campaign  in  Mississippi,  which  terminated  so 
disastrously,  was  still  pending,  General  Bragg  continued  to 
occupy  his  position  in  Southern  Tennessee.  Too  weak  to 
attack  Rosecrans,  because  of  the  reduction  of  his  army,  by  the 
reinforcements  sent  to  the  Mississippi,  Bragg  was  able  merely 
to  maintain  a  vigilant  observation  of  his  adversary.  After  the 
fall  of  Vicksburg  General  Rosecrans  received  reinforcements 
sufficient  to  justify  an  advance  against  the  Confederates.  After 
an  obstinate  resistance  the  Confederate  commander  was  flanked 
by  a  force,  which  the  superior  strength  of  his  antagonist  en 
abled  him  to  detach,  and  abandoned  a  line  of  great  natural 


MILITARY   REVERSES.  485 

strength,  and  strongly  fortified.  This  was  an  important  suc 
cess  to  the  enemy,  who  were  hereafter  able,  with  much  better 
prospects,  to  undertake  expeditions  against  the  heart  of  the 
Confederacy.  General  Bragg  extricated  his  army  from  a 
perilous  position,  and  made  a  successful  retreat  to  Chattanooga. 
Auxiliary  to  the  retreat  of  Bragg  was  the  diversion  made  by 
General  John  Morgan,  which  occasioned  the  detachment  of  a 
portion  of  Burnside's  forces  from  East  Tennessee,  which 
threatened  Bragg's  rear.  The  expedition  of  Morgan  was 
pushed  by  that  daring  officer  through  Kentucky  and  across 
the  Ohio,  to  the  great  alarm  of  the  States  upon  the  border  of 
that  river,  but  ended  in  the  capture  of  Morgan  and  nearly  all 
his  command. 

A  most  painful  surprise  to  the  South  was  the  surrender  of 
Cumberland  Gap,  early  in  September.  This  was  a  serious 
blow  at  the  whole  system  of  defense  in  Tennessee  and  the  ad 
jacent  States.  A  Richmond  newspaper  declared  that  the  pos 
session  of  Cumberland  Gap  gave  the  enemy  the  "  key  to  the 
back-door  of  Virginia  and  the  Confederacy ."  The  officer  in 
command  of  the  position  was  severely  censured  by  the  country, 
and  though  he  has  since  explained  his  conduct  in  terms,  which 
appear  to  be  satisfactory,  the  impression  prevailed  until  the 
end  of  the  war,  that  the  loss  of  this  most  important  position 
was  caused  by  gross  misconduct.  The  comment  of  President 
Davis  explains  the  serious  nature  of  this  affair:  "The  entire 
garrison,  including  the  commander,  being  still  held  prisoners 
by  the  enemy,  I  am  unable  to  suggest  any  explanation  of  this 
disaster,  which  laid  open  Eastern  Tennessee  and  South-western 
Virginia  to  hostile  operations,  and  broke  the  line  of  communi 
cation  between  the  seat  of  government  and  Middle  Tennessee. 
This  easy  success  of  the  enemy  was  followed  by  the  advance 


486  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESOX   DAVIS. 

of  General  Rosecrans  into  Georgia,  and  our  army  evacuated 
Chattanooga." 

Thus  the  cooperating  movements  of  Rosecrans  in  Middle 
Tennessee,  and  of  Burnside  in  East  Tennessee,  had  the  ample 
reward  of  expelling  the  Confederates  from  their  strong  lines 
of  defense  in  the  mountains.  Cumberland  Gap  controlled  the 
most  important  line  of  communication  in  the  Confederacy. 
Chattanooga  was  the  portal  from  which  the  enemy  could 
debouch  upon  the  level  country  of  the  Gulf  and  Atlantic 
States.  The  capture  of  Yicksburg  and  seizure  of  the  Missis 
sippi  Valley,  by  which  the  Confederacy  was  sundered,  was  the 
first  stage  of  conquest.  Chattanooga  was  now  the  base  from 
which  was  to  be  attempted  the  next  great  step  of  Federal  am 
bition — the  second  bisection  of  the  Confederacy. 

When  Rosecrans  advanced  into  Georgia,  after  his  occupation 
of  Chattanooga,  the  aspect  of  affairs  was  exceedingly  threaten 
ing,  and  it  became  necessary  to  strengthen  Bragg  sufficiently 
to  enable  him  to  give  battle,  and  thus  check  the  advance  of  the 
enterprising  Federal  commander.  With  this  view  the  corps 
of  Longstreet  was  temporarily  detached  from  Lee,  and  sent  to 
Bragg.  This  accession  to  his  forces  gave  General  Bragg  the 
opportunity  of  winning  one  of  the  most  brilliant  victories  of 
the  war.  The  signal  defeat  of  Rosecrans  was  followed  by  his 
precipitate  retreat  into  Chattanooga,  closely  pressed  by  Bragg. 

For  weeks  the  Federal  army  was  besieged  with  a  good  pros 
pect  for  its  ultimate  surrender.  The  imperiled  position  of 
Rosecrans  had  the  effect  of  relieving  the  pressure  of  invasion 
at  other  points,  forcing  the  concentration,  for  his  relief,  of 
large  bodies  of  troops  withdrawn  from  the  armies  in  the  Mis 
sissippi  Valley  and  in  Northern  Virginia.  General  Bragg 
made  an  able  disposition  of  his  forces  in  the  neighborhood  of 


EVENTS  NEAR  CHATTANOOGA.  487 

Chattanooga,  and  awaited  with  confidence  the  surrender  of 
Kosecraus.  He  subsequently  said  :  "  These  dispositions,  faith 
fully  sustained,  ensured  the  enemy's  speedy  evacuation  of 
Chattanooga  for  want  of  food  and  forage.  Possessed  of  the 
shortest  road  to  his  depot,  and  the  one  by  which  r  e'en/or  cements 
must  reach  him,  we  held  him  at  our  mercy,  and  his  destruction 
was  only  a  question  of  time." 

The  situation  fully  justified  this  statement.  So  crippled  was 
Hosecrans  by  his  defeat  at  Chickamauga,  that  an  attack  upon 
Bragg  was  out  of  the  question.  The  alternative  of  starvation, 
or  retreat,  seemed  forced  upon  the  Federal  army.  The  roads 
in  its  rear  were  in  a  terrible  condition,  and  the  distance  over 
which  its  supplies  had  to  be  drawn,  was  sixty  miles.  At  this 
critical  moment,  General  Grant,  whose  command  had  been  en 
larged,  after  his  success  at  Vicksburg,  and  now  embraced  the 
three  main  Federal  armies  in  the  West,  reached  the  field  of 
operations.  Grant  immediately  executed  a  plan  of  character 
istic  boldness,  by  which  he  effected  a  lodgment  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  secured  new  lines  of  com 
munication,  thus  relieving  the  beleaguered  army.  General 
Longstreet,  to  whom  the  holding  of  this  all-important  route 
was  confided,  made  an  unsuccessful  night  attack  designed  to 
defeat  Grant's  movement. 

Having  relieved  the  Federal  army  of  the  apprehension  of 
starvation  or  a  disastrous  retreat,  Grant  now  meditated  opera 
tions,  which,  however  hazardous,  or  however  in  violation  of 
probability  may  have  been  their  success,  were  fully  vindicated 
by  the  result.  Waiting  until  he  thought  his  accumulation  of 
forces  sufficient  to  justify  an  assault  upon  the  strong  positions 
of  the  Confederates,  Grant  finally  made  a  vigorous  and  well- 
planned  attack  with  nearly  his  entire  force.  The  result  was 


488  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

a  disastrous  defeat  and  retreat  of  Bragg's  army.  General 
Grant  claimed,  as  the  fruits  of  his  victory,  seven  thousand 
prisoners  and  nearly  fifty  pieces  of  artillery. 

There  were  circumstances  attending  this  battle  peculiarly 
discouraging  to  the  South.  These  circumstances  were  thus 
commented  upon  by  President  Davis: 

"  After  a  long  and  severe  battle,  in  which  great  carnage  was 
inflicted  on  him,  some  of  our  troops  inexplicably  abandoned  posi 
tions  of  great  strength,  and,  by  a  disorderly  retreat,  compelled  the 
commander  to  withdraw  the  forces  elsewhere  successful,  and  finally 
to  retire  with  his  whole  army  to  a  position  some  twenty  or  thirty 
miles  to  the  rear.  It  is  believed  that  if  the  troops  who  yielded  to 
the  assault  had  fought  with  the  valor  which  they  had  displayed  on 
previous  occasions,  and  which  was  manifested  in  this  battle  on  the 
other  parts  of  the  line,  the  enemy  would  have  been  repulsed  with 
very  great  slaughter,  and  our  country  would  have  escaped  the  mis 
fortune,  and  the  army  the  mortification  of  the  first  defeat  that  has 
resulted  from  misconduct  by  the  troops. 

With  this  disastrous  battle  terminated  the  connection  of 
General  Bragg  with  the  army,  which  he  commanded  during 
a  large  portion  of  its  varied  career.  Fully  acknowledging  his 
defeat,  General  Bragg  candidly  avowed  to  the  Government  the 
extent  of  a  reverse,  which  he  declared  disabled  him  from  any 
serious  resistance,  should  the  Federal  commander  press  his 
success.  At  his  own  request  he  was  relieved,  and,  seeking 
recuperation  for  his  shattered  health,  was  not  assigned  to  duty 
until  February,  1864,  when  President  Davis  ordered  him  to 
the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  "  Commanding  General,"  at 
Richmond,  the  position  held  by  General  Lee  before  his  trans 
fer  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


GENERAL   BRAGG.  489 

No  commander  was  more  harshly  criticised  than  Bragg,  and 
the  unfortunate  career  of  the  Western  army,  under  his  com 
mand,  was  an  inexhaustible  theme  for  diatribe  and  invective 
from  the  opponents  of  the  Confederate  administration.  Bragg 
wyas  often  declared  to  be,  at  once  the  most  incompetent  and 
unlucky  of  the  "  President's  favorites."  Yet  nothing  is  more 
certain  than  that  an  impartial  review  of  his  military  career 
will  demonstrate  General  Bragg  to  have  been  a  soldier  of 
rare  and  superior  merit.  It  certainly  can  not  be  claimed  that 
his  campaigns  exhibited  the  brilliant  and  solid  achievements 
of  several  of  those  conducted  by  Lee,  or  of  the  Valley  cam 
paign  of  Jackson.  The  great  disparity  of  numbers  and 
means  of  the  two  sections,  enabled  few  Confederate  command 
ers  to  achieve  the  distinction  of  unmarred  success,  even  before 
that  period  of  decline  when  disaster  was  the  rule,  and  victory 
the  exception  with  the  Confederate  forces. 

But  Bragg  can  not  justly  be  denied  the  merit  of  having, 
with  most  inadequate  means,  long  deferred  the  execution  of 
the  Federal  conquest  of  the  West.  At  the  time  of  his  as 
sumption  of  command,  in  June,  1862,  the  armies  of  Grant 
and  Buell,  nearly  double  his  own  aggregate  of  forces,  were 
overrunning  the  northern  borders  of  the  Gulf  States,  and 
threatening  the  very  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  His  masterly 
combinations,  attended  by  loss  altogether  disproportion ed  to 
the  results  accomplished,  recovered  large  sections  of  territory, 
which  had  been  for  months  the  easy  prey  of  the  enemy,  and 
transferred  the  seat  of  war  to  Middle  Tennessee.  Here  he 
maintained  his  position  for  nearly  a  year,  vigorously  assailing 
the  enemy  at  every  opportunity,  constantly  menacing  his  com 
munications,  and  firmly  holding  his  important  line,  in  the  face 
of  overwhelming  odds,  while  the  Confederate  armies  in  every 


490  LIFE   OF   JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

other  quarter  were  losing  ground.  Finally,  when  forced  back 
by  the  concentration  of  Federal  forces,  released  by  their  suc 
cesses  elsewhere,  Bragg  skillfully  eluded  the  combinations  for 
his  destruction,  and,  at  an  opportune  moment,  delivered  Rose- 
crans  one  of  the  most  timely  and  stunning  blows  inflicted  dur 
ing  the  war.  No  fact  of  the  war  is  more  clearly  established 
than  Bragg's  exculpation  from  any  responsibility  for  the  escape 
of  the  Federal  army  from  the  field  of  Chickamauga.  His  posi 
tive  commands  were  disobeyed,  his  plan  of  battle  threatened 
with  entire  derangement  by  the  errors  of  subordinates,  and  the 
escape  of  Rosecrans  secured  by  the  same  causes.  But  still  more 
cruel  was  the  disappointment  of  Bragg's  well-grounded  expec 
tation  of  a  successful  siege  of  Chattanooga.  So  clear  is  his 
exculpation  in  this  case,  that  no  investigation  of  facts,  severely 
reflecting  upon  others,  is  required. 

While  the  controversy  between  Bragg  and  Longstreet  was 
pending,  some  disposition  was  manifested  to  censure  the  former 
for  his  rejection  of  a  plan  of  campaign  proposed  by  Longstreet 
after  the  victory  of  Chickamauga.  The  latter  officer  suggested 
crossing  the  Tennessee  above  Chattanooga,  and  then  moving 
upon  the  enemy's  rear,  with  a  view  to  force  him  back  upon 
Nashville.  The  pregnant  criticism  of  General  Bragg  quickly 
disposes  of  the  suggestion.  Said  he :  "  The  suggestion  of  a 
movement  by  our  right,  immediately  after  the  battle,  to  the 
north  of  the  Tennessee,  and  thence  upon  Nashville,  requires 
notice  only  because  it  will  find  a  place  on  the  files  of  the  de 
partment.  Such  a  movement  was  utterly  impossible  for  want 
of  transportation.  Nearly  half  our  army  consisted  of  ree'n- 
forcements  just  before  the  battle,  without  a  wagon  or  an  artil 
lery  horse,  and  nearly,  if  not  quite,  a  third  of  the  artillery 
horses  on  the  field  had  been  lost.  The  railroad  bridges,  too, 


GENERAL   BEAGG.  491 

had  been  destroyed  to  a  point  south  of  Binggold,  and  on  all 
the  road  from  Cleveland  to  Knoxville.  To  these  insurmount 
able  difficulties  were  added  the  entire  absence  of  means  to 
cross  the  river,  except  by  fording  at  a  few  precarious  points 
too  deep  for  artillery,  and  the  well-known  danger  of  sudden 
rises,  by  which  all  communication  would  be  cut  off,  a  con 
tingency  which  did  actually  happen  a  few  days  after  the 
visionary  scheme  was  abandoned."  General  Bragg  continues 
a  recitation  of  cogent  considerations  in  support  of  his  objec 
tions  to  a  plan  which  he  declares  utterly  wanting  in  "  military 
propriety." 

The  culmination  of  Bragg's  unpopularity  was  his  defeat  at 
Missionary  Ridge.  No  officer,  save  Lee,  could,  by  any  possi 
bility,  have  hoped  for  a  dispassionate  judgment  by  the  public, 
at  this  desperate  stage  of  the  war,  of  an  affair  so  calamitous. 
The  real  explanation  of  that  battle  was  unquestionably  con 
tained  in  the  extract  from  President  Davis'  message  previously 
given.  Although  Bragg  could  oppose  but  little  more  than 
thirty  thousand  troops  to  the  eighty  thousand  which  Grant 
threw  against  him,  the  strength  of  his  position  would  have 
compensated  for  this  disparity,  had  his  troops  fought  with  the 
usual  spirit  of  Confederate  soldiers. 

It  was  not  to  be  anticipated  that  the  enemies  of  the  Presi 
dent  in  Congress  and  the  hostile  press  would  fail  to  find  a 
pretext  upon  which  to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  Mr. 
Davis.  The  disaster  was  declared  to  have  resulted  from  the 
detachment  of  Longstreet  for  an  expedition  into  East  Ten 
nessee.  It  is  only  necessary  to  state  the  facts  of  the  case  to 
show  the  falsity  and  injustice  of  this  criticism.  In  the  first 
place,  as  we  have  already  stated,  Bragg's  force  was  sufficient 
to  hold  his  tremendously  strong  position  without  Longstreet, 


492  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

should  his  army  fight  with  its  usual  spirit.  Secondly,  Long- 
street's  corps  was  a  part  of  Lee's  army,  detached  for  a  purely 
temporary  purpose  with  Bragg,  and  its  absence  was  a  source 
of  constant  anxiety  to  General  Lee.  This  temporary  purpose 
was  well  served  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  which  Bragg 
designed  to  be  a  destructive  blow,  and  which  failed  in  a  part 
of  its  purpose,  through  no  fault  of  that  commander. 

It  was  never  intended  to  leave  Longstreet  in  the  West  any 
longer  than  was  necessary  to  relieve  Bragg  in  his  great  exi 
gency  after  the  evacuation  of  Chattanooga.  That  result  being 
accomplished,  Lougstreet  was  detained  for  a  few  weeks,  in  the 
expectation  that  Rosecrans,  driven  to  desperation  by  his  ne 
cessities,  would  attempt  to  retreat,  in  which  event,  Long- 
street  could  perform  valuable  service  in  aiding  to  destroy 
the  Federal  army.  When  Grant,  however,  opened  the  Fed 
eral  communications,  and  Longstreet  was  foiled  in  his  effort 
to  prevent  it,  there  was  no  longer  a  sufficient  reason  for  his 
detention  so  far  from  Lee.  Accordingly,  he  was  sent  through 
East  Tennessee,  with  the  double  design  of  opening  communi 
cation  with  Virginia,  where,  at  any  moment,  he  might  be 
needed,  and  of  clearing  East  Tennessee  of  the  forces  of  Burn- 
side. 

Had  Longstreet's  expedition  been  successful,  it  can  not  be 
doubted  that  the  pressure  against  Bragg  would  have  been  im 
mediately  relieved,  and  a  vital  section  restored  to  the  Confed 
eracy.  We  can  not  pause,  however,  to  review  the  incidents 
of  General  Longstreet's  movement,  nor  to  revive  the  contro 
versy  between  himself  and  a  subordinate,  evoked  by  an  expe 
dition  whose  results  exhibited  few  features  of  success. 

President  Davis,  better  acquainted  with  the  facts  of  the  war 
than  the  critics  who  so  often  mislead  the  public,  held  General 


OPERATIONS   IN  VIRGINIA.  493 

Bragg  In  that  high  estimation  to  which  his  unquestioned  pa 
triotism  and  his  military  qualities  entitled  him.  Of  General 
Bragg  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  he  made  the  most  of  his 
opportunities  and  his  means.  If  he  made  retreats,  they  were 
always  preceded  by  bloody  fights,  and  marked  by  obstinate 
resistance.  If  his  constrained  and  sullen  retreats  lost  terri 
tory,  they  were  not  comparable  in  that  respect  with  that 
mysterious  "strategy"  of  other  commanders  in  high  favor 
with  the  opponents  of  Mr.  Davis,  which  eventually  threatened 
to  "toll"  the  enemy  to  the  Atlantic  coast,  or  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  without  once  bringing  him  to  a  general  engagement. 

Bragg  never  feared  to  stake  his  fame  on  the  gage  of  battle, 
and,  if  he  sustained  reverses,  he  won  many  more  victories. 
An  educated  soldier,  he  was  also  a  rigid  disciplinarian,  and 
had  little  toleration  for  the  demagogism  so  conspicuous  in 
volunteer  armies.  This  was  the  occasion  of  much  of  the  per 
sonal  enmity  by  which  he  was  embarrassed  both  in  and  out 
of  the  army.  But,  whatever  the  justice  of  the  public  condem 
nation  of  Bragg,  his  period  of  usefulness  in  the  Western  army 
was  at  an  end.  Very  soon  afterwards  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston  took  command  of  the  army  in  Northern  Georgia. 

The  two  armies  in  Virginia,  weakened  by  the  detachments 
from  each  sent  to  the  West,  continued  inactive  until  autumn. 
In  October,  General  Lee  prepared  a  brilliant  campaign,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  place  his  army  between  General  Meade 
and  Washington.  Meade,  though  forced  back  to  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Manassas  and  Centreville,  had  become  apprized 
of  Lee's  movement  in  time  to  prevent  the  consummation  of 
the  strategy  of  the  Confederate  commander.  An  incident  of 
the  expedition  was  the  severe  repulse  of  a  part  of  General  Hill's 
command,  attended  with  considerable  loss.  Meanwhile,  General 


494  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

Imboden,  cooperating  with  the  movements  of  the  main  army, 
captured  several  hundred  prisoners  and  valuable  stores  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  Early  in  November,  nearly  two  thousand 
Confederates  were  captured  at  Rappahannock  Station  by  a 
movement  marked  by  skill  and  gallantry  on  the  part  of  Gen 
eral  Sedgwick.  The  campaign  in  Northern  Virginia  terminated 
with  a  handsome  success  by  the  division  of  General  Edward 
Johnson  over  a  large  detachment  from  Meade's  army  at  Mine 
Eun.  In  December,  General  Averill,  with  a  force  of  Federal 
cavalry,  made  a  destructive  raid  into  South-western  Virginia, 
and  destroyed  portions  of  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Rail 
road. 

At  the  close  of  1863,  there  were  many  signs  of  the  ap 
proaching  exhaustion  of  the  South,  yet  there  was  good  reason 
to  hope  that,  by  a  vigorous  use  of  means  yet  remaining,  the 
war  might  be  brought  to  a  favorable  conclusion.  The  peace 
party  of  the  North,  despite  the  increased  strength  and  popu 
larity  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration,  resulting  from  the  Fed 
eral  successes  of  the  summer,  was  evidently  becoming  more 
bold  and  defiant.  The  whole  North,  too,  was  disappointed  at 
the  prospect  of  an  indefinite  resistance  by  the  South.  Gettys 
burg  and  Vioksburg  were  not  followed,  as  had  been  antici 
pated,  by  the  immediate  collapse  of  the  Confederacy.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  South  had  much  to  anticipate  from  a 
bold  and  defiant  front  at  the  opening  of  the  next  campaign. 
Unquestionably  its  resources  were  less  adequate  than  before, 
but  there  was  evidently  capacity  to  prolong  the  war  for  an 
almost  indefinite  period.  Thus,  while  the  Confederacy  could 
not  cherish  the  hope  of  daring  exploits  at  the  opening  of  the 
campaign,  which  should  again  make  the  enemy  apprehensive 
for  his  own  homes,  there  was  a  well-grounded  anticipation  of 


WANING   STRENGTH   OF   THE   SOUTH.  495 

a  successful  defensive,  which  should  wear  out  the  enemy's  ar 
dor,  and  again  present  opportunities  for  bold  enterprise. 

The  message  of  President  Davis  to  Congress,  which  met 
early  in  December,  was  one  of  his  ablest  productions.  Re 
viewing  the  entire  field  of  the  war,  in  its  more  important 
phases,  it  was  equally  remarkable  for  its  frank  statement  of 
the  situation,  and  for  the  energetic  policy  recommended. 

There  could  be  no  difficulty  in  comprehending  the  needs  of 
the  Confederacy  at  this  distressing  period.  The  three  great 
elements  of  war — men,  money,  and  subsistence — were  now  de 
manded  to  a  greatly  increased  extent.  In  nothing  was  the  cam 
paign  of  1863  more  fatal,  than  in  the  terrible  losses  inflicted  on 
the  armies  of  the  Confederacy.  At  the  close  of  the  year,  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  including  the  absent  corps  of 
Longstreet,  was  weaker,  by  more  than  a  third  of  the  force  carried 
into  Pennsylvania.  The  losses  of  the  Western  army  had  fear 
fully  diminished  its  strength,  and  its  frequent  disasters  had 
greatly  impaired  its  morale.  Measures  were  now  required 
which  should  repair  the  losses,  and,  if  possible,  increase  the 
army  beyond  its  strength  at  the  opening  of  the  previous  cam 
paign,  in  order  to  meet  the  enormous  conscription  preparing 
at  the  North. 

President  Davis"  indicated  the  following  methods  of  adding 
to  the  army  :  "  Restoring  to  the  army  all  who  are  improp 
erly  absent,  putting  an  end  to  substitution,  modifying  the 
exemption  law,  restricting  details,  and  placing  in  the  ranks 
such  of  the  able-bodied  men  now  employed  as  wagoners,  nurses, 
cooks,  and  other  employes  as  are  doing  service,  for  which  the 
negroes  may  be  found  competent." 

These  were  evidently  the  last  expedients  by  which  the  Con 
federate  armies  could  be  recruited  from  the  white  population. 


496  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

By  successive  enactments  Congress  had  empowered  the  Presi 
dent  to  call  into  the  field  all  persons  between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  forty-five.  The  exigency  consequent  upon  the 
reverses  of  the  summer  had  necessitated  the  requisition  of  the 
last  reserves  provided  by  Congress — the  class  between  forty 
and  forty-five.  Conscription  had  failed  to  give  the  effective 
strength  calculated  upon.  Each  extension  of  the  law  exhib 
ited,  in  the  result,  an  accession  of  numbers  greatly  below  the 
estimate  upon  which  it  was  based.  This  was  largely  due  to 
the  inefficient  execution  of  the  law,  and  to  the  opposition  which 
it  encountered  in  many  localities.  But  the  results  also  indi 
cated  a  most  exaggerated  estimate  of  the  available  arms-bear 
ing  population  of  the  South.  In  the  latter  part  of  1863,  the 
rolls  of  the  Adjutant-General's  office  in  Richmond  showed  a 
little  more  than  four  hundred  thousand  men  under  arms ;  and 
Secretary  Seddon  stated  that,  from  desertions  and  other  causes, 
"  not  more  than  a  half — never  two-thirds — of  the  soldiers  were 
in  the  ranks. " 

The  message  of  Mr.  Davis  indicated  defective  features  in 
the  system  of  conscription,  and  suggested  improvements  as 
follows : 

"  On  the  subject  of  exemptions,  it  is  believed  that  abuses  can 
not  be  checked  unless  the  system  is  placed  on  a  basis  entirely 
different  from  that  now  provided  by  law.  The  object  of  your  legis 
lation  has  been,  not  to  confer  privileges  on  classes,  but  to  exon 
erate  from  military  duty  such  number  of  persons  skilled  in  the 
various  trades,  professions,  and  mechanical  pursuits,  as  could  ren 
der  more  valuable  service  to  their  country  by  laboring  in  their 
present  occupation  than  by  going  into  the  ranks  of  the  army.  The 
policy  is  unquestionable,  but  the  result  would,  it  is  thought,  be 
better  obtained  by  enrolling  all  such  persons,  and  allowing  details 


EXECUTIVE   RECOMMENDATIONS.  497 

to  be  made  of  the  number  necessary  to  meet  the  wants  of  the 
country.  Considerable  numbers  are  believed  to  be  now  exempted 
from  the  military  service  who  are  not  needful  to  the  public  in  their 
civil  vocation. 

"  Certain  duties  are  now  performed  throughout  the  country  by 
details  from  the  army,  which  could  be  as  well  executed  by  persons 
above  the  present  conscript  age.  An  extension  of  the  limit,  so 
as  to  embrace  persons  over  forty-five  years,  and  physically  fit  for 
service  in  guarding  posts,  railroads,  and  bridges,  in  apprehending 
deserters,  and,  where  practicable,  assuming  the  place  of  younger 
men  detailed  for  duty  with  the  nitre,  ordnance,  commissary,  and 
quartermaster's  bureaus  of  the  War  Department,  would,  it  is  hoped, 
add  largely  to  the  effective  force  in  the  field,  without  an  undue 
burden  on  the  population." 

The  message  further  recommended  legislation  replacing 
"not  only  enlisted  cooks,  but  wagoners,  and  other  employes 
in  the  army,  by  negroes."  From  these  measures  the  President 
expected  that  the  army  would  be  "so  strengthened,  for  the 
ensuing  campaign,  as  to  put  at  defiance  the  utmost  efforts  of 
the  enemy." 

But  the  meagre  results  of  conscription  revealed  not  only  an 
excessive  calculation  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  Confed 
eracy  ;  they  indicated  the  reluctance  with  which  the  harsh  ne 
cessities  of  the  war,  in  its  later  stages,  were  met.  As  the  war 
was  protracted,  popular  ardor  naturally  waned,  and  in  the  pres 
ence  of  losses  and  reverses,  the  spirit  of  voluntary  sacrifice 
gradually  disappeared.  Draft  and  impressment  were  now  re 
quired  to  obtain  the  services  and  the  means,  which,  in  the  be 
ginning,  were  lavishly  proffered. 

Partially  the  result  of  a  natural  popular  weariness  of  the  in 
creasing  exactions  of  a  long  and  exhaustive  struggle,  these  were 
32 


498  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

also  the  legitimate  fruits  of  the  distrust  so  assiduously  inculca 
ted  by  the  fault-finders.  When  reverses  to  their  armies  came 
with  appalling  rapidity,  and,  in  many  instances,  in  spite  of  the 
exertions  of  their  ablest  and  most  popular  leaders,  the  people 
saw  confidence  and  industry  only  in  their  Government,  and 
that  Government  they  were  constantly  taught  to  believe  grossly 
incompetent  and  unworthy.  Under  such  circumstances,  how 
could  there  be  that  unity  and  cooperation,  without  which  the 
cause  was  preordained  to  failure?  In  that  industry  which 
sought  every  possible  occasion  for  censure,  that  ingenuity  which 
exaggerated  every  error,  that  intemperance  which  filled  the 
halls  of  Congress  with  denunciation,  and  the  land  with  clamor 
and  discontent,  the  North  at  last  found  allies  which  ably  as 
sisted  its  armies. 

More  violent,  intemperate,  and  unscrupulous  than  ever,  were 
the  assaults  upon  the  administration,  in  that  long  period  of 
agony  which  followed  the  disasters  in  Mississippi  and  Penn 
sylvania.  Such  was  an  appropriate  occasion,  when  a  grief- 
stricken  country  implored  the  unanimity  which  alone  could 
bring  relief,  for  agitation,  revenge,  and  invective.  In  Congress 
Mr.  Davis  was  assailed  with  furious  vituperation,  because  he 
had  refused,  at  the  instance  of  a  member,  to  remove  Bragg,  and 
place  Johnston  in  command  of  the  Western  army.  Yet  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  after  a  visit  to  Tennessee,  earnestly  advised  the 
President  not  to  remove  Bragg,  as  the  public  interests  would 
suffer  by  that  step.  Almost  daily  Mr.  Davis  was  assailed  for 
not  having  properly  estimated  the  war,  in  the  diatribes  of  an 
able  editor,  who  himself,  but  a  few  weeks  before  hostilities 
opened,  declared  there  would  be  no  war.  Of  such  a  character 
were  the  accusers  and  the  accusations. 

If  Jefferson  Davis  courted  revenge,  he  could  find  ample  sat- 


DEFICIENCY   OF   SUPPLIES.  499 

isfaction  in  the  contrast  between  himself  and  some  of  his  fore 
most  accusers,  which  the  sequel  has  drawn.  He  fell  at  last, 
but  only  when  that  cause  was  lost,  which  he  unselfishly  loved, 
and  which  his  heart  followed  to  its  glorious  grave.  His  name 
is  already  immortal — the  embodiment  of  the  heroism,  the  vir 
tues,  the  sufferings,  the  glory  of  a  people  who  revere  him  and 
scorn  his  persecutors.  Nor  can  the  South  forget  that  many, 
who,  during  her  arduous  struggle,  constantly  assailed  her 
chosen  ruler,  have  since  taken  refuge  in  the  camp  of  those 
who  first  conquered,  and  now  seek  to  degrade  her  people. 

A  source  of  universal  alarm  in  the  South,  at  this  period,  was 
the  deficiency  of  food.  We  have  elsewhere  quoted  freely  the 
admonitions  of  President  Davis  respecting  the  question  of  sup 
plies,  and  indicating  the  cause  which  led  to  so  much  suffering 
in  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy.  Ever  since  the  loss  of  large 
sections  of  Tennessee,  in  the  spring  of  1862,  this  subject  had 
occasioned  anxiety.  Without  entering  into  details,  it  may  be 
briefly  stated,  that,  with  the  loss  of  Kentucky  and  the  larger 
portion  of  Tennessee,  the  Confederacy  lost  the  main  source  of 
its  supplies  of  meat.  As  other  sections  were  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  communications  were  destroyed,  the  area  of  the 
Confederacy  became  more  and  more  contracted,  and  its  sources 
of  supply  still  more  limited.  Even  when  supplies  were  abun 
dant  in  many  quarters,  the  armies  in  the  field  suffered  actual 
want,  in  consequence  of  the  want  of  transportation,  and  of  the 
remoteness  of  the  supplies  from  the  lines  of  the  railroads. 

But  while  the  meat  in  the  Confederacy  was  rapidly  dimin 
ishing  in  quantity,  as  the  Federal  armies  advanced,  and  seized 
or  destroyed  every  thing  in  the  shape  of  subsistence,  the  army 
was  still  deprived  of  supplies  which  should  have  been  made 
available.  The  unpatriotic  practice  of  hoarding  supplies — a 


500  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

temptation  suggested  by  the  rife  spirit  of  speculation,  arising 
from  a  redundant  and  depreciated  currency — necessitated  the 
passage  of  impressment  laws.  These  laws  were  practically 
rendered  nugatory  by  the  inadequate  provisions  for  their  exe 
cution.  In  no  respect  was  the  timid  and  demagogical  legisla 
tion  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  so  illustrated  as  by  its  adop 
tion  of  a  system  of  impressment,  which  aggravated  the  very 
evil  it  was  designed  to  remedy. 

Various  expedients  were  attempted,  with  partial  success,  for 
obtaining  subsistence  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy. 
It  will  be  readily  seen,  however,  how  precarious  was  this  de 
pendence.  It  was  impossible  for  the  Confederacy  to  maintain 
its  armies,  while  its  resources  in  every  other  respect  were  rap 
idly  reaching  the  point  of  exhaustion.  In  the  end  the  want  of 
food  proved  the  most  efficient  adversary  of  the  South.  The 
final  military  catastrophe  made  the  Federal  army  master  of  a 
country  already  half  conquered  by  starvation.* 

*  My  limited  space  has  prevented  the  extended  account  of  the  Confed 
erate  Commissary  Department,  which  was  originally  designed.  The  his 
tory  of  its  commissariat  is  an  important  chapter  in  the  history  of  the 
Confederacy.  President  Davis  was  much  abused  for  his  retention  of  Col 
onel  Northrop,  who  has  been  charged,  both  during  and  since  the  war,  with 
incompetency,  corruption,  and  every  conceivable  abuse  of  his  office.  The 
amount  of  truth,  in  the  charge  of  corruption  against  Colonel  Northrop, 
may  be  estimated,  when  we  state  a  fact  known  almost  universally  in  Rich 
mond,  that  few  persons  suffered  the  privations  of  the  war  more  severely 
than  he.  Hundreds  of  the  most  respectable  gentlemen  in  the  iSouth  will 
ingly  testify  to  the  unimpeachable  patriotism  and  purity  of  Colonel  Nor 
throp.  Equally  false  was  the  statement  that  Mr.  Davis  gratified  merely 
his  personal  partiality  in  appointing  Commissary-General  a  man  who  had 
given  no  previous  evidence  of  fitness.  Colonel  Northrop,  when  in  the 
regular  Federal  army,  had  seen  extensive  service  in  that  department, 
where  he  was  detailed,  after  having  been  disabled.  His  services  were 


COLONEL   NORTHROP.  501 

amply  testified  to  by  his  superiors,  who  regarded  him  as  having  peculiar 
qualifications  for  the  duties  of  the  commissariat.  Of  these  facts  Mr.  Davis 
had  personal  knowledge,  though,  when  he  placed  Colonel  Northrop  at  the 
head  of  the  Confederate  commissariat,  they  had  not  met  for  more  than 
twenty  years. 

Again,  when  commissioned  by  Mr.  Davis,  Colonel  Northrop  was  the 
Commissary-General  of  South  Carolina — a  position  to  which  he  would 
hardly  have  been  invited,  without  at  least  some  conviction,  by  the  authori 
ties  of  that  State,  of  his  fitness.  It  is  well  known,  too,  that  a  committee 
of  the  Confederate  Congress  investigated  the  affairs  of  the  Commissary 
Department,  and  made  a  report  which  amply  and  honorably  vindicated 
Colonel  Northrop.  Indeed,  a  member  of  that  committee,  one  of  the  ablest 
men  in  Virginia,  and  not  friendly  to  Mr.  Davis,  declared  it  to  be  the  best 
managed  department  of  the  Confederate  Government. 

Editors  perpetually  clamored  against  Colonel  Northrop  for  issuing  half 
rations  to  the  army,  who  daily  issued  half  sheets  to  their  subscribers — re 
fusing  to  understand  that  in  each  case  the  cause  was  the  same,  viz.,  an 
exhaustion  of  supply,  resulting  from  the  depletion  of  the  resources  of  the 
country. 


502  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

AN  EFFORT  TO  BLACKEN  THE  CHARACTER  OF  THE  SOUTH — THE  PERSECUTION  OP 
MR.  DAVIS  AS  THE  SUBSTITUTE  FOR  THE  ASSUMED  OFFENSES  OF  THE  SOUTH — 

REPUTATION  OF  THE   SOUTH    FOR    HUMANITY TREATMENT   OF   PRISONERS   OF 

WAR — EARLY  ACTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  UPON  THE  SUBJECT 
— MR.  DAVIS'  LETTER  TO  MR.  LINCOLN — THE  COBB-WOOL  NEGOTIATIONS — PER 
FIDIOUS  CONDUCT  OF  THE  FEDERAL  AUTHORITIES A  CARTEL  ARRANGED  BY 

GENERALS  DIX  AND  HILL — COMMISSIONER  OULD — HIS  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH 

THE   FEDERAL  AGENT    OF  EXCHANGE REPEATED   PERFIDY    OF   THE    FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT SUSPENSION    OF  THE    CARTEL    CAUSED    BY  THE    BAD    FAITH    OF 

THE  FEDERAL  ADMINISTRATION,  AND  THE  SUFFERING  WHICH  IT  CAUSED — 
EFFORTS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES  TO  RENEW  THE  OPERATION  OF 
THE  CARTEL — HUMANE  OFFER  OF  COMMISSIONER  OULD — JUSTIFICATION  OF  THE 
CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES — GUILT  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT — MR. 
DAVIS*  STATEMENT  OF  THE  MATTER COLONEL  OULD's  LETTER  TO  MR.  ELD- 
RIDGE — NORTHERN  STATEMENTS :  GENERAL  BUTLER,  NEW  YORK  TRIBUNE, 
ETC. — THE  CHARGE  OF  CRUELTY  AGAINST  THE  SOUTH — A  CONTRAST  BETWEEN 
ANDERSONVILLE  AND  ELMIRA — IMPOVERISHMENT  OF  THE  SOUTH— DISREPU 
TABLE  MEANS  EMPLOYED  TO  AROUSE  RESENTMENT  OF  THE  NORTH— THE  VIN 
DICATION  OF  THE  SOUTH  AND  OF  MR  DAVIS HIS  STAINLESS  CHARACTER,  HIS 

HUMANITY  AND  FORBEARANCE — AN  INQUIRY  OF  HISTORY. 

IT  is  in  vain  to  invoke  the  admiration  of  mankind  for  qual 
ities  of  greatness,  displayed  either  in  the  history  of  a  nation 
or  the  life  of  an  individual,  unless  those  qualities  shall  have 
been  adorned  by  the  practice  of  humanity  and  the  observance 
of  high  moral  obligation.  Since  the  political  fabric  of  the  South 
has  been  overthrown,  a  brave  and  virtuous  people  cherish  with 
a  more  tenacious  affection  than  ever,  that  honorable  reputation 
which  was  their  birthright,  and  which  they  worthily  illus- 


AN   INFAMOUS   DESIGN.  503 

trated  during  the  late  war.  The  violent  commotion  with 
which  the  American  Union  was  but  lately  convulsed  has  re 
newed  the  historical  analogy  of  revolutions,  not  less  in  the 
sequel  than  in  its  progress.  When  the  strife  of  arms  was 
ended,  and  the  two  great  armies  ceased  their  death  struggles, 
and  parted  with  that  mutual  respect  which  is  characteristic 
of  brave  antagonists,  events  were  far  from  encouraging  the 
cessation  of  sectional  bitterness  which  was  to  be  hoped  for. 

The  dominant  party  at  the  North,  apparently  not  satisfied 
with  the  political  overthrow  of  the  South,  and  the  complete 
extinction  of  its  social  system,  has  followed  up  the  triumphs 
of  the  Federal  armies  with  a  persistent  and  implacable  war 
upon  the  character  and  reputation  of  the  South.  To  affix  a 
stigma  upon  a  conquered  foe,  to  brand  with  infamy  a  class  of 
their  own  countrymen — the  descendants  of  the  compatriots  of 
Franklin,  Hancock,  and  Adams — and  to  consign  to  perpetual 
obloquy  a  cause  which  enlisted  the  sympathies  of  five  millions 
of  people,  are  the  aims  of  a  malignant  and  remorseless  fac 
tion.  These  are  the  motives  which  have  instigated  the  effort 
to  frame  an  indictment  against  the  Christianity,  the  morality, 
arid  the  humanity  of  the  South,  and  to  visit  every  form  of 
degradation,  to  practice  every  refinement  of  cruelty  upon  its 
most  distinguished  representative. 

It  is  impossible  to  explain,  upon  any  other  theory,  the  ex 
ceptional  rigor  with  which,  since  the  termination  of  the  war, 
Mr.  Davis  has  been  pursued.  As  the  most  honored  by  the 
South,  he  has  been  selected  as  the  proper  substitute  upon 
whom  to  visit  the  offenses  of  his  people.  To  convict  Jeffer 
son  Davis  of  heinous  offenses  against  humanity  is  to  blacken 
the  cause  which  he  represented — to  degrade  the  people  of 
whom  he  was  the  chosen  ruler.  The  North  should  have  been 


504  LIFE  OP  JEFFEHSON  DAVIS. 

admonished,  by  previous  examples,  of  the  futility  of  its  at 
tempts  to  prejudge  historical  questions  of  such  moment.  Of 
what  avail  were  the  malignity,  the  misrepresentation,  and  the 
unrelenting  vindictiveness  of  England  against  Napoleon? 

As  yet,  the  North  has  been  unable,  even  by  ex  parte  evi 
dence,  to  obtain  a  pretext  for  the  arraignment  of  Jefferson 
Davis  for  those  atrocious  crimes  of  which  it  was  pretended 
he  was  guilty.  Even  perjury  has  proven  inadequate  to  the 
invention  of  material  with  which  to  sustain  a  complicity  in 
guilt,  from  which  his  previous  character  alone  should  have 
vindicated  him.  Who  can  doubt  the  inevitable  recoil  when 
the  investigations  of  history,  unobstructed  by  prejudice  and 
passion,  shall  lay  bare  the  facts  upon  which  posterity  will 
render  its  verdict?  History,  in  such  a  question,  will  know 
neither  North  nor  South,  nor  will  it  accept  all  testimony  as 
truth  which  comes  under  the  guise  of  "  loyalty,"  nor  reject  as 
falsehood  all  upon  which  has  been  placed  the  odium  of  "  dis 
loyalty." 

In  this  volume,  we  could  not,  even  if  so  disposed,  avoid 
reference  to  that  question  which  so  involves  the  honor  and 
humanity  of  the  South — the  extent  of  her  regard,  in  the  con 
duct  of  the  late  war,  for  those  moral  obligations  which  are  rec 
ognized  by  all  Christian  and  civilized  communities.  The  course 
of  her  enemies  has  left  the  South  no  alternative,  and  she  can 
not  be  apprehensive  of  the  result  when  the  record  is  fairly 
consulted. 

We  have  now  reached,  with  a  due  regard  for  chronological 
order,  a  point  where  naturally  arises  the  subject  of  the  treat 
ment  of  prisoners,  which,  in  the  later  months  of  1863,  assumed 
its  most  interesting  phase.  We  approach  the  subject  not  with 
any  expectation  of  enlightenment  of  the  Northern  mind.  Upon 


TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS.  505 

this  subject  a  large  portion  of  the  Northern  people  have  res 
olutely  turned  their  backs  upon  all  statements  which  do  not 
favor  their  sectional  prejudices.  Calumnies  are  often  believed 
by  mere  force  of  iteration ;  and  so  persistent  has  been  the  effort 
to  poison  the  Northern  mind  with  falsehood  that  at  least  a 
generation  must  pass  away  before  the  South  can  expect  an  im 
partial  hearing.  Nevertheless,  by  grouping  together,  in  these 
pages,  important  testimony  from  various  sources,  and  confined 
to  neither  section,  we  hope  to  promote,  however  feebly,  the 
great  end  of  historic  truth. 

At  an  early  period  of  the  contest,  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  recognized  its  obligation  to  treat  prisoners  of  war  with 
humanity  and  consideration.  Before  any  action  was  taken  by 
Congress  upon  the  subject,  the  executive  authorities  provided 
prisoners  with  proper  quarters  and  barracks,  and  with  rations 
— the  same  in  quantity  and  quality  as  those  furnished  to  the 
Confederate  soldiers  who  guarded  them.  The  first  action  of 
Congress  with  reference  to  prisoners  was  taken  on  the  21st  of 
May,  1861.  Congress  then  provided  that  "all  prisoners  of 
war  taken,  whether  on  land  or  at  sea,  during  the  pending  hos 
tilities  with  the  United  States,  shall  be  transferred  by  the  cap 
tors  from  time  to  time,  and  as  often  as  convenient,  to  the  De 
partment  of  War;  and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  with  the  approval  of  the  President,  to  issue  such  in 
structions  to  the  Quartermaster-General  and  his  subordinates 
as  shall  provide  for  the  safe  custody  and  sustenance  of  pris 
oners  of  war ;  and  the  rations  furnised  prisoners  of  war  shall  be 
the  same  in  quantity  and  quality  as  those  furnished  to  enlisted 
men  in  the  army  of  the  Confederacy."  This  declared  policy  of 
the  Confederate  authorities  was  adhered  to,  not  only  in  the 
earlier  months  of  the  war,  when  provisions  were  abundant, 


506  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

but  was  afterwards  pursued  as  far  as  possible  under  the  pecu 
liar  style  of  warfare  waged  by  the  North.  Even  amid  the 
losses  and  privations  to  which  the  enemy  subjected  them,  they 
sought  to  carry  out  the  humane  purpose  of  this  solemn  dec 
laration. 

The  first  public  announcement  by  President  Davis,  with 
respect  to  prisoners,  was  made  in  a  letter  to  President  Lin 
coln,  dated  July  6th,  1861.  This  letter  was  called  forth  by 
the  alleged  harsh  treatment  of  the  crew  of  the  Confederate 
vessel  Savannah,  then  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
We  extract  a  paragraph  of  this  letter : 

"  It  is  the  desire  of  this  Government  so  to  conduct  the  war  now 
existing,  as  to  mitigate  its  horrors  as  far  as  may  be  possible  ;  and, 
with  this  intent,  its  treatment  of  the  prisoners  captured  by  its 
forces  has  been  marked  by  the  greatest  humanity  and  leniency 
consistent  with  public  obligation ;  some  have  been  permitted  to 
return  home  on  parole,  others  to  remain  at  large  under  similar 
condition  within  this  Confederacy,  and  all  have  been  furnished 
with  rations  for  their  subsistence,  such  as  are  allowed  to  our  own 
troops.  It  is  only  since  the  news  has  been  received  of  the  treat 
ment  of  the  prisoners  taken  on  the  Savannah,  that  I  have  been 
compelled  to  withdraw  these  indulgences,  and  to  hold  the  prisoners 
taken  by  us  in  strict  confinement." 

In  his  message,  dated  July  20th,  1861,  he  mentioned  this 
letter,  and  thus  alluded  to  the  expected  reply  from  President 
Lincoln : 

"  I  earnestly  hope  this  promised  reply  (which  has  not  yet  been 
received)  will  convey  the  assurance  that  prisoners  of  war  will  be 
treated,  in  this  unhappy  contest,  with  that  regard  for  humanity, 
which  has  made  such  conspicuous  progress  in  the  conduct  of 
modern  warfare." 


THE   WOOL-COBB   CARTEL.  507 

Several  months  elapsed,  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities, 
before  the  captures  on  either  side  were  sufficiently  numerous 
to  demand  much  consideration.  A  proposition  was  even  made 
in  the  Confederate  Congress,  to  return  the  Federal  prisoners, 
taken  at  the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  without  any  formality 
whatever. 

In  February,  1862,  negotiations  occurred  between  the  two 
governments,  with  a  view  to  the  arrangement  of  a  system  of 
exchange.  In  these  negotiations  Generals  Howell  Cobb  and 
Wool  represented  their  respective  Governments.  The  result 
was  a  cartel,  by  which  prisoners  of  either  side  should  be 
paroled  within  ten  days  after  their  capture,  and  delivered  on 
the  frontier  of  their  own  country.  A  point  of  difference  was, 
however,  raised,  as  to  a  provision  requiring  each  party  to  pay 
the  expense  of  transporting  their  prisoners  to  the  frontier. 
This  difference  General  Wool  reported  to  the  Federal  Govern 
ment,  which  refused  to  pay  these  expenses.  At  a  second  in 
terview,  March  1st,  1862,  this  action  of  the  Federal  author 
ities  being  made  known  to  General  Cobb,  the  latter  immedi 
ately  conceded  the  point,  and  proposed  to  make  the  cartel  con 
form  in  all  its  features  to  the  wishes  of  General  Wool.  The 
latter  declined  any  arrangement,  declaring  "that  his  Govern 
ment  had  changed  his  instructions,"  and  abruptly  terminated 
the  negotiations. 

The  explanation  of  this  conduct  was  apparent.  While  the 
negotiations  between  Generals  Wool  and  Cobb  were  pending, 
Fort  Donelson  had  fallen,  reversing  the  previous  state  of 
things,  and  giving  the  North  an  excess  of  prisoners.  These 
prisoners,  instead  of  being  sent  South  on  parole,  were  carried 
into  the  interior  of  the  North,  and  treated  with  severity  and 
indignity.  Repudiating  this  agreement,  just  as  soon  as  it  was 


508  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ascertained  that  their  captures  at  Donelson  placed  the  South  at 
disadvantage,  the  Federal  authorities  foreshadowed  that  "  con 
sistently  perfidious  conduct/'  which  President  Davis  declared 
to  be  characteristic  of  their  entire  course  upon  the  subject. 

It  was  impossible  to  bring  the  Federal  Government  to  any 
arrangement,  until  the  fortune  of  war  again  placed  the  Con 
federates  in  possession  of  the  larger  number  of  prisoners.  An 
immediate  consequence  of  the  Confederate  successes  in  the 
summer  of  1862,  was  the  indication  of  a  more  accommodating 
spirit  by  the  enemy.  Negotiations  between  General  D.  H.  Hill, 
on  behalf  of  the  Confederate  authorities,  and  General  John  A. 
Dix,  on  behalf  of  his  Government,  resulted  in  the  adoption 
of  a  new  cartel  of  a  completely  satisfactory  and  humane  char 
acter.  Under  this  cartel,  which  continued  in  operation  for 
twelve  months,  the  Confederate  authorities  restored  to  the 
enemy  many  thousands  of  prisoners  in  excess  of  those  whom 
they  held  for  exchange,  and  encampments  of  the  surplus  pa 
roled  prisoners  were  established  in  the  United  States,  where 
the  men  were  able  to  receive  the  comforts  and  solace  of  con 
stant  communication  with  their  homes  and  families.  In  July, 
1863,  the  fortune  of  war  again  favored  the  enemy,  and  they 
were  enabled  to  exchange  for  duty  the  men  previously  de 
livered  to  them,  against  those  captured  and  paroled  at  Yicks- 
burg  and  Port  Hudson.  The  prisoners  taken  at  Gettysburg, 
however,  remained  in  their  hands,  and  should  have  been  at 
once  returned  to  the  Confederate  lines  on  parole,  to  await  ex 
change.  Instead  of  executing  a  duty  imposed  by  the  plainest 
dictates  of  justice  and  good  faith,  pretexts  were  instantly 
sought  for  holding  them  in  permanent  captivity.  General 
orders  rapidly  succeeded  each  other  from  the  bureau  at  Wash 
ington,  placing  new  constructions  on  an  agreement  which  had 


PERFIDY   OF   THE   FEDERAL   GOVERNMENT.  509 

given  rise  to  no  dispute  while  the  Confederates  retained  the 
advantage  in  the  number  of  prisoners.  With  a  disregard  of 
honorable  obligations,  almost  unexampled,  the  Federal  au 
thorities  did  not  hesitate,  in  addition  to  retaining  the  prisoners 
captured  by  them,  to  declare  null  the  paroles  given  by  the 
prisoners  captured  by  the  Confederates  in  the  same  series  of 
engagements,  and  liberated  on  condition  of  not  again  serving 
until  exchanged.  They  then  openly  insisted  on  treating  the 
paroles  given  by  their  own  soldiers  as  invalid,  and  those  of 
Confederate  soldiers,  given  under  precisely  similar  circum 
stances,  as  binding.  A  succession  of  similar  unjust  pretensions 
was  maintained  in  a  correspondence  tediously  prolonged,  and 
every  device  employed,  to  cover  the  disregard  of  an  obliga 
tion,  which,  between  belligerent  nations,  is  only  to  be  enforced 
by  a  sense  of  honor. 

We  have  not  space  sufficient  for  even  a  sketch  of  the  pro 
tracted  correspondence,  which  ensued  between  the  commission 
ers  of  exchange,  respecting  the  suspension  of  the  cartel.  In 
its  progress  Commissioner  Ould  triumphantly  vindicated  the 
action  of  the  Confederate  Government,  in  every  instance 
meeting  in  an  unanswerable  manner,  the  counter-charges  of 
the  Federal  authorities.  The  South  can  require  no  better  re 
cord  of  its  honorable  and  humane  conduct,  than  is  furnished 
by  this  correspondence.  The  Confederate  Government  was 
singularly  fortunate  in  the  selection  of  Mr.  Ould,  who  unites 
to  a  most  honorable  and  amiable  character,  an  intellect  of  un 
usual  vigor  and  astuteness,  as  was  abundantly  shown  in  his 
conclusive  demonstrations  of  the  perfidious  conduct  of  the 
authorities  at  Washington. 

For  twelve  months  after  the  date  of  the  cartel  (that  is,  until 
after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg),  the  Confederates  held  a  con- 


510  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

siderable  excess  of  prisoners.  It  has  never  been  alleged,  amid 
all  the  calumny  which  has  assailed  the  South,  that  during  this 
period,  the  Federal  prisoners  (unless  held  on  serious  charges), 
were  not  promptly  delivered.  Commissioner  Ould  several 
times  urged  the  Federal  authorities  to  send  increased  trans 
portation  for  their  prisoners.  On  the  other  hand,  numbers  of 
Confederate  officers  and  soldiers  were  kept  in  irons  and  dun 
geons,  in  many  instances  without  even  having  charges  pre 
ferred  against  them. 

On  the  26th  July,  1863,  Commissioner  Ould  said  in  a  let 
ter  to  the  Federal  Agent  of  Exchange  :  "  Now  that  our  official 
connection  is  being  terminated,  I  say  to  you  in  the  fear  of 
God — and  I  appeal  to  him  for  the  truth  of  the  declaration — 
that  there  has  been  no  single  moment,  from  the  time  we  were 
first  brought  together  in  connection  with  the  matter  of  ex 
change,  to  the  present  hour,  during  which  there,  has  not  been 
an  open  and  notorious  violation  of  the  cartel,  by  your  author 
ities.  Officers  and  men,  numbering  over  hundreds,  have  been, 
during  your  whole  connection  with  the  cartel,  kept  in  cruel 
confinement,  sometimes  in  irons,  or  doomed  to  cells,  without 

charges  or  trial The  last  phase  of  the  enormity, 

however,  exceeds  all  others.  Although  you  have  many  thou 
sands  of  our  soldiers  now  in  confinement  in  your  prisons,  and 
especially  in  that  horrible  hold  of  death,  Fort  Delaware,  you 

have  not,  for  several  weeks,  sent  us  any  prisoners 

For  the  first  two  or  three  times  some  sort  of  an  excuse  was 
attempted.  None  is  given  at  this  present  arrival.  I  do  not 
mean  to  be  offensive  when  I  say  that  effrontery  could  not  give 
one." 

In  reply  to  these  and  similar  charges  by  Commissioner 
Ould,  which  he,  in  repeated  instances,  substantiated  by  naming 


511 

the  Confederate  officers  and  soldiers  thus  shamefully  treated, 
the  enemy  retorted  with  a  charge  of  similar  treatment  of  Fed 
eral  prisoners.  Yet  the  prison  records  of  the  Confederacy,  in 
no  instance,  show  the  detention  of  prisoners  while  the  cartel 
was  in  operation,  unless  held  under  grave  charges.  Commis 
sioner  Ould,  in  his  letter  of  August  1, 1863,  effectually  silenced 
this  replication.  Said  he :  "  You  have  claimed  and  exercised 
the  right  to  retain  officers  and  men  indefinitely,  not  only  upon 
charges  actually  preferred,  but  upon  mere  suspicion.  You 
have  now  in  custody  officers  who  were  in  confinement  when 
the  cartel  was  framed,  and  who  have  since  been  declared  ex 
changed.  Some  of  them  have  been  tried,  but  most  of  them 
have  languished  in  prison  all  the  weary  time  without  trial  or 
charges.  /  stand  prepared  to  prove  these  assertions.  This 
course  was  pursued,  too,  in  the  face  not  only  of  notice,  but  of 
protest.  Do  you  deny  to  us  the  right  to  detain  officers  and 
men  for  trial  upon  grave  charges,  while  you  claim  the  right 
to  keep  in  confinement  any  who  may  be  the  object  of  your 
suspicion  or  special  enmity?" 

The  paroles  issued  after  capture  were  respected  by  both 
parties,  until,  about  the  middle  of  1863,  the  Federal  authori 
ties  declared  void  the  paroles  of  thousands  of  their  soldiers, 
who  had  been  sent  North  by  the  Confederate  Government. 
At  that  time,  it  is  noteworthy,  the  Federal  Government  had 
no  lists  of  paroled  prisoners  to  be  charged  against  the  Confed 
eracy.  The  latter  had  previously  discharged  all  its  obligations 
from  its  large  excess  of  prisoners,  leaving  still  a  large  balance 
in  their  favor  unsatisfied.  In  this  condition  of  affairs,  Com 
missioner  Ould  was  notified  that  "  exchanges  will  be  confined 
to  such  equivalents  as  are  held  in  confinement  on  either  side." 
After  such  a  display  of  perfidy,  no  surprise  should  be  occa- 


512  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

sioned  by  the  subsequent  action  of  the  Federal  authorities. 
This  announcement,  in  unmistakable  phraseology,  meant  sim 
ply  that,  as  the  Confederates  had  returned  equivalents  for  all 
paroles  held  against  them,  and  the  Federals  held  no  paroles 
to  be  charged  against  the  Confederacy,  hereafter  no  exchange 
would  be  made  except  for  men  actually  in  captivity.  In  other 
words,  having  received  all  the  benefits  which  they  could  from 
the  observance  of  the  cartel,  the  Federal  Government  openly 
repudiated  it,  the  moment  that  its  operation  would  favor  their 
antagonists.  Commissioner  Ould  promptly  declined  the  per 
fidious  proposition  of  the  enemy,  which  would  have  continued 
thousands  of  Confederate  soldiers  in  prison,  after  their  Govern 
ment  had  returned  all  prisoners  in  their  possession,  and  yet 
held  the  paroles  of  Federal  soldiers,  largely  exceeding  in  num 
ber  the  Confederate  soldiers  held  captive  by  the  enemy.  Sub 
sequently  the  Federal  officers  and  soldiers,  in  violation  of  their 
paroles,  and  without  being  declared  exchanged,  were  ordered 
back  to  their  commands.  Commissioner  Ould  then  very  prop 
erly  declared  exchanged  an  equal  number  of  Confederate  officers 
and  men,  who  had  been  paroled  by  the  enemy  at  Vicksburg. 
With  these  transactions  ended  all  exchanges  under  that 
provision  of  the  cartel  which  provided  the  delivery  of  prison 
ers  within  ten  days.  All  subsequent  deliveries  of  prisoners 
were  made  by  special  agreement.  The  facts  which  we  have 
stated,  showing  the  suspension  of  the  cartel  to  have  been  oc-  . 
casioned  by  the  bad  faith  of  the  Federal  Government,  are  upon 
record,  and  can  not  be  disputed.  They  are  accessible  to  every 
Northern  reader,  who  may  feel  disposed  to  satisfy  his  judg 
ment,  by  facts,  rather  than  to  foster  prejudices  based  upon  the 
most  monstrous  falsehoods,  ever  invented  in  the  interest  of 
fanaticism  and  hate.  The  suspension  of  the  cartel  was  the 


THE   CARTEL   SUSPENDED.  513 

direct  cause  of  those  terrible  sufferings  which  were  afterwards 
endured  by  the  true  men  of  both  sides.  It  led  directly  to  the 
hardships,  the  exposure,  and  hunger  of  Andersonville,  the 
cruelties  of  Camp  Douglas,  the  freezing  of  Confederate  soldiers 
upon  the  bleak  shores  of  the  Northern  lakes,  and  those  count 
less  woes  which  are  endured  by  the  occupants  of  military  pris 
ons,  even  when  conducted  upon  the  most  humane  system. 
Having  been  guilty  of  a  shameful  violation  of  faith,  the  Fed 
eral  Government  persisted  in  a  policy,  which  was  not  only 
cruel  to  the  South,  but  brought  upon  the  brave  men  who  were 
fighting  its  battles,  the  sufferings  which  the  North  has  falsely 
pictured  with  every  conceivable  feature  of  horror  and  atrocity. 

Until  the  end  of  the  war,  the  Confederate  Government  con 
tinued  its  efforts  to  secure  the  renewed  operations  of  the  car 
tel — a  policy  which  humanity  to  its  own  defenders  demanded. 
Why  it  was  not  renewed,  the  motives  which  dictated  a  policy 
which  occasioned  an  almost  unexampled  degree  of  human  suf 
fering,  is  a  question  abundantly  answered  in  the  testimony  here 
adduced,  the  most  conclusive  portions  of  which  comes  from 
Northern  sources. 

In  January,  1864,  it  was  plain  from  the  disposition  of  the 
enemy  that  the  majority  of  the  prisoners  of  both  sides  were 
doomed  to  confinement  for  many  weary  months,  if  not  until 
the  end  of  the  war.  Under  this  impression,  Commissioner 
Ould  wrote  the  following  letter,  which  was  promptly  delivered 
to  the  Federal  Agent  of  Exchange : 

"CONFEDERATE  STATES  OP  AMERICA,  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
"RICHMOND,  VA.,  January  24,  1864.          } 
" Major-General  E.  A.  Hitchcock,  Agent  of  Exchange — 

"  SIR:  In  view  of  the  present  difficulties  attending  the  exchange 
and  release  of  prisoners,  I  propose  that  all  such  on   either  side 
33 


514  LIFE    OF   JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 

shall  be  attended  by  a  proper  number  of  their  own  surgeons,  who, 
under  rules  to  be  established,  shall  be  permitted  to  take  charge 
of  their  health  and  comfort.  I  also  propose  that  these  surgeons 
shall  act  as  commissaries,  with  power  to  receive  and  distribute 
such  contributions  of  money,  food,  clothing,  and  medicines  as  may 
be  forwarded  for  the  relief  of  the  prisoners.  I  further  propose 
that  these  surgeons  shall  be  selected  by  their  own  Government, 
and  that  they  shall  have  full  liberty,  at  any  and  all  times,  through 
the  Agents  of  Exchange,  to  make  reports  not  only  of  their  own 
acts,  but  of  any  matters  relating  to  the  welfare  of  the  prisoners. 
"Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

«  ROBERT  OULD, 

"Agent  of  Exchange." 

To  this  humane  proposition  no  answer  was  ever  made.  It  is 
needless  to  depict  the  alleviation  of  misery  which  its  adoption 
would  have  secured.  Can  there  be  but  one  interpretation  of 
the  motives  of  those  who  rejected  this  noble  offer?  These 
propositions  are  indeed  extraordinary,  in  view  of  the  obloquy 
heaped  upon  the  Confederate  authorities  for  their  alleged  in 
difference  to  the  health  and  comfort  of  their  prisoners.  Most 
noticeable,  however,  is  the  invitation  extended  to  the  Fed 
eral  authorities  to  investigate,  and  report  to  the  world,  the 
treatment  and  condition  of  Federal  soldiers  in  Southern 
prisons. 

But  this  is  far  from  completing  the  evidence  which  convicts 
the  Federal  Government  of  a  purpose  to  trade  upon  the  suf 
ferings  of  their  prisoners,  and  thus  inflame  the  resentment  of 
the  North  during  the  war,  and  shows  the  malignant  purpose 
of  a  faction  to  establish  a  foul  libel  upon  the  South  in  the 
mind  of  posterity.  On  the  10th  of  August,  1864,  Commis 
sioner  Ould  wrote  as  follows: 


HUMANE    EFFORTS   OF   COLONEL   OULD.  515 

"Major  John  E.  Mulford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange — 

"SiR:  You  have  several  times  proposed  to  me  to  exchange  the 
prisoners  respectively  held  by  the  two  belligerents,  officer  for  offi 
cer,  and  man  for  man.  The  same  offer  has  also  been  made  by 
other  officials  having  charge  of  matters  connected  with  the  ex 
change  of  prisoners.  This  proposal  has  heretofore  been  declined 
by  the  Confederate  authorities,  they  insisting  upon  the  terms  of 
the  cartel,  which  required  the  delivery  of  the  excess  on  either 
side  upon  parole.  In  view,  however,  of  the  very  large  number 
of  prisoners  now  held  by  each  party,  and  the  suffering  consequent 
upon  their  continued  confinement,  I  now  consent  to  the  above 
proposal,  and  agree  to  deliver  to  you  the  prisoners  held  in  cap 
tivity  by  the  Confederate  authorities,  provided  you  agree  to  de 
liver  an  equal  number  of  Confederate  officers  and  men.  As 
equal  numbers  are  delivered  from  time  to  time,  they  will  be  de 
clared  exchanged.  This  proposal  is  made  with  the  understanding 
that  the  officers  and  men,  on  both  sides,  who  have  been  longest 
in  captivity,  will  be  first  delivered,  where  it  is  practicable.  I 
shall  be  happy  to  hear  from  you  as  speedily  as  possible,  whether 
this  arrangement  can  be  carried  out. 

"  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

«  ROBERT  OULD, 

''''Agent  of  Exchange." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Confederate  authorities,  by  this 
proposition,  consented  to  waive  all  previous  questions,  to  con 
cede  every  point  to  the  enemy,  that  could  facilitate  the  release 
from  captivity  of  its  own  soldiers  and  those  of  the  North.  As 
an  inducement  to  action  by  the  Federal  authorities,  this  letter 
was  accompanied  by  a  statement  exhibiting  the  mortality  among 
the  prisoners  at  Andersonville.  Receiving  no  reply,  Commis 
sioner  Ould  made  the  same  proposition  to  General  Hitchcock, 


516  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

in  Washington.     The  latter  making  no  response,  application 
was  made  again  to  Major  Mulford,  who  replied  as  follows : 

'"Son,  R.  Quid,  Agent  of  Exchange — 

"SiR:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
favor  of  to-day,  requesting  answer,  etc.,  to  your  communication  of 
the  10th  inst.,  on  the  question  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  to 
which,  in  reply,  I  would  say,  I  have  no  communication  on  the 
subject  from  our  authorities,  nor  am  I  yet  authorized  to  make 
any. 

"  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
"JOHN  E.  MULFORD, 

"Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange.'1 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  generosity  of  this  offer.  When  it 
was  made,  the  North  had  a  large  excess  of  prisoners.  By  this 
arrangement  every  Federal  soldier  would  have  been  released 
from  captivity,  while  a  large  surplus  of  Confederates  would 
have  remained  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The  brutal  calculation 
of  the  Federal  authorities  was  that  an  exchange  would  add  so 
many  thousands  of  muskets  to  the  depleted  ranks  of  the  Con 
federacy,  and  would,  besides,  deprive  them  of  every  pretext  for 
the  manufacture  of  chapters  of  "  rebel  barbarities." 

It  was  known  to  the  world  that  the  means  of  subsistence 
in  the  South  was  so  reduced — chiefly  through  the  cruel  warfare 
waged  by  the  North — that  Confederate  soldiers  were  then  sub 
sisting  upon  a  third  of  a  pound  of  meat,  and  a  pound  of  indiffer 
ent  meal  or  flour  each  day.  Upon  such  rations,  half  naked, 
thousands  of  them  barefooted,  Confederate  soldiers  were  ex 
posed  to  sufferings  unexampled  in  history.  How  could  it  be 
possible,  under  such  circumstances,  to  prevent  suffering  among 
the  prisoners?  Military  prisons,  under  the  most  favorable 


MR.   DAVIS'    STATEMENT   OF   THE   MATTER.  517 

circumstances,  are  miserable  enough,  but  the  Federal  prisoners 
in  the  South  were  compelled  to  endure  multiplied  and  aggra 
vated  miseries,  imposed  by  the  condition  of  the  South — shared 
by  their  captors,  and  by  the  women  and  children  of  the  country 
which  they  invaded.  But  what  possible  palliation  can  there 
be  for  the  guilt  of  a  Government  which  willfully  subjected  its 
defenders  to  horrors  which  it  so  blazoned  to  the  world  ?  De 
claring  that  "  rebel  pens  "  were  worse  than  Neapolitan  prisons 
and  Austrian  dungeons,  the  Federal  authorities  yet  persistently 
rejected  offers  of  exchange. 

There  could  be  no  more  forcible  presentation  of  the  question 
than  that  made  by  President  Davis : 

"  In  the  meantime  a  systematic  and  concerted  effort  has  been 
made  to  quiet  the  complaints  in  the  United  States  of  those  rela 
tives  and  friends  of  the  prisoners  in  our  hands,  who  are  unable  to 
understand  why  the  cartel  is  not  executed  in  their  favor,  by  the 
groundless  assertion  that  we  are  the  parties  who  refuse  compliance. 
Attempts  are  also  made  to  shield  themselves  from  the  execration 
excited  by  their  own  odious  treatment  of  our  officers  and  soldiers 
now  captive  in  their  hands,  by  misstatements,  such  as  that  the 
prisoners  held  by  us  are  deprived  of  food.  To  this  last  accusation 
the  conclusive  answer  has  been  made,  that,  in  accordance  with  our 
laws  and  the  general  orders  of  the  department,  the  rations  of  the 
prisoners  are  precisely  the  same,  in  quantity  and  quality,  as  those 
served  out  to  our  own  gallant  soldiers  in  the  field,  and  which  have 
been  found  sufficieut  to  support  them  in  their  arduous  campaign, 
•while  it  is  not  pretended  by  the  enemy  that  they  treat  prisoners 
by  the  same  generous  rule.  By  an  indulgence,  perhaps  unprece 
dented,  we  have  even  allowed  the  prisoners  in  our  hands  to  be 
supplied  by  their  friends  at  home  with  comforts  not  enjoyed  by  the 
men  who  captured  them  in  battle.  In  contrast  to  this  treatment, 


518  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

the  most  revolting  inhumanity  has  characterized  the  conduct  of 
the  United  States  towards  prisoners  held  by  them.  One  prom 
inent  fact,  which  admits  no  denial  nor  palliation,  must  suffice  as  a 
test :  The  officers  of  our  army— natives  of  southern  and  semi- 
tropical  climates,  and  unprepared  for  the  cold  of  a  northern  win 
ter — have  been  conveyed  for  imprisonment,  during  the  rigors  of 
the  present  season,  to  the  most  northern  and  exposed  situation 
that  could  be  selected  by  the  enemy.  There,  beyond  the  reach 
of  comforts,  and  often  even  of  news  from  home  and  family,  exposed 
to  the  piercing  cold  of  the  northern  lakes,  they  are  held  by  men 
who  can  not  be  ignorant  of — even  if  they  do  not  design — the 
probable  result.  How  many  of  our  unfortunate  friends  and  com 
rades,  who  have  passed  unscathed  through  numerous  battles,  will 
perish  on  Johnston's  Island,  under  the  cruel  trial  to  which  they 
are  subjected,  none  but  the  Omniscient  can  foretell.  That  they 
will  endure  this  barbarous  treatment  with  the  same  stern  fortitude 
that  they  have  ever  evinced  in  their  country's  service,  we  can  not 
doubt.  But  who  can  be  found  to  believe  the  assertion  that  it  is 
our  refusal  to  execute  the  cartel,  and  not  the  malignity  of  the  foe, 
which  has  caused  the  infliction  of  such  intolerable  cruelty  on  our 
own  loved  and  honored  defenders?" 

Since  the  war,  Commissioner  Ould  has  given  testimony  of 
the  most  conclusive  character.  While  the  subject  of  the  treat 
ment  of  prisoners  was  pending  in  Congress,  during  the  past 
summer,  he  wrote  the  following  letter.  It  will  be  observed 
that  he  offers  to  prove  his  statements  by  the  testimony  of  Federal 
officers. 

"WASHINGTON,  July  23,  18G7. 
"To  the  Editors  of  the  National  Intelligencer — 

"  I  respectfully  request  the  publication  of  the  following  letter, 
received  by  me  from  Colonel  Robert  Ould,  of  Richmond.  It  will 


COLONEL  OULD'S  LETTER.  519 

be  perceived  that  it  fully  sustains  my  statement  in  the  House, 
with  the  unimportant  exception  of  the  number  of  prisoners  offered 
to  be  exchanged,  without  equivalent,  by  the  Confederate  authori 
ties.  Very  respectfully, 

"CHARLES  A.  ELDRIDGE." 

"RICHMOND,  July  19,  1867. 
"Hon.  Charts  A.  Eldridge— 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  I  have  seen  your  remarks  as  published.  They 
are  substantially  correct.  Every  word  that  I  said  to  you  in  Rich 
mond  is  not  only  true,  but  can  be  proved  by  Federal  officers.  I 
did  offer,  in  August,  to  deliver  the  Federal  sick  and  wounded, 
without  requiring  equivalents,  and  urged  the  necessity  of  haste  in 
sending  for  them,  as  the  mortality  was  terrible.  I  did  offer  to  de 
liver  from  ten  to  fifteen  thousand  at  Savannah  without  delay. 
Although  this  offer  was  made  in  August,  transportation  was  not 
sent  for  them  until  December,  and  during  the  interval,  the  mor 
tality  was  perhaps  at  its  greatest  height.  If  I  had  not  made  the 
offer,  why  did  the  Federal  authorities  send  transportation  to  Savan 
nah  for  ten  or  fifteen  thousand  men  ?  If  I  made  the  offer,  based 
only  on  equivalents,  why  did  the  same  transportation  carry  down 
for  delivery  only  three  thousand  men  ? 

"  Butler  says  the  offer  was  made  in  the  fall  (according  to  the 
newspaper  report),  and  that  seven  thousand  were  delivered.  The 
offer  was  made  in  August,  and  they  were  sent  for  in  December.  I 
then  delivered  more  than  thirteen  thousand,  and  would  have  gone 
to  the  fifteen  thousand  if  the  Federal  transportation  had  been 
sufficient.  My  instructions  to  my  agents  were  to  deliver  fifteen 
thousand  sick  and  wounded,  and  if  that  number  of  that  class  were 
not  on  hand,  to  make  up  the  number  by  well  men.  The  offer  was 
made  by  me  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  War.  I  was  ready  to  keep  up  the  arrangement  until 
every  sick  and  wounded  man  had  been  returned. 


520  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

"  The  three  thousand  men  sent  to  Savannah  by  the  Federals  were 
in  as  wretched  a  condition  as  any  detachment  of  prisoners  ever  sent 
from  a  Confederate  prison. 

"All  these  things  are  susceptible  of  proof,  and  I  am  much  mis 
taken  if  I  can  not  prove  them  by  Federal  authority.  I  am  quite 
sure  that  General  Mulford  will  sustain  every  allegation  here  made. 
"  Yours  truly,  R.  OULD. 

"  P.  S. — General  Butler's  correspondence  is  all  on  one  side,  as  I 
was  instructed,  at  the  date  of  his  letters,  to  hold  no  correspond 
ence  with  him.  I  corresponded  with  Mulford  or  General  Hitch 
cock.  «R.  OULD." 

In  another  letter,  written  about  the  same  time,  Colonel 
Ould  thus  invites  investigation : 

"General  Mulford  will  sustain  every  thing  I  have  herein  writ 
ten.  He  is  a  man  of  honor  and  courage,  and  I  do  not  think  will 
hesitate  to  tell  the  truth.  I  think  it  would  be  well  for  you  to 
make  the  appeal  to  him,  as  it  has  become  a  question  of  veracity." 

But  though  President  Davis  and  Colonel  Ould  are  known 
by  thousands  of  people,  North  and  South,  to  be  men  of  unim 
peachable  truthfulness,  and  though  no  honorable  enemy  would 
question  their  statements,  we  can  not  hope  that  their  testimony 
will  make  headway  against  the  intolerant  prejudices  and  pas 
sions  of  faction.  General  B.  F.  Butler  is  doubtless  sufficiently 
orthodox,  and,  besides,  his  testimony  is  voluntary.  Says  this 
exponent  of  latter-day  "  loyalty  :  " 

"  The  great  importance  of  the  question;  the  fearful  responsibil 
ity  for  the  many  thousands  of  lives  which,  by  the  refusal  to  ex 
change,  were  sacrificed  by  the  most  cruel  forms  of  death;  from 
cold,  starvation,  and  pestilence  of  the  prison-pens  of  Raleigh  and 
Andersonville,  being  more  than  all  the  British  soldiers  killed  in 


•       521 

the  wars  of  Napoleon ;  the  anxiety  of  fathers,  brothers,  sisters, 
mothers,  wives,  to  know  the  exigency  which  caused  this  terrible — 
and  perhaps  as  it  may  have  seemed  to  them  useless  and  unneces 
sary — destruction  of  those  dear  to  them,  by  horrible  deaths,  each 
and  all  have  compelled  me  to  this  exposition,  so  that  it  may  be 
seen  that  these  lives  were  spent  as  a  part  of  the  system  of  attack 
upon  the  rebellion,  devised  by  the  wisdom  of  the  General-in-Chief 
of  the  armies,  to  destroy  it  by  depletion,  depending  upon  our  su 
perior  numbers  to  win  the  victory  at  last. 

"  The  loyal  mourners  will  doubtless  derive  solace  from  this  fact, 
and  appreciate  all  the  more  highly  the  genius  which  conceived  the 
plan  and  the  success  won  at  so  great  a  cost." 

The  New  York  Tribune  will  also  be  accepted  as  competent 
authority.  Referring  to  the  occurrences  of  1864,  the  Tribune 
editorially  says :  • 

"  In  August  the  rebels  offered  to  renew  the  exchange,  man  for 
man.  General  Grant  then  telegraphed  the  following  important 
order:  'It  is  hard  on  our  men,  held  in  Southern  prisons,  not  to 
exchange  them,  but  it  is  humanity  to  those  left  in  the  ranks  to 
fight  our  battles.  Every  man  released  on  parole  or  otherwise  be 
comes  an  active  soldier  against  us  at  once,  either  directly  or  indi 
rectly.  If  we  commence  a  system  of  exchange  which  liberates  all 
prisoners  taken,  we  will  have  to  fight  on  till  the  whole  South  is 
exterminated.  If  we  hold  those  caught,  they  amount  to  no  more 
than  dead  men.  At  this  particular  time,  to  release  all  rebel  pris 
oners  North  would  insure  Sherman's  defeat,  and  would  compro 
mise  our  safety  here.'" 

Here  is  even  a  stronger  statement  from  a  Northern  source : 

"  NEW  YORK,  August  8,  1865. 

"  Moreover,  General  Butler,  in  his  speech  at  Lowell,  Massachusetts, 
stated  positively  that  he  had  been  ordered  by  Mr.  Stanton  to  put  for" 


522  LIFE   OF  JEFFEESON   DAVIS. 

ward   the  negro  question  to  complicate   and  prevent  the  exchange. 

Every  one  is  aware  that,  when  the   exchange   did 

take  place,  not  the  slightest  alteration  had  occurred  in  the  ques 
tion,  and  that  our  prisoners  might  as  well  have  been  released  twelve 
or  eighteen  months  before  as  at  the  resumption  of  the  cartel,  which 
would  have  saved  to  the  Republic  at  least  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand 
heroic  lives.  That  they  were  not  saved  is  due  alone  to  Mr.  Edwin 
M.  Stantons  peculiar  policy  and  dogged  obstinacy;  AND,  AS  I  HAVE 

REMARKED  BEFORE,  HE  IS  UNQUESTIONABLY  THE  DIGGER  OF  THE 
UNNAMED  GRAVES  THAT  CROWD  THE  VICINITY  OF  EVERY  SOUTH 
ERN  PRISON  WITH  HISTORIC  AND  NEVER-TO-BE-FORGOTTEN  HOR 
RORS. 

"  I  regret  the  revival  of  this  painful  subject,  but  the  gratuitous 
effort  of  Mr.  Dana  to  relieve  the  Secretary  of  War  from  a  respon 
sibility  he  seems  willing  to  bear,  and  which  merely  as  a  question 
of  policy,  independent  of  all  considerations  of  humanity,  must  be 
regarded  as  of  great  weight,  has  compelled  me  to  vindicate  myself 
from  the  charge  of  making  grave  statements  without  due  consid 
eration. 

"  Once  for  all,  let  me  declare  that  I  have  never  found  fault  with 
any  one  because  I  was  detained  in  prison,  for  I  am  well  aware  that 
that  was  a  matter  in  which  no  one  but  myself,  and  possibly  a  few 
personal  friends,  would  feel  any  interest ;  that  my  sole  motive  for 
impeaching  the  Secretary  of  War  was  that  the  people  of  the  loyal 
North  might  know  to  whom  they  were  indebted  for  the  cold-blooded 
and  needless  sacrifice  of  their  fathers  and  brothers,  their  husbands 
and  their  sons. 

"JUNIUS  HENRI  BROWNE." 


Now,  what  is  the  "  inexorable  logic "  of  this  train  of  evi 
dence?  Either  the  calumnies  against  the  South  stand  self- 
convicted,  or  those  who  have  uttered  them  show  themselves 


THE   SOUTH   ACQUITTED.  523 

to  have  been  worse  fiends  than  they  pretend  to  believe  the 
Confederate  authorities  to  have  been. 

But  can  a  candid  world  credit  the  charge  of  cruelty  against 
the  South?  Honorable  enemies,  even,  will  scorn  the  allegation 
of  torture,  of  designedly  inflicting  suffering  upon  helpless  men, 
against  a  people  who,  within  the  past  six  years,  have  so  hon 
orably  illustrated  the  American  name.  Brave  men  are  never 
cruel — cowards  only  delight  in  torture  of  the  helpless.  Cru 
elty  to  prisoners  would  be  inconsistent  not  only  with  the  known 
generosity  of  the  Southern  character,  but  with  that  splendid 
courage  which  the  North  will  not  dishonor  itself  by  calling  in 
question. 

Until  the  suspension  of  the  cartel,  the  Federal  prisoners, 
even  at  the  risk  of  their  recapture,  were  kept  in  Richmond 
convenient  for  exchange.  Confederate  prisoners,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  hurried  to  the  Northern  frontier,  where  the  rigor 
of  the  climate  alone  subjected  them  to  the  most  cruel  suffer 
ings.  Driven  by  the  course  of  the  Federal  Government,  re 
specting  the  subject  of  exchange,  the  Confederate  authorities 
selected  a  site  for  the  quartering  of  prisoners,  whom  it  was 
impossible  to  subsist  in  Richmond  or  its  neighborhood.  An- 
dersonville  was  selected,  in  accordance  with  an  official  order 
contemplating  the  following  objects :  "A  healthy  locality,  plenty 
of  pure,  good  water,  a  running  stream,  and,  if  possible,  shade 
trees,  and  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  grist  and  saw 
mills."  Such  were  the  "  horrors  of  Andersonville,"  which  the 
world  has  been  urged  to  believe  the  Confederate  Government 
selected  with  special  view  to  the  torment  and  death  of  pris 
oners. 

The  terrible  mortality  among  the  prisoners  at  Andersonville 
was  not  due  either  to  starvation  or  to  the  unhealthiness  of  the 


524  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

locality.  Federal  soldiers  were  unaccustomed  to  the  scanty 
and  indifferent  diet  upon  which  the  Confederates  were  fed,  and 
which  caused  the  death  of  thousands  of  delicate  youths  in  the 
Southern  armies.  By  this  single  fact  may  be  explained  much 
of  the  mortality  at  Anderson ville.  When  to  scurvy  and  other 
fatal  forms  of  disease,  produced  by  inadequate  and  unwholesome 
diet,  are  added  the  mental  sufferings,  which  are  peculiarly  the 
lot  of  a  prisoner,  the  despondency,  and,  in  the  case  of  the  An- 
dersonville  prisoners,  the  despair  occasioned  by  the  refusal  of 
their  own  Government  to  relieve  them,  we  have  abundant  ex 
planation  of  the  most  shocking  mortality. 

But  the  statement  that  the  mortality  of  Andersonville  was 
in  excess  of  that  of  all  other  military  prisons,  is  a  willful  false 
hood.  We  present  the  following  extracts  from  a  letter  to  the 
New  York  World,  by  a  gentleman,  whose  integrity  will  be 
vouched  for  by  thousands  of  the  best  people  in  Virginia  : 

PRISON  MORTALITY— ANDERSONVILLE  AND  ELMIRA. 

"RICHMOND,  YA.,  August  14. 

"To  the  Editor  of  the  World— 

"SlR:  I  have  just  seen,  in  a  city  paper,  a  paragraph,  credited  to 
the  World,  alleging  that  among  the  Confederate  prisoners  at  El- 
mira,  during  the  last  four  or  five  months  of  the  use  of  that  prison, 
the  deaths  only  amounted  to  a  few  individuals  out  of  many  thou 
sand  prisoners.  I  am  not  able  to  controvert  that  fact,  as  I  left 
there  on  the  llth  of  October,  1864;  but  if  the  impression  desired 
to  be  produced  is  that  the  general  mortality  at  that  pen  was  slight, 
I  can  contradict  it  from  the  record.  During  a  portion  of  the  period 
of  my  incarceration  in  the  Elmira  pen,  it  was  my  duty  to  receive, 
from  the  surgeon's  office,  each  morning,  the  reports  of  the  deaths 
of  the  preceding  day,  and  embody  them  in  an  official  report,  to  be 
signed  by  the  commandant  of  the  prison,  and  forwarded  to  the 


ELMIRA   AND   ANDERSONVILLE.  525 

commandant  of  the  post.  I  entered,  each  morning,  in  a  diary, 
which  now  lies  before  me,  the  number  of  reported  deaths ;  and  the 
facts  demonstrate  that,  in  as  healthy  a  location  as  there  is  in  New 
York,  with  every  remedial  appliance  in  abundance,  with  no  epidemic, 
and  with  a  great  boast  of  humanity,  the  deaths  were  relatively 
larger  than  among  the  Federal  prisoners  at  Andersonville  among  a 
famished  people,  whose  quartermaster  could  not  furnish  shelter  to 
its  soldiers,  and  whose  surgeons  were  without  the  commonest  medi 
cines  for  the  sick.  The  record  shows  that  at  Andersonville,  be 
tween  the  1st  of  February  and  1st  of  August,  1864,  out  of  thirty- 
six  thousand  prisoners,  six  thousand,  or  one-sixth,  died — a  fearful 
rate  unquestionably.  But  the  official  report  of  the  Elmira  pen 
shows,  that  during  the  month  of  September,  1864,  which  was  the 
first  month  after  the  quota  of  that  prison  was  made  up,  out  of  less 
than  nine  thousand  jive  hundred  prisoners,  the  deaths  were  THREE 
HUNDRED  AND  EIGHTY-SIX.  In  other  words,  the  average  mortality 
at  Andersonville,  during  that  period,  was  one  thirty-sixth  of  the 
whole  per  month,  while  at  Elmira  it  was  one  twenty-fifth  of  the 
whole.  At  Elmira  it  was  four  per  cent.;  at  Andersonville,  less 
than  three  per  cent 

"  Another  item,  which  I  gather  from  my  diary,  will  indicate  the 
manner  in  which  the  medical  officer  at  Elmira  discharged  his  func 
tions.  The  hospitals  began  to  be  filled,  in  the  latter  part  of  Au 
gust,  with  obstinate  cases  of  scurvy.  Men  became  covered  with 
fearful  sores,  many  lost  their  teeth,  and  many  others  became  crip 
ples,  and  will  die  cripples  from  that  cause.  The  commandant  of 
the  post  ordered  a  report  to  be  made  of  all  the  scorbutic  cases  in 
prison,  grave  and  trifling ;  and  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  Septem 
ber  11,  the  lists  were  added  up,  when  it  was  found  that  of  nine 
thousand  three  hundred  prisoners  examined,  eighteen  hundred  and 
seventy  were  tainted  with  scurvy. 

"  The  Federal  Government,  as  one  of  its  measures  of  reconstruc 
tion,  is  officially  and  expensively  engaged  in  traducing  the  South- 


526  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ern  people,  and  the  facility  with  which  it  procures  all  necessary 
evidence,  whether  the  object  be  to  hang  or  to  calumniate,  warrants 
the  belief  that  we  shall  have  a  couple  of  volumes  a  year  for  the 
rest  of  the  century,  demonstrating  the  barbarity  of  the  rebels. 
Against  so  admirable  a  system  of  manufacturing  evidence,  it  is,  of 
course,  idle  to  oppose  the  feeble  efforts  of  individuals,  but  I  regard 
the  duty  none  the  less  binding  on  such  of  us  as  know  the  truth  to 
declare  it ;  and  I  hope  that,  throughout  the  Southern  States,  intel 
ligent  and  credible  men  are  now  putting  into  authentic  form,  the 
evidences  of  Federal  outrages,  the  exploits  of  the  Shermans  and 
Sheridans,  and  Milroys  and  Butlers,  one  day  to  be  published  by 
general  subscription  of  our  people,  that  the  world  may  judge  be 
tween  us  and  the  spoon  thieves,  the  furniture  thieves,  the  barn 
burners,  the  bummers,  and  the  brutes  who  too  often  wore  the  uni 
form  of  the  Federal  army. 

"A.  M.  K." 


Can  the  North  expect  impartial  history  to  accept  its  miser 
able  subterfuge  of  "  disloyalty,"  by  which  such  testimony  as 
this  is  now  excluded? 

Any  reference  to  this  subject  must  be  wholly  inadequate 
which  does  not  describe  the  condition  of  the  South  at  the  pe 
riod  when  she  is  alleged  to  have  been  guilty  of  unexampled 
atrocities.  The  blockade  of  the  South  by  the  North  was  strin 
gent  beyond  any  precedent  in  modern  warfare.  Medicines  were 
held  as  contraband.  Southern  hospitals  were  not  supplied,  for 
that  reason,  with  all  the  medicaments  that  were  needed  by  sick 
and  wounded  soldiers;  and  those  who  were  prisoners  in  our 
hands  necessarily  shared,  in  this  respeet,  the  privations  of  the 
Confederate  soldiers.  But  if  there  was  any  thing  "  cruel  and 
inhuman  "  in  this  deficiency,  whose  fault  was  it  ?  Of  whom  is 
the  cruelty  and  inhumanity  to  be  alleged  ?  The  South  searched 


DEVASTATION  OF   THE   SOUTH.  527 

her  forests  and  meadows  for  restoratives.  She  ran  in  medi 
cines,  as  far  as  practicable,  at  great  cost  and  hazard.  We 
shared  our  stores  with  our  prisoners.  If  the  supply  was  inad 
equate  or  ill-assorted,  we  again  ask,  are  we  to  be  charged  with 
cruelty  and  inhumanity? 

The  same  observations  are  applicable  as  to  supplies  of  food 
and  clothing.  The  war  was  waged,  by  the  North,  on  the 
policy  of  unsparing  devastation.  Mills  were  burnt,  factories 
demolished,  barns  given  to  the  flames,  and  the  means  of  com 
fort  and  of  living  destroyed  on  system.  What  the  South  was 
able  to  save,  she  shared  with  her  prisoners.  We  gave  them 
such  rations  as  we  gave  our  own  soldiers.  Does  any  one  sus 
pect  the  Confederate  Government  of  deliberately  stinting  its 
own  soldiers?  How,  then,  can  it  be  pretended  that  it  was 
"  cruel  and  inhuman  "  to  prisoners  whom  it  fed  as  well  ?  If 
we  could  not  maintain  them  as  well  as  we  wished,  it  was 
through  the  success  of  those  who  wasted  our  subsistence,  for 
the  purpose  of  reducing  us  to  that  precise  condition  of  inability. 
It  is  obviously  monstrous  to  charge  the  fact,  and  to  charge  it 
as  blame,  upon  us — to  accuse  the  South  of  "  cruelty  and  inhu 
manity."  * 

*We  present  two  resolutions  of  a  series  adopted  by  Federal  prisoners 
of  war : 

"Resolved,  That  whilst  allowing  the  Confederate  authorities  all  due 
praise  for  the  attention  paid  to  our  prisoners,  numbers  of  our  men  are 
daily  consigned  to  early  graves  in  the  prime  of  manhood,  far  from  home 
and  kindred,  and  this  is  not  caused  intentionally  by  the  Confederate 
Government,  but  by  the  force  of  circumstances ;  the  prisoner  is  obliged 
to  go  without  shelter,  and,  in  a  great  portion  of  cases,  without  medicine. 

"Resolved,  That  whereas,  in  the  fortune  of  war,  it  was  our  lot  to  become 
prisoners,  we  have  suffered  patiently,  and  are  still  willing  to  suffer,  if  by 


528  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

But  there  is  still  another  revelation  to  be  added  to  the  over 
whelming  evidence  which  demonstrates  the  murderous  purpose 
of  the  Federal  authorities,  equally  toward  their  own  men  and 
toward  Confederate  soldiers,  by  which  they  adroitly  sought  to 
cover  the  Confederate  Government  with  accusing  blood.  A 
marked  feature  in  the  policy  of  the  Lincoln  cabinet  was,  at 
concerted  intervals,  to  inflame  the  heart  of  the  North  by  ap 
peals  to  passion  and  resentment.  The  supreme  excellence  of 
the  Federal  administration,  in  this  respect,  was,  indeed,  its 
substitute  for  statesmanship.  To  conceal  its  own  iniquitous 
course,  with  reference  to  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  the  admin 
istration  successfully  sought  to  frenzy  the  Northern  masses  by 
the  most  ingenious  misrepresentations  of  the  condition  of  their 
men  in  the  Southern  prisons. 

To  this  end  the  foul  brood  of  pictorial  falsifiers — the  Har 
pers,  Leslies,  etc. — gave  willing  and  effective  aid.  Men  in  the 
most  horrible  conditions  of  human  suffering — ghastly  skele 
tons,  creatures  demented  from  sheer  misery — a  set  of  wretched, 
raving,  and  dying  creatures — were  photographed,  the  pictures 
reduplicated  to  an  unlimited  extent,  and  scattered  broadcast 
over  the  North,  as  evidence  of  the  brutality  practiced  upon 

so  doing  we  can  benefit  the  country,  but  we  would  most  respectfully  beg  to 
say  that  we  are  not  willing  to  suffer  to  further  the  ends  of  any  party  or 
clique,  to  the  detriment  of  our  own  honor,  our  families,  and  our  country ; 
and  we  would  beg  this  affair  be  explained  to  us,  that  we  may  continue  to 
hold  the  Government  in  the  respect  which  is  necessary  to  make  a  good 

citizen  and  a  soldier. 

P.  BRADLEY, 

<(  Chairman  of  Committee,  on  behalf  of  Prisoners." 

These  resolutions  were  adopted  at  a  meeting  of  prisoners  in  Savannah, 
September  28,  1864,  and  sent  to  President  Lincoln. 


RENEWED    PERFIDY.  529 

Federal  prisoners  in  the  South.  In  view  of  the  well-known  and 
designed  influence  of  these  appeals  upon  Northern  sentiment, 
what  must  be  the  scorn  of  the  civilized  world  for  the  perfidy 
which  used  the  means  which  we  here  relate,  to  accomplish  its 
iniquitous  ends? 

Immediately  preceding  the  return  of  these  prisoners,  the 
Federal  Agent  applied  for  the  delivery  of  the  worst  cases  of 
sick  Federal  prisoners.  Said  he:  "Even  in  cases  where  your 
surgeons  think  the  men  too  ill  to  be  moved,  and  not  strong 
enough  to  survive  the  trip,  if  they  express  a  desire  to  come, 
let  them  come."  At  this  time,  it  should  be  remembered,  reg 
ular  exchanges  were  intermitted.  Commissioner  Ould,  con 
sistently  with  his  known  humanity  and  the  humane  disposi 
tion  of  his  Government,  consented  to  send  the  worst  cases  of 
their  prisoners,  provided  that  they  would  not  be  accepted  as 
representatives  of  the  average  condition  of  the  Federal  pris 
oners  in  the  South,  and  used  as  a  means  to  inflame  Northern 
sentiment.  This  condition  was  sacredly  pledged. 

With  this  understanding,  Commissioner  Ould  prepared  a 
barge  adapted  specially  to  the  purpose,  and,  with  the  aid  of 
the  Richmond  Ambulance  Committee,  carefully  and  tenderly 
delivered  the  prisoners.  The  Federal  vessel  that  received 
them  sailed  immediately  to  Annapolis,  where,  instead  of  re 
ceiving  the  tender  treatment  that  their  pitiable  condition  re 
quired,  they  were  made  a  spectacle  of  for  an  obvious  purpose. 
Photographic  artists  made  portraits  of  them  ;  a  committee  of 
Congress  was  sent  to  report  upon  their  condition;  in  short, 
they  had  been  obtained  for  a  purpose;  and,  how  well  that 
purpose  was  subserved,  the  South,  at  least,  well  knows.  These 
miserable  wrecks  of  humanity,  specially  asked  for,  specially 
selected  as  the  worst  cases,  were  pointed  to  as  representatives 
34 


530  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

of  the  average  state  of  Federal  prisoners  in  the  South,  although 
the  most  sacred  assurances  had  been  given  that  they  would  be 
used  for  no  such  purpose. 

History  will  be  searched  in  vain  for  such  an  example  of 
mingled  wickedness,  perfidy,  and  cruelty.  Yet  the  faction 
that  could  practice  such  treachery  and  barbarity  has  dared 
to  impeach  the  honor  and  humanity  of  the  South.  Through 
such  means,  it,  of  course,  can  easily  be  proven  that  the  South 
"  starved  and  tortured "  thousands  of  Union  prisoners.  Nor 
can  Stanton,  Holt,  and  Conover  have  difficulty  in  proving 
that  these  cruelties  were  by  direct  order  of  President  Davis. 

Need  we  pursue  this  subject  further?  We  have  not  ad 
duced  one-tenth  of  the  evidence  which  completes  the  record 
of  Southern  justice  and  humanity,  yet  what  candid  mind  will 
deny  that  this  testimony  is  ample?  The  vindication  of  the 
South,  too,  is  the  assured  defense  of  Jefferson  Davis.  Nay, 
more :  the  exceptional  victim  of  Northern  malice  is  known  to 
his  countrymen  to  have  a  special  record  of  humanity  which 
should  have  claimed  a  special  consideration  from  the  enemy. 
Upon  no  subject  was  President  Davis  more  censured  in  the 
South  than  for  what  was  termed  his  "ill-timed  tenderness" 
for  the  enemy.  Stung  to  madness  by  the  devastations  and 
cruelties  attending  the  invasion  of  their  country,  the  people 
often  responded  to  the  clamor  of  the  newspapers  for  retaliation 
against  the  harsh  measures  of  the  enemy.  Before  the  writer  is 
a  Richmond  newspaper,  of  date  during  the  war,  in  which  the 
leading  editorial  begins  with  the  assertion  that  "  The  chivalry 
and  humanity  of  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  will  inevitably  ruin  this 
Confederacy,"  and  the  editor  continues  to  reproach  Mr.  Davis 
for  culpable  leniency. 

To  the  same  alleged  cause  the  Examiner  was  accustomed  to 


HUMANITY  OF  ME.   DAVIS.  531 

attribute  what  it  described  as  the  "  humiliating  attitude  of  the 
Confederacy.  Said  the  Examiner:  "The  enemy  have  gone 
from  one  unmanly  cruelty  to  another,  encouraged  by  their  im 
punity,  till  they  are  now,  and  have  for  some  time,  been  inflict 
ing  on  the  people  of  this  country  the  worst  horrors  of  barbar 
ous  and  uncivilized  war."  Yet,  in  spite  of  all  this,  the  Ex 
aminer  alleged,  that  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  dealings  with  the  enemy, 
was  "as  gentle  as  the  sucking  dove."  The  same  paper  pub 
lished  a  "bill  of  fare"  provided  for  one  of  the  prisons,  and 
invoked  the  indignation  of  the  country  upon  a  policy  which 
fed  the  prisoners  of  the  enemy  better  than  the  soldiers  of  the 
Confederacy. 

Never,  indeed,  did  the  ruler  of  an  invaded  people  exhibit 
such  forbearance  in  the  face  of  so  much  provocation.  When 
reminded  of  the  relentless  warfare  of  the  enemy,  which  spared 
neither  age,  sex,  nor  condition,  of  his  devastation,  rapine  and 
violence,  Davis'  invariable  reply  was :  "  The  crimes  of  our 
enemies  can  not  justify  us  in  a  disregard  of  the  duties  of 
humanity  and  Christianity."  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
Mr.  Davis  occasionally  erred  in  his  extreme  generosity  to  the 
foe.  Yet,  how  noble  must  be  that  fame,  which  is  marred  only 
by  such  a  fault.  History  has  canonized  Lamartine  for  pre 
venting  the  re-raising  of  the  red  flag  in  1848.  What  will  be 
its  award  to  the  heroic  firmness  of  Jefferson  Davis,  in  pre 
venting  the.  raising  of  the  black  flag,  among  a  people,  whose 
dearest  rights  were  assailed,  whose  homes  were  destroyed,  and 
themselves  subjected  to  the  most  ruthless  persecutions  known 
in  modern  warfare? 

But  apart  from  the  perjured  testimony,  which  has  been  ut-r 
terly  inadequate  to  establish  the  charge  of  "  cruelty  to  prison 
ers,"  has  the  time  passed,  when  the  honorable  character  of  a 


532  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

people  and  of  an  individual  can  be  properly  considered  ?  The 
whole  history  of  the  United  States  does  not  exhibit  a  public 
career  more  stainless  than  that  of  Jefferson  Davis,  while  in  the 
service  of  the  Union.  Occupying  almost  every  position  of 
honor  and  trust,  in  both  houses  of  Congress,  member  of  the 
cabinet,  and  as  a  gallant  soldier,  the  breath  of  slander  never 
once  tarnished  his  name.  To  his  incorruptible  official  and 
private  integrity,  to  the  sincerity  of  his  convictions,  and  the 
rectitude  and  honesty  of  his  intentions,  no  men  could  better 
testify  than  those  Republican  Senators,  who  were,  for  years, 
his  associates.  Indeed,  Mr.  Davis  has  been  peculiar  in  his 
complete  exemption  from  that  personal  defamation,  which  is 
almost  a  necessity  of  political  life. 

But,  impartial  history  will  ask,  whence  come  these  calumnies 
against  the  great,  pure,  and  pious  leader  of  a  brave  people,  in 
a  struggle  for  liberty  ?  Then  must  come  that  inevitable  re 
coil,  which  shall  bring  to  just  judgment,  a  government,  which 
destroyed  the  houses  and  the  food  of  non-combatants;  the 
fruits  of  the  earth  and  the  implements  of  tillage ;  which  con 
demned  its  own  defenders  to  imprisonment  and  death ;  which 
imprisoned  without  charges,  gray-haired  men,  and  doomed 
them  to  tortures,  which  brought  them  to  premature  graves ; 
exposed  helpless  women  and  children  to  starvation,  by  depriv 
ing  them  of  their  natural  protectors ;  which  declared  medicines 
contraband  of  war,  and  finally  sought,  by  perjury,  to  justify 
cruelty  to  a  helpless  captive,  because  his  people,  in  the  midst 
of  starvation,  could  not  adequately  feed  and  nurture  the  cap 
tive  soldiers  of  the  enemy. 


POPULAR   FEELING.  533 


CHAPTEE   XVIII. 

DICAT10NS  OF   POPULAR    FEELING  AT   THE  BEGINNING   OF   1864 — APATHY  AND 

DESPONDENCY  OF   THE  NORTH IMPROVED  FEELING  IN    THE  CONFEDERACY 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ENDURANCE PREPARATIONS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GOV 
ERNMENT MILITARY  SUCCESS  THE  GREAT  DESIDERATUM A  SERIES  OF  SUC 
CESSES — FINNEGAN'S  VICTORY  IN  FLORIDA — SHERMAN'S  EXPEDITION — FOR 
REST'S  VICTORY THE  RAID  OF  DAHLGREN TAYLOR  DEFEATS  BANKS 

FORREST'S  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN — HOKE'S  VICTORY — THE  VALUE  OF  THESE 

MINOR  VICTORIES CONCENTRATION  FOR  THE  GREAT  STRUGGLES  IN  VIRGINIA 

AND  GEORGIA FEDERAL  PREPARATIONS — GENERAL  GRANT — HIS  THEORY  OF 

WAR — HIS  PLANS THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA SHERMAN FEEBLE 

RESOURCES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  "  ON  TO  RICHMOND"  AND  "  ON  TO 

ATLANTA" — GENERAL  GRANT  BAFFLED — HE  NARROWLY  ESCAPES  RUIN — HIS 

OVERLAND  MOVEMENT  A  TOTAL  FAILURE SHERIDAN  THREATENS  RICHMOND 

DEATH  OF  STUART BUTLER' S  ADVANCE  UPON  RICHMOND THE  CITY  IN 

GREAT  PERIL BEAUREGARD's  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS —VIEWS  OF  MR.  DAVIS 

DEFEAT  OF  BUTLER,  AND  HIS  CONFINEMENT  IN  A  "CUL  DE  SAC  " FAILURE  OF 

GRANT'S  COMBINATIONS — CONSTANTLY  BAFFLED  BY  LEE — TERRIBLE  LOSSES 
OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMY GRANT  CROSSES  THE  JAMES HIS  FAILURES  RE 
PEATED HIS  NEW  COMBINATIONS EARLY' S  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  VALLEY 

AND   ACROSS  THE  POTOMAC THE  FEDERAL  COMBINATIONS  AGAIN   BROKEN 

DOWN FAVORABLE  SITUATION  IN  VIRGINIA THE  MISSION  OF  MESSRS.  CLAY, 

THOMPSON,  AND  HOLCOMBE CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  MR.  LINCOLN THE  AR 
ROGANT  AND  MOCKING  REPLY  OF  THE  FEDERAL  PRESIDENT. 

DESPITE  the  solid  advantages  obtained  by  the  North  in 
the  campaign  just  ended,  the  close  of  the  winter  devel 
oped  the  existence  of  great  apprehension  at  Washington,  and 
a  correspondingly  improved  feeling  in  the  South.  It  was  in 
deed  remarkable  that  the  conviction  entertained  by  both  sides, 
that  the  struggle  was  now  about  to  assume  its  latest  and  de- 


534  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

cisive  phase,  should  have  evoked  such  different  manifestations 
of  feeling  at  Washington  and  Richmond. 

At  the  North  was  seen  a  singular  apathy,  which  temporarily 
checked  overwrought  displays  of  popular  exultation,  and  a 
mutual  distrust  of  the  Government  and  the  public,  not  at  all 
encouraging  of  success  in  designs  demanding  zealous  coopera 
tion.  The  thoughtful  observer  of  Northern  sentiment  readily 
detected  the  presence  of  depression  and  suspicion — a  general 
apprehension  that  the  restoration  of  the  Union  was  an  enter 
prise  developing  new  and  unseen  obstacles  at  each  step,  and 
a  confusion  of  views  as  to  the  management  of  the  war.  But, 
in  the  violent  exhibitions  of  party  spirit,  the  North  realized 
its  chief  cause  of  alarm.  The  peace  party  increased  in  num 
bers  and  influence  with  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  and  the 
preservation  of  pqwer  by  the  Government  party  was  clearly 
dependent  upon  such  military  results,  as  should  foreshadow 
the  speedy  "collapse  of  the  rebellion."  In  short,  the  North 
saw  that  the  culmination  of  the  momentous  struggle  was  to 
be  reached,  while  it  was  in  the  throes  of  an  embittered  Pres 
idential  contest. 

There  was  another  explanation  of  the  altered  feeling  in  the 
two  sections  developed  during  the  winter.  Throughout  the 
war,  the  Northern  mind  was  singularly  accessible  to  the  in 
fluence  of  sensation  and  "clap-trap;"  hence  were  always  to 
be  expected  periodical  galvanic  excitements,  followed  by  revul 
sion  of  feeling.  The  conservative  instincts  of  the  South  sought 
repose  rather  than  excitement;  and  the  crippled  condition  of 
the  enemy,  after  his  achievements  of  the  summer  and  fall, 
gave  the  South  a  sufficient  respite  for  the  recovery  of  much 
of  its  lost  confidence.  Nor  was  the  transition  of  the  South 
ern  mind,  within  a  few  weeks,  from  depression  to  something 


CONFEDERATE   HOPES.  535 

like  hopeful  anticipation,  based  upon  a  mere  presentiment  of 
prosperous  fortune.  The  lessons  of  the  war,  not  less  than  the 
teachings  of  previous  history,  encouraged  reanimation.  It  was 
contended  that  the  conquest  of  a  territory  so  extensive,  and 
the  subjection  of  a  people  numerically  as  strong  and  as  cou 
rageous  as  those  of  the  South,  was  physically  impossible.  It 
was  urged  that  the  Federal  successes  of  the  preceding  summer 
had  only  placed  the  enemy  upon  the  threshold  of  his  enter 
prise,  and  that,  in  surmounting  the  resolute  resistance  which 
had  almost  defeated  his  earliest  movements,  he  had  vainly 
wasted  the  spirit  and  the  strength  which  were  now  needed 
for  his  further  progress. 

From  such  a  condition  of  feeling,  the  logical  conclusion  was 
that  the  war  had  now  become  a  question  of  endurance,  and 
that  the  Confederacy  must  now  depend  upon  its  capacity  to 
resist  until  the  Xorth  should  abandon  the  war  in  sheer  dis 
gust.  The  Richmond  journals  pithily  stated  the  problem  as 
one  of  "Southern  fortitude  and  endurance  against  Yankee 
perseverance." 

In  the  nieantime,  the  enforced  quiet  of  the  enemy  was  dili 
gently  improved  by  the  Government.  Probably  at  no  period 
of  the  war  did  the  Confederate  administration  exhibit  more 
energy  and  skill  in  the  employment  of  its  limited  resources, 
than  in  its  preparations  for  the  campaign  of  1864.  The  vig 
orous  measures  of  the  President  were,  in  the  main,  seconded 
by  Congress,  though  this  session  was  not  wanting  in  those 
displays  of  demagogism  which,  throughout  the  war,  dimin 
ished  the  influence  and  efficiency  of  that  body.  In  the  sequel, 
the  expedients  adopted  did  not  realize  the  large  results  antici 
pated.  The  financial  legislation  of  Congress  did  not  improve 
the  value  of  the  currency,  nor  did  the  various  expedients  re- 


536  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

sorted  to  for  strengthening  the  army  obtain  the  desired  num 
bers.  It  was  calculated  that  the  Confederate  armies  would  ag 
gregate,  by  the  opening  of  spring,  something  like  four  hundred 
thousand  men,  of  which  the  repeal  of  the  substitute  law  alone 
was  expected  to  furnish  seventy  thousand.  The  real  strength 
of  all  the  Confederate  armies,  however,  did  not  exceed  two 
hundred  thousand  men  when  the  campaign  was  entered  upon. 
The  execution  of  the  conscription  law  was  a  subject  of  sore 
perplexity  to  the  administration,  and,  though  President  Davis 
made  strenuous  exertions  to  remedy  the  difficulty,  the  system 
continued  defective  until  the  end. 

The  army  was,  nevertheless,  strengthened  both  in  numbers 
and  material,  while  its  spirit,  as  shown  in  the  alacrity  and 
unanimity  of  reenlistment,  was  never  surpassed.  Military  suc 
cess  was  now  the  end  to  which  the  Government  devoted  its 
whole  energies,  as  the  real  and  only  solution  of  its  difficulties. 
In  time  of  war  military  success  is  the  sole  nepenthe  for  na 
tional  afflictions.  Without  victories  the  Confederacy  would 
seek  in  vain  a  restoration  of  its  finances  through  the  expedients 
of  legislation.  Equally  necessary  were  victories  for  relief  from 
the  difficulty  as  to  food.  Should  the  spring  campaign  be  suc 
cessful,  the  Confederacy  would  recover  the  country  upon  which 
it  had  been  mainly  dependent  for  supplies,  and  such  additional 
territory  as  was  required  to  put  at  rest  the  alarming  difficulty 
of  scarcity. 

The  expectation  of  the  South  was  much  encouraged  by  a 
series  of  successes  upon  minor  theatres  of  the  war,  during  the 
suspension  of  operations  by  the  main  armies.  A  signal  victory 
was  won  late  in  February,  by  General  Finnegan,  at  Ocean 
Pond,  Florida,  the  important  event  of  which  was  the  decisive 
failure  of  a  Federal  design  to  possess  that  State. 


SHERMAN'S  EXPEDITION.  537 

The  most  serious  demonstration  by  the  enemy,  during  the 
winter  months,  was  the  expedition  of  Sherman  across  the  State 
of  Mississippi.  This  movement,  undertaken  with  all  the  vigor 
and  daring  of  that  commander,  was  designed  to  capture  Mobile 
and  to  secure  the  Federal  occupation  of  nearly  the  whole  of 
Alabama  and  Mississippi.  It  was  the  second  experiment,  un 
dertaken  by  Federal  commanders,  during  the  war,  of  leaving 
a  regular  base  of  operations,  and  seeking  the  conquest  of  a 
large  section  of  territory,  by  penetrating  boldly  into  the  in 
terior.  The  first  similar  attempt  was  made  by  Grant,  from 
Memphis  into  the  interior  of  Mississippi.  It  is  notable  that 
both  these  expeditions  were  marked  by  shameful  failure.  They 
signally  illustrated  the  military  principle  of  the  impossibility 
of  successful  penetration  of  hostile  territory,  even  when  held  by 
a  greatly  inferior  force,  and,  moreover,  clearly  indicate  the  fate 
that  would  inevitably  have  overtaken  Sherman,  in  his  "  march 
to  the  sea,"  had  there  been  an  opposing  army  to  meet  him. 
When  Van  Dorn  captured  Grant's  supplies  at  Holly  Springs,  in 
the  autumn  of  1862,  the  Federal  commander  had  no  alternative 
but  to  make  a  rapid  retreat  to  his  base.  A'  similar  experience 
awaited  Sherman,  who,  leaving  Vicksburg  with  thirty  thousand 
men,  marched  without  opposition  through  Mississippi — General 
Polk,  with  his  corps  of  ten  thousand  men,  falling  back  before 
him.  Cooperating  with  Sherman  was  a  large  cavalry  force, 
which,  leaving  North  Mississippi,  was  to  unite  with  him  at 
Meridian,  and  upon  this  junction  offerees  depended  the  success 
of  the  entire  expedition.  But  General  Forrest,  a  remarkably 
skillful  and  energetic  cavalry  leader,  attacked  the  Federal  col 
umn,  utterly  routing  and  dispersing  it,  though  not  having 
more  than  one-third  the  force  of  the  enemy.  This  neces 
sitated  the  retreat  of  Sherman,  with  many  circumstances  in- 


538  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

dicating  demoralization  among  his  troops.  His  expedition 
terminated  with  no  results  sufficient  to  give  it  more  dignity, 
than  properly  belonged  to  at  least  a  dozen  other  plundering 
and  incendiary  enterprises,  undertaken  by  Federal  officers  who 
are  comparatively  without  reputation.  The  exploits  of  Sher 
man  in  Mississippi  gave  him  a  "bad  eminence/'  which  he 
afterwards  well  sustained  by  the  burning  of  Rome  and  At 
lanta,  the  sack  of  Columbia,  and  his  career  of  pillage  and 
incendiarism  in  the  Carolinas. 

A  notable  event  of  the  winter  was  the  raid  of  Dahlgren,  an 
expedition  marked  by  every  dastardly  and  atrocious  feature 
imaginable.  When  this  expedition  of  "  picked  "  Federal  cav 
alry  had  been  put  to  ignominious  flight  by  the  departmental 
clerks  at  Richmond,  its  retreat  was  harassed  by  local  and 
temporary  organizations  of  farmers,  school-boys,  and  furloughed 
men  from  Lee's  army.  Not  until  its  leader  was  killed,  how 
ever,  was  revealed  the  fiendish  errand  which  he  had  under 
taken.  Upon  his  person  was  found  ample  documentary  evi 
dence  of  the  objects  of  the  expedition,  viz. :  to  burn  and  sack 
the  city  of  Richmond,  and  to  assassinate  President  Davis  and 
his  cabinet.*  Yet  this  man,  killed  in  honorable  combat,  after 

*Upon  the  person  of  Dahlgren  was  found  the  address,  from  which  ex 
tracts  relative  to  the  purpose  of  the  expedition  are  given.  The  portions 
which  we  omit  are  mainly  exhortations  to  the  courage  of  the  men  in  a 
desperate  enterprise : 

'•'"Officers  and  men — 

"  You  have  been  selected  from  brigades  and  regiments,  as  a  picked 
command,  to  attempt  a  desperate  undertaking — an  undertaking,  which,  if 
successful,  will  write  your  names  on  the  hearts  of  your  countrymen  in 
letters  that  can  never  be  erased,  and  which  will  cause  the  prayers  of 
your  fellow-soldiers,  now  confined  in  loathsome  prisons,  to  follow  you 
wherever  you  may  go. 


THE   DAHLGREN   PAPERS.  539 

his  cut-throat  mission  had  failed,  was  apotheosized  by  the 
North  as  a  "  hero,"  who  had  been  "  assassinated "  while  on 
an  errand  of  patriotism  and  philanthropy.  The  shocking 
details  of  this  diabolical  scheme,  substantiated  by  every  neces 
sary  proof  of  authenticity,  were  published  in  the  Richmond 
journals,  and  instead  of  provoking  the  condemnation  of  the 

11  We  hope  to  release  the  prisoners  from  Belle  Island  first,  and,  having 
seen  them  fairly  started,  we  will  cross  the  James  River  into  Richmond, 
destroying  the  bridges  after  us,  and  exhorting  the  released  prisoners  to 
destroy  and  burn  the  hateful  city;  and  do  not  allow  the  rebel  leader, 
Davis,  and  his  traitorous  crew  to  escape,"  etc.  The  conclusion  of  this 
remarkable  order  is,  "Ask  the  blessing  of  the  Almighty,  and  do  not  fear 
the  enemy." 

We  have  not  space  for  the  indisputable  testimony  which  has  estab 
lished  the  authenticity  of  the  "  Dahlgren  Papers  " — a  subject  upon  which 
there  is  no  longer  room  for  doubt.  The  writer,  at  the  time  of  this  raid, 
had  full  descriptions  of  them  from  persons  who  saw  the  originals.  They 
were  found  upon  Dahlgren' s  body  by  a  school-boy  thirteen  years  old,  who 
.  could  not  write,  and  were  immediately  placed  in  the  hands  of  his  teacher. 
The  soiled  folds  of  the  paper  were  plainly  visible.  The  words  referring 
to  the  murder  of  President  Davis  were  a  part  of  the  regular  text  of  the 
manuscript.  Additional  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  the  papers  was  fur 
nished  by  the  note-book,  also  found  upon  the  person  of  Dahlgren,  con 
taining  a  rough  draft  of  the  address  to  the  troops,  and  various  memoranda. 
The  address  was  written  in  pencil  in  the  note-book,  and  differs  very 
slightly  from  the  copy,  containing,  however,  the  injunction  that  the  Con 
federate  authorities  be  u  killed  on  the  spot."  The  statement  of  Mr.  Hal- 
bach,  who  is  still  living,  supported  by  the  testimony  of  a  number  of 
persons,  must  be  deemed  conclusive  of  the  genuineness  of  the  documents 
published  in  the  Richmond  journals. 

Hon.  Stephen  R.  Mallory,  late  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  has 
recently  made  the  following  statement  of  Mr,  Davis'  course  concerning 
this  matter: 

"An  expedition  directed  avowedly  against  the  lives  of  the  heads  of  the 


540  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

hypocritical  "  humanity  "  of  the  North,  with  characteristic  ef 
frontery  were  ridiculed  as  "  rebel  forgeries/' 

The  Trans-Mississippi  region  was,  in  the  early  spring,  the 
scene  of  brilliant  and  important  Confederate  successes.  About 
the  middle  of  March,  the  famous  "  Red  River  Expedition  "  of 
General  Banks,  contemplating  the  complete  subjugation  of 
Louisiana,  and  the  occupation  of  Western  Texas,  was  under 
taken.  The  result  was,  perhaps,  the  most  ignominious  failure 
of  the  war.  Defeated  by  General  Taylor,  in  a  decisive  en 
gagement  at  Mansfield,  General  Banks,  with  great  difficulty, 
effected  his  retreat  down  Red  River,  and  abandoned  the  en 
terprise,  which  he  had  undertaken  with  such  extravagant  an 
ticipations  of  fame  and  wealth. 

In  the  month  of  April,  Forrest  executed  a  brilliant  cam 
paign  among  the  Federal  garrisons  in  Tennessee,  capturing 

Government,  and  aiming  at  firing  an  entire  city,  was  deemed  so  violative 
of  the  rules  of  war  as  to  demand  a  retribution  of  death  upon  all  con 
cerned  in  it. 

"  The  subject  was  one  of  universal  discussion  in  Richmond;  excitement 
increased  with  what  it  fed  upon;  Congress  participated  in  it;  and  a  pres 
sure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  Mr.  Davis  to  order  the  execution  of  some 
of  the  captured. 

"  He  entertained  no  doubt  that  justice,  humanity,  and  policy  equally 
forbade  this  cruel  measure,  and  refused  to  sanction  it;  and  at  the  same 
time  referred  the  subject  to  General  Lee,  then  near  Petersburg,  for  im 
mediate  attention.  The  General's  answer  promptly  came,  asserting, 
without  having  been  apprized  of  them,  the  views  already  presented  by 
Mr.  Davis;  and  the  chief  of  which  was,  that  the  men,  having  surren 
dered  with  arms  in  their  hands,  and  been  accepted  and  treated  as  pris 
oners  of  war,  could  not,  in  retaliation  for  the  unexecuted  designs  of  their 
leader,  be  treated  otherwise.  This  disposed  of  the  case,  and  satisfied  the 
people,  who  were  ever  ready  to  recognize  the  wisdom  and  policy  of  Gen 
eral  Lee's  judgment." 


CONFEDERATE   SUCCESSES.  541 

several  thousand  prisoners  and  adding  large  numbers  of  re 
cruits  to  his  forces.  With  a  force  mainly  organized  within 
three  months,  this  dashing  officer  penetrated  the  interior  of 
Tennessee,  which  the  enemy  had  already  declared  "con 
quered,"  capturing  garrisons  and  stores,  and  concluded  his 
campaign  by  penetrating  to  the  Mississippi  River,  and  suc 
cessfully  storming  Fort  Pillow.*  The  most  encouraging  event 
of  the  spring  was  the  capture  of  Plymouth,  North  Carolina, 
by  General  Hoke.  This  enterprise,  executed  with  great  gal 
lantry  and  skill,  had  the  tangible  rewrard  of  a  large  number 
of  prisoners,  many  cannon,  and  an  important  position  with 
reference  to  the  question  of  supplies.f 

The  aggregate  of  these  Confederate  successes  was  not  incon 
siderable.  Expectation  was  strengthened  by  them  at  the 
South,  and  proportionately  disappointed  at  the  North.  It 
was  chiefly  in  their  influence  upon  public  feeling  that  these 
minor  victories  were  valuable,  as  they  in  no  way  aifected  the 
main  current  of  the  war,  and  were  speedily  overlooked  at 
the  first  sound  of  the  mighty  shock  of  arms  along  the  Rapi- 
dan  and  in  Northern  Georgia.  Indeed,  the  actors  in  these 

*The  "Fort  Pillow  massacre "  was  a  fruitful  theme  for  new  chapters 
of  "  rebel  barbarities."  Forrest  was  charged  with  indiscriminate  slaughter 
of  a  captive  garrison,  when,  in  fact,  he  only  continued  to  fight  a  garrison 
which  had  not  surrendered.  After  the  Confederates  had  forced  their  way 
into  the  fort,  the  flag  was  not  taken  down,  nor  did  the  garrison  offer  to 
surrender.  The  explanation  obviously  was  that  the  enemy  relied  upon 
their  gunboats  in  the  river  to  destroy  Forrest's  forces  after  they  had  en 
tered  the  fort 

fin  the  last  two  years  of  the  war,  there  were  few  more  promising 
officers  than  General  Hoke.  Mr.  Davis  thought  very  highly  of  his  capac 
ity,  and,  upon  one  occasion,  alluded  to  him  as  "that  gallant  North  Caro 
linian,  who  always  did  his  duty,  and  did  it  thoroughly." 


542  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

preliminary  events  were,  in  most  instances,  themselves  shifted 
to  these  two  main  theatres,  upon  which  the  concentrated 
power  of  each  contestant  was  preparing  its  most  desperate 
exertions.  Troops  on  both  sides  were  recalled  from  South 
Carolina,  and  even  Florida,  to  participate  in  the  great  wrestle 
for  the  Confederate  capital,  and  the  impending  struggle  in 
Georgia  absorbed  nearly  all  the  forces  hitherto  operating  west 
of  the  Alleghanies  and  east  of  the  Mississippi. 

However  discouraged  may  have  been  the  public  mind  of  the 
North  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  the  preparations  of  the 
Federal  Government,  for  the  spring  campaign,  indicated  no 
abatement  of  energy  or  determination.  Well  aware  of  the  di 
minished  resources  of  the  South,  and  of  the  political  necessities 
which  imperatively  demanded  speedy  and  decisive  successes, 
the  Federal  administration  prepared  a  more  vigorous  use  of 
its  great  means  than  had  yet  been  attempted.  The  draft  was 
energetically  enforced,  and  volunteering  was  stimulated  by 
high  bounties.  At  no  period  of  the  war  were  the  Federal 
armies  so  numerous,  so  well  equipped  and  provided  with  every 
means  that  tends  to  make  war  successful.  Their  morale  was 
better  than  at  the  outset  of  any  previous  campaign.  The 
Federal  armies  were  now  inured  to  Avar,  composed  mainly  of 
seasoned  veterans,  and  commanded  by  officers  whose  capacity 
had  been  amply  tested  in  battle. 

The  agents  selected  by  the  Federal  Government,  to  carry  out 
its  designs,  were  men  \vhose  previous  careers  justified  their  se 
lection.  The  sagacity  of  the  North  had,  at  length,  realized  the 
one  essential  object,  to  the  accomplishment  of  which  all  its 
efforts  must  contribute.  This  object  was  the  destruction  of 
Lee's  army.  Virginia  was  justly  declared  the  "backbone"  of 
Confederate  power ;  Lee's  army  was  the  pedestal  of  the  edifice. 


GENERAL   GRANT.  543 

It  was  in  the  clearer  appreciation  of  this  object,  and  in  the  de 
termination  to  subordinate  every  concern  of  the  war  to  its  ac 
complishment,  that  Northern  sentiment  made  a  step  forward, 
that  was,  of  itself,  no  insignificant  auxiliary  to  ultimate  suc 
cess.  The  blows  which  Sherman  prepared  to  deliver  upon  the 
distant  fields  of  Georgia,  were  aimed  at  Lee's  army,  not  less 
than  were  those  of  Grant.  While  the  latter  "  hammered  away 
continuously  "  in  Virginia,  to  pulverize,  as  it  were,  the  column 
from  which  so  many  Federal  endeavors  had  been  forced  to  re 
coil,  Sherman  was  expected  to  pierce  the  very  centre  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  seize  or  destroy  every  remaining  source  of 
sustenance. 

The  presence  in  Virginia  of  the  General  commanding  all  the 
Federal  forces,  was  sufficiently  indicative  of  his  recognition  of 
the  supreme  object  of  the  campaign.  The  successful  career  of 
this  officer  was  the  recommendation  which  secured  for  him  the 
high  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  armies  of  the 
Union.  He  was  the  most  fortunate  officer  produced  by  the 
war — fortunate  not  less  in  having  won  nearly  every  ^victory 
which  could  promote  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  war,  but 
fortunate  in  having  won  victories  where  defeat  was  the  result 
to  be  logically  expected. 

It  is  not  at  all  necessary  to  weigh,  in  detail,  the  merits  of 
General  Grant  as  a  soldier.  With  the  overwhelming  argument 
of  results  in  his  favor,  there  would  be  little  encouragement, 
even  if  there  could  be  strict  justice,  in  denying  superior  ability 
to  Grant.  His  campaigns  have  contributed  nothing  to  mili 
tary  science,  in  its  correct  sense,  and  the  military  student  will 
find  in  his  operations  few  incidents  that  illustrate  the  art  or 
economy  of  war.  In  discarding  the  formulas  of  the  schools,  and 
condemning  the  theories  upon  which  the  best  of  his  predeces- 


544  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

sors  had  conducted  the  war,  Grant,  by  no  means,  proved  that 
he  was  not  a  good  soldier.  But  his  independence  in  this  re 
spect  did  not  establish  his  claim  to  genius,  since  his  contempt 
for  military  rules  and  theories  was  not  followed  by  the  display 
of  any  original  features  of  true  generalship.  His  name  was 
coupled  with  a  great  disaster  at  Shiloh,  where  he  was  rescued 
from  absolute  destruction  by  the  energy  of  Buell,  and  the  de 
lay  of  his  adversary.  At  Donelson,  at  Vicksburg,  and  at 
Missionary  Ridge,  he  had  succeeded  by  mere  weight  of  num 
bers;  and,  indeed,  in  no  instance  had  he  exhibited  any  other 
quality  of  worth,  than  boldness  and  perseverance.  But  his 
success  was  a  sufficient  recommendation  to  the  material  mind 
of  the  North,  which  did  not  once  pause  to  consider  how  far 
Grant's  victories  were  due  to  his  military  merit. 

But  whatever  the  defects  of  Grant  in  the  higher  qualities  of 
generalship,  he  was  preeminently  the  man  for  the  present  emer 
gency.  If  the  Federal  Government  saw  the  necessity  of  vigor 
ous  warfare,  looking  to  speedy  and  final  results,  General  Grant 
ktfew  how  to  conduct  the  campaign  upon  that  idea,  provided 
the  Government  would  give  him  unlimited  means,  and  the 
Northern  people  would  consent  to  the  unstinted  sacrifice. 
Grant  knew  no  other  than  an  aggressive  system  of  warfare, 
and  contemplated  no  other  method  of  destroying  the  Confeder 
acy,  than  by  the  momentum  of  superior  weight — by  heavy, 
simultaneous  and  continuous  blows.  The  plans  of  Grant  were 
remarkable  for  their  simplicity,  and  contemplated  merely  the 
employment  of  the  maximum  of  force  against  the  two  main 
armies  of  the  Confederacy,  keeping  the  entire  force  of  the  South 
in  constant  and  unrelieved  strain.  By  "continuous  hammer 
ing"  he  thus  hoped  eventually  to  destroy  or  exhaust  it. 

General  Grant  was  again  fortunate  in  having  the  unlimited 


HIS   THEORY   OF   WAR.  545 

confidence  of  his  Government,  which  placed  at  his  disposal  a 
million  of  soldiers,  and  was  prepared  to  accede  to  his  every 
demand.  To  the  most  trusted  of  his  lieutenants — Sherman — 
Grant  intrusted  the  conduct  of  operations  against  the  centre 
of  the  Confederacy,  reserving  for  himself  the  control  of  the 
campaign  against  Richmond,  and  Lee's  army.  His  plan  of 
operation  was  to  destroy,  not  to  defeat,  an  army  which  he 
knew  could  not  be  conquered,  so  long  as  its  vitality  remained. 
The  military  talent  of  the  North  had  been  already  exhausted 
against  Lee,  and  its  largest  army  too  often  baffled  by  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  to  admit  the  hope  of  defeating 
it  in  battle.  To  outgeneral  Lee,  Grant  well  knew  required  a 
greater  master  of  the  art  of  war  than  himself.  To  conquer 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  he,  not  less  than  his  army, 
knew  to  be  impossible.  His  calculation  was  to  wear  it  out  by 
the  "attrition"  of  successive  and  remorseless  blows.  This 
theory  was  based  upon  the  plain  calculation  that  the  North 
could  furnish  a  greater  mass  of  humanity  for  the  shambles, 
(as  was  afterward  calculated  it  could  spare  a  greater  mass 
for  the  prisons,)  than  the  South,  and  that  thus  when  the 
latter  should  be  exhausted,  the  former  would  still  have  left 
abundant  material  for  an  army.  Such  was  Grant's  theory  of 
the  war.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  it  as  a  military  con 
ception,  the  theory  was  one  that  must  succeed  in  the  end, 
provided  the  perseverance  of  the  North  should  hold  out. 

General  Grant  determined  upon  a  direct  advance  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  against  Richmond,  by  the  overland 
route  from  the  Rapidan.  The  frame-work  of  his  plan,  how 
ever,  embraced  cooperating  movements  in  other  quarters, 
which  should,  at  the  same  time,  occupy  every  man  that 
might  be  available  for  the  reinforcement  of  Lee.  Grant  was 
35 


546  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

embarrassed  by  no  lack  of  the  men  who  were  needed  to  make 
each  one  of  these  movements  formidable.  The  most  impor 
tant  of  these  was  that  designed  to  occupy  the  southern  com 
munications  of  Richmond,  thus  at  once  making  the  Confed 
erate  capital  untenable,  and  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  Lee. 
This  operation  was  intrusted  to  General  Butler,  who,  with 
thirty  thousand  men,  was  to  ascend  James  River,  establish 
himself  in  a  fortified  position  near  City  Point,  and  invest 
Richmond  on  its  south  side.  The  other  auxiliary  movements 
were  designed  against  the  westward  communications  of  Rich 
mond,  and  were  to  be  undertaken  by  Generals  Sigel  and 
Crook — the  former,  with  seven  thousand  men,  moving  up  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  and  the  latter,  with  ten  thousand,  moving 
against  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Railroad.  The  force  im 
mediately  under  General  Grant  was  one  hundred  and  forty 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  Thus  the  grand  aggregate  of  the 
Federal  armies  now  threatening  Richmond  reached  the  neigh 
borhood  of  one  hundred  and  ninety  thousand  men.  In  addi 
tion  to  these  was  a  force  at  Washington,  equal  in  strength  to 
the  whole  of  Lee's  army. 

The  Federal  Government  was  hardly  less  lavish  in  the  dis 
tribution  of  its  enormous  resources  to  Sherman  than  to  Grant. 
Sherman  had  proven  himself  an  officer  of  much  enterprise. 
Intellectually  he  was  the  superior  of  Grant,  but  not  less  than 
other  Federal  commanders  he  relied  upon  superior  numbers 
to  overcome  the  skill  and  valor  of  the  Confederate  armies. 
Physical  momentum  was  needed  to  overwhelm  Johnston,  and 
was  amply  supplied.  Sherman  demanded  one  hundred  thou 
sand  men  to  capture  Atlanta,  and,  by  the  consolidation  of  the 
various  armies  which  had  hitherto  operated  independently  in  the 
West,  his  force  attained  within  a  few  hundreds  of  that  number. 


THE   CAMPAIGN   OPENS.  547 

In  painful  contrast  with  this  enormous  outlay  of  forces, 
were  the  feeble  means  of  the  Confederacy.  When  the  season 
favorable  for  military  operations  opened,  General  Lee  con 
fronted  Grant  upon  the  Rapidan,  and  General  Johnston  faced 
Sherman  near  Dalton,  in  Northern  Georgia.  Neither  of  these 
armies  reached  fifty  thousand  men.  The  undaunted  aspect  and 
mien  of  firm  resistance,  with  which  both  awaited  the  perilous 
onset  of  the  enemy,  were,  however,  assuring  of  the  steady  de 
termination  which  still  defended  the  Confederacy.  Critical  as 
was  the  emergency,  the  Government  and  the  country  yet  be 
lieved  the  strength  of  these  two  armies  equal  to  the  great  test 
of  endurance,  at  least  beyond  the  perils  of  the  present  cam 
paign.  To  hold  its  own  was  the  primary  hope  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  If  autumn  could  be  reached  without  decisive  victories 
by  the  North,  and  the  great  Federal  sacrifices  of  spring  and 
summer  should  then  have  proven  in  vain,  there  was  ample 
ground  for  hope  of  those  dissensions  among  the  enemy,  which, 
throughout  the  struggle,  constituted  so  large  a  share  of  Con 
federate  expectation. 

On  the  3d  of  May,  1864,  General  Grant  initiated  the  cam 
paign  in  Virginia,  by  crossing  the  Rapidan  with  his  advanced 
forces ;  on  the  5th,  the  correspondent  movement  of  Sherman,  a 
thousand  miles  away,  was  begun.  By  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
one  hundred  thousand  Federal  soldiers  were  across  the  Rap 
idan,  and  on  the  same  day,  the  first  round  of  the  great  wrestle 
occurred.  Entertaining  no  doubt  of  his  capacity  to  destroy 
Lee,  Grant  imagined  that  his  adversary  would  seek  to  escape. 
Having,  in  advance,  proclaimed  his  contempt  for  "  maneuvres," 
he  was  solicitous  only  for  an  opportunity  to  strike  the  Con 
federate  army  before  it  should  elude  his  grasp.  But  Hooker 
had  made  the  same  calculation  a  year  before,  and  was  dis- 


548  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

appointed,  and  a  like  disappointment  was   now  in  store  for 
Grant. 

Lee  had  no  power  either  to  prevent  the  Federal  crossing  of 
the  Rapidan,  nor  to  prevent  the  turning  of  his  right.  Instead 
of  retreating,  he  immediately  assumed  the  aggressive,  and 
dealt  the  assailant  one  of  the  most  effective  blows  ever  aimed 
by  that  powerful  arm.  Three  days  sufficed  to  reveal  to  the 
Federal  commander  his  miscalculations  of  his  adversary's  de 
signs,  and,  baffled  in  all  his  operations,  he  already  indicated 
distrust  of  his  system  of  warfare,  and  was  compelled  to  at 
tempt  by  "  maneuvre,"  what  he  had  failed  to  effect  by  brute 
force.  The  events  of  the  5th  and  6th  of  May  clearly  demon 
strated  that  strategy  could  not  yet  be  dispensed  with  in  war 
fare.  Indeed,  nothing  but  Lee's  extreme  weakness  and  the 
untoward  wounding  of  Longstreet,  in  just  such  a  crisis,  and 
in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  marked  •  the  fall  of  Jackson, 
prevented  the  defeat  of  the  Federal  campaign  in  its  incipiency. 
But  for  these  circumstances  the  Federal  Agamemnon  would 
have  been  completely  unhorsed  on  the  6th  of  May,  and  would 
have  added  another  name  to  the  list  of  decapitated  command 
ers  whom  Lee  had  successively  brought  to  grief.  But  the  luck 
of  Grant  did  not  forsake  him,  and  he  still  had  numbers  suf 
ficient  to  attempt  the  "hammering"  process  again.  Grant's 
first  attempt  at  "maneuvre"  was  a  movement  upon  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court-house,  a  point  south-east  of  the  late  battle-fields, 
by  which  he  sought  to  throw  his  army  between  Lee  and  Rich 
mond.  Again  he  was  to  be  disappointed,  and  again  did  the 
Confederate  commander  prove  himself  the  master  of  his  antag 
onist,  in  every  thing  that  constitutes  generalship.  The  Confed 
erate  forces  were  already  at  Spottsylvania,  when  the  Federal 
column  reached  the  neighborhood,  and  Lee,  so  cautious  in  his 


549 

morels,  announced  to  his  Government  that  the  enemy  had  been 
"  repulsed  with  heavy  slaughter." 

But  Lee  had  done  far  more  than  foil  Grant.  He  had  se 
cured  an  impregnable  position  upon  the  Spottsylvania  heights, 
against  which  Grant  remorselessly,  but  vainly,  dashed  his 
huge  columns  for  twelve  days.  At  the  end  of  that  period  Lee's 
lines  were  still  intact,  his  mien  of  resistance  still  preserved, 
and  the  "hammering"  generalship  of  Grant  had  cost  the  North 
nearly  fifty  thousand  veteran  soldiers.  Men  already  began  to 
ask  the  question,  to  which  history  will  find  a  ready  answer: 
"  What  would  be  the  result  if  the  resources  of  the  two  commanders 
were  reversed?"  Not  even  the  North  could  fail  to  see  how 
entirely  barren  of  advantage  was  all  this  horrible  slaughter. 
The  "shambles  of  the  Wilderness"  became  the  popular  phrase 
descriptive  of  Grant's  operations,  and  the  Northern  public  was 
rapidly  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the  "  hammer  would  itself 
break  on  the  anvil." 

While  the  dead-lock  at  Spottsylvania  continued,  and  Lee 
held  Grant  at  bay,  Richmond  was  seriously  threatened  by  co 
operating  movements  of  the  enemy.  General  Grant  had  or 
ganized  a  powerful  cavalry  force  under  Sheridan,  for  operations 
against  the  Confederate  communications.  Sheridan  struck  out 
boldly  in  the  direction  of  Richmond,  followed  closely  by  the 
Confederate  cavalry.  For  several  days  he  hovered  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  city,  unable  to  penetrate  the  line  of 
fortifications,  and  eventually  retired  in  the  direction  of  James 
River. 

A  melancholy  incident  of  this  raid  of  Sheridan  was  the  death, 
in  an  engagement  near  Richmond,  of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
the  renowned  cavalry  leader  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 
This  was  a  severe  bereavement  to  the  South,  and  a  serious 


550  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

loss  to  the  army.  Stuart's  exploits  fill  a  brilliant  chapter  of 
the  war  in  Virginia,  and  he  was  probably  the  ablest  cavalry 
chieftain  in  the  Confederate  army.  President  Davis,  who  was 
constantly  on  the  field  during  the  presence  of  Sheridan  near 
Richmond,  deeply  deplored  the  loss  of  Stuart.  The  President, 
not  less  than  General  Lee,  reposed  great  confidence  in  Stuart's 
capacity  for  cavalry  command,  and  the  noble  character  and 
gallant  bearing  of  Stuart  enlisted  the  warm  personal  regard  of 
Mr.  Davis — a  feeling  which  was  heartily  reciprocated.  Upon 
the  day  of  his  death,  Mr.  Davis  visited  the  bedside  of  the  dy 
ing  chief,  and  remained  with  him  some  time.  In  reply  to  the 
question  of  Mr.  Davis,  "  General,  how  do  you  feel  ? "  Stuart 
replied :  "  Easy,  but  willing  to  die,  if  God  and  my  country 
think  I  have  fulfilled  my  destiny  and  done  my  duty." 

The  important  correspondent  movement  of  Butler  upon  the 
south  side  of  James  River,  began  early  in  May.  Ascending 
the  river  with  numerous  transports,  Butler  landed  at  Bermuda 
Hundreds,  and  advanced  against  the  southern  communications 
of  Richmond.  The  force  near  the  city  was  altogether  inade 
quate  to  check  the  army  of  Butler,  and  almost  without  opposi 
tion  he  laid  hold  of  the  Richmond  and  Petersburg  Railroad,  and 
advanced  within  a  few  miles  of  Drewry's  Bluif,  the  fortifica 
tions  of  which  commanded  the  passage  of  the  river  to  the  Con 
federate  capital.  Troops  were  rapidly  thrown  forward  from 
the  South,  and  by  the  14th  May,  General  Beauregard  had 
reached  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond,  from  Charleston. 

Probably  at  no  previous  moment  of  the  war  was  Richmond 
so  seriously  threatened,  as  pending  the  arrival  of  Beauregard's 
forces.  Mr.  Davis  was,  however,  resolved  to  hold  the  city  to 
the  last  extremity.  Though  much  indisposed  at  the  time,  he 
was  every  morning  to  be  seen,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  riding 


BEAUREGARD'S  PLAN.  551 

in  the  direction  of  the  military  lines.  Superintending,  to  a 
large  extent,  the  disposition  of  the  small  force  defending  the 
city,  he  was  fully  aware  of  the  extreme  peril  of  the  situation, 
but  nevertheless  determined  to  share  the  dangers  of  the  hour. 
When  Beauregard  reached  the  scene  the  crisis  had  by  no  means 
passed.  Unless  Butler  should  be  dislodged,  not  only  was  Rich 
mond  untenable,  but  it  was  impossible  to  maintain  Lee's  army 
north  of  James  River.  Yet  the  force  available  seemed  very 
inadequate  to  any  thing  like  a  decisive  defeat  of  the  enemy. 
The  aggregate  of  commands  from  the  Carolinas,  added  to  the 
force  previously  at  Richmond,  did  not  exceed  fifteen  thousand 
men,  while  Butler,  with  thirty  thousand,  held  a  strongly  in 
trenched  position. 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival,  General  Beauregard  suggested 
a  plan  of  operations,  by  which  he  hoped  to  destroy  Butler,  and, 
without  pausing,  to  inflict  a  decisive  defeat  upon  Grant.  The 
plan  he  proposed  was  that  Lee  should  fall  back  to  the  defensive 
lines  of  the  Chickahominy,  even  to  the  intermediate  lines  of 
Richmond,  temporarily  sending  fifteen  thousand  men  to  the 
south  side  of  the  James,  and  with  this  accession  of  force  he  pro 
posed  to  take  the  offensive  against  Butler.  Pointing  out  the 
isolated  situation  of  Butler,  he  urged  the  opportunity  for  his 
destruction  by  the  concentration  of  a  superior  force.  Under 
the  circumstances  General  Beauregard  thought  the  capture  of 
Butler's  force  inevitable,  and  the  occupation  of  his  depot  of 
supplies  at  Bermuda  Hundreds  a  necessary  consequence.  When 
these  results  should  be  accomplished,  he  proposed,  at  a  con 
certed  moment,  to  throw  his  whole  force  upon  Grant's  flank, 
while  Lee  attacked  in  front.  General  Beauregard  was  confi 
dent  of  his  ability  to  make  the  attack  upon  Butler,  in  two  days 
after  receiving  the  desired  reinforcements,  and  was  equally  con- 


552  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

fident  of  the  result  both  against  Butler  and  Grant.  His  prop 
osition  concluded  with  the  declaration  that  Grant's  fate  could 
not  be  doubtful  if  the  proposed  concentration  should  be  made, 
and  indicated  the  following  gratifying  result :  "  The  destruc 
tion  of  Grant's  forces  would  open  the  way  for  the  recovery  of 
most  of  our  lost  territory." 

Whatever  his  views  as  to  its  feasibility,  the  President  could 
not  refuse  a  careful  consideration  of  a  plan,  whose  author,  in 
advance,  claimed  such  momentous  results.  Upon  reflection 
President  Davis  declined  the  plan  as  involving  too  great  a 
risk,  not  only  of  the  safety  of  Richmond,  but  of  the  very  exist 
ence  of  Lee's  army.  The  proposition  of  Beauregard  was  sub 
mitted  on  the  14th  May.  At  that  time  the  grapple  between 
Grant  and  Lee  was  still  unrelaxed.  Twelve  days  of  battle  had 
cost  Lee  fifteen  thousand  men.  Meanwhile  he  had  not  received 
a  single  additional  musket,  while  Grant  had  nearly  supplied  his 
losses  by  reinforcements  from  Washington.  Thus,  while  Lee's 
force  did  not  reach  forty  thousand,  Grant's  still  approximated 
one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand.  The  President  also  knew 
that  Grant  was  at  that  moment  closely  pressing  Lee,  moving 
toward  his  left,  and  seeking  either  to  overlap  or  break  in  upon 
the  right  flank  of  Lee. 

The  proposed  detachment  of  fifteen  thousand  men  from  Lee, 
leaving  him  not  more  than  twenty-five  thousand,  in  such  a 
crisis,  would  have  been  simply  madness.  Butler,  it  is  possible, 
might  have  been  destroyed,  but  the  end  of  the  Confederacy 
would  have  been  hastened  twelve  months.  It  is  questionable 
whether,  at  any  moment  after  Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan,  the 
overmatched  army  of  Lee  could  have  been  diminished  without 
fatal  disaster.  The  timely  arrival  of  Longstreet  had  prevented 
a  serious  reverse  on  the  6th  May.  Is  it  reasonable  to  suppose 


553 

that  Lee  could  have  detached  one-third  of  his  army,  without 
Grant's  knowledge,  or  that  the  energy  of  the  Federal  com 
mander  would  have  permitted  an  hour's  respite  to  his  sorely- 
pressed  adversary  after  the  discovery?  The  case  would  have 
been  altogether  different,  had  Lee  been  already  safe  within  his 
works  at  Richmond.  Under  the  circumstances  proposed,  he 
had  before  him  a  perilous  retrograde,  followed  by  a  force  four 
times  his  own  strength,  and  commanded  by  the  most  unrelent-. 
ing  and  persistent  of  officers. 

But  there  was  another  view  of  the  proposition  not  to  be 
overlooked  by  the  President  in  his  perilous  responsibility.  It 
is  true  Beauregard  promised  grand  results — nothing  less  than 
the  total  destruction  of  nearly  all  the  Federal  forces  in  Vir 
ginia.  In  brief,  his  plan  proposed  to  destroy  two  hundred 
thousand  men  with  less  than  sixty  thousand.  Again  it  was 
true  the  enemy  was  to  be  destroyed  in  detail — Butler  first, 
and  Grant  afterwards.  There  were  precedents  in  history  for 
such  achievements.  But  it  should  be  remembered  that  if  But 
ler  should  be  immediately  destroyed,  and  if  Lee  should  be 
guaranteed  a  safe  retrograde,  Beauregard  would  still  be  able 
to  aid  Lee  to  the  extent  of  but  little  more  than  twenty  thou 
sand  men.  This  would  give  Lee  less  than  fifty  thousand  with 
which  to  take  the  offensive  against  more  than  twice  that  num 
ber.  Against  just  such  odds  Lee  had  already  tried  the  offen 
sive,  and  failed  because  of  his  weakness.  He  had  assailed 
Grant  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  effecting  a 
complete  surprise  when  the  Federal  commander  believed  him 
already  retreating,  but  was  unable  to  follow  up  his  advantage. 
Was  there  reason  to  believe  that  any  better  result  would  follow 
from  a  repetition  of  the  offensive? 

Believing  himself  not  justified  in  hazarding  the  safety  of 


554  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

the  Confederacy  upon  such  a  train  of  doubtful  conditions,  and 
agreeing  with  General  Beauregard,  that  Butler  could  be  dis 
lodged  from  his  advanced  positions,  so  menacing  to  Richmond, 
Mr.  Davis  rejected  a  plan  which,  under  different  circumstances, 
he  would  have  heartily  and  confidently  adopted. 

With  remarkable  promptitude,  Beauregard  conceived  a  bril 
liant  plan  of  battle,  and  within  twenty-four  hours  had  already 
put  it  in  virtual  execution.  With  fifteen  thousand  men,  he 
drove  Butler  from  all  his  advanced  works,  and  confined  him 
securely  in  the  cul  de  sac  of  Bermuda  Hundreds,  where,  in  a 
few  months,  ended  the  inglorious  military  career  of  a  man 
who,  in  every  possible  manner,  dishonored  the  sword  which 
he  wore,  and  disgraced  the  Government  which  he  served.  The 
brilliant  conception  of  Beauregard  merited  even  better  results, 
which  were  prevented  not  less  by  untoward  circumstances  than 
by  the  weakness  of  his  command. 

While  Beauregard  thus  effectually  neutralized  Butler,  Grant's 
combinations,  elsewhere,  were  brought  to  signal  discomfiture. 
The  expedition  from  the  Kanawha  Valley  had  been,  in  a  meas 
ure,  successful  in  its  designs  against  the  communications  of 
South-western  Virginia,  but  did  not  obtain  the  cooperation  de 
signed,  by  the  column  moving  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Si" 
gel,  in  his  advance  up  the  Valley,  was  encountered  at  New 
market  by  General  Breckinridge,  who  signally  defeated  him, 
capturing  artillery  and  stores,  and  inflicting  a  heavy  loss  upon 
the  enemy.  Sigel  retreated  hastily  down  the  Valley. 

General  Grant,  on  the  llth  of  May,  proclaimed  to  his  Gov 
ernment  his  purpose  "  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes 
all  summer,"  yet,  within  a  week  afterwards,  he  was  already 
meditating  another  plan  of  operations.  Forty  thousand  of  the 
bravest  soldiers  of  the  Federal  army  had  been  vainly  sacrificed, 


GKANT'S  FAILUEES.  555 

and  yet  the  Confederate  line  remained  intact  upon  the  impreg 
nable  hills  of  Spottsylvania.  A  week  was  consumed  in  fruitless 
search  for  a  weak  point  in  the  breastplate  of  Lee.  Grant  was 
again  driven  to  "maneuvre."  Foiled  again  and  again  by  the 
great  exemplar  of  strategy,  with  whom  he  contended,  Grant  at 
no  point  turned  his  face  towards  Eichmond  without  finding  Lee 
across  his  path.  Moving  constantly  to  the  left,  the  3d  of  June 
— exactly  one  month  from  the  crossing  of  the  Rapidan — found 
Grant  near  the  Chickahominy,  and  Lee  still  facing  him.  The 
fortune  of  war  again  brought  the  belligerents  upon  the  old 
battle-ground  of  the  Peninsula.  Just  before  Lee  reached  the 
defenses  of  Richmond,  for  the  first  time  during  the  campaign, 
he  received  reinforcements.*  Grant  also  was  strengthened,  draw- 
Ing  sixteen  thousand  men  from  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hundreds. 
On  the  3d  of  June  occurred  the  second  battle  of  Cold  Har 
bor.  It  was  the  last  experiment  of  the  strictly  "  hammering " 
system,  unaided  by  the  resources  of  strategy.  It  cost  Grant 
thirteen  thousand  men,  and  Lee  a  few  hundred.  Such  was 
a  fitting  finale  of  a  campaign  avowedly  undertaken  upon  the 
brutal  principle  of  the  mere  consumption  of  life,  and  in  con 
tempt  of  every  sound  military  precept.  Cold  Harbor  termi 
nated  the  overland  movement  of  Grant,  and  he  speedily  aban 
doned  the  line  upon  which  he  had  proposed  "  to  fight  all 
summer."  Not  that  he  willingly  abandoned  his  "hammering" 
principle  after  this  additional  sacrifice  of  lives,  for  he  would 
still  have  dashed  his  army  against  the  impregnable  wall  in 

*  At  Hanover  Junction,  on  the  23d  of  May,  General  Lee  was  joined  by 
Breckinridge's  division,  numbering  less  than  three  thousand  muskets,  and 
by  Pickett's  division  of  perhaps  three  thousand  five  hundred  muskets. 
General  Lee  was  compelled,  very  shortly  afterwards,  to  send  Breckm- 
ridge's  division  back  to  the  Valley. 


556  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

his  front,  but  his  men  recoiled,  in  the  consciousness  of  an 
impotent  endeavor.  They  had  done  all  that  troops  could  ac 
complish,  and  shrank  from  that  which  their  own  experience 
told  them  was  impossible.  And  there  should  be  no  wonder 
that  the  Federal  army  was  reluctant  to  be  vainly  led  to  slaugh 
ter  again.  For  forty  days  its  proven  mettle  had  been  subjected 
to  a  cruel  test,  such  as  even  Napoleon,  reckless  of  his  men's 
lives  as  he  was,  had  never  imposed  upon  an  army.  It  is  safe  to 
say  that  no  troops  but  Americans  could  have  been  held  so  long 
to  such  an  enterprise  as  that  attempted  by  Grant  in  May,  1864, 
and  none  but  Americans  could  have  withstood  such  desperate 
assaults  as  were  sustained  by  Lee's  army. 

In  one  month,  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  Chickahominy, 
more  than  sixty  thousand  of  the  flower  of  the  Federal  army 
had  been  put  hors  du  combat,  and  many  of  the  best  of  its 
officers,  men  identified  with  its  whole  history,  \vere  lost  for 
ever.  In  one  month  Lee  had  inflicted  a  loss  greater  than  the 
whole  of  the  force  which  he  commanded  during  the  last  year 
of  the  war!  Yet  this  was  the  "generalship"  of  Grant,  for 
which  a  meeting  of  twenty-five  thousand"  men  in  New  York 
returned  the  "  thanks  of  the  nation."  The  world  was  invited, 
by  the  sensational  press  of  the  North,  to  admire  the  "  strategy  " 
which  had  carried  the  Federal  army  from  the  Rapidan  to  the 
James,  a  position  which  it  might  have  reached  by  transports 
without  the  loss  of  a  man. 

For  a  brief  season,  hope,  positive  and  well-defined,  dawned 
upon  the  South.  Thus  far  the  problem  of  endurance  was  in 
favor  of  the  Confederacy.  Grant's  stupendous  combinations 
against  Richmond  had  broken  down.  The  spirit  of  the  North 
seemed  to  be  yielding,  and  again  the  Federal  Government  en 
countered  the  danger  of  a  collapse  of  the  war. 


GRANT  CROSSES  THE  JAMES.  557 

The  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  convinced  General  Grant  of  the 
futility  of  operations  against  Richmond  from  the  north  side  of 
James  River.  He  therefore  determined  to  transfer  his  army 
to  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  seek  to  possess  himself  of 
the  communications  southward,  and  to  employ  cooperative 
forces  to  destroy  or  occupy  the  comrrrunications  of  Richmond 
with  Lynchburg  and  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  This  involved 
new  combinations,  and  Grant  still  had  abundant  means  to 
execute  them.  If  successful,  this  plan  would  completely 
isolate  Richmond,  leaving  no  avenue  of  supplies  except  by 
the  James  River  Canal,  which  also  would  be  easily  access 
ible. 

Lee  could  not  prevent  the  transfer  of  Grant's  army  to  the 
south  side.  Petersburg  and  Richmond  were  both  to  be  de 
fended,  and  his  strength  was  too  limited  to  be  divided.  Grant 
made  a  vigorous  dash  against  Petersburg.  He  had  anticipated 
an  easy  capture  of  that  city  by  a  coup  de  main,  but  in  this  he 
was  disappointed.  Petersburg  was  found  to  be  well  fortified, 
and  the  desperate  assaults  made  by  the  Federal  advanced  forces 
were  repulsed.  In  a  few  days  Lee's  army  again  confronted 
Grant,  and  Richmond  and  Petersburg  were  safe. 

Thus  the  system  of  rushing  men  upon  fortifications  failed 
on  the  south  side  not  less  signally  than  in  the  overland  cam 
paign.  The  Federal  commander  had  no  alternative  but  a 
formal  siege  of  Petersburg.  Driven  by  circumstances  beyond 
his  control,  General  Grant  thus  assumed  a  position  which,  in 
the  end,  proved  fatal  to  the  Confederacy,  and  the  results  of 
which  have  exalted  him,  in  the  view  of  millions,  to  rank 
among  the  illustrious  generals  of  history.  The  south  side  of 
James  River  was  always  the  real  key  to  the  possession  of 
Richmond.  Sooner  or  later  the  Confederate  capital  must  fall, 


558  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

if  assailed  from  that  direction  with  pertinacity,  and  with  such 
ample  means  as  were  given  to  Grant. 

The  new  Federal  combination  was  in  process  of  execution 
by  the  middle  of  June.  After  the  defeat  of  Sigel,  a  large 
force  was  organized  in  the  lower  valley,  and  intrusted  to  the 
direction  of  General  Hunter,  an  officer  distinguished  by  fanat 
ical  zeal  against  the  section  of  which  he  was  a  native,  and  by 
the  peculiar  cruelty  of  a  renegade.  Breckinridge  had  been 
withdrawn  from  the  Valley,  to  Lee's  lines,  immediately  after 
his  defeat  of  Sigel,  and  Hunter  without  difficulty  overwhelmed 
the  small  force  left  under  General  Jones.  Forming  a  junction 
with  Crook  and  Averill  from  North-western  Virginia,  at 
Staunton,  Hunter  advanced  upon  Lynchburg,  meanwhile 
destroying  public  and  private  property  indiscriminately,  and 
practicing  a  system  of  incendiarism  and  petty  oppression 
against  which  even  Federal  officers  protested. 

It  was  necessary  to  detach  a  portion  of  the  army  from  the 
lines  of  Richmond  to  check  the  demonstration  of  Hunter. 
Accordingly,  General  Early,  who  had  acquired  great  reputa 
tion  in  the  battles  upon  the  Rapidan,  was  sent  with  eight 
thousand  men  to  the  Valley.  Uniting  his  forces  to  those 
already  on  the  ground,  General  Early  made  a  vigorous  pursuit 
of  Hunter,  whose  flight  was  as  dastardly  as  his  conduct  had 
been  despicable.  Retreating  with  great  precipitation  through 
the  mountains  of  Western  Virginia,  Hunter's  force,  for  several 
weeks,  bore  no  relation  to  operations  in  Virginia.  "With  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  thus  denuded  of  invaders,  Early  rapidly 
executed  a  movement  of  his  forces  down  the  Valley,  with  a 
view  to  a  demonstration  beyond  the  Potomac  frontier,  which 
was  entirely  uncovered  by  Hunter's  retreat.  The  movement 
of  Early  into  Maryland  caused,  as  was  anticipated;  a  detach- 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  A  FAILUEE.  559 

ment  from  Grant's  forces,  for  the  defense  of  the  Federal 
capital.  Advancing  with  extraordinary  vigor,  General  Early 
pursued  the  retreating  enemy,  defeating  them  in  an  engage 
ment  near  Frederick  City,  and  arrived  near  Washington  on 
the  10th  of  July.  "Warned  of  the  approach  of  heavy  reenforce- 
ments  from  Grant,  which  must  arrive  before  the  works  could 
be  carried,  Early  abandoned  his  design  of  an  attack  upon 
Washington,  and  retired  across  the  Potomac,  with  his  exten 
sive  and  valuable  captures. 

Signal  failure  attended  the  cavalry  expeditions  sent  by  Grant 
against  the  railroads.  Sheridan,  while  moving  northward 
against  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville,  from  which  points, 
after  inflicting  all  possible  damage  upon  the  railroads  to  Rich 
mond,  he  was  to  join  Hunter  at  Lynchburg,  was  intercepted 
by  Wade  Hampton,  the  worthy  successor  of  Stuart,  and  com 
pelled  to  abandon  his  part  of  the  campaign.  An  extended 
raid,  under  Wilson  and  Kautz,  on  the  south  side,  also  ter 
minated  in  disaster.  The  expedition  of  Burbridge  against 
South-western  Virginia  was  baffled  by  a  counter-movement 
of  Morgan  with  his  cavalry,  into  Kentucky,  the  Federal  forces 
following  him  into  that  State. 

Thus  again  were  all  of  General  Grant's  plans  disappointed, 
and  by  midsummer  the  situation  in  Virginia  was  altogether 
favorable  to  the  Confederacy.  There  was  indeed  good  reason 
for  the  evident  apprehension  of  the  North,  that,  after  all, 
Grant's  mighty  campaign  was  a  failure.  His  mere  proximity 
to  the  Confederate  capital  signified  nothing.  All  his  attempts 
against  both  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  whether  by  strategy 
or  coups  de  main,  had  ended  in  disaster;  the  Confederate  lines 
were  pronounced  impregnable  by  the  ablest  Federal  engineers, 
and  after  the  ridiculous  fiasco  of  "  Burnside's  mine,"  the  cap- 


560  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ture  of  Richmond  seemed  as  remote  as  ever.  To  increase 
public  alarm  at  the  North,  was  added  the  activity  of  Lee,  his 
evident  confidence  in  his  ability  to  hold  his  own,  with  a  di 
minished  force,  and  even  to  threaten  the  enemy  with  invasion. 

The  Confederate  Government,  fully  apprized  of  the  mo 
mentous  results,  with  which  the  present  year  was  pregnant, 
and  of  the  increased  peril  which  assailed  the  Confederacy,  in 
consequence  of  its  diminished  resources,  depended  upon  other 
influences,  than  an  exhibition  of  military  strength,  to  promote 
its  designs.  The  cause  of  the  South  could  no  longer  be  sub 
mitted,  unaided,  to  the  arbitrament  of  battle.  At  other  peri 
ods,  while  freely  avowing  his  desire  for  peace,  and  offering 
to  the  Federal  authorities,  opportunity  for  negotiation,  Presi 
dent  Davis  had  relied  almost  solely  upon  the  sword,  as  the 
agency  of  Southern  independence.  The  opening  of  the  spring 
campaign  of  1864  was  deemed  a  favorable  conjuncture  for  the 
employment  of  the  resources  of  diplomacy.  To  approach  the 
Federal  Government  directly  would  be  in  vain.  Repeated  ef 
forts  had  already  demonstrated  its  inflexible  purpose  not  to 
negotiate  with  the  Confederate  authorities.  Political  develop 
ments  at  the  North,  however,  favored  the  adoption  of  some 
action  that  might  influence  popular  sentiment  in  the  hostile 
section.  The  aspect  of  the  peace  party  was  especially  encour 
aging,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  real  issue  to  be  decided  in 
the  Presidential  election,  was  the  continuance  or  cessation  of 
the  war. 

A  commission  of  three  gentlemen,  eminent  in  position  and 
intelligence,  was  accordingly  appointed  by  Mr.  Davis  to  visit 
Canada,  with  a  view  to  negotiation  with  such  persons  in  the 
North,  as  might  be  relied  upon,  to  facilitate  the  attainment 
of  peace.  This  commission  was  designed  to  facilitate  such 


ATTEMPS   AT   NEGOTIATION.  561 

preliminary  conditions,  as  might  lead  to  formal  negotiation 
between  the  two  governments,  and  their  intelligence  was  fully 
relied  upon  to  make  judicious  use  of  any  political  opportuni 
ties  that  might  be  presented  in  the  progress  of  military  opera 
tions 

The  Confederate  commissioners,  Messrs.  Clay,  of  Alabama, 
Holcombe,  of  Virginia,  and  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  sailed 
from  Wilmington  at  the  incipiency  of  the  campaign  on  the 
Rapidan.  Within  a  few  weeks  thereafter  they  were  upon  the 
Canada  frontier,  in  the  execution  of  their  mission.  A  cor 
respondence  with  Horace  Greeley  commenced  on  the  12th  of 
July.  Through  Mr.  Greeley  the  commissioners  sought  a  safe 
conduct  to  the  Federal  capital.  For  a  few  days  Mr.  Lincoln 
appeared  to  favor  an  interview  with  the  commissioners,  but 
finally  rejected  their  application,  on  the  ground  that  they 
were  not  authorized  to  treat  for  peace.  In  his  final  communi 
cation,  addressed  "To  whom  it  may  concern,"  Mr.  Lincoln 
offered  safe  conduct  to  any  person  or  persons  having  authority 
to  control  the  armies  then  at  war  with  the  United  States,  and 
authorized  to  treat  upon  the  following  basis  of  negotiation : 
"  the  restoration  of  peace,  the  integrity  of  the  whole  Union,  and 
the  abandonment  of  slavery" 

Upon  this  basis,  negotiation  was,  of  course,  precluded,  and 
peace  impossible.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  perfectly  aware  that  the 
commissioners  had  no  control  of  the  Confederate  armies,  and 
that  the  Confederate  Government  alone  was  empowered  to 
negotiate.  He  therefore  did  not  expect  the  acceptance  of  his 
passport,  and  added  to  the  mockery  an  arrogant  statement,  in 
advance,  of  the  conditions  upon  which  he  would  consent  to 
treat.  Even  if  the  commissioners  had  been  empowered  to 

treat,  Mr.  Lincoln's  terms  dictated  the  surrender  of  every 
36 


562  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

thing  for  which  the  South  was  fighting,  and  more  than  the 
North  professed  to  demand  at  the  outset.  Abolition  was  now 
added  to  the  conditions  of  re-admission  to  the  Union.  Mr. 
Lincoln's  proposition  was  a  cruel  mockery,  an  unworthy  insult 
to  the  manhood  of  a  people,  whom  his  armies,  at  least,  had 
learned  to  respect. 


GENERAL   JOHNSTON.  563 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

DISAPPOINTMENT  AT  RESULTS  OF  THE  GEORGIA  CAMPAIGN  —  HOW  PAR  IT  WAS 
PARALLEL  WITH  THE  VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN  —  DIFFERENT  TACTICS  ON  BOTH 
SIDES  -  REMOVAL  OF  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  -  THE  EXPLANATION  OF  THAT 
STEP  -  A  QUESTION  FOR  MILITARY  JUDGMENT  -  THE  NEGATIVE  VINDICATION 
OF  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  -  DIFFERENT  THEORIES  OF  WAR  -  THE  REAL  PHILOS 
OPHY  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  FAILURE  —  THE  ODDS  IN  NUMBERS  AND  RESOURCES 
AGAINST  THE  SOUTH  —  WATER  FACILITIES  OF  THE  ENEMY  —  STRATEGIC  DIFFI 
CULTIES  OF  THE  SOUTH  —  THE  BLOCKADE  —  INSIGNIFICANCE  OF  MINOR  QUES 
TIONS  —  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  THE  WASHINGTON  OF  THE  SOUTH  -  GENERAL  JOHN 
B.  HOOD  -  HIS  DISTINGUISHED  CAREER  —  HOPE  OF  THE  SOUTH  RENEWED  - 
HOOD'S  OPERATIONS  -  LOSS  OF  ATLANTA  -  IMPORTANT  QUESTIONS  -  PRESIDENT 
DAVIS  IN  GEORGIA  —  PERVERSE  CONDUCT  OF  GOVERNOR  BROWN  —  MR.  DAVIS 
IN  MACON  -  AT  HOOD'S  HEAD-QUARTERS  -  HOW  HOOD'S  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN 
VARIED  FROM  MR.  DAVIS'  INTENTIONS  -  SHERMAN'S  PROMPT  AND  BOLD  CON 
DUCT  —  HOOD'S  MAGNANIMOUS  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  —  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  POWER  IN  THE  SOUTH-WEST. 


ENERAL  JOHNSTON  had  failed  to  realize  either  the 
expectations  of  the  public,  or  the  hope  of  the  Govern 
ment,  in  his  direction  of  the  campaign  in  Georgia.  His  tac 
tics  were  those  uniformly  illustrated  by  this  officer  in  all  his 
operations,  of  falling  back  before  the  enemy,  and  seeking  to 
obviate  the  disadvantage  of  inferior  numbers  by  partial  en 
gagements  in  positions  favorable  to  himself.  There  was,  in 
deed,  some  parallel  between  his  campaign  and  that  of  Lee, 
between  the  Rapidan  and  James,  but  the  results  in  Virginia 
and  Georgia  were  altogether  disproportionate.  The  advance 
of  Sherman  was  slow  and  cautious,  but  nevertheless  steady; 


564  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

and  when  the  campaign  had  lasted  seventy  days,  he  was  be 
fore  Atlanta,  the  objective  point  of  his  designs,  and  in  secure 
occupation  of  an  extensive  and  important  section  of  country, 
heretofore  inaccessible  to  the  Federal  armies.  Not  only  were 
Sherman's  losses  small,  as  compared  with  those  of  Grant,  but 
his  force  was  relatively  much  weaker. 

There  can  be  no  just  comparison  of  these  two  campaigns, 
either  as  illustrating  the  same  system  of  tactics,  or  as  yielding 
the  same  results.  The  aggregate  of  Federal  forces  in  Georgia 
did  not  exceed,  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  one  hun 
dred  thousand  men,  if  indeed  it  reached  that  figure.  To 
oppose  this,  Johnston  had  forty-five  thousand.  We  have  al 
ready  stated  the  aggregate  of  Federal  forces  in  Virginia  to 
have  been  at  least  four  times  the  force  that,  under  any  cir 
cumstances,  Lee  could  have  made  available.  The  public  did 
not  interpret  as  retreats,  the  parallel  movements  by  which  Lee 
successively  threw  himself  in  the  front  of  Grant,  wherever  the 
latter  made  a  demonstration.  Not  once  had  Lee  turned  his 
back  upon  the  enemy,  nor  abandoned  a  position,  save  when 
the  baffled  foe,  after  enormous  losses,  sought  a  new  field  of 
operations.  At  its  conclusion,  Grant  had  sustained  losses  in 
excess  of  the  whole  of  Lee's  army,  abandoned  altogether  his 
original  design,  and  sought  a  base  of  operations,  which  he 
might  have  reached  in  the  beginning,  not  only  without  loss, 
but  without  even  opposition. 

Some  explanation  of  the  widely  disproportionate  results 
achieved  in  Virginia  and  Georgia,  is  to  be  found  in  the  dif 
ferent  tactics  of  the  Federal  commanders.  Sherman,  whose 
nature  is  thoroughly  aggressive,  yet  developed  great  skill  and 
caution.  Instead  of  fruitlessly  dashing  his  army  against  for 
tifications,  upon  ground  of  the  enemy's  choosing,  he  treated 


JOHNSTON   CENSUKED.  565 

the  positions  of  Johnston  as  fortresses,  from  which  his  antag 
onist  was  to  be  flanked. 

But  while  this  explanation  was  appreciated,  the  public  was 
much  disposed  to  accept  the  two  campaigns  as  illustrations  of 
the  different  systems  of  tactics  accredited  to  the  two  Confed 
erate  commanders.  It  was  seen  that  in  Virginia  the  enemy 
occupied  no  new  territory,  and,  at  the  end  of  three  months, 
was  upon  ground  which  he  might  easily  have  occupied  at 
the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  but  to  reach  which,  by  the 
means  selected,  had  cost  him  nearly  eighty  thousand  men.* 
In  Georgia,  on  the  other  hand,  Sherman  had  advanced  one 
hundred  miles  upon  soil  heretofore  firmly  held  by  the  Con 
federacy,  and  without  a  general  engagement  of  the  oppos 
ing  forces.  In  Virginia,  the  enemy  had  no  difficulty  as  to 
his  transportation,  and  the  farther  Grant  advanced  towards 
James  River,  the  more  secure  and  abundant  became  his  means 
of  supply.  In  Georgia,  Sherman  drew  his  supplies  over  miles 
of  hostile  territory,  and  was  nowhere  aided  by  the  proximity 
of  navigable  streams. 

When  in  a  censorious  mood,  the  popular  mind  is  not  over- 
careful  of  the  aptness  of  the  parallels  and  analogies,  wherewith 
to  justify  its  carping  judgments.  Without  denying  his  skill, 
or  questioning  his  possession  of  the  higher  qualities  of  gener 
alship,  people  complained  that  "Johnston  was  a  retreating 
general."  Whatever  judgment  may  have  arisen  from  subse 
quent  events,  it  can  not  be  fairly  denied  that  when  Johnston 

*  This  estimate  includes  Grant's  losses  in  his  assaults  upon  the  fortifi 
cations  of  Petersburg,  immediately  after  his  passage  of  the  James  River. 
I  have  seen  his  total  losses  from  the  Rapidan,  until  the  siege  of  Peters 
burg  was  regularly  begun,  estimated  by  Northern  writers,  at  over  ninety 
thousand. 


566  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

reached  Atlanta,  there  was  a  very  perceptible  loss  of  popular 
confidence,  not  less  in  the  issue  of  the  campaign  than  in  Gen 
eral  Johnston  himself.  It  was  in  deference  to  popular  senti 
ment,  as  much  as  in  accordance  with  his  views  of  the  necessity 
of  the  military  situation,  that  President  Davis,  about  the 
middle  of  July,  relieved  General  Johnston  from  command. 
Sympathizing  largely  with  the  popular  aspiration  for  a  more 
bold,  ample,  and  comprehensive  policy,  and  appreciating  the 
value  of  unlimited  public  confidence,  Mr.  Davis  had  lost  much 
of  his  hope  of  those  decisive  results,  which  he  believed  the 
Western  army  competent  to  achieve. 

The  dispatch  relieving  General  Johnston  was  as  follows : 

"RICHMOND,  VA.,  July  17,  1864. 
11  To  General  J.  E.  Johnston : 

11  Lieutenant-General  J.  B.  Hood  has  been  commissioned  to  the 
temporary  rank  of  General,  under  the  law  of  Congress.  I  am 
directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  inform  you,  that  as  you  have 
failed  to  arrest  the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  the  vicinity  of  At 
lanta,  and  express  no  confidence  that  you  can  defeat  or  repel  him, 
you  are  hereby  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  and  De 
partment  of  Tennessee,  which  you  will  immediately  turn  over  to 

General  Hood. 

"S.  COOPER, 

"Adjutant  and  Inspector-General.1' 

This  order  sufficiently  explains  the  immediate  motive  of 
Johnston's  removal,  but  there  was  a  train  of  circumstances 
which,  at  length,  brought  the  President  reluctantly  to  this 
conclusion.  The  progress  of  events  in  Georgia,  from  the  be 
ginning  of  spring,  had  developed  a  marked  difference  in  the 
views  of  General  Johnston  and  the  President.  Early  in  the 
year  Mr.  Davis  had  warmly  approved  an  offensive  campaign 


THE   GEORGIA   CAMPAIGN.  567 

against  the  Federal  army,  while  its  various  wings  were  not 
yet  united.  The  Federal  force,  then  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Dalton,  did  not  greatly  exceed  the  Confederate  strength,  and 
Mr.  Davis,  foreseeing  the  concentration  of  forces  for  the  cap 
ture  of  Atlanta,  believed  the  opportunity  for  a  decisive  stroke 
to  exist  before  this  concentration  should  ensue.  General  Hood 
likewise  favored  this  view  of  the  situation.  He  urged  that 
the  enemy  would  certainly  concentrate  forces  to  such  an  ex 
tent,  if  permitted,  as  would  gradually  force  the  Southern  army 
back  into  the  interior,  where  a  defeat  would  be  irreparable, 
with  no  new  defensive  line,  and  without  the  hope  of  rallying 
either  the  army  or  the  people.  General  Johnston  opposed 
these  views,  on  the  ground  that  the  enemy,  if  defeated,  had 
strong  positions  where  they  could  take  refuge,  while  a  defeat 
of  the  Confederate  force  would  be  fatal.  This  difference  of 
opinion  is  to  be  appropriately  decided  only  by  military  criti 
cism,  but  it  can  not  be  fairly  adjudged  that  an  offensive  in 
the  spring  would  not  have  succeeded,  because  it  failed  in  the 
following  autumn.  Circumstances  were  altogether  different. 

General  Johnston's  operations  between  Dalton  and  Atlanta 
were  unsatisfactory  to  Mr.  Davis.  Here  again  arises  a  mili 
tary  question,  which  we  shall  not  seek  to  decide,  in  the  evi 
dent  difference  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee, 
for  any  other  than  purely  defensive  operations.  It  was,  in 
deed,  not  so  much  an  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  President, 
to  Johnston's  operations,  as  the  apprehension  of  a  want  of 
ultimate  aim  in  his  movements.  Whatever  the  plans  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston  may  have  been,  they  were  not  communicated  to 
Mr.  Davis,  at  least  in  such  a  shape  as  to  indicate  the  hope  of 
early  and  decisive  execution.  Alarmed  for  the  results  of  a 
policy  having  seemingly  the  characteristics  of  drifting,  of  wait- 


568  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ing  upon  events,  and  of  hoping  for,  instead  of  creating  oppor 
tunity,  Mr.  Davis  yet  felt  the  necessity  of  giving  General 
Johnston  an  ample  trial.  During  all  this  period  strong  influ 
ences  were  brought  to  bear  against  Johnston,  and  upon  the 
other  hand,  he  was  warmly  sustained  by  influences  friendly 
both  to  himself  and  the  President. 

For  weeks  the  President  was  importuned  by  these  conflict 
ing  counsels,  the  natural  effect  of  which  was  to  aggravate  his 
grave  doubts  as  to  the  existence  of  any  matured  ultimate  ob 
ject  in  General  Johnston's  movements.  Upon  one  occasion, 
while  still  anxiously  deliberating  the  subject,  an  eminent  poli 
tician,  a  thorough  patriot,  a  supporter  of  Mr.  Davis,  and 
having  to  an  unlimited  extent  his  confidence,  called  at  the 
office  of  the  President,  with  a  view  to  explain  the  situation 
in  Georgia,  whence  he  had  just  arrived.  This  gentleman  had 
been  with  the  army,  knew  its  condition,  its  enthusiasm  and 
confidence.  He  was  confident  that  General  Johnston  would 
destroy  Sherman,  and  did  not  believe  that  the  Federal  army 
would  ever  be  permitted  to  reach  even  the  neighborhood  of 
Atlanta.  Mr.  Davis,  having  quietly  heard  this  explanation, 
replied  by  handing  to  his  visitor  a  dispatch  just  received  from 
Johnston,  and  dated  at  Atlanta.  The  army  had  already 
reached  Atlanta,  before  the  gentleman  could  reach  Eichmond, 
and  he  acknowledged  himself  equally  amazed  and  disap 
pointed. 

Despite  his  doubts  and  apprehensions,  however,  Mr.  Davis 
resisted  the  applications  of  members  of  Congress  and  leading 
politicians  from  the  section  in  which  General  Johnston  was 
operating,  for  a  change  of  commanders,  until  he  felt  himself 
no  longer  justified  in  hazarding  the  loss  of  Atlanta  without  a 
struggle.  There  appeared  little  ground  for  the  belief  that 


JOHNSTON   RELIEVED.  569 

Johnston  would  hold  Atlanta,  nor  did  there  appear  any  reason 
why  his  arrival  there  should  occasion  a  departure  from  his 
previous  retrograde  policy.  Of  the  purpose  of  General  John 
ston  to  evacuate  Atlanta  the  President  felt  that  he  had  abun 
dant  evidence.  Not  until  he  felt  fully  satisfied  upon  this 
point,  was  the  removal  of  that  officer  determined  up#n.  In 
deed,  the  order  removing  Johnston  sets  forth  as  its  justifica 
tion,  that  he  had  expressed  no  confidence  in  his  ability  to 
"  repel  the  enemy."  If  Atlanta  should  be  surrendered,  where 
would  General  Johnston  expect  to  give  battle?* 

Subsequently  to  his  removal,  General  Johnston  avowed  that 
his  purpose  was  to  hold  Atlanta;  and,  therefore,  we  are  not  at 
liberty  to  question  his  purpose.  But  this  does  not  alter  the 

*  President  Davis  regarded  the  security  of  Atlanta  as  an  object  of  the 
utmost  consequence,  for  which,  if  necessary,  even  great  hazards  must  be 
run.  His  frequent  declaration  was  that  the  Confederacy  "had  no  vital 
points"  This  theory  was  correct,  as  there  was  certainly  no  one  point, 
the  loss  of  which  necessarily  involved  the  loss  of  the  cause.  Yet  it  was 
obvious  in  the  beginning  that  certain  sections,  either  for  strategic  reasons, 
or  as  sources  of  supply,  were  of  vast  importance  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  war  to  a  speedy  and  successful  conclusion.  The  value  of  Richmond 
and  Virginia  was  obvious.  Equally  important  was  a  secure  foothold  in  the 
Mississippi  Valley,  and  the  possession  of  the  great  mountainous  range 
from  Chattanooga  to  Lynchburg,  the  "backbone  region"  of  the  South. 
Mr.  Davis  regarded  each  one  of  these  three  objects  as  justifying  almost 
any  hazard  or  sacrifice.  Under  no  circumstances  could  he  approve  a 
military  policy  which  contemplated'  the  surrender  of  either  of  these  ob 
jects,  without  a  desperate  struggle.  He  had  wanted  Vicksburg  defended 
to  the  last  extremity,  and  now  desired  equal  tenacity  as  to  Atlanta.  This 
city  was  a  great  manufacturing  centre ;  the  centre  of  the  system  of  rail 
roads  diverging  in  all  directions  through  the  Gulf  States,  and  it  was  the 
last  remaining  outpost  in  the  defense  of  the  central  section  of  the  Con 
federacy. 


570  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

legitimate  inference  drawn  by  Mr.  Davis  at  the  time  of  his 
removal.  Can  it  be  believed  that  the  President  would  have 
taken  that  step,  if  satisfied  of  Johnston's  purpose  to  deliver 
battle  for  Atlanta? 

This  entire  subject  belongs  appropriately  only  to  military 
discussion,  and  no  decision  from  other  sources  can  possibly 
affect  the  ultimate  sentence  of  that  tribunal.  Yet  the  most  se 
rious  disparagement  of  Mr.  Davis,  by  civilian  writers,  has  been 
based  upon  the  removal  of  Johnston  from  the  command  of  the 
Western  army.  Granting  that  General  Johnston  would  have 
sought  to  hold  Atlanta,  can  it  be  believed  that  the  ultimate 
result  would  have  been  different?  When  Sherman  invested 
Atlanta,  the  North  found  some  compensation  for  Grant's  fail 
ures  in  Virginia;  and  even  though  his  force  should  have  been 
inadequate  for  a  siege,  can  it  now  be  doubted  that  he  would 
have  been  reenforced  to  any  needed  extent?  The  mere  pres 
ence  of  Sherman  at  Atlanta  was  justly  viewed  by  the  North  as 
an  important  success.  He  had  followed  his  antagonist  to  the 
very  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  and  was  master  of  innumerable 
strong  positions  held  by  the  Confederates  at  the  outset  of  the 
campaign.  To  suppose  that  he  would,  at  such  a  moment,  "be 
permitted  to  fail  from  a  lack  of  means,  is  a  hypothesis  at  va 
riance  with  the  conduct  of  the  North  throughout  the  war. 

General  Johnston  has  that  sort  of  negative  vindication  which 
arises  from  the  disasters  of  his  successor,  though,  as  we  shall 
presently  show,  Mr.  Davis  was  nowise  responsible  for  the  mis 
fortunes  of  General  Hood.*  The  question  is  one  which  must 

*  Yet  the  argument  that  General  Hood's  errors  establish  the  wisdom  of 
General  Johnston's  policy,  can  hardly  be  deemed  fair  by  an  intelligent  and 
impartial  judgment.  A  more  competent  commander  than  Hood  might 
have  more  ably  executed  an  offensive  campaign,  even  after  the  fall  of 


ANTAGONISTIC   THEORIES.  571 

some  day  arise  as  between  the  general  military  policy  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  the  antagonistic  views  which  have  been  so 
freely  ascribed  to  General  Johnston  by  his  admirers.  We  have 
no  desire  to  pursue  that  antagonism,  which,  if  it  really  existed, 
can  hardly  yet  be  a  theme  for  impartial  discussion.  Towards 
the  close  of  the  war,  it  was  usual  to  accredit  Johnston  with  the 
theory  that  the  Confederacy  could  better  afford  to  lose  territory 
than  men,  and  that  hence  the  true  policy  of  the  South  was  to 
avoid  general  engagements,  unless  under  such  circumstances  as 
should  totally  neutralize  the  enemy's  advantage  in  numbers. 
We  are  not  prepared  to  say  to  what  extent  these  announcements 
of  his  views  were  authorized  by  General  Johnston,  or  to  what 
extent  they  were  based  upon  retrospection.  Some  confirmation 
of  their  authenticity  would  seem  to  be  deducible  from  General 
Johnston's  declaration  since  the  war,  that  the  "  Confederacy 
was  too  weak  for  offensive  war."  Certainly  there  could  be  no 
theory  more  utterly  antagonistic  to  the  genius  of  the  Southern 
people,  and  that  is  a  consideration,  to  which  the  great  com 
manders  of  history  have  not  usually  been  indifferent.  Nor  was 
it  the  theory  which  inspired  those  achievements  of  Southern 
valor,  which  will  ring  through  the  centuries.  It  was  not  the 

Atlanta ;  or,  again,  other  tactics  than  those  of  Johnston,  from  Dalton  to 
Atlanta,  might  have  had  better  results. 

After  Johnston's  removal,  the  President  received  numerous  letters  from 
prominent  individuals  in  the  Cotton  States,  heartily  applauding  that  step. 
The  condemnation  of  the  President,  for  the  removal  of  Johnston,  came 
only  after  Hood's  disasters;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  Hood's  later 
operations  were  not  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Davis'  views. 

The  writer  remembers  a  pithy  summary  of  the  Georgia  campaign,  made 
by  a  Confederate  officer,  shortly  before  the  end  of  the  war.  Said  he: 
"While  Johnston  was  in  command  there  were  no  results  at  all;  when 
Hood  took  command,  results  came  very  rapidly" 


572  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

theory  which  Lee  and  Jackson  adopted,  nor,  we  need  hardly 
add,  that  which  Jefferson  Davis  approved. 

Indeed,  the  philosophy  of  the  Southern  failure  is  not  to  be 
sought  in  the  discussion  of  opposing  theories  among  Confeder 
ate  leaders.  The  conclusion  of  history  will  be,  not  that  the 
South  accomplished  less  than  was  to  be  anticipated,  but  far 
more  than  have  any  other  people  under  similar  circumstances. 
Southern  men  hardly  yet  comprehend  the  real  odds  in  numbers 
and  resources  which  for  four  years  they  successfully  resisted. 
Other  questions  than  those  merely  of  aggregate  populations  and 
material  wealth,  enter  into  the  solution  of  the  problem. 

By  the  census  of  1860,  the  aggregate  free  population  of  the 
thirteen  States,  which  the  Confederacy  claimed,  was  7,500,000, 
leaving  in  the  remaining  States  of  the  Union  a  free  population 
of  over  twenty  millions.  This  statement  includes  Kentucky 
and  Missouri  as  members  of  the  Confederacy ;  yet,  by  the  com 
pulsion  of  Federal  bayonets,  these  States,  not  less  than  Mary 
land  and  Delaware,  were  virtually  on  the  side  of  the  North. 
Kentucky  proclaimed  neutrality,  but  during  the  whole  war  was 
overrun  by  the  Federal  armies,  and,  with  her  State  govern 
ment  and  large  numbers  of  her  people  favoring  the  North, 
despite  the  Southern  sympathies  of  the  majority,  her  moral  in 
fluence,  as  well  as  her  physical  strength,  sustained  the  Union. 
The  legitimate  government  of  Missouri,  and  a  majority  of  her 
people,  sided  with  the  South ;  but  early  occupied  and  held  by 
the  Federal  army,  her  legitimate  government  was  subverted, 
and  her  moral  and  physical  resources  were  thrown  into  the 
scale  against  the  Confederacy. 

To  say  nothing  of  the  large  numbers  of  recruits  obtained  by 
the  Federal  armies  from  Kentucky,  Maryland  and  Missouri, 
(chiefly  from  their  large  foreign  populations,)  their  contributions 


THE   NUMERICAL   DISPAKITY.  573 

to  the  Confederate  army  were  nearly,  if  not  quite,  compensa 
ted  by  the  accessions  to  Federal  strength  from  East  Tennessee, 
Western  Virginia,  and  other  portions  of  the  seceded  States.  It 
would  be  fair,  therefore,  to  deduct  the  population  of  these  two 
States  from  that  of  the  South,  and  this  would  leave  the  Con 
federacy  five  and  one-half  millions.  Dividing  their  free  popu 
lations  between  the  two  sections,  and  the  odds  were  six  and  a 
half  millions  against  twenty  and  a  half  millions.  This  is  a  lib 
eral  statement  for  the  North,  and  embraces  only  the  original 
populations  of  the  two  sections  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities. 
There  can  hardly  be  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  had  the  struggle 
been  confined  to  these  numerical  forces,  the  South  would  have 
triumphed.  But  hordes  of  foreign  mercenaries,  incited  by  high 
bounty  and  the  promise  of  booty,  flocked  to  the  Federal  army, 
and  thus  was  the  North  enabled  to  recruit  its  armies  to  any 
needed  standard,  while  the  South  depended  solely  upon  its  orig 
inal  population.  As  the  South  was  overrun,  too,  negroes  were 
forced  or  enticed  into  the  Federal  service,  and  thus,  by  these 
inexhaustible  reserves  of  foreign  mercenaries  and  negro  re 
cruits,  the  Confederate  army  was  finally  exhausted. 

The  following  exhibition  of  the  strength  of  the  Federal 
armies  is  from  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  session  of  Congress  in  December,  1865 : 

Official  reports  show  that  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  the  aggre 
gate  national  military  force  of  all  arms,  officers  and  men,  was  nine 
hundred  and  seventy  thousand  seven  hundred  and  ten,  to-wit : 

Available  force  present  for  duty 662,345 

On  detached  service  in  the  different  military  departments 109,348 

In  field  hospitals  or  unfit  for  duty 41,266 

In  general  hospitals  or  on  sick  leave  at  home 75,978 

Absent  on  furlough  or  as  prisoners  of  war 66,290 

Absent  without  leave 15,483 

Grand  aggregate 970,710 


574  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

The  aggregate  available  force  present  for  duty  May  1st,  1864, 
was  distributed  in  the  different  commands  as  follows : 

Department  of  Washington 42,124 

Army  of  the  Potomac 120,386 

Department  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina 59,139 

Department  of  the  South 18,165 

Department  of  the  Gulf 61,866 

Department  of  Arkansas 23,666 

Department  of  the  Tennessee 74,174 

Department  of  the  Missouri 15,770 

Department  of  the  North-west 5,295 

Department  of  Kansas 4,798 

Head-quarters  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 476 

Department  of  the  Cumberland 119,948 

Department  of  the  Ohio 35,416 

Northern  Department „ 9,540 

Department  of  West  Virginia 30,782 

Department  of  the  East 2,828 

Department  of  the  Susquehanna 2,970 

Middle  Department 5,627 

Ninth  Army  Corps 20,780 

Department  of  New  Mexico 3,454 

Department  of  the  Pacific 5,141 

Total 662,345 

And  again : 

Official  reports  show  that  on  the  1st  of  March,  1865,  the  aggre 
gate  military  force  of  all  arms,  officers  and  men,  was  nine  hundred 
and  sixty-five  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-one,  to-wit : 

Available  forces  present  for  duty 602,598 

On  detached  service  in  the  different  military  departments 132,538 

In  field  hospitals  and  unfit  for  duty 35,628 

In  general  hospitals  or  on  sick  leave 143,419 

Absent  on  furlough  or  as  prisoners  of  war 31,695 

Absent  without  leave 19,683 


Grand  aggregate 965,591 

This  force  was  augmented  on  the  1st  of  May,  1865,  by  enlist 
ments,  to  the  number  of  one  million  five  hundred  and  sixteen,  of 
all  arms,  officers  and  men  (1,000,516). 

And  again  lie  says : 


THE   NUMEKICAL   DISPAEITY.  575 

The  aggregate  quotas  charged  against  the  several  States  under  all 
calls  made  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  from  the  15th 
day  of  April,  1861,  to  the  14th  day  of  April,  1865,  at  which  time 
drafting  and  recruiting  ceased,  was 2,759,049 

The  aggregate  number  of  men  credited  on  the  several  calls,  and  put 
into  service  of  the  United  States,  in  the  army,  navy,  and  marine 
corps,  during  the  above  period,  was 2,656,553 

Leaving  a  deficiency  on  all  calls,  when  the  war  closed,  of 102,596 

This  statement  does  not  include  the  regular  army,  nor  the 
negro  troops  raised  in  the  Southern  States,  which  were  not 
raised  by  calls  on  the  States.  It  may  be  safely  asserted  that 
the  "available  force  present  for  duty,"  of  the  Federal  armies 
at  the  beginning  or  close  of  the  last  year  of  the  war,  exceeded 
the  entire  force  called  into  the  service  of  the  Confederacy  dur 
ing  the  four  years.  The  aggregate  of  Federal  forces  raised 
during  the  war  numbered  more  than  one-third  of  the  free  pop 
ulation  of  the  Confederate  States,  including  men,  women,  and 
children.* 

*It  has  been  contended  that  the  odds  against  the  South  in  numbers 
and  resources  were  compensated  by  the  advantages  of  her  defensive  posi 
tion,  and  by  the  strong  incentives  of  a  war  for  her  homes  and  liberties. 
An  ingenious  argument  in  demonstration  of  the  assumed  defective  admin 
istration  of  the  Confederacy  has  been  deduced  from  various  historical 
examples  of  successful  resistance  against  overwhelming  odds.  The  most 
plausible  citation  has  been  the  success  of  Frederick  the  Great,  in  his  de 
fense  of  Prussia  against  the  coalition  of  Russia,  Austria,  and  France. 
This  illustration  has  no  value,  as  it  does  not  at  all  meet  the  case. 

Waiving  all  consideration  of  the  peculiar  strategic  difficulties  of  the 
South,  Frederick  first  had  the  advantage  of  his  English  alliance.  Fred 
erick  never  fought  odds  greater  than  two  to  one,  while  the  South  fought 
three,  four,  sometimes  five  to  one — but  never  equal  numbers.  Again, 
Prussia  was  inaccessible  except  by  overland  marches — not  penetrated, 
like  the  South,  in  every  direction  by  navigable  rivers,  and  nearly  sur 
rounded  by  the  sea.  Frederick,  too,  was  absolute  in  Prussia,  and  had 
the  lives  and  property  of  all  his  subjects  at  his  control.  Mr.  Davis,  on 
the  other  hand,  never  could  consolidate  the  resources  of  the  South  as  he 


576  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

But  this  disparity  of  numbers,  apparently  sufficient  of  itself 
to  decide  the  issue  against  the  South,  was  by  no  means  the 
greatest  advantage  of  the  North.  When  it  is  asserted  that  the 
naval  superiority  of  the  North  decided  the  contest  in  its  favor, 
we  are  not  limited  to  the  consideration  merely  of  that  absolute 
command  of  the  water,  which  prevented  the  South  from  im 
porting  munitions  of  war,  except  at  enormous  expense  and 
hazard,  which  made  the  defense  of  the  sea-coast  and  contigu 
ous  territory  impossible,  and  which  so  disorganized  the  Con 
federate  finances.  The  Confederacy  encountered  strategic  dif 
ficulties,  by  reason  of  the  naval  superiority  of  the  North, 
which,  at  an  early  period  of  the  war,  counter-balanced  the  ad 
vantages  of  its  defensive  position. 

In  the  beginning  the  enemy  had  easy,  speedy,  and  secure 
access  to  the  Southern  coast,  and  wherever  there  was  a  harbor 
or  inlet,  was  to  be  found  a  base  of  operations  for  a  Federal 
army.  Thus,  at  the  outset,  the  Confederacy  presented  on 
every  side  an  exposed  frontier.  In  every  quarter,  the  Federal 
armies  had  bases  of  operations  at  right  angles,  each  to  the 
other,  and  thus,  wherever  the  Confederate  army  established  a 

desired,  being  constantly  hampered  by  demagogism  in  Congress,  which 
could  at  all  times  be  coerced  by  the  press  hostile  to  the  administration, 
or  influenced  by  the  slightest  display  of  popular  displeasure.  Pretending 
to  place  the  whole  means  of  the  country  at  the  disposal  of  the  President, 
Congress  yet  invariably  rendered  its  measures  inoperative  by  emasculat 
ing  clauses  providing  exemptions  and  immunities  of  every  description. 
President  Davis  was  too  sincere  a  republican,  and  had  too  much  re 
gard  for  the  restraints  of  the  Constitution  to  violently  usurp  ungranted 
powers. 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  too,  that  the  South  received  no  foreign  aid, 
while  Frederick  was  at  last  saved  by  the  accession  of  Peter  to  the  Rus 
sian  throne,  which  event  dissolved  the  coalition  against  Prussia. 


STRATEGIC   DIFFICULTIES.  577 

defensive  line,  it  was  assailable  by  a  second  Federal  army  ad 
vancing  from  a  second  base.  The  advantage  of  rapid  concen 
tration  of  forces,  usually  belonging  to  an  interior  line,  was 
obviated  by  the  easy  and  rapid  conveyance  of  large  masses  by 
water. 

Probably  the  most  serious  strategic  disadvantage  of  the  South 
was  its  territorial  configuration,  through  the  intersection  of  its 
soil  in  nearly  every  quarter  by  navigable  rivers,  either  empty 
ing  into  the  ocean,  of  which  the  North,  at  all  times,  had  un 
disputed  control,  or  opening  upon  the  Federal  frontier.  In  all 
the  Atlantic  States  of  the  Confederacy  navigable  streams  pen 
etrate  far  into  the  interior,  and  empty  into  the  sea.  The  Mis 
sissippi,  aptly  termed  an  "inland  sea,"  flowing  through  the 
Confederacy,  was,  both  in  its  upper  waters  and  at  its  mouth, 
held  by  the  North.  The  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers, 
with  their  mouths  upon  the  Federal  frontiers,  navigable  in 
winter  for  transports  and  gunboats,  in  the  first  twelve  months 
of  the  war,  brought  the  Federal  armies  to  the  centre  of  the 
South-west.  In  the  Trans-Mississippi  region,  the  Arkansas 
and  Red  Rivers  gave  the  enemy  convenient  and  secure  bases 
of  operations  along  their  margins.  Each  one  of  these  streams 
having  inevitably,  sooner  or  later,  become  subject  to  the  con 
trol  of  the  Federal  navy,  afforded  bases  of  operations  against 
the  interior  of  the  South,  while  it  was  likewise  threatened  from 
the  Northern  frontier. 

The  difficulty  of  space,  which  defeated  Napoleon  in  his  in 
vasion  of  Russia,  and  which  has  baffled  the  largest  armies  led 
by  the  ablest  commanders,  had  an  easy  solution  for  the  North. 
Remarkable  illustrations  of  the  extent  to  which  these  water 
facilities  aided  the  North,  were  afforded  by  the  signal  failure 
attending  every  overland  advance  of  the  Federal  armies  so 
37 


578  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

long  as  the  Confederates  could  raise  even  the  semblance  of 
an  opposing  force.  Besides  the  innumerable  Federal  failures 
in  the  Appalachian  region  of  Virginia,  Sherman  and  Grant, 
the  most  successful  of  Northern  commanders,  illustrated  this 
military  principle  in  instances  already  noted.  When  Sherman 
finally  marched  from  the  Confederate  frontier  to  the  ocean, 
General  Grant's  policy  of  "attrition"  had  virtually  destroyed 
the  military  strength  of  the  South,  and  Sherman  simply  ac 
complished  an  unopposed  march  through  an  undefended  coun 
try.  There  can  be  no  better  illustration  of  these  strategic 
difficulties  of  the  Confederacy,  than  that  afforded  by  the  train 
of  disasters  in  the  beginning  of  1862,  each  of  which  was  di 
rectly  and  mainly  attributable  to  the  naval  advantages  of  the 
enemy  and  the  geographical  configuration. 

A  candid  review  of  the  events  of  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war  will  demonstrate  the  inevitable  failure  of  subjugation  of 
the  South,  but  for  these  advantages  of  her  invaders.  Not  only 
are  the  facilities  of  transportation  possessed  by  the  North  to 
be  considered,  but  the  further  advantage  extended  by  its  fleet 
in  the  event  of  military  reverse.  The  shipping  constituted  an 
invulnerable  defense  and  convenient  shelter  for  the  fugitive 

t> 

Federals.  Upon  at  least  two  occasions,  the  two  main  Federal 
armies  were  rescued  from  destruction  by  the  gunboats — in  the 
ease  of  Grant  at  Shiloh,  and  of  McClellan  on  James  River. 

Nor  was  it  possible  for  the  South  to  make  adequate  pro 
vision  to  meet  the  naval  advantages  of  the  North.  The  Fed 
eral  Government  retained  the  whole  of  the  navy.  The  North 
was  manufacturing  and  commercial,  while  the  South  was  purely 
agricultural  in  its  means;  hence  the  incomparable  rapidity  with 
which  the  Federal  Government  accumulated  shipping  of  every 
character.  The  initial  superiority  of  the  North  in  naval  re- 


THE    BLOCKADE.  579 

sources  prevented  the  South  from  obtaining  from  foreign  sources 
the  men  and  the  material  for  the  equipment  of  vessels  of  war. 
Then,  again,  the  disputed  question  of  the  capacity  of  shore 
batteries  to  resist  vessels  of  war,  had  a  most  inopportune  solu 
tion  for  the  South,  and  in  cases  where  great  interests  were 
involved.  We  have  already  noted  one  instance  where  this 
question  had  a  fatal  solution — that  of  New  Orleans.  And  in 
this  instance,  too,  the  want  of  time  for  preparation  was  a  fatal 
difficulty.  But  for  the  unfinished  condition  of  the  iron-clads 
at  New  Orleans,  the  possession  of  the  Mississippi  by  the  enemy 
would  have  been  greatly  deferred,  though,  with  the  head-waters 
and  mouth  of  the  great  river  in  Federal  control,  it  was  hardly 
more  than  a  question  of  time,  should  the  North  skillfully  em 
ploy  its  superior  manufacturing  resources  and  preponderant 
population. 

The  special  weapon  of  the  North,  from  which  no  amount 
of  victories  ever  brought  the  Confederacy  one  moment's  re 
lief,  was  the  blockade — a  weapon  which  the  injustice  of  for 
eign  powers  placed  in  the  grasp  of  our  adversaries.  The 
blockade  ruined  the  Confederate  finances  and,  by  preventing 
the  importation  of  military  material,  weakened  the  Confeder 
ate  armies  to  the  extent  of  thousands  of  men  who  were  de 
tailed  for  manufacturing  and  other  purposes.  It  was  the 
blockade,  too,  which  caused  the  derangement  of  the  internal 
economy  of  the  South,  creating  the  painful  contrast  in  the 
effects  of  the  war  upon  the  two  sections.  The  North,  with 
its  ports  open,  the  abundant  gold  of  California,  and  petroleum 
stimulating  speculation,  found  in  the  war  a  mine  of  wealth. 
Patriotism  and  profit  went  hand  in  hand.  The  vast  expendi 
tures  of  Government  created  a  lucrative  market ;  the  enormous 
transportation  demanded  made  the  railroads  prosperous  beyond 


580  LIRE   OF   JEFFERSOX    DAVIS. 

parallel;  and  the  sources  of  popular  prosperity  and  exhilara 
tion  were  inexhaustible.  The  condition  of  the  South  was  the 
exact  reverse.  "With  its  commerce  almost  totally  suspended  ; 
frequently  in  peril  of  famine;  whole  States,  one  after  another, 
occupied  or  devastated  by  the  enemy,  so  that  when  the  Confed 
erate  armies  expelled  the  enemy  they  could  not  maintain  them 
selves,  and  were  compelled  to  retreat;  deprived  of  every  comfort, 
and  nearly  of  all  the  necessaries  of  life,  the  history  of  the  war 
in  the  South  is  a  record  of  universal  and  unrelieved  suffering. 
It  must  be  apparent  that  we  have  here  given  but  a  superfi 
cial  review  and  imperfect  statement  of  the  obstacles  with  which 
the  South  contended.  But,  assuredly,  before  even  this  array 
of  odds,  such  minor  questions  as  the  removal  of  one  officer  and 
the  retention  of  another  sink  into  utter  insignificance.  As  we 
have  before  intimated,  many  of  the  most  important  incidents 
in  the  conduct  of  the  war  must  be  reserved  for  the  decision  of 
impartial  military  judgment.  What  if  it  should  be  granted 
that  the  appointment  of  Pemberton  and  the  removal  of  John 
ston  were  fatal  blunders,  were  they  compensated  by  no  acts  of 
judicious  selection  of  other  officers  for  promotion  and  reward? 
Is  the  firm  and  constant  support  of  Lee,  of  Sidney  Johnston, 
of  Jackson,  and  of  Early  to  be  accounted  as  nothing  ?  Are 
we  to  accept  the  imputation  of  error  to  Mr.  Davis  alone  ?  We 
need  not  pursue  the  career  of  General  Johnston  much  farther 
than  its  beginning  to  discover  what  his  countrymen  unani 
mously  deplored  as  an  error,  what  Stonewall  Jackson  declared 
a  fatal  blunder.  General  Lee  confessed  his  error  at  Gettys 
burg.  Beauregard,  too,  has  been  generally  adjudged  to  have 
seriously  erred  at  Shiloh.  Yet  how  easy  would  it  be  to  con 
struct  a  plausible  theory,  demonstrating  the  seriously  adverse 
influence  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy,  from  each  one 


GENERAL    HOOD.  581 

of  those  errors.  And  we  could  extend  the  parallel  much 
farther.  Napoleon  estimated  the  merits  of  different  generals 
by  the  comparative  number  of  their  faults  and  virtues.  Per 
haps  that  is  even  a  better  philosophy  which  urges  us  to 
measure  the  reputations  of  men,  "  not  by  their  exemption  from 
fault,  but  by  the  size  of  the  virtues  of  which  they  are  pos 
sessed."  Assuredly,  the  South  can  never  demur  to  the  appli 
cation  of  this  test  either  to  herself  or  her  late  leader.  Judged 
by  such  a  standard  of  merit,  neither  can  be  apprehensive  for 
the  award  of  posterity.  Two  generations  hence,  if  not  sooner, 
Jefferson  Davis,  not  less  for  his.  wisdom  than  for  his  virtues, 
will  be  commemorated  as  the  Washington  of  the  South. 

With  a  view  to  dramatic  unity,  we  shall  disregard  somewhat 
of  chronological  order,  and  follow,  with  a  rapid  summary,  the 
movements  of  the  ill-starred  Western  army  of  the  Confederacy, 
to  the  point  where  its  existence  virtually  terminated.  The 
successor  of  General  Johnston,  General  John  B.  Hood,  em 
bodied  a  rare  union  of  the  characteristics  of  the  popular  ideal 
of  a  soldier.  He  was  the  noblest  contribution  of  Kentucky 
chivalry  to  the  armies  of  the  South,  and  his  record  throughout 
the  war,  even  though  ending  in  terrible  disaster,  was  that  of  a 
gallant,  dashing,  and  skillful  leader.  Identified  with  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  from  an  early  period  of  its  history,  he 
shared  its  dangers,  its  trials,  and  its  most  thrilling  triumphs. 
"  Hood  and  his  Texans  "  were  household  words  in  the  Con 
federacy,  and  the  bulletins  from  every  battle-field  in  Virginia 
were  emblazoned  with  their  exploits.  Few  commanders  have 
possessed  to  a  greater  extent  than  Hood  that  magnetic  mastery 
over  troops,  which  imbues  them  with  the  consciousness  of  irre 
sistible  resolution.  Of  conspicuous  personal  gallantry  and  com 
manding  physique,  he  united  to  fiery  energy,  consummate  self- 


582  LIFE   OP   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

possession  and  excellent  tactical  ability.  A  favorite  with 
General  Lee  and  President  Davis,  he  had  also  received  the 
warm  commendation  of  Stonewall  Jackson  for  his  distin 
guished  services  at  Cold  Harbor,  in  1862. 

Painfully  wounded  and  disabled  at  Gettysburg,  he  accom 
panied  his  old  division  to  Georgia,  and,  while  his  previous 
wound  was  yet  unhealed,  he  lost  a  leg  at  Chickamauga. 
After  months  of  painful  confinement,  he  was  again  in  Rich 
mond,  soliciting  the  privilege  of  additional  service  to  his 
country.  His  conspicuous  devotion  challenged  equally  the 
admiration  of  the  people  and  the  Government,  and  President 
Davis  was  universally  declared  never  to  have  conferred  a  more 
deserved  promotion  than  that  by  which  he  made  Hood  a 
Lieutenant-General.  General  Hood  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  a  corps  under  Johnston,  and  accompanied  the  army 
in  its  movements  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta. 

The  appointment  of  Hood  as  the  successor  of  Johnston  was 
the  occasion  of  renewed  anticipation  to  the  South.  His  ag 
gressive  qualities,  it  was  thought,  would  supply  that  bold  and 
energetic  policy  which  the  country  believed  to  be  the  great 
need  of  the  situation  in  Georgia.  Nor  was  there  any  thing 
in  the  record  of  Hood,  to  cause  apprehension  that  his  posses 
sion  of  these  qualities  excluded  such  an  equipoise  of  mental 
faculties,  as  should  ensure  a  sound  and  discreet  system  of 
operations. 

We  shall  not  discuss  in  detail  the  operations  which  General 
Hood  so  speedily  inaugurated.  They  were  necessitated,  to  a 
large  extent,  by  a  situation  of  affairs  for  which  he  was  not  re 
sponsible.  The  one  object  of  Hood,  and  the  one  hope  and 
necessity  of  the  Confederacy,  was  the  expulsion  of  Sherman 
from  a  vital  section.  Sherman  had  not  delayed  an  hour  in 


FALL    OF   ATLANTA.  583 

his  purpose  of  securing  possession  of  the  Macon  road,  and  sev 
ering  the  communications  of  Atlanta.  Already  he  was  pre 
paring  operations  similar  to  those  by  which  Grant  sought  the 
isolation  of  Petersburg ;  and  if  his  strength  was  not  then  ade 
quate,  there  could  be  no  question  of  his  capacity  to  obtain  ample 
means  from  his  Government  to  secure  the  great  results  of  his 
skillfully  conducted  and  successful  campaign.  The  situation 
required  precisely  that  immediate  execution  of  a  vigorous 
policy  by  which  Lee  had  relieved  Richmond  of  the  presence 
of  McClellan. 

"While  thus  foreseeing  the  fatal  result  of  permitting  himself 
to  be  besieged  in  Atlanta,  General  Hood  did  not  rashly  assail 
the  enemy.  A  favorable  opportunity  was  presented,  by  a  gap 
between  two  of  Sherman's  columns,  for  a  concentrated  assault 
upon  that  which  was  most  exposed.  Though  the  Confederate 
forces  were  admirably  massed  and  skillfully  led,  they  were 
eventually  repulsed  by  the  murderous  fire  of  the  Federal 
artillery,  which  was  concentrated  with  signal  promptitude  and 
served  with  rare  ability.  This  demonstration  was  a  failure, 
though  it  had  promised  favorably,  and,  for  a  time,  exposed  the 
entire  Federal  army  to  serious  danger.  A  series  of  subsequent 
engagements,  fought  by  Hood  to  prevent  the  consummation  of 
Sherman's  design  to  isolate  Atlanta,  left  the  enemy  in  possession 
of  the  Confederate  line  of  supply,  and  Atlanta  was  evacuated 
on  the  1st  of  September. 

Such  was  the  melancholy  conclusion,  for  the  Confederacy, 
of  the  first  stage  of  the  Georgia  campaign.  Military  judg 
ment  must  decide,  how  far  an  able  offensive  policy,  at  the  out 
set  of  the  campaign  would  have  delayed,  if  not  entirely  checked 
the  march  of  Sherman  to  Atlanta;  how  far  an  offensive  was 
then  practicable;  to  what  extent  Hood's  course  was  imposed 


584  LJFE    OF    JEFFKRSON    DAVIS. 

upon  him  by  a  situation  which  he  did  not  create,  and  whether 
his  accession  to  command,  either  altered  or  hastened  the  ulti 
mate  fate  of  Atlanta. 

The  emergency  consequent  upon  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  sum 
moned  President  Davis  to  Georgia.  His  visit  was  dictated 
by  the  double  purpose,  of  healing  dissensions  in  that  State, 
and  of  devising  measures  for  the  restoration  of  the  campaign. 
The  perverse  course  of  Governor  Brown  had  proven  successful 
in  the  dissemination  of  disaffection,  and  his  teachings  were 
beginning  to  mature  those  fruits  of  demoralization  in  Georgia, 
which  the  subsequent  march  of  Sherman  abundantly  developed. 
It  would  be  impossible  to  characterize  the  conduct  of  this  of 
ficial  in  terms  of  extravagant  severity.  Capricious  and  per 
verse  in  his  hostility  to  the  Confederate  Government,  while  yet 
professing  fealty  to  the  cause,  he  contrived,  in  the  most  dis 
tressing  exigencies,  to  paralyze  the  energies  of  Georgia,  and 
finally  to  create  a  feeling  bordering  closely  upon  open  disaf 
fection. 

The  conduct  of  Governor  Brown,  acceptable  only  to  the 
clique  of  malcontents  who  followed  him,  was  the  subject  of 
criticism  throughout  the  Confederacy,  and  of  suspicion  by  a 
large  portion  of  the  public.  It  is  a  matter  of  record  that 
after  the  fall  of  Atlanta  he  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  Con 
federate  authorities  for  the  defense  of  Georgia,  and  demanded 
the  return  of  the  Georgia  troops  in  Virginia,  unless  the  Presi 
dent  would  send  reinforcements.  Yet  he  was  perfectly  aware 
that  the  Confederate  Government  then,  had  not  one  man  to 
spare  in  any  quarter,  and  was  in  a  crisis,  produced  solely  by 
the  want  of  numbers.  His  communications  to  the  Confederate 
Government  were  usually  splenetic  assaults  upon  the  Presi 
dent,  whose  military  administration  he  offensively  criticised, 


GOVERNOR   BROWN.  585 

and  whom  he  charged  with  an  ambition  to  destroy  every  pro 
tection  to  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States.  There  is  no  point 
of  view  in  which  the  course  of  Governor  Brown  is  not  equally 
incomprehensible  and  indefensible.  It  was  freighted  with 
disaster  and  defeat  to  the  cause  which  he  professed  to  serve. 
Considered  in  the  aspect  of  partisan  administration,  or  the  in 
dulgence  of  personal  spleen,  its  inconsistency  was  paralleled 
only  by  its  folly.  It  demoralized  public  sentiment,  and  tended 
largely  to  that  corruption  of  the  public  and  the  army  which, 
in  the  last  stage  of  the  war,  was  so  palpable.  Not  the  least 
injurious  feature  of  Governor  Brown's  official  policy  was  the 
unpropitious  seasons  which  he  selected  for  the  indulgence  of 
his  capricious  and  splenetic  moods.  Upon  the  heels  of  crush 
ing  military  disasters,  and  when  the  Confederate  authorities 
were  most  helpless,  Governor  Brown  was  most  exacting. 

The  purposes  of  his  persistent  and  vindictive  impeachments 
of  the  Confederate  Government,  at  such  periods,  must  remain 
a  subject  of  speculation.  Certainly  he  did  not  exalt  his  dig 
nity  as  a  statesman,  nor  approve  his  earnestness  as  a  patriot, 
by  giving  precedence  to  his  personal  animosities  over  his  of 
ficial  duties,  and  by  substituting  for  cooperation  in  support  of 
a  cause  to  which  he  protested  his  devotion,  a  system  of  malig 
nant  controversy  with  the  national  authorities. 

The  interviews  of  President  Davis,  with  Governor  Brown, 
during  his  visit  to  Georgia,  in  September,  failed,  as  had  all 
previous  efforts  to  that  end,  to  effect  an  accommodation  of 
differences.  Governor  Brown  was  determined  not  to  be  satis 
fied,  and  though  Mr.  Davis,  having  made  nearly  every  conces 
sion  demanded,  left  him  under  the  impression  that  Brown  was 
at  last  prepared  to  cooperate  with  him  heartily  and  zealously, 
he  was  speedily  convinced  of  the  error  of  such  a  calculation. 


586  LIFE   OF    JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

While  on  his  way  to  Hood's  army  Mr.  Davis  addressed  the 
citizens  of  Macon,  and  spoke  with  great  candor,  concerning 
the  perils  of  the  situation,  which,  though  serious,  he  believed, 
might  be  repaired.  Alluding  to  the  demand  made  upon  him 
for  reinforcements  from  Virginia,  he  said  that  the  disparity 
in  Virginia  was  greater  than  in  Georgia;  the  army  under 
Early  had  been  sent  to  the  Valley,  because  the  enemy  had 
penetrated  to  Lynchburg;  and  now  should  Early  be  with 
drawn,  there  would  be  nothing  to  prevent  the  Federal  army 
from  forming  a  complete  cordon  of  men  around  Richmond. 
He  had  counseled  with  General  Lee  upon  all  these  points; 
his  mind  had  sought  to  embrace  the  entire  field,  and  the 
necessities  of  every  quarter,  and  his  conclusion  was,  that  "if 
one-half  of  the  men  now  absent  from  the  field,  would  return 
to  duty,  .we  can  defeat  the  enemy.  With  that  hope,  I  am 
now  going  to  the  front.  I  may  not  realize  this  hope,  but  I 
know  that  there  are  men  there,  who  have  looked  death  too 
often  in  the  face  to  despond  now." 

On  the  18th  September,  the  President  reached  Hood's  head 
quarters,  and  on  the  following  day  reviewed  the  whole  army. 
He  addressed  the  troops  in  terms  of  encouragement,  and  his 
promise  to  them  of  an  advance  northward,  was  received  with 
unbounded  enthusiasm.  The  situation  in  Georgia  admitted  a 
very  limited  consideration  of  expedients,  by  which  to  obtain 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  Atlanta.  Sherman's  presence,  un 
molested,  in  the  interior  of  Georgia,  during  the  autumn  and 
winter,  would  be  fatal.  He  would  then  be  in  a  position  to 
assail,  at  leisure,  the  only  remaining  source  of  supplies  for  the 
Confederate  armies.  His  cavalry  could  safely  penetrate  in 
every  direction,  destroying  communications  and  supplies,  and 
producing  universal  demoralization. 


THE   TENNESSEE   CAMPAIGN.  587 

Hood  was  confident  that  his  army  was  capable  of  better 
fighting  than  it  had  performed  against  Sherman,  provided  it 
could  meet  the  enemy  under  such  circumstances  as  should 
promise  the  recovery  of  the  ground  lost,  in  the  event  of  vic 
tory.  To  attack  Sherman  in  Atlanta  was  not  to  be  considered, 
and  to  await  the  development  of  the  enemy's  plan  would  be 
dangerous.  Sherman  had  already  announced  his  purpose  to 
rest  his  army  at  Atlanta,  with  a  view  to  its  preparation  for  the 
arduous  enterprises  yet  before  it.  Hence,  it  became  necessary 
to  adopt  a  plan,  which  should  draw  him  away  from  his  de 
fenses,  and  compel  him  to  fight  upon  equal  ground. 

It  may  be  briefly  stated  that  the  subsequent  operations  of 
General  Hood,  when  they  ceased  to  menace  the  enemy's  flank, 
and  assumed  the  character  of  a  mere  detachment  upon  the  Fed 
eral  rear,  was  not  the  plan  of  campaign  which  Mr.  Davis 
expected  to  be  carried  into  execution.  He  approved  a  con 
centration  upon  the  Federal  flank,  which  it  was  not  likely 
Sherman  would  permit  to  be  endangered.  Seeing,  however, 
the  exposed  situation  of  the  country  south  of  Atlanta,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  movement  into  Alabama,  Mr.  Davis  opposed 
any  operations  which  should  place  Hood's  army  beyond  striking 
distance  of  Sherman,  should  the  latter  move  southward  from  At 
lanta. 

It  is  remarkable  to  what  extent  the  movements  of  Sherman 
demonstrated  the  judicious  character  of  the  Confederate  move 
ment,  so  long  as  it  was  in  conformity  with  these  views  of  Mr. 
Davis.  Puzzled,  at  first,  as  to  Hood's  purposes,  Sherman  was 
no  longer  perplexed  as  to  what  his  own  course  should  be,  when 
it  was  evident  that  Hood  was  making  a  serious  demonstration 
for  the  recovery  of  Tennessee,  meanwhile  giving  up  Georgia 
entirely  to  Federal  possession.  When  these  larger  and  more 


588  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

doubtful  enterprises  were  added  to  the  original  scope  of  the 
Confederate  movement,  Mr.  Davis  was  too  remote  from  the 
scene  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  recalling  the  army  from 
an  enterprise  which  he  felt  assured  would  not  be  attempted 
without  justifying  information  by  the  commander.* 

But,  after  all,  the  disastrous  consequences,  following  the  un 
covering  of  Georgia,  are  to  be  attributed  less  to  the  intrinsic 
ally  erroneous  strategy  of  Hood,  than  to  the  consummate  vigor 
and  promptitude  of  Sherman.  Odious  to  the  South  as  Sher 
man  is,  by  reason  of  his  cruelties  and  barbarities,  he  can  not 
be  denied  the  merit  of  an  immediate  grasp  of  the  critical  situ 
ation,  and  a  no  less  prompt  execution.  A  commander  of  less 
self-possession,  and  less  audacity,  would  have  been  bewildered 
by  the  transfer  of  an  army  from  his  immediate  front  to  his 
rear,  and  placed  astride  his  communications.  The  t(  march  to 
the  sea"  was  no  military  exploit,  and  only  a  brazen  charlatan 
ism  could  exalt  it  as  an  illustration  of  genius.  The  proof  of 

*  General  Hood's  magnanimous  acknowledgment  is  sufficient  for  the 
acquittal  of  Mr.  Davis  from  any  responsibility  for  this  ill-starred  move 
ment.  On  taking  leave  of  his  army,  in  January,  1865,  Hood  said,  speak 
ing  of  the  late  campaign :  "/  am  alone  responsible  for  its  conception,  and 
strove  hard  to  do  my  duty  in  its  execution.1' 

But  in  addition  to  this,  there  was  a  correspondence,  between  Mr.  Davis 
and  a  Confederate  officer  of  high  rank,  which  completely  exculpated  Mr. 
Davis.  In  accordance  with  Mr.  Davis'  accustomed  magnanimity  and  re 
gard  for  the  public  welfare,  this  correspondence  was  never  published. 
The  facts  in  this  matter  conspicuously  illustrate  the  persistent  and  reck 
less  misrepresentation,  which  has  not  ceased  with  the  termination  of  the 
war.  With  a  class  of  writers,  the  facts  regarding  Mr.  Davis  are  things 
least  to  be  desired.  In  many  instances,  their  attacks  upon  his  fame  are 
puerile,  but  in  others,  where  facts  are  either  distorted  or  wantonly  dis 
regarded,  the  object  seems  to  be  merely  to  gratify  a  wicked  spirit  of  de 
traction. 


589 

Sherman's  merit  is  to  be  seen  in  the  quick  determination  and 
execution  of  his  purpose,  when  the  real  significance  of  Hood's 
operations  was  revealed.  His  telegram  to  Washington  fully 
described  the  situation  and  prophesied  the  sequel :  "  Hood  has 
crossed  the  Tennessee.  Thomas  will  take  care  of  him  and 
Nashville,  while  Schofield  will  not  let  him  into  Chattanooga 
or  Knoxville.  Georgia  and  South  Carolina  are  at  my  mercy, 
and  I  shall  strike.  Do  not  be  anxious  about  me.  I  am  all 
right." 

We  are  not  permitted  to  trace  the  unfortunate  Tennessee 
campaign  of  General  Hood,  culminating  in  his  disastrous  de 
feat  at  Nashville,  in  December,  and  in  the  virtual  destruction 
of  the  gallant  but  ill-starred  army,  upon  whose  bayonets  the 
Confederate  power,  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  was  so  long  up 
held.  It  was  the  final  campaign  of  the  Confederacy  in  that 
quarter,  and,  with  its  failure,  perished  forever  the  hope  of  de 
fending  the  western  and  central  sections  of  the  South.*  Mean 
while,  Sherman,  unopposed,  had  marched  like  Fate  through 
Georgia,  to  Savannah,  realizing  Grant's  assertion  that  the  Con 
federacy  was  a  mere  shell,  and  revealing  a  fact,  until  then  t  not 
clearly  appreciated,  of  the  exhaustion  and  demoralization  of  its 
people. 

*In  the  autumn  of  1864,  General  Price  advanced  into  Missouri,  pro 
claiming  his  purpose  to  be  a  permanent  occupation.  The  expedition 
ended  in  disaster.  Defeated  in  an  engagement  on  the  Big  Blue,  Price 
retreated  into  Kansas,  and  finally  into  Southern  Arkansas.  The  cam 
paign  did  not  affect  the  current  of  the  war  elsewhere,  and  was  a  failure. 


. 


590  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON    DAVIS. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

INCIDENTS  ON  THE  LINES  OF  RICHMOND  AND  PETERSBURG  DURING  THE  SUMMER 

AND    AUTUMN CAPTURE    OF    FORT    HARRISON OTHER    DEMONSTRATIONS    BY 

GRANT THE  SITUATION  NEAR  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAPITAL EARLY's  VALLEY 

CAMPAIGN POPULAR  CENSURE  OF  EARLY INFLUENCE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAM 
PAIGN    UPON    THE    SITUATION    NEAR    RICHMOND WHAT    THE    AGGREGATE   OF 

CONFEDERATE  DISASTERS  SIGNIFIED DESPONDENCY  OF  THE  SOUTH THE   IN 
JURIOUS  EXAMPLES  OF  PROMINENT  MEN THE  PRESIDENT  AND  GENERAL  LEE 

MR.   DAVIS'   POPULARITY WHY  HE  DID  NOT  FULLY  COMPREHEND    THE    DE 
MORALIZATION  OF  THE  PEOPLE HE  HOPES  FOR  POPULAR  REANIMATION WAS 

THE  CASE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY  HOPELESS? VACILLATING  CONDUCT  OF  CON 
GRESS THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS  A  WEAK  BODY MR.  DAVIS'   RELATIONS 

WITH    CONGRESS PROPOSED    CONSCRIPTION  OF    SLAVES — FAVORED    BY    DAVIS 

AND    LEE DEFEATED    BY    CONGRESS LEGISLATION    DIRECTED    AGAINST    THE 

PRESIDENT DAVIS'   OPINION    OF    LEE RUMORS   OF    PEACE HAMPTON    ROADS 

CONFERENCE THE    FEDERAL     ULTIMATUM THE    ABSURD    CHARGE    AGAINST 

MR.  DAVIS  OF  OBSTRUCTING  NEGOTIATIONS HIS   RECORD  ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF 

PEACE A  RICHMOND  NEWSPAPER    ON    THE    FEDERAL    ULTIMATUM — DELUSIVE 

SIGNS   OF    PUBLIC    SPIRIT NO   ALTERNATIVE    BUT   CONTINUED   RESISTANCE — 

REPORT  OF  THE  HAMPTON  ROADS  CONFERENCE. 

"1%/TE  AN  WHILE  the  siege  of  Petersburg  had  progressed 
-**•"-•-  drearily  through  the  months  of  summer  and  autumn. 
The  "hammering77  principle  was  abandoned  by  General  Grant, 
for  a  series  of  maneuvres  having  in  view  the  possession  of  the 
railroads  extending  southward  and  eastward. 

About  the  middle  of  August  a  portion  of  Grant's  army  was 
established  upon  the  Weldon  road.  This  was  by  no  means  a 
line  of  communication  vital  to  General  Lee,  though  several 
heavy  engagements  ensued  from  its  disputed  possession.  The 


INCIDENTS    ON    THE    RICHMOND    LINES.  591 

Federal  losses  in  these  engagements  were  very  heavy,  and  were 
hardly  compensated  by  any  immediate  advantage  following  the 
permanent  acquisition,  by  General  Grant,  of  the  Weldon  Rail 
road.  The  location  of  the  Federal  army  gave  ample  opportu 
nity  for  the  transfer  of  forces  to  either  side  of  the  river,  and 
General  Grant  did  not  fail  to  avail  himself  of  his  facilities,  for 
aiding  the  more  important  operations  before  Petersburg,  by 
numerous  diversions  in  the  direction  of  Richmond.  One  of 
these  movements  upon  the  north  side  of  James  River,  in  the 
last  days  of  September,,  resulted  disastrously  to  the  Confeder 
ates,  in  the  loss  of  Fort  Harrison,  a  position  of  great  impor 
tance  in  the  defense  of  that  portion  of  the  Confederate  line. 
Efforts  to  recapture  it  were  unavailing,  and  attended  with 
heavy  loss.  The  enemy  was  left  in  secure  possession  of  a  posir 
tion  from  which  Richmond  could  be  seriously  menaced.  The 
last  serious  demonstration  by  General  Grant,  before  winter,  was 
the  movement  of  a  heavy  force,  with  the  view  of  turning  the 
Confederate  position,  and  obtaining  the  possession  of  Lee's 
communications  with  Lynchburg  and  Danville.  Though  sus 
tained  by  a  strong  diversion  on  other  portions  of  the  line,  this 
demonstration  was  barren  of  results. 

Thus,  the  beginning  of  winter  found  the  Confederate  forces 
still  safely  holding  the  lines  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg. 
The  situation  near  the  Confederate  capital  was  encouraging, 
and  indicated  an  almost  indefinite  resistance.  But  nearly  every 
other  quarter  of  the  Confederacy  was  darkened  by  the  shadow 
of  disaster. 

The  campaign  of  Hood  in  Tennessee  had  its  counterpart  in 
the  Valley  campaign  of  General  Early.  This  campaign,  the 
original  design  of  which  was  the  expulsion  of  Hunter,  was 
doubly  important  afterwards  in  the  design  to  secure  the  harvests 


592  LIFE    OF    JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  to  continue  the  diversion  of  a 
large  Federal  force  from  the  front  of  Richmond.  The  earlier 
movements  of  General  Early  were  attended  with  success,  and 
the  Confederacy  had  the  promise  of  a  campaign,  which  should 
renew  the  glories  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  in  a  district  which  his 
exploits  had  made  forever  famous.  In  its  conclusion  was  re 
vealed,  perhaps  more  strikingly  than  upon  any  other  theatre  of 
the  war,  the  overwhelming  odds  and  obstacles,  with  which  the 
Confederacy  contended  in  this  desperate  stage  of  its  history. 
The  activity  of  General  Early  in  the  summer  months,  and  his 
well-earned  reputation  as  an  officer  of  skill  and  daring,  induced 
the  enemy  to  concentrate  a  heavy  force  to  protect  the  Potomac 
frontier,  and,  if  possible,  to  overwhelm  the  Confederate  army  in 
the  Valley.  In  the  months  of  September  and  October,  several 
engagements  occurred,  in  which  General  Early  was  badly  de 
feated,  and  his  army  at  the  close  of  autumn  exhibited  so  many 
evidences  of  demoralization,  as  to  occasion  apprehension  for  its 
future  efficiency. 

The  censure  of  General  Early  by  the  public  and  the  news 
papers  was  unsparing.  Most  unworthy  allegations,  totally  un 
supported,  were  circulated  in  explanation  of  his  disasters. 
That  such  a  man  as  Early,  whose  every  promotion  had  been 
won  by  a  heroism  and  efficiency  inferior  to  those  of  none  of 
Lee's  subordinates,  should  have  been  recklessly  condemned  for 
reverses,  which  were  clearly  the  results  of  no  errors  or  mis 
conduct  of  his  own,  is  now  a  striking  commentary  upon  that 
sullen  despondency  into  which  the  Southern  mind  was  fast 
settling.  A  victory,  in  any  quarter,  was  now  almost  the  last 
expectation  of  the  public,  and  still  Early  was  recklessly  abused 
for  not  winning  victories,  with  a  demoralized  army,  against 
forces  having  four  times  his  own  strength.  Neither  President 


THE   VALLEY    CAMPAIGN.  593 

Davis  nor  General  Lee  ever  doubted  General  Early's  efficiency ; 
and  the  letter  of  the  commanding  general  to  Early,  written  in 
the  last  hours  of  the  Confederacy,  constitutes  a  tribute  to  patri 
otic  and  distinguished  services,  which  the  old  hero  may  well 
cherish  in  his  exile,  as  a  worthy  title  to  the  esteem  of  posterity. 

The  defeat  of  Early  at  Cedar  Creek,  late  in  October,  was  the 
decisive  event  of  the  last  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
In  December  nearly  all  Early's  forces  were  transferred  to 
General  Lee's  lines,  and  the  bulk  of  the  Federal  army  in  the 
Valley  returned  to  General  Grant.  General  Early  remained  in 
the  Valley  with  a  fragmentary  command,  which  Sheridan  easily 
overran  on  his  march  from  Winchester  to  the  front  of  Peters 
burg. 

Events  in  the  Valley  had  a  marked  influence  upon  the  situa 
tion  near  Richmond.  The  Confederate  authorities  had  hoped 
for  such  a  successful  issue  in  the  Valley  as  should  relieve  Rich 
mond  of  much  of  Grant's  pressure.  The  disappointment  of 
this  hope  left  the  Federal  frontier  secure,  and  gave  Grant  a 
large  accession  of  strength,  for  which  Lee  had  no  compensation, 
except  the  debris  of  a  defeated  and  dispirited  army. 

The  aggregate  of  military  disasters  with  which  the  year  1864 
terminated,  established  the  inevitable  failure  of  the  Confeder 
acy,  unless  more  vigorous  measures-  than  the  Government  had 
ever  yet  attempted  should  be  adopted,  and  unless  the  people 
were  prepared  for  sacrifices  which  had  not  yet  been  exacted. 
The  reserves  of  men,  which  the  various  acts  of  conscription 
were  designed  to  place  in  the  field,  were  exhausted,  or  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  Government,  and  the  supplies  of  the  army 
became  more  and  more  precarious  each  day.  There  was,  in 
deed,  nothing  fatal  as  affecting  the  ultimate  decision  of  the 
contest,  in  the  military  events  of  the  past  year,  if  unattended 
38 


594  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

by  a  decay  of  public  spirit.  It  was  not  until  the  winter  of 
1864-1865  that  any  considerable  body  of  the  Southern  people 
were  brought  to  the  conviction  that  their  struggle  was  a  hope 
less  one.  The  waste  of  war  is  in  nothing  more  continuous  than 
in  its  test  of  the  moral  energy  of  communities.  In  the  last 
winter  of  the  war  the  distrust  of  the  popular  mind  was 
painfully  apparent.  The  South  began  to  read  its  fate  when 
it  saw  that  the  North  had  converted  warfare  into  universal 
destruction  and  desolation,  and  when  it  exchanged  the  code 
of  civilized  war  for  the  grim  butchery  of  Grant,  and  the  savage 
measures  of  Sherman  and  Sheridan.  It  was  plain  that  while 
the  losses  of  the  Federal  army  were  shocking,  and  were  suffi 
cient  to  have  unnerved  the  army  and  the  people  of  the  North, 
the  "attrition"  of  General  Grant  had  caused  a  fearful  dimi 
nution  of  the  Confederate  armies. 

The  facility  of  the  Federal  Government  in  repairing  its 
losses  of  men,  baffled  all  previous  calculation  in  the  Confeder 
acy,  and  it  had  long  since  become  evident  that  the  resources 
of  the  North,  in  all  other  respects,  were  equal  to  an  indefinite 
endurance.  Indeed,  it  has  been  justly  said  that  the  material 
resources  of  the  North  were  not  seriously  tested,  but  merely 
developed  by  the  war.  Peculiarly  disheartening  to  the  South 
was  the  triumph  of  the  Republican  party  in  the  reelection  of 
Mr.  Lincoln — an  event  plainly  portending  a  protraction  of  the 
war  upon  a  scale,  which  should  adequately  employ  the  in 
exhaustible  means  at  the  command  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment. 

It  would  be  needless  to  speculate  now  as  to  the  material 
capacity  of  the  South  to  have  met  the  demands  of  another 
campaign.  The  military  capacity  of  the  Confederacy  in  the 
last  months  of  the  war,  is  not  to  be  measured  by  the  number 


DESPONDENCY   OF   THE   SOUTH.  595 

of  men  that  still  might  have  been  brought  to  the  field,  or  by 
the  material  means  which  yet  survived  the  consumption  and 
waste  of  war.  These  considerations  are  admissible  only  in 
connection  with  that  moral  condition  of  the  public,  which 
fitted  or  disqualified  it  for  longer  endurance  of  the  privations 
and  sacrifices  of  the  war.  Long  before  the  close  of  winter, 
popular  feeling  assumed  a  phase  of  sullen  indifference  which, 
while  yet  averse  to  unconditional  submission  to  the  North, 
manifestly  despaired  of  ultimate  success,  viewed  additional 
sacrifices  as  hopeless,  and  anticipated  the  worst. 

Only  a  hasty  and  ill-informed  judgment  could  condemn  the 
Southern  people  for  the  decay  of  its  spirit  in  this  last  stage 
of  the  war.  No  people  ever  endured  with  more  heroism  the 
trials  and  privations  incidental  to  their  situation.  Yet  these 
sacrifices  appeared  to  have  been  to  no  purpose;  a  cruel  and 
inexorable  fate  seemed  to  pursue  them,  and  to  taunt  them  with 
the  futility  of  exertion  to  escape  its  decree.  Victories,  which 
had  amazed  the  world,  and  again  and  again  stunned  a  powerful 
adversary,  and  which  the  South  felt  that,  under  ordinary  cir 
cumstances,  should  have  secured  the  reward  of  independence, 
were  recurred  to  only  as  making  more  bitter  the  chagrin  of 
the  present.  Previous  defeats,  at  the  time  seeming  fatal,  had 
been  patiently  encountered,  and  bravely  surmounted,  so  long 
as  victory  appeared  to  offer  a  reward  which  should  compen 
sate  for  the  sacrifice  necessary  to  obtain  it.  But,  now,  even 
the  hope  of  victory  had  almost  ceased  to  be  a  source  of  en 
couragement,  since  any  probable  success  would  only  tend  to 
a  postponement  of  the  inevitable  catastrophe,  which,  perhaps, 
it  would  be  better  to  invite  than  to  defer. 

It  must  be  confessed,  too,  that  the  people  and  the  army  of 
the  Confederacy,  in  this  crisis,  found  but  little  source  of  re- 


596  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

animation  in  the  example  of  a  majority  of  its  public  men. 
Long  before  the  taint  of  demoralization  reached  the  heart  of 
the  masses,  the  Confederate  cause  had  been  despaired  of  by 
men  whose  influence  and  position  determined  the  convictions 
of  whole  communities.  In  President  Davis  and  General  Lee 
the  South  saw  conspicuous  examples  of  resolution,  fortitude, 
and  self-abnegation.  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  impatient 
and  almost  despairing  temper  of  the  public  was  visibly  influ 
enced  by  the  persistent  crimination  of  Mr.  Davis,  by  the  fac 
tion  which  sought  to  thwart  him  even  at  the  hazard  of  the 
public  welfare.  But  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  unity  of 
counsel  and  purpose  which  had  animated  the  President  and 
General  Lee  at  every  stage  of  the  struggle,  was  still  main 
tained,  popular  sympathy  still  clung  to  the  leader,  whose  un 
selfish  devotion  and  unshaken  fortitude  should  have  been  a 
sufficient  rebuke  to  his  accusers. 

A  vast  deal  of  misrepresentation  has  been  indulged  to  show 
that  Mr.  Davis  had  become  unpopular  in  the  last  stage  of  the 
war,  and  that  he  was  the  object  of  popular  reproach  as  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  country.  To  the  contrary, 
there  were  many  evidences  of  the  sympathy  which  embraced 
Mr.  Davis  as  probably  the  chief  sufferer  from  apprehended 
calamities.  His  appearance  in  public  in  Richmond,  was  al 
ways  the  occasion  of  unrestrained  popular  enthusiasm.  Even 
but  a  few  weeks  before  the  final  catastrophe,  there  were  signal 
instances  of  the  popular  affection  for  him,  and  it  was  painfully 
evident  to  those  who  knew  his  character,  that  these  demon 
strations  were  accepted  by  him  as  an  exhibition  of  popular 
confidence  in  the  success  of  the  cause.  Indeed,  the  very  con 
fidence  which  these  exhibitions  of  popular  sympathy  produced 
in  the  mind  of  Mr.  Davis,  has  been  urged  as  an  evidence  of 


597 

a  want  of  sagacity,  which  disqualified  him  for  a  clear  apprecia 
tion  of  the  situation  of  affairs. 

Perhaps  with  more  color  of  truth  than  usual,  this  view  of 
Mr.  Davis'  character  has  been  presented.  That  he  did  not 
fully  comprehend  the  wide-spread  demoralization  of  the  South 
in  the  last  months  of  the  war,  is  hardly  to  be  questioned. 
Judging  men  by  his  own  exalted  nature,  he  conceived  it  im 
possible  that  the  South  could  ever  abandon  its  hope  of  inde 
pendence.  He  did  not  realize  how  men  could  cherish  an  aspi 
ration  for  the  future,  which  did  not  embrace  the  liberty  of 
their  country.  No  sacrifice  of  personal  interests  or  hopes 
were,  in  his  view,  too  great  to  be  demanded  of  the  country 
in  behalf  of  a  cause,  for  which  he  was  at  all  times  ready  to 
surrender  his  life.  Of  such  devotion  and  self-abnegation,  a 
sanguine  and  resolute  spirit  was  the  natural  product,  and  it  is 
a  paltry  view  of  such  qualities  to  characterize  them  as  the 
proof  of  defective  intellect.  Just  such  qualities  have  won  the 
battles  of  liberty  in  all  ages.  Washington,  at  Valley  Forge, 
with  a  wretched  remnant  of  an  army,  which  was  yet  the  last 
hope  of  the  country,  and  with  even  a  more  gloomy  future  im 
mediately  before  him,  declared  that  in  the  last  emergency  he 
would  retreat  to  the  mountains  of  Virginia,  and  there  continue 
the  struggle  in  the  hope  that  he  would  "yet  lift  the  flag  of 
his  bleeding  country  from  the  dust."  In  the  same  spirit  Jef 
ferson  Davis  would  never  have  abandoned  the  Confederate 
cause  so  long  as  it  had  even  a  semblance  of  popular  support. 

Almost  to  the  last  moment  of  the  Confederacy,  he  continued 
to  cherish  the  hope  of  a  reaction  in  the  public  mind,  which  he 
believed  would  be  immediately  kindled  to  its  old  enthusiasm  by 
a  decided  success.  It  was  in  recognition  of  this  quality  of  in 
flexible  purpose,  as  much  as  of  any  other  trait  of  his  character, 


598  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

that  the  South  originally  intrusted  Davis  with  leadership. 
Fit  leaders  of  revolutions  are  not  usually  found  in  men  of 
half-hearted  purpose,  wanting  in  resolution  themselves,  and 
doubting  the  fidelity  of  those  whom  they  govern.  Desperate 
trial  is  the  occasion  which  calls  forth  the  courage  of  those  truly 
great  men,  who,  while  ordinary  men  despair,  confront  agony 
itself  with  sublime  resolution. 

If  ingenuity  and  malignity  have  combined  to  exaggerate 
the  faults  of  Mr.  Davis,  the  love  of  his  countrymen,  the  can 
dor  of  honorable  enemies,  and  the  intelligence  of  mankind  have 
recognized  his  intellectual  and  moral  greatness.  The  world 
to-day  does  not  afford  such  an  example  of  those  blended  qual 
ities  which  constitute  the  title  to  universal  excellence.  For 
one  in  his  position,  the  leader  of  a  bold,  warlike,  intelligent, 
and  discerning  people,  there  was  demanded  that  union  of  ardor 
and  deliberation  which  he  so  peculiarly  illustrated.  Revolu 
tionary  periods  imperatively  demand  this  union  of  capacities 
for  thought  and  action.  The  peculiar  charm  of  Mr.  Davis  is 
the  perfect  poise  of  his  faculities;  an  almost  exact  adjustment 
of  qualities ;  of  indomitable  energy  and  winning  grace ;  heroic 
courage  and  tender  affection ;  strength  of  character,  and  almost 
excessive  compassion;  of  calculating  judgment  and  knightly 
sentiment ;  acute  penetration  and  analysis ;  comprehensive  per 
ception;  laborious  habits,  and  almost  universal  knowledge. 
Of  him  it  may  be  said  as  of  Hamilton  :  "  He  wore  the  blended 
wreath  of  arms,  of  law,  of  statesmanship,  of  oratory,  of  letters, 
of  scholarship,  of  practical  affairs ;"  and  in  most  of  these  fields 
of  distinction,  Mr.  Davis  has  few  rivals  among  the  public 
men  of  America. 

But  it  is  altogether  a  fallacious  supposition  that  the  mili 
tary  situation  of  the  Confederacy,  in  the  last  winter  of  the 


THE   CONFEDERATE   CONGRESS.  599 

war,  was  beyond  reclamation.  The  most  hasty  glance  at  the 
situation  revealed  the  feasibility  of  destroying  Sherman,  when 
he  turned  northward  from  Savannah,  with  a  proper  concen 
tration  of  the  forces  yet  available.  President  Davis  anxiously 
sought  to  secure  this  concentration,  but  was  disappointed  by 
causes  which  need  not  here  be  related.  With  Sherman  de 
feated,  the  Confederacy  must  have  obtained  a  new  lease  of 
life,  as  all  the  territory  which  he  had  overrun,  would  immedi 
ately  be  recovered,  and  the  worthless  title  of  his  conquests 
would  be  apparent,  even  to  the  North.  There  were  indeed 
many  aspects  of  the  situation  encouraging  to  enterprise,  could 
an  adequate  army  be  obtained,  and  the  heart  of  the  country 
reanimated.  President  Davis  was  not  alone  in  the  indulgence 
of  hope  of  better  fortune.  Again  he  had  the  sanction  of  Lee's 
name  in  confirmation  of  his  hopes,  and  in  support  of  the  meas 
ures  which  he  recommended. 

But  the  resolution  of  the  President  was  not  sustained  by  the 
cooperation  of  Congress.  The  last  session  of  that  body  was 
commemorated  by  a  signal  display  of  timidity  and  vacillation. 
Congress  assembled  in  November,  and  at  the  beginning  of  its 
session  its  nerve  was  visibly  shaken.  Before  its  adjournment 
in  March,  there  was  no  longer  even  a  pretense  of  organized 
opinion  and  systematic  legislation.  Its  occupation  during  the 
winter  was  mainly  crimination  of  the  President,  and  a  con 
temptible  frivolity,  which  at  last  provoked  the  hearty  disgust 
of  the  public.  The  calibre  of  the  last  Confederate  Congress 
may  be  correctly  estimated,  when  it  is  stated  that  as  late  as 
the  22d  of  February,  1865,  less  than  sixty  days  before  the  fall 
of  Richmond,  that  body  was  earnestly  engaged  in  devising  a 
new  flag  for  the  Confederacy. 

Not  a  single  measure  of  importance  was  adopted  without 


600  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

some  emasculating  clause,  or  without  such  postponement  as 
made  it  practically  inoperative.  Of  all  the  vigorous  sug 
gestions  of  Mr.  Davis  for  recruiting  the  army,  mobilizing  the 
subsistence,  and  renovating  the  material  condition  of  the  coun 
try,  hardly  one  was  adopted  in  a  practicable  shape.  Congress 
had  clearly  despaired  of  the  cause.  It  had  not  the  courage  to 
counsel  the  submission,  of  which  it  secretly  felt  the  necessity, 
and  left  the  capital  with  a  declaration  that  the  "  conquest  of 
the  Confederacy  was  geographically  impossible,"  yet  clearly 
attesting  by  its  flight  a  very  different  view  of  the  situation. 

The  history  of  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  is  a 
record  of  singular  imbecility  and  irresolution.  It  was  a  body 
without  leaders,  without  popular  sympathy,  without  a  single 
one  of  those  heroic  attributes  which  are  usually  evoked  in  peri 
ods  of  revolution.  It  may  safely  be  asserted  that  in  the  history 
of  no  other  great  revolution  does  the  statesmanship  of  its  legis 
lators  appear  so  contemptible,  when  compared  with  the  military 
administration  which  guided  its  armies.  Whatever  may  be 
the  estimate  of  the  executive  ability  of  the  Confederate  admin 
istration,  it  can  not  be  denied  that  its  courage  was  abundant ; 
nor  can  it  be  questioned  that  the  courage  of  Congress  often 
required  the  spur  of  popular  sentiment.  In  the  wholesale 
condemnation  of  Mr.  Davis  by  a  class  of  writers,  it  is*  remark 
able  that  the  defective  legislation  of  the  Confederacy  should  be 
accredited  with  so  little  influence  in  producing  its  failure.  If 
he  was  so  grossly  incompetent,  what  must  be  the  verdict  of  his 
tory  upon  a  body  which,  for  four  years,  submitted  to  a  ruinous 
administration  when  the  corrective  means  were  in  its  own 
hands? 

Of  Mr.  Davis*  relations  with  Congress,  Ex-Secretary  Mai- 
lory  writes  as  follows : 


MR.    DAVIS'    RELATIONS   WITH    CONGRESS.  601 

"  I  have  said  that  his  relations  with  members  of  Congress  were 
not  what  they  should  have  been,  nor  were  they  what  they  might 
have  been.  Towards  them,  as  towards  the  world  generally,  he  wore 
his  personal  opinions  very  openly.  Position  and  opportunity  pre 
sented  him  every  means  of  cultivating  the  personal  good-will  of 
members  by  little  acts  of  attention,  courtesy,  or  deference,  which 
no  man,  however  high  in  his  position,  who  has  to  work  by  means 
of  his  fellows,  can  dispense  with.  Great  minds  can.  in  spite  of 
the  absence  of  these  demonstrations  towards  them  in  a  leader — 
nay,  in  the  face  of  neglect  or  apparent  disrespect — go  on  steadily 
and  bravely,  with  a  single  eye  to  the  public  welfare ;  but  the 
number  of  these  in  comparison  to  those  who  are  more  or  less 
governed  by  personal  considerations  in  the  discharge  of  their 
public  duties  is  small.  While  he  was  ever  frank  and  cordial  to 
his  friends,  and  to  all  whom  he  believed  to  be  embarked  heart 
and  soul  in  the  cause  of  Southern  independence,,  he  would  not, 
and,  we  think,  could  not,  sacrifice  a  smile,  an  inflection  of  the 
voice,  or  a  demonstration  of  attention  to  flatter  the  self-love  of 
any  man,  in  or  out  of  Congress,  who  did  not  stand  in  this  relation. 
Acting  himself  for  the  public  welfare,  regardless  of  self  or  the  opin 
ions  of  others,  he  placed  too  light  a  value  upon  the  thousand  nameless 
influences  by  which  he  might  have  brought  others  up,  apparently, 
to  his  own  high  moral  standard.  By  members  of  Congress,  who 
had  to  see  him  on  business,  his  reception  of  them  was  frequently 
complained  of  as  ungracious.  They  frequently,  in  their  anxiety 
amidst  public  disaster,  called  upon  him  to  urge  plans,  suggestions, 
or  views  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  or  for  the  attainment  of  peace, 
and  often  pressed  matters  upon  him  which  he  had  very  carefully 
considered,  and  for  which  he  alone  was  responsible. 

"  Often,  in  such  cases,  though  he  listened  to  all  they  had  to  say — 
why,  for  example,  some  man  should  be  made  a  brigadier,  major 
or  lieutenant-general,  or  placed  at  the  head  of  an  army,  etc. — and 
in  return  calmly  and  precisely  stated  his  reasons  against  the 


602  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

measure,  lie  at  times  failed  to  satisfy  or  convince  them,  simply 
because,  in  his  manner  and  language  combined,  there  was  just  an 
indescribable  something  which  offended  their  self-esteem.  Some 
of  his  best  friends  left  him  at  times  with  feelings  bordering 
closely  upon  anger  from  this  cause,  and  with  a  determination, 
hastily  formed,  of  calling  no  more  upon  him ;  and  some  of  the 
most  sensible  and  patriotic  men  of  both  Houses  were  alienated 
from  him  more  or  less  from  this  cause.  The  counsel  of  judicious 
friends  upon  this  subject,  and  as  to  more  unrestrained  intercourse 
between  him  and  the  members  of  the  Senate  and  the  House,  was 
vainly  e-xerted.  His  manly,  fearless,  true,  and  noble  nature  turned 
from  what  to  him  wore  the  faintest  approach  to  seeking  popularity, 
and  he  scorned  to  believe  it  necessary  to  coax  men  to  do  their 
duty  to  their  country  in  her  darkest  hour  of  need." 

When  Congress  assembled  in  November  it  was  plain  that 
the  army  must  have  other  means  of  recruiting  than  from  the 
remnant  yet  left  by  the  conscription.  There  was  but  one 
measure  by  which  the  requisite  numbers  could  be  supplied, 
and  that  was  the  extension  of  the  conscription  to  the  slave 
population.  Public  sentiment  was  at  first  much  divided  upon 
this  subject,  but  gradually  the  propriety  of  the  measure  was 
made  evident,  and  something  like  a  renewal  of  hope  was  man 
ifested  at  the  prospect  of  making  use  of  an  element  which  the 
enemy  so  efficiently  employed.  President  Davis  had,  for  months 
previous,  contemplated  the  enlistment  of  the  slaves  for  service 
in  various  capacities  in  the  field.  In  the  last  winter  of  the 
war  he  strongly  urged  a  negro  enrollment,  as  did  General  Lee, 
whose  letter  to  a  member  of  Congress  eventually  convinced  the 
country  of  its  necessity. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  merits  of  the  proposition  to 
arm  the  slaves,  as  a  means  of  renovating  the  military  condition 


VACILLATING   COURSE   OF   CONGRESS.  603 

of  the  Confederacy,  the  dilatory  action  of  Congress  left  no  hope 
of  its  practical  execution.  The  discussion  upon  this  subject 
continued  during  the  entire  session,  and  was  at  last  terminated 
by  the  adoption  of  a  bill  providing  for  the  reception  of  such 
slaves  into  the  service  as  might  be  tendered  by  their  masters. 
Mr.  Davis  and  General  Lee  both  advocated  the  extension  of 
freedom  to  such  of  the  slaves  as  would  volunteer,  and  this  was 
clearly  the  only  system  of  enrollment  upon  which  they  could 
be  efficiently  employed.  But  even  though  the  slave-holding 
interest  had  not  thus  emasculated  the  measure,  by  refusing 
emancipation,  it  was  too  late  to  hope  for  any  results  of  impor 
tance.  The  bill  was  not  passed  until  three  weeks  before  the 
fall  of  Richmond. 

But  Congress  found  congenial  employment  in  giving  vent 
to  its  partisan  malignity,  by  the  adoption  of  measures  plainly 
designed  to  humiliate  the  Executive,  and  with  no  expectation 
of  improving  the  condition  of  the  Confederacy,  which  most 
of  its  members  believed  to  be  already  beyond  reclamation. 
In  this  spirit  was  dictated  the  measure  making  General  Lee 
virtually  a  military  dictator,  and  that  expressing  want  of  con 
fidence  in  the  cabinet.  All  of  this  action  of  Congress  was 
extra-official,  and  subversive  of  the  constitutional  authority 
of  the  Executive,  but  it  utterly  failed  in  its  obvious  design. 

President  Davis  never  made  a  more  noble  display  of  feeling, 
than  in  his  response  to  the  resolution  of  the  Virginia  Legisla 
ture  recommending  the  appointment  of  General  Lee  to  the 
command  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy.  Said  he :  "  The 
opinion  expressed  by  the  General  Assembly  in  regard  to  Gen 
eral  R.  E.  Lee  has  my  full  concurrence.  Virginia  can  not 
have  a  higher  regard  for  him,  or  greater  confidence  in  his 
character  and  ability,  than  is  entertained  by  me.  When  Gen- 


604  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

eral  Lee  took  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  he 
was  in  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States 
by  my  order  of  assignment.  He  continued  in  this  general 
command,  as  well  as  in  the  immediate  command  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  as  long  as  I  could  resist  his  opinion 
that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  be  relieved  from  one  of  these 
two  duties.  Ready  as  he  has  ever  shown  himself  to  be  to  per 
form  any  service  that  I  desired  him  to  render  to  his  country, 
he  left  it  for  me  to  choose  between  his  withdrawal  from  the 
command  of  the  army  in  the  field,  and  relieving  him  of  the 
general  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States. 
It  was  only  when  satisfied  of  this  necessity  that  I  came  to  the 
conclusion  to  relieve  him  from  the  general  command,  believ 
ing  that  the  safety  of  the  capital  and  the  success  of  our  cause 
depended,  in  a  great  measure,  on  then  retaining  him  in  the 
command  in  the  field  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  On 
several  subsequent  occasions,  the  desire  on  my  part  to  enlarge 
the  sphere  of  General  Lee's  usefulness,  has  led  to  renewed 
consideration  of  the  subject,  and  he  has  always  expressed  his 
inability  to  assume  command  of  other  armies  than  those  now 
confided  to  him,  unless  relieved  of  the  immediate  command  in 
the  field  of  that  now  opposed  to  General  Grant." 

A  striking  indication  of  the  feverish  condition  of  the  pub 
lic  mind  of  both  sections,  during  the  last  winter  of  the  war, 
was  the  ready  credence  given  to  the  most  extravagant  and  ipa- 
probable  rumors.  Washington  correspondents  of  Northern 
newspapers  declared  that  the  air  of  the  Federal  capital  was 
"thick  with  rumors  of  negotiation."  At  Richmond  this  cred-  . 
ulous  disposition  was  even  more  marked.  Men  were  found  as 
late  as  the  middle  of  March,  who  believed  that  President  Da 
vis  had  actually  formed  an  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive, 


THE  "BLAIR  MISSION."  605 

with  the  French  Emperor.  In  the  month  of  January  the 
rumors  as  to  peace  negotiations  assumed  a  more  definite  shape, 
in  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Francis  P.  Blair  at  the  Confederate 
capital. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  "  Blair  mission "  and  its  sequel, 
the  Hampton  Roads  conference,  though  palpably  contemplat 
ing  only  the  discussion  of  such  mere  generalities  as  belong  to 
other  efforts  at  peace  at  different  stages  of  the  war,  and,  indeed, 
introducing  nothing  in  the  shape  of  formal  negotiation,  should 
have  been  dignified  as  a  most  important  episode.  Equally 
remarkable,  in  view  of  the  published  proceedings  of  the  Hamp 
ton  Roads  conference,  is  the  disposition  to  censure  President 
Davis  for  having  designedly  interposed  obstacles  to  the  con 
summation  of  peace.  Mr.  Blair  visited  Richmond  by  the 
permission  of  President  Lincoln,  but  without  any  official  au 
thority,  and  without  having  the  objects  of  his  mission  com 
mitted  to  paper.  In  short,  Mr.  Blair's  mission  had  no  official 
character,  and  he  came  to  Richmond  to  prevail  upon  Mr. 
Davis  to  encourage,  in  some  manner,  preliminary  steps  to 
negotiation.  In  his  interviews  with  the  Confederate  President, 
Mr.  Blair  disclaimed  the  official  countenance  of  the  Federal 
authorities  for  the  objects  of  his  visit.  It  was  known  to  the 
world,  that  Mr.  Davis,  upon  repeated  occasions,  had  avowed 
his  desire  for  peace  upon  any  terms  consistent  with  the  honor 
of  his  country,  and  that  he  would  not  present  difficulties  as 
to  forms  in  the  attainment  of  that  object,  at  this  critical  pe 
riod.  Hence,  despite  the  unauthorized  nature  of  Mr.  Blair's 
•  conciliatory  efforts,  Mr.  Davis  gave  him  a  letter,  addressed 
to  himself,  avowing  the  willingness  of  the  Confederate  authori 
ties  to  begin  negotiations,  to  send  or  receive  commissioners 
authorized  to  treat,  and  to  "renew  the  effort  to  enter  into  a 


606  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

conference,  with  a  view  to  secure  peace  between  the  two  coun 
tries." 

Mr.  Lincoln,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Blair,  acknowledged  having 
read  Mr.  Davis7  note,  and  avowed  his  readiness  to  receive  an 
agent  from  Mr.  Davis,  or  from  the  authority  resisting  the 
Federal  Government,  to  confer  with  him  informally,  with  the 
view  of  restoring  peace  to  the  people  of  aour  common  coun 
try." 

The  commissioners  appointed  by  Mr.  Davis,  after  this  notifi 
cation,  were  Vice-President  Stephens,  Senator  Hunter,  and 
Judge  Campbell.  The  conference  was  held  on  a  steamer  lying 
in  Hampton  Roads,  between  the  three  Confederate  commission 
ers  and  Messrs.  Lincoln  and  Seward.  By  both  sides  the  inter 
view  was  treated  as  informal ;  there  were  neither  notes  nor 
secretaries,  nor  did  the  interview  assume  any  other  shape  than 
an  irregular  conversation.  During  the  four  hours  of  desul 
tory  discussion,  there  was  developed  no  basis  of  negotiation, 
no  ground  of  possible  agreement.  Mr.  Lincoln  declared  that 
he  would  consent  to  no  truce  or  suspension  of  hostilities,  ex 
cept  upon  the  single  condition  of  the  disbandment  of  the  Con 
federate  forces,  and  the  submission  of  the  revolted  States  to  the 
authority  of  the  Union.  The  result  was  simply  the  assertion, 
in  a  more  arrogant  form,  of  the  Federal  ultimatum — the  un 
conditional  submission  of  the  South,  its  acquiescence  in  all  the 
unconstitutional  legislation  of  the  Federal  Congress  respecting 
slavery,  including  emancipation,  and  the  right  to  legislate  upon 
the  subject  of  the  relations  between  the  white  and  black  pop 
ulations  of  each  State.  Mr.  Lincoln,  moreover,  refused  to  treat  • 
with  the  authorities  of  the  Confederate  States,  or  with  the 
States  separately ;  declared  that  the  consequences  of  the  estab 
lishment  of  the  Federal  authority  would  have  to  be  accepted, 


THE   "  BLAIR   MISSION."  607 

and  declined  giving  any  guarantee  whatever,  except  an  in 
definite  assurance  of  a  liberal  use  of  the  pardoning  power, 
towards  those  who  were  assumed  to  have  made  themselves 
liable  to  the  pains  and  penalties  of  the  laws  of  the  United 
States. 

The  statement  of  the  Confederate  commissioners,  and  all  the 
known  facts  of  the  transaction,  demonstrate,  without  argument, 
the  injustice  of  holding  Mr.  Davis  responsible,  to  any  extent, 
for  the  results  of  the  Hampton  Roads  conference.  With  one 
voice  the  South  accepted  the  result  as  establishing  the  purpose 
of  the  Federal  Government  to  exact  "  unconditional  submis 
sion,"  as  the  only  basis  of  peace,  and  scorned  the  insolent 
demand  of  the  enemy.  If  the  South  had  shown  itself  willing 
to  accept  the  terms  of  the  Federal  Government,  or  if  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  suggested  other  propositions  than  that  of  uncon 
ditional  submission,  then  only  could  Mr.  Davis  be  charged 
with  having  presented  obstacles  to  the  termination  of  the  war. 

Nor  is  it  to  be  assumed  that  the  terms  of  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Blair,  referring  to  his  desire  for  peace  between  the  "  two  coun 
tries,"  precluded  negotiation  upon  the  basis  of  reunion.  His  lan 
guage  was  that  of  a  proper  diplomacy,  which  should  not  com 
mit  the  error  of  yielding  in  advance  to  the  demands  of  an 
enemy,  then  insolent  in  what  he  regarded  as  the  assurance  of 
certain  victory.  The  period  was  opportune  for  magnanimity 
on  the  part  of  the  North,  but  not  propitious  for  the  display  of 
over-anxious  concession  by  the  South.  Mr.  Davis  was  at  this 
time  anxious  for  propositions  from  the  Federal  Government, 
for,  while  he  had  not  despaired  of  the  Confederacy,  he  was 
deeply  impressed  with  the  increasing  obstacles  to  its  success. 
His  frequent  declaration,  at  this  time,  was :  "  I  am  solicitous 
only  for  the  good  of  the  people,  and  am  indifferent  as  to  the 


608  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

forms  by  which  the  public  interests  are  to  be  subserved." 
Indeed,  the  Federal  authorities  had  ample  assurance  that  Mr. 
Davis  would  present  any  basis  of  settlement,  which  might  be 
offered,  to  the  several  States  of  the  Confederacy  for  their  indi 
vidual  action.  Nor  did  he  doubt  the  acceptance  of  reconstruc 
tion,  without  slavery  even,  by  several  of  the  States — an  event 
which  would  have  left  the  Confederacy  too  weak  for  further 
resistance. 

In  view  of  the  consistent  record  of  Mr.  Davis,  during  the 
entire  period  of  the  war,  to  promote  the  attainment  of  peace, 
it  is  remarkable  that  there  should  ever  have  been  an  allega 
tion  of  a  contrary  disposition.  In  a  letter,  written  in  1864, 
to  Governor  Vance,  of  North  Carolina,  he  conclusively  stated 
his  course  upon  the  subject  of  peace.  Said  Mr.  Davis,  in  this 
letter: 

"  We  have  made  three  distinct  efforts  to  communicate  with  the 
authorities  at  "Washington,  and  have  been  invariably  unsuccessful. 
Commissioners  were  sent  before  hostilities  were  begun,  and  the 
Washington  Government  refused  to  receive  them  or  hear  what 
they  had  to  say.  A  second  time,  I  sent  a  military  officer  with  a 
communication  addressed  by  myself  to  President  Lincoln.  The 
letter  was  received  by  General  Scott,  who  did  not  permit  the  offi 
cer  to  see  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  promised  that  an  answer  would  be 
sent.  No  answer  has  ever  been  received.  The  third  time,  a  few 
months  ago,  a  gentleman  was  sent,  whose  position,  character,  and 
reputation  were  such  as  to  ensure  his  reception,  if  the  enemy 
were  not  determined  to  receive  no  proposals  whatever  from  the 
Government.  Vice-President  Stephens  made  a  patriotic  tender 
of  his  services  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  promote  the  cause 
of  humanity,  and,  although  little  belief  was  entertained  of  his  suc- 
'  cess,  I  cheerfully  yielded  to  his  suggestions,  that  the  experiment 


MR.  .DAVIS'  VIEWS  AS  TO  PEACE.  609 

be  tried.  The  enemy  refused  to  let  him  pass  through 
tiieir  lines  or  hold  any  conference  with  them.  He  was  stopped 
before  he  ever  reached  Fortress  Monroe,  on  his  way  to  Wash 
ington.  .  ... 

"  If  we  will  break  up  our  Government,  dissolve  the  Confederacy, 
disband  our  armies,  emancipate  our  slaves,  take  an  oath  of  alle 
giance,  binding  ourselves  to  obedience  to  him  and  of  disloyalty  to 
our  own  States,  he  proposes  to  pardon  us,  and  not  to  plunder  us  of 
any  thing  more  than  the  property  already  stolen  from  us,  and  such 
slaves  as  still  remain,  In  order  to  render  his  proposals  so  insulting 
as  to  secure  their  rejection,  he  joins  to  them  a  promise  to  support 
with  his  army  one-tenth  of  the  people  of  any  State  who  will  at 
tempt  to  set  up  a  government  over  the  other  nine-tenths,  thus 
seeking  to  sow  discord  and  suspicion  among  the  people  of  the  sev 
eral  States,  and  to  excite  them  to  civil  war  in  furtherance  of  his 
ends.  I  know  well  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  your  people,  if 
they  possessed  full  knowledge  of  these  facts,  to  consent  that  propo 
sals  should  now  be  made  by  us  to  those  who  control  the  Govern 
ment  at  Washington.  Your  own  well-known  devotion  to  the  great 
cause  of  liberty  and  independence,  to  w^hich  we  have  all  committed 
whatever  we  have  of  earthly  possessions,  would  induce  you  to  take 
the  lead  in  repelling  the  bare  thought  ^f  abject  submission  to  the 
enemy.  Yet  peace  on  other  terms  is  n^w  impossible." 

The  spirit  in  which  the  South  received  the  results  of  the 
Hampton  Roads  conference  is  to  be  correctly  estimated  by  the 
following  extract  from  a  Richmond  newspaper,  of  date  Feb 
ruary  15,  1865 : 

"  The  world  can  again,  for  the  hundredth  time,  see  conclusive 

evidence  in   the   history  and  sequel   of  the  '  Blair  mission,'  the 

blood-guiltiness  of  the   enemy,  and   their   responsibility   for  the 

ruin,  desolation,  and  suffering  which  have  followed,  and  will  yet 

39 


610  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

follow,  their  heartless  attempts  to  subjugate  and  destroy  an  inno 
cent  people.  The  South  again  wins  honor  from  the  good,  the 
magnanimous,  the  truly  brave  every-where  by  her  efforts  to  stop 
the  effusion  of  blood,  save  the  lives  and  the  property  of  her  own 
citizens,  and  to  stop,  too,  the  slaughter  of  the  victims  of  the 
enemy's  cruelty,  which  has  forced  or  deceived  them  into  the  ranks 
of  his  armies.  We  have  lost  nothing  by  our  efforts  in  behalf  of 
peace;  for,  waiving  all  consideration  of  the  reanimation  and  re 
union  of  our  people,  occasioned  by  Lincoln's  haughty  rejection  of 
our  commissioners,  we  have  added  new  claims  upon  the  sympathy 
and  respect  of  the  world  and  posterity,  which  will  not  fail  to  be 
remembered  to  our  honor,  in  the  history  of  this  struggle,  even 
though  we  should  finally  perish  in  it.  The  position  of  the  South 
at  this  moment  is  indeed  one  which  should  stamp  her  as  the 
champion,  not  only  of  popular  rights  and  self-government,  which 
Americans  have  so  much  cherished,  but  as  the  champion  of  the 
spirit  of  humanity  in  both  sections  :  for  it  can  not  be  supposed 
that  we  have  all  the  sorrows  as  well  as  sufferings  of  this  war  to 
endure,  and  that  there  are  no  desolate  homes,  no  widows  and  or 
phans,  no  weeds  nor  cypress  in  the  enemy's  country 

"One  fact  is  certain,  that  whatever  Seward's  design  may  have 
been,  and  whatever  its  success  may  be,  the  Confederacy  has  derived 
an  immediate  advantage  from  the  visit  of  our  commissioners  to 
Fortress  Monroe.  Nothing  could  have  so  served  to  reanimate  the 
courage  and  patriotism  of  our  people,  as  his  attempted  imposition 
of  humiliation  upon  us.  Lincoln  will  hear  no  more  talk  of 
'  peace '  and  '  negotiation '  from  the  Southern  side,  for  now  we  are 
united  as  one  man  in  the  purpose  of  self-preservation  and  venge 
ance,  and  it  may  not  be  long  before  his  people,  now  rioting  in 
excessive  exultation  over  successes  really  valueless,  and  easily 
counter-balanced  by  one  week  of  prosperous  fortune  for  the  South, 
will  tremble  at  the  manifestation  of  the  spirit  which  they  have 
aroused." 


DELUSIVE   INDICATIONS.  611 

But  the  evidences  of  popular  reanimation  in  the  South  were 
delusive.  For  a  brief  moment  there  was  a  spirit  of  fierce  and 
almost  desperate  resolution.  At  a  meeting  held  in  the  African 
church,  in  Richmond,  President  Davis  delivered  one  of  his  most 
eloquent  popular  orations,  and  the  enthusiasm  was  perhaps 
greater  than  upon  any  similar  occasion  during  the  war.  But 
popular  feeling  soon  lapsed  into  the  sullen  despondency,  from 
which  it  had  been  temporarily  aroused  by  the  unparalleled 
insult  of  the  enemy.  Yet  the  ultimatum  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and 
the  declared  will  of  the  South,  left  President  Davis  no  other 
policy  than  a  continuation  of  the  struggle,  with  a  view  to  the 
best  attainable  results.  Upon  this  course  he  was  now  fully 
resolved,  looking  to  the  future  with  serious  apprehension,  not 
altogether  unrelieved  by  hope. 

The  report  of  the  Hampton  Roads  conference  and  its  result^ 
was  made  by  President  Davis,  to  Congress,  on  the  5th  Feb 
ruary  : 

"  To  the  /Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 

of  the  Confederate  States  of  America : 

"  Having  recently  received  a  written  notification,  which  satisfied 
me  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  disposed  to  confer, 
informally,  with  unofficial  agents  that  might  be  sent  by  me,  with  a 
view  to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  requested  Hon.  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  Hon.  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  and  Hon.  John  A.  Campbell,  to 
proceed  through  our  lines,  to  hold  a  conference  with  Mr.  Lincoln, 
or  such  persons  as  he  might  depute  to  represent  him. 

"  I  herewith  submit,  for  the  information  of  Congress,  the  report 
of  the  eminent  citizens  above  named,  showing  that  the  enemy  re 
fuse  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  Confederate  States,  or  any 
one  of  them  separately,  or  to  give  our  people  any  other  terms  or 
guarantees  than  those  which  a  conqueror  may  grant,  or  permit  us 


612  LIFE  OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

to  have  peace  On  any  other  basis  than  our  unconditional  submission 
to  their  rule,  coupled  with  the  acceptance  of  their  recent  legisla 
tion,  including  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  for  the  emancipa 
tion  of  negro  slaves,  and  with  the  right,  on  the  part  of  the  Federal 
Congress,  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  the  relations  between  the 
white  and  black  population  of  each  State. 

"Such  is,  as  I  understand,  the  effect  of  the  amendment  to  the 
Constitution,  which  has  been  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 

States. 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

"  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  Feb.  5,  1865." 


"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  February  5,  1865. 
"To  the  President  of  the  Confederate.  States — 

"  SIR  :  Under  your  letter  of  appointment  of  28th  ult.,  we  pro 
ceeded  to  seek  an  informal  conference  with  Abraham  Lincoln, 
President  of  the  United  States,  upon  the  subject  mentioned  in 
your  letter. 

"The  conference  was  granted,  and  took  place  on  the  3d  inst., 
on  board  a  steamer  anchored  in  Hampton  Roads,  where  we  met 
President  Lincoln  and  Hon.  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States.  It  continued  for  several  hours,  and  was  both  full 
and  explicit. 

"  We  learned  from  them  that  the  Message  of  President  Lincoln 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  in  December  last,  explains 
clearly  and  distinctly,  his  sentiments  as  to  terms,  conditions,  and 
method  of  proceeding  by  which  peace  can  be  secured  to  the  peo 
ple,  and  we  were  not  informed  that  they  would  be  modified  or 
altered  to  obtain  that  end.  We  understood  from  him  that  no 
terms  or  proposals  of  any  treaty  or  agreement  looking  to  an  ulti 
mate  settlement  would  be  entertained  or  made  by  him  with  the 
authorities  of  the  Confederate  States,  because  that  would  be  a  rec 
ognition  of  their  existence  as  a  separate  power,  which,  under  no 


OFFICIAL  CORRESPONDENCE.  613 

circumstances,  would  be  done;  and,  for  like  reasons,  that  no  such 
terms  would  be  entertained  by  him  from  States  separately ;  that  no 
extended  truce  or  armistice,  as  at  present  advised,  would  be  granted 
or  allowed  without  satisfactory  assurance,  in  advance,  of  complete 
restoration  of  the  authority  of  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States  over  all  places  within  the  States  of  the  Confederacy ; 
that  whatever  consequences  may  follow  from  the  reestablishment 
of  that  authority  must  be  accepted,  but  the  individuals  subject  to 
pains  and  penalties,  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  might 
rely  upon  a  very  liberal  use  of  the  power  confided  to  him  to  remit 
those  pains  and  penalties  if  peace  be  restored. 

"During  the  conference  the  proposed  amendments  to  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  adopted  by  Congress  on  the  31st 
ult.,  were  brought  to  our  notice.  These  amendments  provide  that 
neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude,  except  for  crime,  should 
exist  within  the  United  States  or  any  place  within  their  jurisdic 
tion,  and  that  Congress  should  have  the  power  to  enforce  this 
amendment  by  appropriate  legislation. 

"  Of  all  the  correspondence  that  preceded  the  conference  herein 
mentioned,  and  leading  to  the  same,  you  have  heretofore  been  in 
formed.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servants, 

"ALEX.  H.  STEPHENS, 
"R.  M.  T.  HUNTER, 
«J.  A.  CAMPBELL." 


614  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 

MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EARLY  PART  OF  1865 — LAST  PHASE  OF  THE  MILI 
TARY  POLICY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY THE  PLAN   TO    CRUSH    SHERMAN CALM 

DEMEANOR   OF    PRESIDENT    DAVIS CHEERFULNESS    OF    GENERAL    LEE THE 

QUESTION  AS    TO  THE    SAFETY  OF   RICHMOND WEAKNESS    OF  GENERAL  LEfi's 

ARMY PREPARATIONS    TO    EVACUATE     RICHMOND    BEFORE     THE     CAMPAIGN 

OPENED A  NEW  BASIS  OF  HOPE WHAT  WAS  TO  BE  REASONABLY  ANTICI 
PATED THE  CONTRACTED  THEATRE  OF  WAR THE  FATAL  DISASTERS  AT 

PETERSBURG MR.  DAVIS  RECEIVES  THE  INTELLIGENCE  WHILE  IN  CHURCH 

RICHMOND  EVACUATED PRESIDENT  DAVIS  AT  DANVILLE HIS  PROCLAMATION 

SURRENDER  OF  LEE DANVILLE  EVACUATED THE  LAST  OFFICIAL  INTER 
VIEW  OF  MR.  DAVIS  WITH  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD — HIS  AR 
RIVAL  AT  CHARLOTTE INCIDENTS  AT  CHARLOTTE REJECTION  OF  THE  SHER 
MAN-JOHNSTON  SETTLEMENT MR.  DAVIS'  INTENTIONS  AFTER  THAT  EVENT 

HIS  MOVEMENTS  SOUTHWARD — INTERESTING  DETAILS — CAPTURE  OF  MR.  DA 
VIS  AND  HIS  IMPRISONMENT  AT  FORTRESS  MONROE. 

It /TILITARY  operations  in  the  first  three  months  of  1865 
-*-*•*-  tended  to  the  concentration  of  forces  upon  the  greatly-re 
duced  theatre  of  war,  which  was  now  confined  mainly  to  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina.  The  developments  of  each  day  indicated 
the  near  approach  of  critical  and  decisive  events.  With  Sher 
man  sweeping  through  the  Carolinas,  and  the  Confederate 
forces  retiring  before  him ;  with  Wilmington,  the  last  port  of 
the  Confederacy,  captured,  and  a  new  base  thus  secured  for  a 
column  auxiliary  to  Sherman,  it  was  evident  that  but  a  short 
time  would  develope  a  grand  struggle,  which  should  not  only 
decide  the  fate  of  Richmond,  but  which  should  involve  nearly 
the  entire  force  at  the  command  of  the  Confederacy « 


•V 

CONFEDERATE   PLANS.  615 

The  last  definite  phase  of  the  military  policy  of  the  Confed 
erate  authorities,  previous  to  the  fall  of  the  capital,  was  the 
design  of  concentration  for  the  destruction  of  Sherman,  who 
was  rapidly  approaching  the  Virginia  border.  This  would,  of 
course,  necessitate  the  abandonment  of  Richmond,  with  a  view 
to  the  junction  of  the  armies  of  Lee  and  Johnston.  The  latter 
officer,  with  the  remnant  of  Hood's  army,  and  other  fragment 
ary  commands,  confronted  Sherman's  army — forty  thousand 
strong — with  a  force  of  about  twenty-five  thousand  men. 
When  Lee's  army  should  unite  with  Johnston's,  the  Confed 
erate  strength  would  approximate  sixty  thousand — a  force 
ample  to  overwhelm  Sherman. 

The  success  of  this  design  was  mainly  dependent  upon  the 
question  of  the  time  of  its  execution.  If  the  concentration 
against  Sherman  should  be  attempted  prematurely,  that  Fed 
eral  commander  would  be  warned  of  his  danger  in  time  to 
escape  to  the  coast,  or  to  retire  until  reinforcements  from 
Grant  should  reach  him.  It  was  thus  highly  important  that 
Sherman  should  advance  sufficiently  far  to  preclude  his  safe 
retreat,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  distance  between  Lee  and 
Johnston  should  be  shortened.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
concentration  should  be  delayed  too  long,  General  Grant  might, 
by  a  vigorous  assault  upon  Lee,  either  hold  the  latter  in  his 
works  at  Petersburg,  or  cut  off  his  retreat,  either  of  which 
events  would  defeat  the  proposed  concentration.  In  the  se 
quel,  the  activity  of  Grant,  his  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
the  timely  arrival  of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  after  the  latter  had 
feiled  in  his  original  design  against  Lynchburg  and  the  Con 
federate  communications,  precipitated  a  catastrophe,  which  not 
only  prevented  the  consummation  of  this  design,  but  speedily 
proved  fatal  to  the  Confederacy. 


-f- 


LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


There  was  nothing  in  the  calm  exterior  of  President  Davis, 
during  the  days  of  early  spring,  to  indicate  that  he  was  then 
meditating  an  abandonment  of  that  capital,  for  the  safety  of 
which  he  had  striven  during  four  years  of  solicitude,  and  in 
the  defense  of  which  the  flower  of  Southern  chivalry  had  been 
sacrificed.  There  was  no  abatement  of  that  self-possession, 
which  had  so  often  proven  invulnerable  to  the  most  trying  ex 
igencies  ;  no  alteration  of  that  commanding  mien,  so  typical  of 
resolution  and  self-reliance.  To  the  despondent  citizens  of 
Richmond,  there  was  something  of  re-assurance  in  the  firm  and 
elastic  step  of  their  President,  as  he  walked,  usually  unattended, 
through  the  Capitol  Square  to  his  office.  His  responses  to  the 
respectful  salutations  of  the  children,  who  never  failed  to  testify 
their  affection  for  him,  were  as  genial  and  playful  as  ever,  and 
the  slaves  still  boasted  of  the  cordiality  with  which  he  ac 
knowledged  their  civility. 

A  similar  cheerfulness  was  observed  in  General  Lee.  In 
the  last  months  of  the  war,  it  was  a  frequent  observation  that 
General  Lee  appeared  more  cheerful  in  manner  than  upon 
many  occasions,  when  his  army  was  engaged  in  its  most  suc 
cessful  campaigns.  Hon.  William  C.  Rives  was  quoted  in  the 
Confederate  Congress,  as  having  said  that  General  Lee  "  had 
but  a  single  thing  to  fear,  and  that  was  the  spreading  of  a 
causeless  despondency  among  the  people.  Prevent  this,  and 
all  will  be  well.  We  have  strength  enough  left  to  win  our 
independence,  and  we  are  certain  to  win  it,  if  people  do  not 
give  way  to  foolish  despair." 

From  the  beginning  of  winter,  the  possibility  of  holding 
Richmond  was  a  matter  of  grave  doubt  to  President  Davis. 
He  had  announced  to  the  Confederate  Congress  that  the  cap 
ital  was  now  menaced  by  greater  perils  than  ever.  Yet  a 


PREPARATIONS   TO   EVACUATE   RICHMOND.  617 

proper  consideration  of  the  moral  consequences  of  a  loss  of  the 
capital,  not  less  than  of  the  material  injury  which  must  result 
from  the  loss  of  the  manufacturing  facilities  of  Richmond,  dic 
tated  the  contemplation  of  its  evacuation  only  as  a  measure 
of  necessity.  When,  however,  the  dilatory  and  vacillating  ac 
tion  of  Congress  baffled  the  President  in  all  his  vigorous  and 
timely  measures,  there  was  hardly  room  to  doubt  that  the  al 
ternative  was  forced  upon  General  Lee  of  an  early  retreat  or 
an  eventual  surrender.  When  spring  opened,  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  was  reduced  to  less  than  thirty-five  thou 
sand  men.  With  this  inadequate  force,  General  Lee  was  hold 
ing  a  line  of  forty  miles,  against  an  army  nearly  one  hundred 
and  seventy-five  thousand  strong.  A  prompt  conscription  of 
the  slaves,  upon  the  basis  of  emancipation,  the  President  and 
General  Lee  believed  would  have  put  at  rest  all  anxiety  for 
the  safety  of  Richmond.  But  when  the  threadbare  discus 
sions  and  timid  spirit  of  Congress  foretold  the  failure  of  this 
measure,  preparations  were  quietly  begun  for  a  retirement  to 
an  interior  line  of  defense. 

These  preparations  were  commenced  early  in  February,  and 
were  conducted  with  great  caution.  Mr.  Davis  did  not  believe 
that  the  capture  of  Richmond  entailed  the  loss  of  the  Confed 
erate  cause  should  Lee's  and  Johnston's  armies  remain  intact. 
That  it  diminished  the  probability  of  ultimate  success  was  ob 
vious,  but  there  was  the  anticipation  of  a  new  basis  of  hope, 
in  events  not  improbable,  could  Lee's  army  be  successfully 
carried  from  Petersburg.  A  thorough  defeat  of  Sherman 
would  obviously  recover  at  once  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia, 
and  give  to  the  Confederacy  a  more  enlarged  jurisdiction  and 
more  easy  subsistence,  than  it  had  controlled  for  more  than  a 
year.  A  reasonable  anticipation  was  the  re-awakening  of  the 


618  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

patriotic  spirit  of  the  people,  and  the  return  of  thousands  of 
absentees  to  the  army,  as  the  immediate  results  of  a  decisive 
defeat  of  Sherman.  Then,  even  if  it  should  prove  that  the 
Confederacy  could  not  cope  with  the  remaining  armies  of  the 
enemy,  it  was  confidently  believed  that  the  North,  rather  than 
endure  the  sacrifices  and  doubts  of  another  campaign,  would 
offer  some  terms  not  inconsistent  with  the  honor  of  the  South 
to  accept.  At  all  events,  resistance  must  continue  until  the 
enemy  abated  his  haughty  demand  of  unconditional  submis 
sion. 

The  movements  of  Sherman  and  Johnston  reduced  the  the 
atre  upon  which  the  crisis  was  enacting  to  very  contracted 
limits.  The  fate  of  the  Confederacy  was  to  be  decided  in  the 
district  between  the  Roanoke  and  James  Rivers,  and  the  At 
lantic  Ocean  and  the  Alleghanies.  General  Grant,  fully  ap 
prised  of  the  extremities  to  which  Lee  was  reduced,  for  weeks 
kept  his  army  in  readiness  to  intercept  the  Confederate  re 
treat.  It  was  greatly  to  the  interest  of  the  Federal  com 
mander  that  Lee  should  be  held  at  Petersburg,  since  his  su 
perior  numbers  must  eventually  give  him  possession  of  the 
Southside  Railroad,  which  was  vital  to  Lee  not  only  as  a 
means  of  subsistence,  but  as  an  avenue  of  escape.  But  Gen 
eral  Grant,  sooner  than  he  anticipated,  found  an  opportunity 
for  a  successful  detachment  of  a  competent  force  against  the 
Southside  Railroad  by  the  arrival  of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  ten 
thousand  strong — as  splendid  a  body  of  cavalry  as  ever  took 
the  field.  The  swollen  condition  of  James  River  had  pre 
vented  the  consummation  of  Sheridan's  original  mission,  which 
was,  after  he  had  effectually  destroyed  all  Lee's  communica 
tions  northward  and  westward,  to  capture  Lynchburg,  and 
thence  to  pass  rapidly  southward  to  Sherman.  Finding  the 


619 

river  impassable,  Sheridan  retired  in  the  direction  of  Rich 
mond,  passed  Lee's  left  wing,  crossed  the  Pamunkey  River, 
and,  by  the  25th  of  March,  had  joined  Grant  before  Peters 
burg.  General  Grant  was  not  slow  in  the  employment  of  this 
timely  accession. 

The  fatal  disaster  of  Lee's  defeat  at  Petersburg  was  the 
battle  of  Five  Forks,  on  the  1st  of  April,  by  which  the  enemy 
secured  the  direct  line  of  retreat  to  Danville.  For,  without 
that  event,  the  fate  of  Petersburg  and  Richmond  was  deter 
mined  by  the  result  of  Grant's  attack  upon  the  Confederate 
centre  on  the  2d  of  April.  "With  all  the  roads  on  the  south 
ern  bank  of  the  Appomattox  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy, 
there  remained  only  the  line  of  retreat  upon  the  northern  side, 
which  was  the  longer  route,  while  the  pursuing  enemy  had  all 
the  advantage  of  the  interior  line.  But  for  that  disadvantage, 
Lee's  escape  would  have  been  assured,  and  the  Confederate 
line  of  defense  reestablished  near  the  Roanoke  River. 

President  Davis  received  the  intelligence  of  the  disasters 
while  seated  in  his  pew  in  St.  Paul's  Church,  where  he  had 
been  a  communicant  for  nearly  three  years.  The  momentous 
intelligence  was  conveyed  to  him  by  a  brief  note  from  the 
"War  Department.  General  Lee's  dispatch  stated  that  his  lines 
had  been  broken,  and  that  all  efforts  to  restore  them  had 
proven  unsuccessful.  He  advised  preparations  for  the  evacu 
ation  of  the  city  during  the  night,  unless,  in  the  meantime, 
he  should  advise  to  the  contrary.  Mr.  Davis  immediately  left 
the  church  with  his  usual  calm  manner  and  measured  tread.* 
The  tranquil  demeanor  of  the  President  conveyed  no  indica- 

*  The  author  has  seen  an  absurd  statement,  made  without  any  inquiry 
into  the  facts,  that  Mr.  Davis  was  seen  to  turn  "ghastly  white"  at  the 
moment  of  receiving  the  intelligence  of  the  disaster  at  Petersburg.  It  is 


620  LIFE  OF  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

tion  of  the  nature  of  the  communication.  But  the  incident 
was  an  unusual  one,  and,  by  the  congregation,  most  of  whom 
had  for  days  been  burdened  with  the  anticipations  of  disaster, 
the  unspoken  intelligence  was,  to  some  extent,  correctly  in 
terpreted. 

The  family  of  Mr.  Davis  had  been  sent  southward  some  days 
before,  and  he  was,  therefore,  under  the  necessity  of  little  prepa 
ration  for  departure.  Though  his  concern  was  obvious,  his  calm 
ness  was  remarkable.  In  this  trying  exigency  in  his  personal 
fortunes,  he  showed  anxiety  only  for  the  fate  of  the  country, 
and  sympathy  for  that  devoted  community  from  which  he  was 
now  compelled  to  separate 

On  the  night  of  Sunday,  April  2d,  1865,  Mr.  Davis,  at 
tended  by  his  personal  staff,  members  of  his  cabinet,  and 
attaches  of  the  several  departments,  left  Richmond,  which 
then  ceased  forever  to  be  the  capital  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy.  In  a  few  hours  after,  that  city,  whose  defense  will  be 
more  famous  than  that  of  Saragossa,  whose  capture  was  for 
four  years  the  aspiration  of  armies  aggregating  more  than  a 
million  of  men,  became  the  spoil  of  a  conqueror,  and  the 
scene  of  a  conflagration,  in  which  "  all  the  hopes  of  the  South 
ern  Confederacy  were  consumed  in  one  day,  as  a  scroll  in  the 
fire." 

In  accordance  with  his  original  design  of  making  a  new 
defensive  line  near  the  Roanoke  River,  Mr.  Davis  proceeded 

simply  one  of  a  thousand  other  reckless  calumnies,  with  as  little  founda 
tion  as  the  rest. 

We  do  not  feel  called  upon  here  to  relate  the  details  of  the  evacuation 
of  Richmond  and  the  occupation  of  the  city  by  the  Federal  army.  They 
are,  doubtless,  known  to  every  intelligent  reader,  and  we  are  here  spe 
cially  concerned  only  in  the  movements  of  Mr.  Davis. 


PKOCLAMATION.  621 

directly  to  Danville.  His  determination  was  to  maintain  the 
Confederate  authority  upon  the  soil  of  Virginia,  until  driven 
from  it  by  force  of  arms.  Reaching  Danville  on  the  3d  of 
April,  he  issued,  two  days  afterwards,  the  following  proclama 
tion: 

"DANVILLE,  VA.,  April  5,  1865. 

"  The  General-in-Chief  found  it  necessary  to  make  such  move 
ments  of  his  troops  as  to  uncover  the  capital.  It  would  be  un 
wise  to  conceal  the  moral  and  material  injury  to  our  cause  result 
ing  from  the  occupation  of  our  capital  by  the  enemy.  It  is  equally 
unwise  and  unworthy  of  us  to  allow  our  own  energies  to  falter, 
and  our  efforts  to  become  relaxed  under  reverses,  however  calami 
tous  they  may  be.  For  many  months  the  largest  and  finest  army 
of  the  Confederacy,  under  a  leader  whose  presence  inspires  equal 
confidence  in  the  troops  and  the  people,  has  been  greatly  tram 
meled  by  the  necessity  of  keeping  constant  watch  over  the  ap 
proaches  to  the  capital,  and  has  thus  been  forced  to  forego  more 
than  one  opportunity  for  promising  enterprise.  It  is  for  us,  my 
countrymen,  to  show  by  our  bearing  under  reverses,  how  wretched 
has  been  the  self-deception  of  those  who  have  believed  us  less 
able  to  endure  misfortune  with  fortitude  than  to  encounter  danger 
with  courage. 

"  We  have  now  entered  upon  a  new  phase  of  the  struggle.  Re 
lieved  from  the  necessity  of  guarding  particular  points,  our  army 
will  be  free  to  move  from  point  to  point,  to  strike  the  enemy  in 
detail  far  from  his  base.  Let  us  but  will  it,  and  we  are  free. 

"  Animated  by  that  confidence  in  your  spirit  and  fortitude  which 
never  yet  failed  me,  I  announce  to  you,  fellow-countrymen,  that 
it  is  my  purpose  to  maintain  your  cause  with  my  whole  heart  and 
soul ;  that  I  will  never  consent  to  abandon  to  the  enemy  one  foot 
of  the  soil  of  any  of  the  States  of  the  Confederacy ;  that  Virginia — 
noble  State — whose  ancient  renown  has  been  eclipsed  by  her  still 


622  LIFE   OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

more  glorious  recent  history ;  whose  bosom  has  been  bared  to  re 
ceive  the  main  shock  of  this  war;  whose  sons  and  daughters  have 
exhibited  heroism  so  sublime  as  to  render  her  illustrious  in  all 
time  to  come — that  Virginia,  with  the  help  of  the  people,  and  by 
the  blessing  of  Providence,  shall  be  held  and  defended,  and  no 
peace  ever  be  made  with  the  infamous  invaders  of  her  terri 
tory. 

"  If,  by  the  stress  of  numbers,  we  should  be  compelled  to  a  tem 
porary  withdrawal  from  her  limits,  or  those  of  any  other  border 
State,  we  will  return  until  the  baffled  and  exhausted  enemy  shall 
abandon  in  despair  his  endless  and  impossible  task  of  making 
slaves  of  a  people  resolved  to  be  free. 

"  Let  us,  then,  not  despond,  my  countrymen,  but,  relying  on  God, 
meet  the  foe  with  fresh  defiance,  and  with  unconquered  and  uncon 
querable  hearts. 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS.'* 

Meanwhile,  some  semblance  of  order  in  several  of  the  de 
partments  of  government  was  established,  though,  of  course, 
the  continued  occupation  of  Danville  was  dependent  upon  the 
safety  of  Lee's  army.  Days  of  anxious  suspense,  during  which 
there  was  no  intelligence  from  Lee,  were  passed,  until  on  Mon 
day,  the  10th  of  April,  it  was  announced  that  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  had  surrendered. 

Leaving  Danville,  Mr.  Davis  and  his  party  went  by  railroad 
to  Greensboro',  North  Carolina.  Here  Mr.  Davis  met  Gen 
erals  Johnston  and  Beauregard.  Consultation  with  these  two 
officers  soon  revealed  to  Mr.  Davis  their  convictions  of  the 
hopelessness  of  a  farther  protraction  of  the  struggle. 

Ex-Secretary  Mallory  gives  the  following  narrative  of  the 
last  official  interview  of  President  Davis  with  Generals  John 
ston  and  Beauregard: 


DAVIS*    INTERVIEW    WITH    JOHNSTON.  623 

"At  8  o'clock  that  evening  the  cabinet,  with  the  exception  of 
Mr.  Trenholm,  whose  illness  prevented  his  attendance,  joined  the 
President  at  his  room.  It  was  a  small  apartment,  some  twelve  by 
sixteen  feet,  containing  a  bed,  a  few  chairs,  and  a  table,  with  writ 
ing  materials,  on  the  second  floor  of  the  small  dwelling  of  Mrs. 
John  Taylor  Wood ;  and  a  few  minutes  after  eight  the  two 
generals  entered. 

"The  uniform  habit  of  President  Davis,  in  cabinet  meetings, 
was  to  consume  some  little  time  in  general  conversation  before 
entering  upon  the  business  of  the  occasion,  not  unfrequently  in 
troducing  some  anecdote  or  interesting  episode,  generally  some 
reminiscence  of  the  early  life  of  himself  or  others  in  the  army, 
the  Mexican  war,  or  his  Washington  experiences ;  and  his  manner 
of  relating  and  his  application  of  them  were  at  all  times  very 
happy  and  pleasing. 

"  Few  men  seized  more  readily  upon  the  sprightly  aspects  of  any 
transaction,  or  turned  them  to  better  account;  and  his  powers  of 
mimicry,  whenever  he  condescended  to  exercise  them,  were  irre 
sistible.  Upon  this  occasion,  at  a  time  when  the  cause  of  the 
Confederacy  was  hopeless,  when  its  soldiers  were  throwing  away 
their  arms  and  flying  to  their  homes,  when  its  Government, 
stripped  of  nearly  all  power,  could  not  hope  to  exist  beyond  a 
few  days  more,  and  when  the  enemy,  more  powerful  and  exultant 
than  ever,  was  advancing  upon  all  sides,  true  to  his  habit,  he  in 
troduced  several  subjects  of  conversation,  not  connected  with  the 
condition  of  the  country,  and  discussed  them  as  if  at  some  pleasant 
ordinary  meeting.  After  a  brief  time  thus  spent,  turning  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  he  said,  in  his  usual  quiet,  grave  way,  when  enter 
ing  upon  matters  of  business :  '  I  have  requested  you  and  General 
Beauregard,  General  Johnston,  to  join  us  this  evening,  that  we 
might  have  the  benefit  of  your  views  upon  the  situation  of  the 
country.  Of  course,  we  all  feel  the  magnitude  of  the  moment. 
Our  late  disasters  are  terrible,  but  I  do  not  think  we  should  regard 


624  LIFE  OF  JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

them  as  fatal.  I  think  we  can  whip  the  enemy  yet,  if  our  people 
will  turn  out.  We  must  look  at  matters  calmly,  however,  and  see 
what  is  left  for  us  to  do.  Whatever  can  be  done  must  be  done  at 
once.  We  have  not  a  day  to  lose.'  A  pause  ensued,  General 
Johnston  not  seeming  to  deem  himself  expected  to  speak,  when 
the  President  said :  '  We  should  like  to  hear  your  views,  General 
Johnston.'  Upon  this  the  General,  without  preface  or  introduc 
tion — his  words  translating  the  expression  which  his  face  had  worn 
since  he  entered  the  room — said,  in  his  terse,  concise,  demonstrative 
way,  as  if  seeking  to  condense  thoughts  that  were  crowding  for 
utterance  :  '  My  views  are,  sir,  that  our  people  are  tired  of  the  war, 
feel  themselves  whipped,  and  will  not  fight.  Our  country  is  over 
run,  its  military  resources  greatly  diminished,  while  the  enemy's 
military  power  and  resources  were  never  greater,  and  may  be  in 
creased  to  any  desired  extent.  We  can  not  place  another  large 
army  in  the  field;  and,  cut  off  as  we  are  from  foreign  intercourse, 
I  do  not  see  how  we  could  maintain  it  in  fighting  condition  if  we 
had  it.  My  men  are  daily  deserting  in  large  numbers,  and  are 
taking  my  artillery  teams  to  aid  their  escape  to  their  homes. 
Since  Lee's  defeat  they  regard  the  war  as  at  an  end.  If  I  march 
out  of  North  Carolina,  her  people  will  all  leave  my  ranks.  It  will 
be  the  same  as  I  proceed  south  through  South  Carolina  and  Georgia, 
and  I  shall  expect  to  retain  no  man  beyond  the  by-road  or  cow- 
path  that  leads  to  his  house.  My  small  force  is  melting  away  like 
snow  before  the  sun,  and  I  am  hopeless  of  recruiting  it.  We  may, 
perhaps,  obtain  terms  which  we  ought  to  accept.' 

"The  tone  and  manner,  almost  spiteful,  in  which  the  General 
jerked  out  these  brief,  decisive  sentences,  pausing  at  every  para 
graph,  left  no  doubt  as  to  his  own  convictions.  When  he  ceased 
speaking,  whatever  was  thought  of  his  statements — and  their  im 
portance  was  fully  understood — they  elicited  neither  comment  nor 
inquiry.  The  President,  who,  during  their  delivery,  had  sat  with 
his  eyes  fixed  upon  a  scrap  of  paper  which  he  was  folding  and  re- 


D AVIS'    INTERVIEW   WITH    JOHNSTON.  625 

folding  abstractedly,  and  who  had  listened  without  a  change  of 
position  or  expression,  broke  the  silence  by  saying,  in  a  low,  even 
tone  :  '  What  do  you  say,  General  Beauregard  ?  ' 

" 1 1  concur  in  all  General  Johnston  has  said,'  he  replied. 

"  Another  silence,  more  eloquent  of  the  full  appreciation  of  the 
condition  of  the  country  than  words  could  have  been,  succeeded, 
during  which  the  President's  manner  was  unchanged. 

"  After  a  brief  pause  he  said,  without  a  variation  of  tone  or 
expression,  and  without  raising  his  eyes  from  the  slip  of  paper 
between  his  fingers :  '  Well,  General  Johnston,  what  do  you  pro 
pose?  You  speak  of  obtaining  terms.  You  know,  of  course,  that 
the  enemy  refuses  to  treat  with  us.  How  do  you  propose  to  ob 
tain  terms?' 

" '  I  think  the  opposing  Generals  in  the  field  may  arrange 
them.' 

"'Do  you  think  Sherman  will  treat  with  you?' 

"'I  have  no  reason  to  think  otherwise.  Such  a  course  would 
be  in  accordance  with  military  usage,  and  legitimate.' 

" '  We  can  easily  try  it,  sir.  If  we  can  accomplish  any  good  for 
the  country,  Heaven  knows  I  am  not  particular  as  to  forms.  How 
will  you  reach  Sherman?' 

"  *  I  would  address  him  a  brief  note,  proposing  an  interview  to 
arrange  terms  of  surrender  and  peace,  embracing,  of  course,  a  ces 
sation  of  hostilities  during  the  negotiations.' 

"  *  Well,  sir,  you  can  adopt  this  course,  though  I  confess  I  am 
not  sanguine  as  to  ultimate  results.' 

"  The  member  of  the  cabinet  before  referred  to  as  conversing 
with  General  Johnston,  and  who  was  anxious  that  his  views  should 
be  promptly  carried  out,  immediately  seated  himself  at  the  writing- 
table,  and,  taking  up  a  pen,  offered  to  act  as  the  General's  aman 
uensis.  At  the  request  of  the  latter,  however,  the  President  dic 
tated  the  letter  to  General  Sherman,  which  was  written  at  once 
upon  a  half  sheet  of  letter  folded  as  note  paper,  and  signed  by 
40 


626  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

General  Johnston,  who  took  it,  and  said  he  would  send  it  to 
General  Sherman  early  in  the  morning,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the 
conference  broke  up.  This  note,  which  was  a  brief  proposition  for 
a  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  a  conference  with  a  view  to  agree 
ing  upon  terms  of  peace,  has  been  published  with  other  letters 
which  passed  between  the  two  Generals. 

"On  or  about  the  16th  of  April,  the  President,  his  staff,  and 
cabinet  left  Greensboro'  to  proceed  still  further  south,  with  plans 
unformed,  clinging  to  the  hope  that  Johnston  and  Sherman  would 
secure  peace  and  the  quiet  of  the  country,  but  still  all  doubtful 
of  the  result,  and  still  more  doubtful  as  to  consequences  of  failure." 

Pending  the  negotiations  between  Generals  Johnston  and 
Sherman,  Mr.  Davis  was  earnestly  appealed  to  by  his  attend 
ants  to  provide  for  his  own  safety,  in  the  event  of  the  failure 
to  obtain  terms  from  Sherman.  There  would  have  been  no 
difficulty  in  his  escaping  either  across  the  Mississippi  into 
Mexico,  or  from  the  Florida  coast  to  the  West  Indies.  Ap 
parently  regardless  of  his  personal  safety,  he  was  reluctant  to 
contemplate  leaving  the  country  under  any  circumstances.  It 
is  certain  that  he  would  not  have  entertained  the  idea  of  an 
abandonment  of  any  organized  body  of  men  yet  willing  to 
continue  in  arms  for  the  cause. 

Accompanied  by  the  members  of  his  cabinet,  General  Cooper, 
and  other  officers,  some  of  whom  were  in  ambulances,  and  others 
on  horseback,  Mr.  Davis  went  from  Greensboro'  to  Lexington. 
Here  he  spent  the  night  at  the  residence  of  an  eminent  citizen 
of  North  Carolina.  Continuing  their  journey,  the  party  reached 
Charlotte  during  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  April.  At  this  place 
were  extensive  establishments  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
and  arrangements  had  already  been  made  for  the  accommoda 
tion  of  Mr.  Davis  and  his  cabinet.  During  the  day  of  his 


MR.    DAVIS   AT   CHARLOTTE.  627 

arrival  at  Charlotte,  Mr.  Davis  received  a  dispatch  from  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge — who,  in  company  with  Mr.  Reagan,  had 
returned  to  Greensboro'  to  aid  the  negotiations  between  John 
ston  and  Sherman — announcing  the  assassination  of  President 
Lincoln. 

In  connection  with  this  event,  Mr.  Mallory  writes  as  fol 
lows: 

"  To  a  friend  who  met  him  a  few  minutes  after  he  had  received 
it,  and  who  expressed  his  incredulity  as  to  its  truthfulness,  Mr. 
Davis  replied  that,  true,  it  sounded  like  a  canard,  but,  in  such  a 
condition  of  public  affairs  as  the  country  then  presented,  a  crime 
of  this  kind  might  be  perpetrated.  His  friend  remarked  that  the 
news  was  very  disastrous  for  the  South,  for  such  an  event  would 
substitute  for  the  known  humanity  and  benevolence  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln  a  feeling  of  vindictiveness  in  his  successor  and  in  Congress, 
and  that  an  attempt  would  doubtless  be  made  to  connect  the  G-ov- 
ernment  or  the  people  of  the  South  with  the  assassination.  To  this 
Mr.  Davis  replied,  sadly:  'I  certainly  have  no  special  regard  for 
Mr.  Lincoln,  but  there  are  a  great  many  men  of  whose  end  I  would 
much  rather  hear  than  his.  I  fear  it  will  be  disastrous  to  our 
people,  and  I  regret  it  deeply.'" 

Mr.  Davis  remained  at  Charlotte  nearly  a  week.  Meanwhile 
the  terms  of  agreement  between  Johnston  and  Sherman  were 
received,  and  by  Mr.  Davis  submitted  to  the  cabinet.  At  a 
meeting  of  the  cabinet,  held  on  the  morning  after  the  propo 
sitions  were  received,  the  written  opinions  of  the  various  mem 
bers  were  concurrent  in  favor  of  the  acceptance  of  the  Sher 
man-Johnston  settlement.  Three  days  afterwards,  Mr.  Davis 
was  informed  by  General  Johnston  of  the  rejection,  by  the 
Federal  Government,  of  the  proposed  settlement,  and  that  he 
could  obtain  no  other  terms  than  those  accorded  by  General 


628  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

Grant  to  General  Lee.  The  surrender  of  General  Johnston 
was,  of  course,  conclusive  of  the  Confederate  cause  east  of  the 
Mississippi.  Whatever  Mr.  Davis'  hopes  might  have  been 
previous  to  that  event,  and  whatever  his  determination  had 
been  in  case  of  disapproval  by  the  Federal  Government  of 
Sherman's  course  (a  contingency  which  he  anticipated),  it  was 
plain  that  Johnston's  surrender  made  resistance  to  the  Federal 
Government  east  of  the  Mississippi  impracticable. 

Fully  recognizing  this  fact,  Mr.  Davis  was  yet  far  from  con 
templating  surrender  at  discretion.  His  hope  now  was  to  cross 
the  Mississippi,  carrying  with  him  such  bodies  of  troops  as 
were  willing  to  accompany  him;  these,  added  to  the  force  of 
Kirby  Smith,  would  make  an  army  respectable  in  numbers, 
and  occupying  a  country  of  abundant  supplies.  In  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  region  Mr.  Davis  would  have  continued  the  struggle, 
in  the  hope  of  obtaining  more  acceptable  terms  than  had  yet 
been  offered.  In  this  expectation  he  was  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  spirit  of  resistance  indicated  by  bodies  of  men  who  had 
refused  to  lay  down  their  arms  with  the  surrendered  armies 
of  Lee  and  Johnston. 

We  again  quote  from  the  account  of  Mr.  Mallory : 

"No  other  course  now  seemed  open  to  Mr.  Davis  but  to  leave 
the  country,  and  his  immediate  advisers  urged  him  to  do  so  with 
the  utmost  promptitude.  Troops  began  to  come  into  Charlotte, 
however,  escaping  from  Johnston's  surrender,  and  there  was  much 
talk  amongst  them  of  crossing  the  Mississippi,  and  continuing  the 
war.  Portions  of  Hampton's,  Debrell's,  Duke's,  and  Ferguson's 
commands  of  cavalry  were  hourly  coming  in.  They  seemed  de 
termined  to  get  across  the  river,  and  fight  it  out;  and,  wherever 
they  encountered  Mr.  Davis,  they  cheered,  and  sought  to  encour 
age  him.  It  was  evident  that  he  was  greatly  affected  by  the  con- 


629 

stancy  and  spirit  of  these  men,  and  that,  regardless  of  his  own 
safety,  his  thoughts  dwelt  upon  the  possibility  of  gathering  to 
gether  a  body  of  troops  to  make  head  against  the  foe  and  to  arouse 
the  people  to  arms. 

"His  friends,  however,  saw  the  urgent  expediency  of  getting 
further  south  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and,  after  a  week's  stay  at 
Charlotte,  they  left,  with  an  escort  of  some  two  or  three  hundred 
cavalry,  and,  two  days  afterwards,  reached  Yorkville,  South  Caro 
lina,  traveling  slowly,  and  not  at  all  like  men  escaping  from  the 
country. 

"  In  pursuing  this  route,  the  party  met,  near  the  Catawba  River, 
a  gentleman,  whose  plantation  and  homestead  lay  about  half  a  mile 
from  its  banks,  and  who  had  come  out  to  meet  Mr.  Davis,  and  to 
offer  him  the  hospitality  of  his  house. 

"His  dwelling,  beautifully  situated,  and  surrounded  by  ornate 
and  cultivated  grounds,  was  reached  about  4  o'clock  P.  M.,  and 
the  charming  lady  of  the  mansion,  with  that  earnest  sympathy  and 
generous  kindness  which  Mr.  Davis,  in  misfortune,  never  failed  to 
receive  from  Southern  women,  soon  made  every  man  of  the  party 
forget  his  cares,  and  feel,  for  a  time  at  least,  'o'er  all  the  ills 
of  life  victorious.' 

"At  Yorkville,  Colonel  Preston  and  other  gentlemen  had  arranged 
for  the  accommodation  of  Mr.  Davis  and  his  party  at  private  houses, 
and  here  they  remained  one  night  and  part  of  the  next  day. 

"A  small  cavalry  escort  scouted  extensively,  and  kept  Mr.  Davis 
advised  of  the  positions  of  the  enemy's  forces — to  avoid  which  was 
a  matter  of  some  difficulty.  With  this  view,  the  party  from  York 
ville  rode  over  to  a  point  below  Clinton,  on  the  Lawrenceville  and 
Columbus  Railroad,  and  thence  struck  off  to  Cokesboro',  on  the 
Greenville  Railroad. 

"  Here  the  party  received  the  kindest  attention  at  private  houses. 
On  the  evening  of  his  arrival,  Mr.  Davis  received  news  by  a  scout 


630  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

that  the  enemy's  cavalry,  in  considerable  force,  was  but  ten  miles 
off,  and  that  he  was  pressing  stock  upon  all  sides ;  and  it  was 
deemed  advisable  to  make  but  a  brief  stay. 

"At  2  o'clock  in  the  morning  Mr.  Davis  was  aroused  by  another 
scout,  who  declared  that  he  had  left  the  enemy  only  ten  miles  off, 
and  that  they  would  be  in  the  town  in  two  or  three  hours.  This 
intelligence  infused  energy  throughout  the  little  party.  It  was 
composed  of  men,  however,  familiar  with  real,  no  less  than  with 
rumored  perils;  men  who  had  faced  danger  in  too  many  forms  to 
be  readily  started  from  their  propriety  ;  and  preparations  were  very 
deliberately  made  with  such  force  as  could  be  mustered  to  pay  due 
honor  to  his  enterprise. 

"  Several  hours  elapsed  without  further  intelligence  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  and  at  half-past  six  in  the  morning  the  party  rode  out 
of  Cokesboro'  toward  Abbeville,  expecting  an  encounter  at  any 
moment,  but  Abbeville  was  reached  without  seeing  an  enemy. 

"  At  Abbeville  the  fragments  of  disorganized  cavalry  commands, 
which  had  thus  far  performed,  in  some  respects,  an  escort's  duty, 
were  found  to  be  reduced  to  a  handful  of  men  anxious  only  to  reach 
their  homes  as  early  as  practicable,  and  whose  services  could  not 
further  be  relied  on.  They  had  not  surrendered  nor  given  a  parole, 
but  they  regarded  the  struggle  as  terminated,  and  themselves  re 
lieved  from  further  duty  to  their  officers  or  the  Confederate*  States, 
and,  with  a  few  exceptions,  determined  to  fight  no  more.  They 
rode  in  couples  or  in  small  squads  through  the  country,  occasion 
ally  ' impressing'  mules  and  horses,  or  exchanging  their  wretched 
beasts  for  others  in  better  condition;  and,  outside  of  a  deep  and 
universal  regret  for  the  failure  of  their  cause,  usually  expressed  by 
the  remark  that  'The  old  Confederacy  has  gone  up,'  they  were  as 
gleeful  and  careless  as  boys  released  from  school.  Almost  every 
cross-road  witnessed  the  separation  of  comrades  in  arms,  who  had 
long  shared  the  perils  and  privations  of  a  terrific  struggle,  now 
seeking  their  several  homes  to  resume  their  duties  as  peaceful  citi- 


ME.  MALLORY'S  ACCOUNT.  631 

zens.  Endeared  to  each  other  by  their  ardent  love  for  a  common 
cause — a  cause  which  they  deemed  unquestionably  right  and  just, 
and  which,  surrendered  not  to  convictions  of  error,  but  to  the  logic 
of  arms,  was  still  as  true  and  just  as  ever — their  words  of  parting, 
few  and  brief,  were  words  of  warm,  fraternal  affection ;  pledges  of 
endless  regard,  and  mutual  promises  to  meet  again. 

"  From  information  gained  here,  it  was  evident  that  his  cavalry 
was  making  a  demonstration ;  but  whether  to  capture  Mr.  Davis,  or 
simply  to  expedite  his  departure  from  the  country,  could  not  be 
determined.  The  country,  or  at  least  those  familiar  with  military 
movements  at  this  period,  have  doubtless  long  since  satisfied  them 
selves  upon  this  point. 

"  To  suppose  that  Mr;  Davis  and  his  staff,  embracing  some  eight 
or  ten  gentlemen,  all  superbly  mounted,  and  with  led  horses,  could 
ride  from  Charlotte,  N.  C.,  to  Washington,  Ga.,  by  daylight,  over 
the  highroads  of  the  country,  their  coming  heralded  miles  in  ad 
vance  by  returning  Confederate  soldiers,  without  the  cognizance 
and  consent  of  the  Federal  commanders,  whose  cavalry  covered 
the  country,  would  be  to  detract  from  all  that  was  known  of  their 
activity  and  vigilance. 

"  Political  considerations,  adequate  to  account  for  this  unmolested 
progress,  may  readily  be  imagined.  Whether  they  influenced  it  is 
only  known  to  those  who  had  the  direction  of  public  affairs  at  the 
time.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  Mr.  Davis'  progress  could  not  well 
have  been  more  public  and  conspicuous. 

"  Mr.  Davis,  who  was  more  generally  known  by  the  soldiers  than 
any  other  man  in  the  Confederacy,  was  never  passed  by  them  with 
out  a  cheer,  or  some  warm  or  kindly  recognition  or  mark  of  respect. 
The  fallen  chief  of  a  cause  for  which  they  had  risked  their  lives 
and  fortunes,  and  lost  every  thing  but  honor,  his  presence  never 
failed  to  command  their  respect,  and  to  add  a  tone  of  sympathy  and 
sadness  to  the  expression  of  their  good  wishes  for  his  future.  They 
knew  not  his  plans  for  the  future,  nor  could  they  conjecture  what 


632  LIFE    OF  JEFFERSON    DAVIS. 

fate  might  have  in  store  for  him ;  but  their  hearts  were  with  him, 
go  where  he  might. 

"  Bronzed  and  weather-beaten  veterans,  who,  when  other  hearts 
were  sore  afraid,  still  hoped  on  and  fought  'while  gleamed  the 
sword  of  noble  Robert  Lee,'  grasped  his  hand,  without  the  power 
of  giving  voice  to  thoughts  which  their  tear-glistening  eyes  revealed. 
Of  such  men  were  the  great  masses  of  the  Confederate  armies  com 
posed.  Firm  and  inflexible  in  their  convictions  of  right,  and  yield 
ing  not  their  convictions,  but  their  armed  maintenance  of  them 
only,  to  the  stern  arbitrament  of  war,  they  may  be  relied  upon  to 
observe  with  inviolable  faith  every  pledge  and  duty  to  the  United 
States,  assumed  or  implied,  by  their  submission  or  parole. 

"  At  Abbeville  Mr.  Davis  was  again  urged  by  his  friends  to 
leave  the  country,  either  from  the  southern  shores  of  Florida  or 
by  crossing  the  Mississippi  and  going  to  Mexico  through  Texas; 
but  though  he  listened  quietly  to  all  they  had  to  say  upon  the 
subject,  and  seemed  to  acquiesce  in  their  views,  he  never  expressed 
a  decided  willingness  or  readiness  to  do  so. 

"  To  some  of  his  friends  it  was  apparent  that  his  capture  was  not 
specially  sought  by  the  military  authorities,  and  that  he  had  but  to 
change  his  dress  and  his  horse,  and  to  travel  with  a  single  friend, 
to  pass  unrecognized  and  in  safety  to  the  sea-shore,  and  there 
embark.  Hitherto,  as  has  been  already  said,  his  coming  along  his 
selected  route  was  known  to  the  people  miles  in  advance.  Schools 
were  dismissed  that  the  children  might,  upon  the  road-side,  greet 
him.  Ladies,  with  fruits  and  flowers,  presented  with  tears  of  sym 
pathy,  were  seen  at  the  gates  of  every  homestead,  far  in  advance, 
awaiting  his  approach ;  and  it  was  hardly  supposable  that  the  gen 
eral  in  command,  whose  spies,  and  scouts,  and  cavalry  covered  the 
country,  and  were  heard  of  upon  all  sides,  was  the  only  person 
uninformed  of  Mr.  Davis'  movements. 

"  The  assertion  that  General  Sherman,  aware  of  this  journey, 
permitted  it  to  facilitate  the  departure  of  Mr.  Davis  and  his  friends 


MR.  MALLORY'S  ACCOUNT.  633 

from  the  country,  is  not  made  or  designed ;  for  it  is  possible  that 
his  capture  was  desired  and  attempted;  but  the  facts  are  matters 
of  history,  and  are  given  regardless  of  the  speculations  which  they 
may  justify. 

"  The  party  left  Abbeville  at  11  o'clock  the  same  night  for  Wash 
ington,  Georgia,  a  distance  of  some  forty-five  miles,  and  by  riding 
briskly  they  reached  the  Savannah  River  at  daylight,  crossing  it 
upon  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  rode  into  Washington  at  about  10 
o'clock  A.  M.  Just  before  leaving  Abbeville  they  learned  that  a 
body  of  Federal  cavalry  was  en  route  to  destroy  this  bridge,  and 
might  reach  it  before  them,  and  hence  they  pushed  on  vigorously, 
meeting  no  enemy,  but  delayed  about  an  hour  by  mistaking  the 
right  road. 

"  The  night  was  intensely  dark,  the  weather  stormy.  In  approach 
ing  the  bridge  through  the  river  swamp  the  guide  and  Colonel 
Preston  Johnston,  and  another  of  the  party,  rode  a  half  mile  in 
advance,  and  the  latter  encountered  a  mounted  Federal  officer. 
The  rays  of  blazing  lightwood  within  a  wood-cutter's  small  cabin 
fell  upon  him  as  he  stood  motionless  beneath  a  tree,  and  revealed 
his  water-proof  riding-coat  and  the  gold  band  upon  his  cap.  He 
hurriedly  inquired,  as  he  listened  to  the  tramp  of  the  coming 
horsemen : 

"'What  troops  are  these?' 

"'What  force  is  this?' 

"'Is  this  Jeff.  Davis'  party?' 

"'Yes,'  replied  the  party  addressed,  while  revolving  in  his  mind 
the  best  course  to  pursue,  '  this  is  Jeff.  Davis'  escort  of  five  thou 
sand  men.' 

"  The  officer  vanished  in  the  darkness,  and  no  others  were  en 
countered. 

"At  Washington  it  was  found  that  squads  of  Federal  cavalry 
scouts  were  there.  A  few  were  in  the  town  at  the  time,  and  Mr. 
Davis  was  again  urged  to  consult  his  safety.  His  family  and  serv- 


634  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

ants,  with  a  small  train  of  ambulances,  accompanied  by  his  private 
Secretary,  Mr.  Burton  Harrison,  had  passed  through  Washington 
twenty-four  hours  before,  and  the  enemy  then  only  some  twenty 
miles  distant,  and  Mr.  Davis  ascertained  that  he  might  readily 
overtake  them ;  and  before  adopting  any  plan  to  leave  the  country, 
he  desired  to  see  and  confer  with  them. 

"  On  the  following  morning,  with  his  party  somewhat  reduced  in 
numbers,  he  left  Washington  and  joined  his  family. 

"  The  circumstance  of  the  capture  of  Mr.  Davis,  as  given  offi 
cially  by  General  Wilson,  were  in  harmony  with  that  system  of 
misrepresentation  by  which  the  popular  mind  was  perverted  as  to 
all  he  said,  and  did,  and  designed.  His  alleged  attempt  to  escape, 
disguised  in  female  apparel — a  naked  fiction — served  well  enough 
for  the  moment  to  gratify  and  amuse  the  popular  mind.  Barnum, 
the  showman,  true  to  his  proclivity  for  practical  falsehood,  pre 
sented  to  the  eyes  of  Broadway  a  graphic  life-size  representation 
of  Mr.  Davis,  thus  habited,  resisting  arrest  by  Federal  soldiers ; 
and  many  thousands  of  children,  whose  wondering  eyes  beheld  it 
will  grow  to  maturity  and  pass  into  the  grave,  retaining  the  ideas 
thus  created  as  the  truth  of  history.  Fortunately,  however,  his 
tory  rarely  leaves  her  verification  wholly  to  the  testimony  of  envy, 
hatred,  malice,  or  falsehood,  but  contrives,  in  her  own  time  and 
method,  .ways  and  means  to  bring  truth  to  her  exposition. 

"  It  has  been  seen  that  before  the  President's  proclamation  con 
necting  him  with  the  assassination,  with  every  desired  opportunity, 
and  with  every  means  of  escape  from  the  country  at  his  command, 
Mr.  Davis  refrained  from  leaving  it;  and  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether,  in  face  of  the  charge  of  complicity  with  this  great  crime, 
any  power  on  earth  could  have  induced  him  to  leave. 

"  The  sentiment  to  which  the  noble  Clement  Clay,  of  Alabama, 
gave  utterance,  upon  learning  that  he  was  charged  as  particeps 
criminis  in  the  assassination  doubtless  actuated  Mr.  Davis.  Clay 
was  able  to  escape  from  the  country,  and  was  prepared  to  do  so; 


MR.  MALLORY'S  ACCOUNT.  635 

but  when  his  heroic  and  loveable  wife  made  known  to  him  this 
charge,  with  indignation  and  scorn  at  its  base  falsehood  breathing 
in  every  tone,  he  rose  quietly,  and  said :  '  Well,  my  dear  wife, 
that  puts  an  end  to  all  my  plans  of  leaving  the  country.  I  must 
meet  this  calumny  at  once,  and  will  go  to  Atlanta  and  surrender 
myself  and  demand  its  investigation.' 

"  Had  Mr.  Davis  left  the  country,  falsehood  and  malignity  would 
have  multiplied  asserted  proofs  of  this  black  charge  against  him ; 
and  the  shortcomings,  errors,  and  crimes,  perhaps,  of  others,  would 
have  been  conveniently  attributed  to  the  faults  of  his  head  or 
heart.  But  his  long  captivity,  his  cruel  treatment,  the  patient, 
passive  heroism  with  which,  when  powerless  otherwise,  and  strong 
only  in  honor  and  integrity,  he  met  his  fate,  have  combined,  not 
only  to  seal  the  lips  of  those  of  his  Confederate  associates  who 
had  wrongs,  real  or  fancied,  to  resent,  but  to  concentrate  upon 
him  the  heartfelt  sympathy  of  the  Southern  people,  and  no  little 
interest  and  sympathy  wherever  heroic  endurance  of  misfortune 
gains  consideration  among  men. 

"His  escape  from  the  country  and  a  secure  refuge  in  a  foreign 
land,  sustained  by  the  respect  and  affection  of  the  Southern  peo 
ple,  were  within  his  own  control ;  and  he  might  have  reasonably 
looked  forward  to  a  return  to  his  native  State,  as  a  result  of  a 
change  in  her  political  status,  at  no  distant  day.  But  he  refrained 
from  embracing  the  opportunities  of  escape  which  were  his  by  for 
tune  or  by  Federal  permission. 

"  The  suggestions  of  friends  as  to  his  personal  safety  were  heard 
with  all  due  consideration,  and  he  manifested  none  of  the  airs  of 
a  would-be  political  martyr  ;  and  yet  it  was  evident  that  captivity 
and  death  had  lost  with  him  their  terrors  in  comparison  with  the 
crushing  calamity  of  a  defeat  of  a  cause  for  whose  triumph  he  had 
been  ever  ready  to  lay  down  his  life. 

"  The  general  language  and  bearing  of  the  people  of  the  country 
through  which  he  passed,  their  ardent  loyalty  to  the  South,  their 


636  LIFE   OF   JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

profound  sorrow  at  the  failure  of  her  cause,  and  their  warm  ex 
pressions  of  regard  for  himself — all  confirmatory  of  the  conviction 
that,  notwithstanding  the  odds  against  her,  a  thorough  and  hearty 
union  of  the  people  and  leaders  would  have  secured  her  triumph, 
affected  him  deeply. 

"Throughout  his  journey  he  greatly  enjoyed  the  exercise  of  rid 
ing  and  the  open  air,  and  decidedly  preferred  the  bivouac  to  the 
bed-room  ;  and  at  such  times,  reclining  against  a  tree,  or  stretched 
upon  a  blanket,  with  his  head,  pillowed  upon  his  saddle,  and  under 
the  inspiration  of  a  good  cigar,  he  talked  very  pleasantly  of  stir 
ring  scenes  of  other  days,  and  forgot,  for  a  time,  the  engrossing 
anxieties  of  the  situation." 

The  solicitude  of  Mr.  Davis  for  the  safety  of  his  family  led 
to  his  capture.  Several  weeks  had  elapsed  since  he  had  parted 
with  them,  and  almost  the  first  positive  information  that  he 
received,  made  him  apprehensive  for  their  safety.  In  the 
then  disorganized  condition  of  the  country  through  which  he 
was  passing,  the  inducements  to  violence  and  robbery  by  des 
perate  characters  were  numerous.  Hearing  that  the  route 
which  Mrs.  Davis  was  pursuing  was  infested  by  marauders, 
he  determined  to  see  that  his  family  was  out  of  danger,  before 
putting  into  execution  his  design  of  crossing  the  Mississippi. 
While  with  his  family,  Mr.  Davis  was  surprised  by  a  body 
of  Federal  cavalry,  and  at  the  time  being  unarmed  and  unat 
tended  by  any  force  competent  for  resistance,  lie  was  made  a 
prisoner.  On  the  19th  May,  1865,  he  was  placed  in  solitary 
confinement  at  Fortress  Monroe. 


MOTIVE    OF    ME.    DAVIS*   ARKEST.  637 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

MOTIVE  OP  MR.  DAVIS'  ARREST — AN  AFTER-THOUGHT  OP  STANTON  AND  THE 
BUREAU  OF  MILITARY  JUSTICE — THE  EMBARRASSMENT  PRODUCED  BY  HIS  CAP 
TURE THE  INFAMOUS  CHARGES  AGAINST  HIM WHY  MR.  DAVIS  WAS  TREATED 

WITH    EXCEPTIONAL   CRUELTY — THE    OUTRAGES    AND    INDIGNITIES    OFFERED 
HIM — HIS  PATIENT  AND  HEROIC  ENDURANCE  OF  PERSECUTION — HIS  RELEASE 

FROM   FORTRESS    MONROE — BAILED  BY  THE    FEDERAL  COURT  AT  RICHMOND 

JOY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY — IN  CANADA — RE-APPEARANCE  BEFORE  THE  FEDERAL 
COURT — HIS  TRIAL  AGAIN  POSTPONED CONCLUSION. 

ALL  doubt  has  long  since  been  dispelled  as  to  the  motive 
of  the  pursuit  and  arrest  of  Mr.  Davis.  His  arrest  and 
imprisonment  were  the  after-thought  of  the  saturnine  Secre 
tary  of  "War,  and  his  associate  inquisitors  of  the  Bureau  of 
Military  Justice,  at  Washington.  The  details  given  by  Mr. 
Mallory,  of  the  circumstances  of  Mr.  Davis'  progress  through 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  a  part  of  Georgia,  added 
to  facts  which  are  yet  fresh  in  the  public  memory,  fully  justify 
the  conclusion  that  the  Federal  authorities  connived  at  his 
supposed  purpose  to  escape  the  country.  The  reputation  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  among  his  countrymen,  for  humanity  as  well  as 
good  sense,  renders  it  extremely  probable  that  such  would  have 
been  his  method  of  avoiding  the  perplexity  which  must  arise 
from  the  capture  of  Mr.  Davis. 

Well  understanding  that  the  inflamed  public  sentiment  of 
the  North,  regarding  Mr.  Davis  as  a  political  offender  of  the 


638  LIFE   OP  JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

worst  possible  character,  would  not  tolerate  his  immediate  re 
lease,  the  Federal  Government  would  have  served  the  ends  of 
humanity  and  sound  policy  by  encouraging  his  escape.  On 
the  other  hand  the  laws  of  the  United  States  tolerate  pro 
longed  imprisonment  only  after  trial  and  sentence.  Hence 
the  arrest  of  Mr.  Davis  must  open  an  endless  perspective  of 
embarrassments.  He  could  not  be  tried  simply  as  an  indi 
vidual,  nor  could  his  punishment  for  any  alleged  crime  of  his 
own,  be  the  sole  object  to  be  sought.  His  arraignment  before 
a  judicial  tribunal,  would  be  the  arraignment  of  the  principle 
of  State  Sovereignty,  of  the  States  which  had  sought  to  put 
that  principle  in  practice,  of  the  five  millions  of  American 
citizens  who  had  supported  it,  and  who  had  cheerfully  risked 
their  lives  and  earthly  possessions 'for  its  maintenance. 

Nay,  more,  the  trial  of  Jefferson  Davis,  upon  a  charge  of 
treason,  meant  the  trial  of  the  North  also.  Should  all  efforts 
to  convict  the  South  in  the  person  of  Mr.  Davis,  of  treason, 
fail,  the  recoil  might  well  be  dreaded  by  those  who  instigated 
the  war  upon  the  rights  and  existence  of  the  States.  It  was 
not  to  be  safely  assumed  that  the  legal  decision  of  a  constitu 
tional  question,  which  divided  the  framers  of  the  Federal  Con 
stitution,  would  necessarily  affirm  the  party  and  sectional  dog 
mas  upon  which  the  North  waged  the  war.  Should  secession 
be  legally  justified,  what  justification  could  the  North  claim, 
that  is  rightfully  denied  to  Russia  in  her  conduct  towards 
Poland?  What  plea  should  England  need  for  her  outrages 
upon  Ireland?  With  Jefferson  Davis  acquitted  of  treason, 
what  could  the  conduct  of  the  North  for  four  years  have  been, 
but  a  revelry  in  blood — the  wanton  perpetration  of  a  monstrous 
crime  ? 

In  this  dilemma  the  industry  of  the  Bureau  of  Military 


CALUMNIES.  639 

Justice,  which  afterwards  achieved  an  immortality  of  infamy, 
by  its  record  of  judicial  murders,  aided  by  the  ingenuity  of 
Stan  ton,  devised  a  scheme  for  the  arrest  of  Mr.  Davis,  upon 
charges  designed  to  cover  him  and  the  cause  which  he  repre 
sented,  with  everlasting  obloquy.  Not  content  with  having 
triumphed  by  superior  numbers,  in  a  war  of  political  opinions, 
which  in  the  beginning  was  declared  not  to  be  waged  for  social 
or  political  subversion;  not  content  with  having  settled  a 
grave  constitutional  question,  by  brute  force,  in  a  government 
founded  upon  the  idea  of  popular  consent,  the  Federal  author 
ities  were  now  made  a  party  to  infamous  falsehoods,  the  cir 
cumstances  and  results  of  which  have  fixed  a  stigma  upon  the 
American  name. 

Contemporary  with  the  announcement  of  events,  which  pro 
claimed  the  irretrievable  downfall  of  the  Confederacy,  were 
the  calumnies  of  the  Northern  press,  under  the  alleged  inspi 
ration  of  Stanton,  representing  that  Mr.  Davis  was  escaping 
with  wagons  filled  with  plunder,  and  with  the  gold  of  the 
Richmond  banks;  and  that  he  had  endeavored  to  escape  in  the 
concealment  of  female  apparel.  No  one  knew  better  than  those 
who  promulgated  this  paltry  defamation,  its  utter  falsity,  and 
we  would  not  insult  Mr.  Davis  and  the  Southern  people  by 
bestowing  consideration  upon  such  palpable  calumnies.  It 
was  not  calculated  that  such  a  portraiture  of  one,  whose  per 
sonal  honor,  courage,  and  manhood  had  triumphantly  endured 
every  test,  would  be  accepted  by  the  intelligence  even  of  the 
North.  But  it  nevertheless  had  an  obvious  purpose,  which 
was  well  answered.  It  imposed  upon  the  weak  and  credulous. 
The  besotted  and  cowardly  mobs  of  the  Northern  cities,  who 
filled  the  air  with  clamor  for  the  "  blood  of  traitors,"  while  the 
men  who  had  conquered  the  South,  were  touched  with  sym- 


640  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

pathy  for  the  misfortunes  of  foes  whom  they  respected,  of 
course  eagerly  accepted  any  caricature  of  Mr.  Davis  agreeable 
to  their  own  vulgar  imaginations.  In  this  manner  was  con 
summated  the  first  step  in  the  object  of  delaying  the  feeling 
of  personal  respect,  and  of  sympathy  for  misfortunes,  which 
eventually  assert  themselves  in  the  masses,  for  a  fallen  foe, 
whom  it  was  already  resolved  to  persecute  with  oppression 
and  cruelty  previously  unknown  under  the  American  political 
system. 

Next  came  the  atrocious  proclamation  charging  Mr.  Davis 
with  complicity  in  the  assassination  of  President  Lincoln.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  incidents  hitherto  prominent  by  their  in 
famy,  will  be  forgotten  by  history,  in  comparison  with  the 
dastardly  criminal  intent  which  instigated  that  document. 
Circumstances  warrant  the  belief  that  not  one  of  the  conspir 
ators  against  the  life  and  honor  of  Mr.  Davis,  believed  either 
then  or  now,  that  the  charge  had  one  atom  of  truth.  Had  the 
charge  been  honestly  made,  it  would  have  been  disavowed, 
when  its  falsity  became  apparent.  But  this  would  not  have 
subserved  the  end  of  the  conspirators,  and  the  poison  was  per 
mitted  to  circulate  and  rankle,  long  after  the  calumny  had 
been  exploded  during  the  investigations  of  the  military  com 
mission,  in  the  cases  of  Mrs.  Surratt  and  Captain  Wirz.  At 
length  justice  was  vindicated  by  the  publication  of  the  con 
fidential  correspondence  between  Holt  and  Conover,  which  dis 
closed  the  unparalleled  subornation  and  perjury  upon  which 
the  conspirators  relied.  Well  has  it  been  said  that  the  world 
will  yet  wonder  "  how  it  was  that  a  people,  passing  for  civil 
ized  and  Christian,  should  have  consigned  Jefferson  Davis  to 
a  cell,  while  they  tolerated  Edwin  M.  Stanton  as  a  Cabinet 
Minister." 


641 

We  have  no  desire  to  dwell  upon  the  details  of  Mr.  Davis' 
long  and  cruel  imprisonment.  The  story  is  one  over  which 
the  South  has  wept  tears  of  agony,  at  whose  recital  the  civil 
ized  world  revolted,  and  which,  in  years  to  come,  will  mantle 
with  shame  the  cheek  of  every  American  citizen  who  values 
the  good  name  of  his  country.  In  a  time  of  profound  peace, 
when  the  last  vestige  of  resistance  to  Federal  authority  had 
disappeared  in  the  South,  Mr.  Davis,  wrecked  in  fortune  and 
in  health,  in  violation  of  every  fundamental  principle  of  Amer 
ican  liberty,  of  justice  and  humanity,  was  detained  for  two 
years,  without  trial,  in  close  confinement,  and,  during  a  large 
portion  of  this  period,  treated  with  all  the  rigor  of  a  sentenced 
convict. 

But  if  indeed  Mr.  Davis  was  thus  to  be  prejudged  as  the 
" traitor "  and  "conspirator"  which  the  Stantons,  and  Holts, 
and  Forneys  declared  him  to  be,  why  should  he  be  selected 
from  the  millions  of  his  advisers  and  followers,  voluntary  par 
ticipants  in  his  assumed  "  treason/7  as  the  single  victim  of  cru 
elty,  outrage,  and  indignity?  What  is  there  in  his  antecedents 
inconsistent  with  the  character  of  a  patriotic  statesman  devoted 
to  the  promotion  of  union,  fraternity,  harmony,  and  faithful 
allegiance  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  his  country?  We 
have  endeavored  faithfully  to  trace  his  distinguished  career  as 
a  statesman  and  soldier,  and  at  no  stage  of  his  life  is  there  to 
be  found,  either  in  his  conduct  or  declared  opinions,  the  evi 
dence  of  infidelity  to  the  Union  as  its  character  and  objects 
were  revealed  to  his  understanding.  Nor  is  there  to  be  found 
in  his  personal  character  any  support  of  that  moral  turpitude 
which  a  thousand  oracles  of  falsehood  have  declared  to  have 
peculiarly  characterized  his  commission  of  "  treason." 

No  tongue  and  pen  were  more  eloquent  than  his  in  describ- 
41 


642  LIFE   OF  JEFFEKSON   DAVIS. 

ing  the  grandeur,  glory,  and  blessings  of  the  Union,  and  in 
invoking  for  its  perpetuation  the  aspirations  and  prayers  of 
his  fellow-citizens.  In  the  midst  of  passion  and  tumult,  in 
1861,  he  was  conspicuous  by  his  zeal  for  compromise,  and 
for  a  pacific  solution  of  difficulties.  No  Southern  Senator 
abandoned  his  seat  with  so  pathetic  and  regretful  an  announce 
ment  of  the  necessity  which  compelled  the  step.  The  sorrow 
ful  tone  of  his  valedictory  moistened  the  eye  of  every  listener, 
and  convinced  even  political  adversaries  of  the  sincerity  and 
purity  of  his  motives.  His  elevation  to  the  Presidency  of  the 
Confederacy  was  not  dictated  by  the  recognition  of  any  sup 
posed  title  to  leadership  in  the  secession  movement.  His  elec 
tion  was  indeed  a  triumph  over  the  extreme  sentiment  of  the 
South,  and  was  declared  by  those  who  opposed  it  to  involve 
a  compromise  of  the  exclusive  sectionalism  which  was  the 
basis  of  the  new  government.  His  administration  of  the 
Confederate  Government  exhibited  the  same  unswerving  loy 
alty  to  duty,  to  justice  and  humanity,  which  his  previous  life 
so  nobly  exemplified.  The  people  of  the  South  alone  know 
how  steadfastly  he  opposed  the  indulgence  of  vengeance ;  how 
he  strove,  until  the  last  moments  of  the  struggle,  to  restrain 
the  rancor  and  bitterness  so  naturally  engendered  under  the 
circumstances.  Yet,  when  Jefferson  Davis  lay  a  helpless  pris 
oner  in  the  strongest  fortress  of  the  Union,  with  "  broad  patches 
of  skin  abraded  "  by  the  irons  upon  his  limbs,  men  were  prac 
tically  pardoned  who  had  devoted  years  of  labor  to  the  pur 
pose  of  disunion,  and  had  reproached  him  for  not  unfurling 
the  "  black  flag."  Is  not  the  inference,  then,  justified  that  all 
of  these  tortures  and  indignities  were  aimed  at  the  people  and 
the  cause  which  his  dignity,  purity,  and  genius  had  so  exalted 
in  the  eyes  of  mankind? 


RELEASE.  643 

But  how  impotent  are  falsehood  and  malignity  to  obstruct 
the  illumination  of  truth  !  As  subornation  and  perjury  proved 
unavailing  to  convict  him  of  atrocious  guilt,  so  equally  has 
persecution  failed  to  accomplish  its  purpose.  To  all  that  shame 
ful  picture  of  barbarous  violence  and  gratuitous  insult ;  of  in 
solent  espionage  and  vulgar  curiosity  ;  of  the  illustrious  leader 
of  a  brave  people,  whose  whole  life  does  not  exhibit  one  act 
of  meanness  or  shame,  or  one  word  of  untruth,  crushed  by  dis 
aster,  and  prostrate  with  disease,  fettered  as  if  he  were  a  des 
perate  felon;  restricted  in  his  diet,  and  not  even  permitted  a 
change  of  linen,  except  by  the  authority  of  a  military  jailer ; 
an  object  of  unrelaxed  scrutiny,  often  driven  to  his  cell  by  the 
peering  curiosity  of  vulgar  men  and  unsexed  women — to  all 
this  there  was  but  one  relief — the  patient  and  constant  heroism 
of  the  sufferer,  giving  heart  to  his  despairing  countrymen,  and 
ennobling  his  own  captivity.  History  furnishes  no  similar 
instance  of  patient  and  dignified  endurance  of  adversity  and 
persecution. 

The  incidents  of  Mr.  Davis'  history  since  his  release  from 
Fortress  Monroe,  do  not  require  detailed  narration.  For  the 
most  part  they  are  confined  to  that  domain  of  privacy  which 
decency  holds  to  be  inviolable.  When  two  years — wanting  a 
few  days — from  the  date  of  his  incarceration  had  elapsed,  Mr. 
Davis  was  transferred  by  the  military  authorities  to  the  cus 
tody  of  the  Federal  civil  authorities  at  Richmond.  Here, 
amid  the  congratulations  of  friends,  and  the  rejoicings  of  the 
community,  which  loves  him  as  it  loves  but  one  other — his 
constant  friend  and  compeer  in  fame — he  was  released  from 
custody  under  circumstances  which  are  well  known.  The  in 
terval  between  his  release  in  May,  1867,  and  his  re-appear 
ance  before  the  Federal  court,  at  Richmond,  in  the  ensuing 


644  LIFE   OF   JEFFERSON   DAVIS. 

November^  was  passed  by  Mr.  Davis  in  Canada.  There  he 
was  the  recipient  of  the  respect  and  sympathy  which  his  charac 
ter  and  his  sufferings  might  have  been  expected  to  elicit  from  a 
humane  people.  At  the  November  term  of  the  Federal  court, 
Mr.  Davis  was  again  present,  with  his  eminent  counsel,  await 
ing  trial,  and  was  again  released  upon  recognizance  to  appear 
on  the  25th  March,  1868. 

In  the  face  of  the  close  proximity  of  the  event,  it  would  be 
unprofitable  to  speculate  as  to  the  sequel  of  this  third  appear 
ance  of  Jefferson  Davis  before  a  judicial  tribunal,  to  answer 
the  charge  of  treason.  Nor  do  we  propose  to  add  to  the  brief 
consideration,  which  has  already  been  given  in  this  volume, 
of  the  legal  and  historical  question  involved  in  the  case  of 
Mr.  Davis.  The  subject  has  been  exhausted.  The  masterly 
expositions  by  Mr.  Davis  of  the  theory  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  (some  of  which  we  have  given),  are  at  once  the  complete 
vindications  of  himself  and  his  countrymen,  and  the  sufficient 
monuments  of  his  fame. 

But  are  the  issues  Qf  the  war  to  be  subjected  to  candid  and 
impartial  legal  adjudication?  Will  the  North  approve  this 
raising  of  a  doubt  as  to  its  own  justification,  merely  in  the 
hope  of  vengeance  upon  one  who  is  powerless  for  injury?  But 
if  there  is  to  be  admitted  another  jurisdiction  than  that  of 
War ;  if  the  arbitrament  of  battle  is  to  be  carried  to  the  higher 
tribunal  of  Law  and  Public  Opinion ;  if  there  is  to  be  a 
trial  and  not  a  judicial  farce,  with  a  foregone  conclusion  and  a 
prejudged  sentence,  the  South  and  its  late  leader  will  not 
shrink  from  the  verdict.  Of  this,  the  world  requires  no  more 
emphatic  iteration  than  that  furnished  by  past  events. 

But  the  decision  of  this  question,  whatever  it  may  be,  can 
not  recover  the  wager  which  the  South  gallantly  staked  and 


CONCLUSION.  645 

irretrievably  lost.  Time  will  show,  however,  the  amount  of 
truth  in  the  prophecy  of  Jefferson  Davis,  made  in  reply  to  the 
remark  that  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  was  lost :  "It  ap 
pears  so.  But  the  principle  for  which  we  contended  is  bound 
to  re-assert  itself,  though  it  may  be  at  another  time  and  in  an 
other  form." 


;     VN!Vfc* 
V 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  \vhich  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


-     -:- 


• 
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21Mar&lTD 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

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(A1724slO)476B 


'C  51259 


','gm>3 ..  !• 


